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GCRI · Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience

Cloud and third parties

Organisations increasingly rely on cloud platforms, managed service providers and software vendors to run critical functions. This moves operations outside their direct control and concentrates many organisations on a few providers, so one outage or breach can affect thousands. This page sets out how third-party and cloud dependence creates risk, how it is mapped and managed, and what evidence serves the organisations and regulators involved.

01Ilaphu lokuzoba

Indlela umsebenzi oqhuba ngayo.

Iinkqubo · ezijikeleze esi sifundoNgumzekelo

Security posture and third parties

Cloud and third parties · Enterprise network · Quarter 2

Two critical suppliers unassessedGCRI · Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience

CSF profile, current vs target

tier 1 to 4

Critical suppliers

Supplier ACloud hostingEweIphakathi
Supplier BPayroll SaaSNoUnknown
Supplier CManaged SOCEweIphantsi
Supplier DIdentity providerNoUnknown

Critical vulnerabilities open

Security posture and third parties: the screen's structure, terms and states for Cloud and third parties.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.

Fig.Security posture and third parties: example names and illustrative values, not a record or a live system.

02The question

Cloud and third parties: how the risk develops.

Concentration and vendor dependency. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Indlela yokusebenza

Shared responsibility is easy to misread

Cloud providers secure their infrastructure; customers secure their configuration, data and identities. Many incidents come from customer misconfiguration.

Indlela yokusebenza

Concentration creates systemic exposure

A few providers host a large share of services. An outage in one region or a faulty update can disrupt many sectors at once.

Indlela yokusebenza

Managed providers hold the keys

Managed service providers have privileged access to many clients. Compromising one provider can reach all of them.

Indlela yokusebenza

Contracts set what is possible

Audit rights, incident notification, exit and data location depend on contracts. Weak terms leave customers unable to see or act on provider risk.

03Ijografi

Connected activity in Europe.

Night lights, population density and true-colour imagery over Europe, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.

Imephu esebenzisanayo idinga i-JavaScript; uluhlu lweeleya nemithombo zingezantsi.

Iileya 3

Connected activity, for this page

Okutsha okukhoyo

NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © abanegalelo kwi-OpenStreetMap (ODbL) · Natural Earth

Kulayishwa imifanekiso yamva nje ye-NASA.

Rhuqa ukuze uhambise. Ctrl okanye ⌘ uze ujikelezise, chophela okanye usebenzise amaqhosha ukusondeza; beka isalathisi phezu kwento ukuze ubone amaxabiso aphantsi kwaso; ukubuyisela kubuyela kummandla.

Connected activity, framed on Europe.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.

Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · NASA HLS S30Sources and licences

  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
  • VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
  • Yenziwe nge-Natural Earth. Idatha yemephu ye-vector ne-raster esimahla @ naturalearthdata.com. Yeyoluntu
  • © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
  • Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imifanekiso ivela kwi-NASA GIBS. Imibala izotywe ngokutsha ukusuka kwimephu yemibala epapashiweyo; amaxabiso afakwe umndilili kwiiseli ezineheksagoni apho aboniswa khona (iguqulwe). Idatha evulekileyo ye-NASA
  • Imeko kwigloubhu nakwimephu ethe tyaba: unxweme, imida, iindlela namagama eendawo avela kwiileya zesalathiso ze-NASA GIBS (idatha ye-OpenStreetMap, ODbL, © abanegalelo kwi-OpenStreetMap); imifanekiso ye-Blue Marble njengesiseko esikhethwayo; umhlaba we-3D nokufundwa kokuphakama okuvela kwisalathiso semibala sokuphakama se-ASTER GDEM (iiklasi ezisuka kwi-5 m ukuya kwi-200 m, zandisiwe ukuze zifundeke). Imida izotywe njengoko ipapashiwe kwaye ayibonisi kuma kuwo nawuphi na ummandla.
  • Iziganeko ezenzeka ngoku: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); iziganeko zingumqondiso nje kwaye zigcina amakhonkco azo emithombo yokuqala.
  • Observed (EO): NASA HLS S30 (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • NASA GIBS: Siyavuma ukusebenzisa imifanekiso enikwe ziinkonzo ze-NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), eyinxalenye ye-NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • Iileya ezikhethwayo (imithombo emi-5 kuluhlu lweeleya: ephilayo, uqikelelo, eqwalaselweyo nemeko) zibonisa isincomo somboneleli wazo kwimephu nalapha xa zivuliwe; uqikelelo sisiphumo semodeli kwaye izalathisi ezivelisiweyo ziqikelelo.

Iileya nemihla

  • Night-time lights, daily: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Oct 2026
  • Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
  • Flood water, 3-day composite: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Oct 2026
  • True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
  • Uhlobo lwesigubungelo somhlaba (IGBP), ngonyaka: MODIS Terra and Aqua isigubungelo somhlaba (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024
  • Enhanced vegetation index, rolling 8 days: MODIS Terra EVI, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026

04Across the domains

Cloud concentration is a common mode across domains.

Concentration studies are designed for the Strategic Systems series. The EU's Digital Operational Resilience Act, applying from January 2025, created oversight of critical third-party providers to finance; the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) rates no provider.

  • Third-party dependency maps under terms.
  • Exit plan exercises.
05Isilinganisi sokuphindwa nothotho lweziphumo

Model cloud and third parties as a system. Run the cascade.

Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Cyber and digital resilience law alignment: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.

Iingozi

  • Dam failure
  • Sea-ice loss
  • Coastal erosion (set off downstream)
  • River flood (set off downstream)
  • Flash flood (set off downstream)
  • Ukufuduswa kwabantu abaninzi (kubangela iziphumo ezilandelayo)
  • Biodiversity loss (set off downstream)
  • Ukuqhawuka kombane okuxhaphakileyo (kubangela iziphumo ezilandelayo)
  • Water supply shortfall (set off downstream)
  • Arctic winter sea-ice collapse (set off downstream)
  • Polar vortex disruption (set off downstream)

Izilawuli

  • NS-10 Imigaqo-nkqubo namagatya (izibophelelo ezifundeka ngoomatshini: inkcazo, ukubopha, uvavanyo nokunyanzeliswa)
  • NS-11 Ukuqinisekiswa nokubekwa kweliso (ubungqina, iziqinisekiso, uqwalaselo lokuhambelana ngaphandle kokuthemba)
  • NS-9 Ii-UNI zemeko (ukusasazwa, iimeko, iimeko zenkqubo)
  • NRS-X6 Cyber and digital security risk
  • NRS-H93 Hazard family: Identity, trust and cryptographic failure (NHS-1 cyber.identity)
  • NRS-K31 Domain pack profile: Cyber national resilience (DOMAIN-031)
  • NRS-H54 Hazard family: Signal and platform disruption (NHS-1 cyber.platform)
  • NRS-H86 Hazard family: Telecom and data-centre failure (NHS-1 infra.digital)
  • NRS-H94 Hazard family: Systemic cyber events (NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)

Uqwalaselo

  • NIST National Vulnerability Database APIs (listed for reference)
  • CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue (listed for reference)
  • EUR-Lex Cellar (EU legal acts and delegated acts) (listed for reference)
  • Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
  • Legal measures pillar of the Global Cybersecurity Index

Umzekelo wejografi

  • North America: 243 hexagonal cells
  • Izibane zasebusuku namhlanje, ukuqhawuka kombane (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
  • Amanzi aphezu komhlaba phantsi kwamafu, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
  • Isantya semvula, isiqingatha seyure esidlulileyo (IMERG), NASA GIBS
  • Vegetation disturbance alerts, 30 m (OPERA DIST-ALERT), NASA GIBS
06Izalathisi

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeIleyibhile
Critical services hosted with a single providercountper inventoryThird-party registersDECLARED
Third parties with privileged accesscountquarterlyAccess management recordsKUQWALASELWE
Cloud misconfiguration findingscount by severityweeklyCloud security posture toolsKUQWALASELWE
Contracts with incident notification and exit termspercent of critical contractsannualContract reviewsKUXELIWE
Provider outages affecting servicescount and hoursannualProvider status history and incident logsKUQWALASELWE
Market share of top cloud providerspercent of marketannualMarket studiesKUQIKELELWE
07Methods and evidence

How cloud and third parties is modelled, measured and tested.

The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.

System model

The couplings between the systems in cloud and third parties: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.

++−+CyberIziseko zophuhliso ezibalulekileyoCommunitiesEconomyR reinforcingB balancing
Causal loop diagram from the page's systems; signs show the direction of influence. Illustrative structure for a system dynamics or network model, not estimated couplings.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
08Imithombo

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

UmthomboWhat it givesLicence class
DORA register of information and ICT third-party oversight materialsRequirements and oversight of critical ICT providers in EU financePublic, EU terms
Provider public incident and status historiesRecords of cloud outagesPublic, terms per provider
Competition authority cloud market studiesMarket structure and concentrationPublic records, licence per authority
Joint agency guidance on managed service provider securityPractices for customers and providersPublic, terms per agency
Financial Stability Board work on third-party riskToolkit for third-party risk management and oversightPublic, FSB terms
09Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Organisations using cloud and managed servicesWhich functions to keep multi-provider or on-premises and what terms to requireDependency maps; contract reviews
Financial and sector regulatorsWhether to designate and oversee critical third-party providersConcentration analyses; outage history
Procurement authoritiesWhat security terms to require from vendorsContract term evidence

Outputs this topic produces

  • Third-party dependency maps for critical functions
  • Concentration analyses across a sector
  • Contract term reviews for cloud and managed services
  • Exit and substitution scenario designs
10Core questions

What experts ask.

Outsourcing a function does not outsource responsibility for it. When a provider fails, its customers still answer to patients, citizens and customers. And when many organisations rely on the same provider, a single outage or compromise becomes a systemic event. Understanding where these concentrations lie is a precondition for resilience at the level of a sector or a country.

  • Which providers, platforms and services does an organisation or sector depend on, including through its suppliers' suppliers?
  • How concentrated are those dependencies, and what would happen if a major provider failed for hours or days?
  • What contractual, technical and operational measures allow continuity or exit if a provider fails?
  • Who has visibility of sector-wide concentration, and who is responsible for managing it?
11Mechanisms

Drivers and processes.

Third-party risk combines technical, contractual and systemic elements.

Concentration

Shared providers

A few cloud, identity, content delivery and managed security providers underpin many services. Their failure modes are shared by all their customers.

Visibility

Hidden dependencies

Organisations often know their direct suppliers but not the providers those suppliers use, so concentration can be invisible until an outage reveals it.

Exit

Substitutability

Moving workloads between providers can take months. Lock-in through proprietary services limits the options available in a crisis.

Concentration has benefits as well as costs. Large providers invest heavily in security and reliability, and many smaller organisations are safer in a well-run cloud than on their own servers. The policy question is not whether to use shared providers but how to make their failure survivable: through visibility of dependencies, tested fallbacks and arrangements for coordinated response when a widely used service goes down.

12Methods and data

How the evidence is built, and its limits.

  1. 01

    Supplier inventories

    Registers of critical third parties and the services they support. They are often incomplete beyond the first tier.

  2. 02

    Outage analysis

    Public post-incident reports from providers describe causes and timelines. Their detail and candour vary.

  3. 03

    Network analysis

    Dependency graphs built with network science and contagion reveal concentration and single points of failure, within the limits of available data.

  4. 04

    Scenario exercises

    Exercises that simulate a major provider outage test continuity plans and expose assumptions.

13Iindlela zokusebenza

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

14Where this page's references

Apho izalathiso zeli phepha zikhokelela khona.

Amaqumrhu namaxwebhu eli phepha elifundwa ngokuthelekiswa nawo. Imeko neenguqulelo ziyatshintsha; ikhonkco ngalinye liya kwiqumrhu elikhuphayo.

16Imibuzo

Imibuzo neempendulo.

What is the shared responsibility model?
The division of security duties between a cloud provider, which secures the underlying infrastructure, and the customer, which secures its own configuration, data, applications and identities.
Why is cloud concentration a systemic risk?
Because many organisations and sectors rely on the same few providers and regions, so a single outage or compromise can disrupt many services at once.
What is fourth-party risk?
Risk from the suppliers of an organisation's suppliers, such as the cloud provider used by a software vendor, which the organisation may not see.
Is cloud less secure than on-premises systems?
Not inherently. Large providers often have stronger security than individual organisations. The issue is concentration and dependency, not cloud as such.
Does the platform rate cloud providers?
No. It does not rate, rank or assess providers. It studies concentration and dependency at system level.
Can an organisation use several clouds to reduce risk?
Multi-provider architectures can reduce dependence on one provider but add complexity and cost. Their value depends on whether critical functions can actually fail over.
IingxeloNikela

Faka ubungqina obuvela kweli phepha.

Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

GCRIUkhuseleko lwe-Cyber Nokomelela KwedijithaliIinkqubo ZobuchuleImeko-mfanekiso noVavanyo loXinzelelo
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