Cybersecurity and cryptography protect data infrastructure and computing facilities, and the sensitive data they hold. In this field the focus is secure research environments, identity federation, supply chain integrity of hardware and software, and resilience of shared facilities.
Cybersecurity and cryptography protect information systems and data from unauthorised access, disruption and manipulation. They address threats that can spread rapidly across interconnected digital and physical systems. In data and compute and energy, cybersecurity analysis identifies how a single compromise can propagate across sectors that share software, vendors or networks. It informs resilience requirements and cyber insurance. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.
Secure research environment design
Isolated environments are designed so that approved users can analyse sensitive data without exporting it, with output checking and audit logs.
Federated identity security
Federated access is assessed for assurance levels, multi-factor authentication and account lifecycle across the institutions that share it.
Facility incident preparedness
Shared computing facilities plan for compromise of user accounts and research software, with isolation and recovery procedures.
03Monitor
Security assessment.
The screen a team would use to follow this method: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Security assessment
Data and compute · Cybersecurity for data and compute · Run R-2961
Two high findingsGCRI · Data and Compute
Findings
Weak key rotation
Identity service
High
PR.AA
Open
Unpatched gateway
Edge
High
PR.PS
Fixing
Logging gap
Payments API
Medium
DE.CM
Open
Stale accounts
Directory
Low
PR.AA
Closed
Method card
Method
Cybersecurity and cryptography
Framework
CSF 2.0 functions
Scope
56 assets
Label
MODELLED
Control coverage by function
Security assessment: the screen's structure, terms and states for Data and compute.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
04Data
What the method consumes.
Datasets and records used by cybersecurity and cryptography on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.
Data
Role
Label
Access logs
Use and anomalies
OBSERVED
Identity federation metadata
Assurance
DECLARED
Incident records
Lessons
REPORTED
05Simulator
A cascade through interdependent networks.
A hazard footprint takes out co-located assets in every layer; fragmentation, dependency between layers and overload of the survivors then spread the failure. The 3D view separates the layers by depth. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.
Controls
Assets per layer
18
Hazard footprint
8% of area
Assets that depend on another layer
60%
Spare capacity (tolerance)
30%
Readouts
Assets hit by the hazard
9%
Assets still working
22%
Amplification of the initial damage
8.4 times
Steps to settle
4
Numbers, methods and sources
Step
Data centres working (%)
Networks working (%)
Power working (%)
0
78
94
100
1
61
33
44
2
44
17
39
3
44
17
11
4
44
17
6
Methods
Interdependent networks Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464
Overload cascades Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66
Betweenness load Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25
Multilayer networks Kivela and others (2014), Journal of Complex Networks 2
Infrastructure interdependencies Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001), IEEE Control Systems 21(6)
Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Data
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page's map can draw:
Natural events (NASA EONET) NASA EONET · register nasa.eonet.events
A cascade through interdependent networks. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: Interdependent networks (Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464); Overload cascades (Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66); Betweenness load (Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25).
Controls are tested through red-team exercises, audits and formal analysis of cryptographic schemes. Incident data are used to check whether defences performed as intended.
Check
How it is done
Penetration testing
Environments are tested by independent assessors
Assurance profile review
Identity providers are checked against assurance profiles
Recovery testing
Facility recovery plans are exercised
Adversaries adapt, so historical data may not reflect future attacks. Software supply chains and legacy systems introduce weaknesses that are hard to inventory.
07Methods and evidence
How cybersecurity for data and compute is modelled, measured and tested.
The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.
Datasets and provenance
The data classes behind cybersecurity for data and compute and what is recorded about each before it is used.
Data classes and the provenance fields recorded for each; a dataset is listed by name only once its licence admits the use.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
What are the limits of cybersecurity and cryptography in this field?
Adversaries adapt, so historical data may not reflect future attacks. Software supply chains and legacy systems introduce weaknesses that are hard to inventory.
How are results checked?
Controls are tested through red-team exercises, audits and formal analysis of cryptographic schemes. Incident data are used to check whether defences performed as intended.
Are the values on this page real?
The data names, roles and checks are real descriptions of practice. The canvas shows a design of the method's use, not a run; no result is reported here.
Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
GCRIData and ComputeExponential TechnologyStrategic Systems
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