Restoration curve analysis
Customer outage records from past events are converted into restoration curves, so the time to recover is measured alongside the size of the initial loss.
GCRI · Energy Nexus
Reliability and resilience engineering asks how energy assets and systems fail, how quickly they recover, and which components and organisational arrangements set the recovery time. It turns outage records, damage surveys and asset data into resilience measures that operators and regulators can compare across events.
Reliability and resilience engineering studies how systems fail, how failures can be prevented and how systems absorb, adapt and recover from disruption. It addresses both technical components and the organisations that operate them. In energy, critical infrastructure and climate and hazards, resilience engineering identifies critical components and recovery bottlenecks across connected systems. It informs redundancy, spares and restoration priorities. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.
Customer outage records from past events are converted into restoration curves, so the time to recover is measured alongside the size of the initial loss.
The paths by which a hospital, water works or data centre loses supply are traced through grid feeds, transfer switches, generators and fuel, revealing single points of failure.
The probability of damage to poles, lines and substations is related to wind speed, ice load or flood depth using post-event damage surveys.
Night lights, sunlight, population density and true-colour imagery over Europe, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.
The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.
Layers 4
Energy now, for this page
Keyboard, with the map focused
Hold Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll to zoom
Latest available
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth
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Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.
Energy now, framed on Europe.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.
Layers and dates
Datasets and records used by reliability and resilience engineering on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.
| Data | Role | Label |
|---|---|---|
| Utility outage and interruption records | Failure rates and durations | Published statistics |
| Post-event damage surveys | Fragility estimation | REPORTED |
| Asset registers | Age, type and condition of components | Published statistics |
| Incident investigation reports | Failure sequences | REPORTED |
A hazard footprint takes out co-located assets in every layer; fragmentation, dependency between layers and overload of the survivors then spread the failure. The 3D view separates the layers by depth. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Europe; the model itself is not tied to a place.
Controls
Readouts
| Step | Power working (%) | Gas working (%) | Telecoms working (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 100 | 94 | 94 |
| 1 | 100 | 67 | 72 |
| 2 | 100 | 61 | 72 |
| 3 | 94 | 61 | 72 |
| 4 | 72 | 61 | 67 |
| 5 | 33 | 56 | 56 |
| 6 | 33 | 39 | 39 |
| 7 | 33 | 39 | 28 |
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page's map can draw:
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
Reliability predictions are compared with field failure data. Exercises and post-event reviews check whether recovery performed as planned.
| Check | How it is done |
|---|---|
| Field data comparison | Predicted failure rates are compared with recorded failures for the same asset class |
| Common-cause review | Redundant components are checked for shared causes such as one fuel supplier or one flood zone |
| Exercise and post-event review | Restoration assumptions are tested against exercises and actual events |
Common-cause failures and rare events are hard to estimate from limited data. Human and organisational factors resist quantification.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Energy risk standards: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
Hazards
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-0 Constitution and principlesNS-1 The UNI and the artefact catalogue (grammar v0.2: domain, sector, region and environment segments)NS-3 Risk record UNIs (grammar, legacy crosswalk, allocation authority)NS-9 Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)NS-10 Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)NS-11 Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)NRS-H84 Hazard family: Energy system instability and shortfall (NHS-1 infra.energy)NRS-H61 Hazard family: Cascading failure (NHS-1 sys.cascade)NRS-U8 Universe platform profile: Energy NexusNRS-H48 Hazard family: Utility and communication network outage (NHS-1 infra.utilities)NRS-H109 Hazard family: Energy-transition technology failures (NHS-1 tech.energy-transition)NRS-H54 Hazard family: Signal and platform disruption (NHS-1 cyber.platform)Observation
Example geography
The sectors resilience engineering for energy systems touches and how strongly they depend on each other: what a study has to observe and model together.
Signature
Energy and its partners
Energy gives power for transport and telecoms to infrastructure (0.8), pumping and treatment to water (0.5) and fertiliser, machinery and cold chains to food (0.5).
W · E · I · F · H · B
Critical Infrastructure stewards reliability and resilience engineering for the Consortium and reviews how it is applied across platforms.
The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.
The couplings between the systems in resilience engineering for energy systems: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
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