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Systems and sectors at baseline

6 min read0 figures2 tables16 notesNR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
    1. 3.1 Where each system stood at evidence close
    2. 3.2 Domain posture
    3. 3.3 Sector screens
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMetodologie
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

TRD · Volume

Seaborne trade volume, 2024

12,720million tons

up 2.2%.

Reported2024UNCTAD1

INF · Distance

Seaborne trade in ton-miles, 2024

66,781billion ton-miles

up 5.9%, fastest since 2011.

Reported2024UNCTAD1

ENE · Hormuz, 2024

Total oil flow through the strait

20.7million b/d

EIA table; LNG about one fifth of trade.

Reported2024EIA78

CON · Hormuz, 2026

Crude oil shut-ins, March to June average

9.4million b/d

against 25.2 produced in February.

Reported2026EIA46

FIN · Trade outlook

WTO 2026 merchandise volume growth, March baseline

1.9%

1.4% in the high-energy-price case.

Reported2026WTO13

FOO · Fertiliser

Share of seaborne fertiliser trade through Hormuz

≈1/3about 16 million tonnes

UNCTAD estimate, March 2026.

Reported2026UNCTAD6

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through supply chains and chokepoints, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries supply chains and chokepoints risk into each domain.

Table 3.1Each domain read in words, not scored
DomainPosture at baselineKoppelingStatus
WATDesalination and pumping depend on energy; Gulf water systems not consolidated here.ENE → WATInferred EQL 2
ENEAbout one fifth of oil and LNG passes through Hormuz; oil production was shut in at scale in 2026.ENE → allReported EQL 4
FOOAbout one third of seaborne fertiliser passes through Hormuz; urea prices rose sharply.ENE → FOOReported EQL 3
HLTMedical supply chains depend on freight and energy; not consolidated here.ENE → HLTInferred EQL 2
BIOBulk trade routes and ports affect species movement; evidence not consolidated here.TRD → BIOExpert input EQL 2
CLILow water levels cut Panama Canal transits until mid-2024.CLI → INFReported EQL 3
INFCanals, straits and ports: Suez about 10 percent of maritime trade volume.the core systemReported EQL 4
FINWTO March baseline of 1.9 percent volume growth in 2026; Suez revenue projected to halve.TRD → FINReported EQL 4
DATVessel-tracking data are the main evidence and were unreliable for Hormuz in 2026.DAT ↔ TRDReported EQL 3
AICThe share of trade growth from AI-enabling goods is not bound at the close.AIC → TRDInferred EQL 2
MINRare earth controls and concentrated refining: about 85 percent top-country refining share in 2025.MIN → TRDReported EQL 3
TRDThe core system: 12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024.the core systemReported EQL 4

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on supply chains and chokepoints, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Table 3.2Sectors: baseline evidence and the exposure to watch
CodeSectorBaseline evidenceExposure to watchEvidence coverage
GS-00Cross-systemtrade routes couple every sector14chokepoint closure with freight spikePARTIAL
GS-01Waterdesalination depends on energy and fuel flowsfuel loss at coastal plantsTHIN
GS-02EnergieHormuz-related oil shut-ins in 202646strait closureGOOD
GS-03Food and agrifoodabout one third of seaborne fertiliser via Hormuz617fertiliser and freight shocksPARTIAL
GS-04Gesondheidmedical supply depends on freight and energyport closureTHIN
GS-05Finance and economyWTO March baseline 1.9 percent13trade shock and price spikePARTIAL
GS-06Ontwikkelinghigh transport costs hit small island and least developed states hardest2rerouting costsPARTIAL
GS-07Klimaatlow water levels cut Panama transits4water-level limits on canalsPARTIAL
GS-08Disasterport and route closures after hazardsconcurrent closuresTHIN
GS-09Infrastruktuurcanal and strait transits410canal capacity limitsGOOD
GS-10Stedeport cities depend on a few routesport disruptionTHIN
GS-11Biodiversiteitshipping routes shape pressure on ecosystemsroute shiftsTHIN
GS-12Aardwaarnemingvessel tracking underpins chokepoint evidence546tracking data gapsPARTIAL
GS-13Kuber en digitaalport and vessel systems carry digital risksystems disruptionTHIN
GS-14BeleidMFN terms cover 72 percent of trade15; export controls22policy shocksGOOD
GS-15Wetenskapsupply network science is mature383940data at operating scalePARTIAL

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 38Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V.M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 80(5), 1977 to 2016, 2012 (DOI 10.3982/ECTA9623; Crossref record and abstract read). Econometric Society. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.3982/ECTA9623back
  15. 39Carvalho, V.M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y.U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1255 to 1321, 2021 (DOI 10.1093/qje/qjaa044; Crossref record and abstract read). Oxford University Press. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1093/qje/qjaa044back
  16. 40Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(3), 1543 to 1592, 2016 (DOI 10.1093/qje/qjw018; Crossref record and abstract read). Oxford University Press. Observation year 2016. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1093/qje/qjw018back

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Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 3: Systems and sectors at baseline. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

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