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Executive summary

The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.

6 min read1 figure0 tables12 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

فهرست مطالب
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
    1. S.1 Abstract
    2. S.2 Key messages
    3. S.3 Headline finding
    4. S.4 At a glance
    5. S.5 What each steward reads in it
    6. S.6 What this edition is, and is not
  3. 1Lifelines fail together
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. Aروش‌شناسی
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

S.1Abstract

Lifeline systems are the networks other systems run on: power, water, communications, transport and health services. The 2025 and 2026 evidence shows the same mechanisms at work in very different events. The Iberian blackout of 28 April 2025 came from interacting factors, including voltage control gaps, oscillations and generator disconnections1. A single software update on 18 July 2024 affected an estimated 8.5 million Windows devices4. Government agencies assessed in February 2024 that state-sponsored actors had pre-positioned in the networks of communications, energy, transport and water operators, with some intrusions lasting at least five years2. ENISA analysed 4,875 incidents in a single twelve-month period3. Asset condition and investment are part of the picture: the 2025 US report card grades the country’s infrastructure C with a USD 3.6 trillion ten-year gap6. Around 199 subsea cable faults occur each year, about two thirds from fishing and transport vessels7. War adds direct damage: Ukraine’s recovery needs reached USD 587.7 billion and Gulf power and desalination plants were struck from March 20261213. This baseline reads these events as mechanisms, not as a list. It ranks no country or operator, attributes no attack and recommends no policy.

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the lifeline systems baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

  1. Yes: hazards, cyber operations, conflict and software faults recur across sectors.12410

    Do lifeline failures have common causes?Reported

  2. Through shared dependence on power, telecoms and software.14

    How do failures spread?Reported

  3. Grades are mixed: C overall in the 2025 US report card.6

    Is the physical base sound?Reported

  4. About 199 faults a year; most are accidental.7

    How exposed are subsea links?Reported

  5. More than USD 250 billion a year to infrastructure from three hazards.10

    How large are the losses?Reported

  6. It adds direct damage to power and water systems.1213

    Does war change the picture?Reported

  7. Concentrated demand on local grids.89

    What does digital load add?Reported

  8. Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure. SCN-SR02-PWR-01

    What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-006

Subsea cable faults averaged 199 a year from 2010 to 2023. About two thirds came from fishing and transport vessels, and intent is hard to establish.

Figure S.1Subsea cable faults a year, 2010 to 2023
موردBar, scaled to the largest valueمقدار
Average faults a year199
of which external aggression (about two thirds)≈133

Source: TeleGeography7. The second bar is a Nexus derivation, method (4), and is approximate.

Most faults are accidents, so route diversity and repair capacity matter more than detecting intent. Governments around the Baltic investigate each fault as potential sabotage, and the analyst notes that severing a few cables is noise rather than a signal7.

S.4At a glance

199faults a year

subsea cables7

8.5million

devices, July 20244

4,875رخدادها

ENISA, to June 20253

3.6USD trillion

US ten-year gap6

>250USD billion

annual hazard loss10

390USD billion

annual disruption cost, LMICs11

S.5What each steward reads in it

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading lifelines as one dependent network.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people lifeline failure arrives as a dark home, a dry tap or a card that will not work.

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Disruption is costly, resilient options are reported to return several times their cost, and the investment gap is large in places.

NEXUS

سنتز

Lifeline risk is well described event by event and thinly measured as a system.

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

A baseline: the 2026 state of the world’s critical infrastructure and lifeline systems and the couplings through which it carries risk into other systems. It synthesises published evidence and ranks no country, company or asset.

What it is not

Not an infrastructure-security ranking, a threat attribution, a vulnerability disclosure or an assessment of any operator, regulator or government. Operation, protection and recovery of infrastructure rest with owners, operators and competent authorities.

What comes next

National, regional and sector evidence feeds the 2027 lifeline systems edition through the federation. Each edition reports what changed against this baseline: observations, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  10. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

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Cite this summary

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Executive summary: Executive summary. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

گزارش‌هامشارکت

Send evidence or a correction on Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

میز شواهد سامانه‌های GCRIسامانه‌های راهبردی

CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.

امضای بخشی

The sectors behind Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

گوشه‌ها را انتخاب کنید · روی خطوط نشانگر ببرید6 / 15 رابطه

زمینه

Infrastructure and its partners

Infrastructure gives pipes, dams and treatment works to water (0.6), transmission and fuel logistics to energy (0.6) and access to care to health (0.5).

W · E · I · F · H · B

بخش‌ها
4 از 6
روابط
6 از 15
پیوستگی
0.46 سهم از کل

قوی‌ترین روابط در جریان

  • انرژی ← زیرساخت · برق برای حمل‌ونقل و مخابرات0.8
  • آب ← انرژی · آب خنک‌کننده و برق‌آبی0.6
  • زیرساخت ← آب · لوله‌ها، سدها و تصفیه‌خانه‌ها0.6
  • آب ← سلامت · آب آشامیدنی و بهداشت0.7
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