- گزارشها
- ویراست پایه 2026
- Complete edition
Exponential Technology Report 2026: Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
Imprint
- ویراستار
- Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor, the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI)
- ناشر ثبتشده
- The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto
- Report number
- NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE
- بستن شواهد
- 30 September 2026, cut DC-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-B0
- وضعیت
- Draft under stewardship review; not yet released
- DOI and UNI
- Issued at deposit
- پروانه
- CC BY 4.0 for Nexus-authored text, tables and figures; third-party material keeps its own licence
- Cite as
- Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Exponential Technology Report 2026: Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI). https://therisk.global/nexus-reports/editions/xt-01/
فهرست مطالب
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- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Executive summary
Executive summary
The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.
S.1Abstract
Artificial intelligence enters 2027 as physical infrastructure. Data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the world total, and the IEA projects roughly 945 TWh by 2030, driven by accelerated servers for AI1. The training compute of frontier models has grown by four to five times a year14, while the cost of using a model at a fixed level of performance fell more than 280-fold in two years2. Adoption has spread fast: 78% of organisations reported using AI in 20242. Supply is concentrated: in 2019 about 92% of the world’s most advanced logic-chip capacity was in Taiwan17, and the refining of key minerals is concentrated in a few countries18. Reported AI incidents rose by more than half in 20242, and governance is moving from principles to law, led by the phased application of the EU AI Act4. This Baseline Edition fixes the 2026 reference state for AI as a system of compute, energy, water, chips, labour and institutions, and sets the questions the 2027 edition will answer. It ranks no model, company or country.
S.2Key messages
Six readings that frame the AI baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.
Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024, about 1.5% of the world total, rising to about 945 TWh by 2030 in the IEA base case.1
How much power does AI use?Reported
Frontier training compute has grown four- to five-fold a year.14
How fast is capability scaling?Reported
The cost of GPT-3.5-level performance fell more than 280-fold in two years.2
Is AI getting cheaper?Reported
About 92% of leading-edge chip capacity sat in one region in 2019.17
How concentrated is supply?Reported
78% of organisations used AI in 2024.2
How widely is AI used?Reported
A quarter to two-fifths of jobs are exposed; exposure is not job loss.1632
What does it mean for work?Reported
Reported incidents reached a record 233 in 2024.2
Are harms rising?Reported
A chip supply disruption coinciding with grid limits at data-centre clusters. SCN-XT01-CHG-01
What will 2027 test first?Expert input
S.3Headline finding
ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-001
Data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the world total, and the IEA projects about 945 TWh by 2030, driven mainly by accelerated servers for AI.
| مورد | Bar, scaled to the largest value | مقدار |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 · observed estimate | 415 | |
| 2030 · IEA base case | 945 |
Source: IEA, Energy and AI1.
Because demand is clustered, the first effects fall on particular grids, water basins and communities: connection queues, local price pressure and competition for clean power. The global share stays small while local shares become large115.
S.4At a glance
S.5What each steward reads in it
GCRI · KEY T
Technical Truth
The evidence supports reading AI as physical infrastructure with fast-rising, clustered demand for power and water, and a highly concentrated supply chain.
GRF · KEY M
Public Meaning
For most people AI arrives as a tool at work, a change in a job or a new data centre nearby.
GRA · KEY F
Capital Meaning
Readiness implications only. Investment is large and concentrated, supply risk sits in a few regions, and liability and insurance for AI are nascent.
NEXUS
سنتز
AI is scaling faster than the infrastructure and institutions around it.
S.6What this edition is, and is not
What this edition is
A baseline: the state of AI compute, energy, water, chips, adoption, labour, incidents and governance in 2026, and the couplings through which AI carries risk into power systems, supply chains, work and institutions. It treats AI as infrastructure, not only software.
What it is not
Not a capability ranking of models or companies, a forecast of artificial general intelligence, a safety certification or a policy recommendation. Benchmarks are cited with their dates and methods.
What comes next
National readiness chapters and federation evidence feed the 2027 edition. Each edition reports what changed against this baseline, new measurements, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
- 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
- 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
- 18International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 4European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, as amended.back
- 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024.back
- 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 34ITU (ed.), Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2024. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2024.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Chapter 1
AI is infrastructure, not only software
Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no model, company or country and certifies no system.
1.1The questions this part answers
Key questions
- Where does AI demand meet physical limits first, power, water or chips?
- Which couplings carry AI-driven shocks into other systems?
- Which AI capabilities and safeguards have been tested?
- What must the federation measure first in 2027?
In this part
- Narrative
- Headline finding
- Lead figure
- Five infrastructure chapters
- Twelve-domain reading
- Sector screens
- Dependency matrix
- Risk objects
- Capability ladder
- سناریو
- Three lenses
- سبد
1.2The argument
AI is usually described by what models can do. This baseline describes what AI needs: electricity, water, chips, minerals, networks, skilled people and institutions. Read that way, AI is one of the fastest-growing loads on the world’s physical systems, and one of the most concentrated supply chains in the global economy.
Demand is rising fast. Data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the world total, and the IEA projects about 945 TWh by 2030 in its base case1. In the United States, data centres used about 4.4% of electricity in 2023, with 6.7–12% projected for 202815. Demand is clustered in a few regions, so its effects on grids and water are local before they are global.
Capability is scaling at a pace few infrastructures have seen. Frontier training compute has grown by four to five times a year14, while the cost of reaching a fixed level of performance has collapsed: GPT-3.5-level use became more than 280 times cheaper between late 2022 and late 20242. Cheaper use spreads adoption, 78% of organisations reported using AI in 20242, and spreads the energy demand with it.
Supply is concentrated. In 2019 about 92% of leading-edge logic-chip capacity was in Taiwan17. The refining of minerals used in chips and batteries is concentrated in a few countries18, and export controls on chips, tools and minerals have tightened since 20221929. A single regional disruption could constrain AI capacity worldwide.
Harms are rising with use. Reported AI incidents reached a record 233 in 20242, and the International AI Safety Report documents risks from malicious use, malfunction and systemic effects on labour and information3. Agentic systems that act on their own add new failure modes, while incident data on them remain thin.
Governance is moving from principles to law. The EU AI Act applies in phases from 20254; the Council of Europe opened a binding convention in 202410; and in 2025 the UN General Assembly created an independent scientific panel and a global dialogue on AI12. About 2.6 billion people remain offline34, so access is itself a governance question.
This edition therefore reads AI as part of the coupled system. The matrix, risk objects, capability ladder and scenario that follow ask the same two questions: where does an AI-driven shock travel next, and who holds the capability to contain it?
Adoption rose by 23 points in a year, faster than most general-purpose technologies. Exposure estimates for jobs vary by definition, so the labour question is how exposure turns into augmentation or substitution21632.
| مورد | Bar, scaled to the largest value | مقدار |
|---|---|---|
| Organisations using AI (%) | 78 | |
| Same, 2023 (%) | 55 | |
| Share of jobs exposed, IMF (%) | 40 | |
| Share of jobs exposed, ILO (%) | 25 |
Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2024.
Figure ID FIG-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003
1.3The six-sector nexus: twenty couplings across five assessed sectors
The technology-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for the demands and effects of AI. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence; they set the graph that measurement will test in 2027.
Each line is one coupling from one sector to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events. Infrastructure: not assessed in this edition’s coupling matrix, so it is drawn hollow with no couplings. The hexagon is the estate doctrine: six sectors and fifteen relations.
- Strong
- متوسط
- Weak
- Not assessed in this edition
Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated. Hexagon: the estate doctrine (Signature).
| From, to | WAT | ENE | FOO | HLT | BIO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WAT آب | · | STRONG hydro · thermal cooling | STRONG irrigation · rain-fed yield | STRONG safe water · sanitation | STRONG flows · wetlands |
| ENE انرژی | MODERATE pumping · treatment · desalination | · | STRONG fuel · fertiliser · cold chain | STRONG air pollution · cooling | MODERATE land use · mining |
| FOO غذا | STRONG ≈70% of withdrawals | WEAK خوراک زیستانرژی | · | STRONG nutrition · food safety | STRONG تغییر کاربری زمین |
| HLT سلامت | WEAK workforce | WEAK workforce | MODERATE labour · disease | · | WEAK residues |
| BIO تنوع زیستی | STRONG regulation · filtration | MODERATE biomass · hydrology | STRONG pollination · soils | MODERATE zoonoses · medicines | · |
| Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A. | |||||
Transmission paths
- 01
AIC → ENE → cities
Clustered data-centre load lengthens grid queues and raises local prices.
Reported United States clusters15
- 02
MIN → AIC
A mineral or chip export control constrains compute supply.
Reported gallium and germanium, 202319
- 03
AIC → WAT
Cooling demand competes with local water use.
Inferred water-stressed sites25
- 04
AIC → DAT → FIN
Concentrated cloud and model dependencies create common failures.
Inferred large outages
- 05
AIC → labour
Automation changes tasks faster than retraining.
Inferred exposure estimates16
1.4Reinforcing loops
A shock entering either system of a loop can return amplified through the other.
| Loop | First direction | Second direction |
|---|---|---|
| WAT and FOO | Water to food: irrigation · rain-fed yield | Food to water: ≈70% of withdrawals |
| WAT and BIO | Water to biodiversity: flows · wetlands | Biodiversity to water: regulation · filtration |
| FOO and BIO | Food to biodiversity: land conversion | Biodiversity to food: pollination · soils |
| A causal-loop reading of the matrix (Sterman, Business Dynamics, 2000): structural, from estimated strengths, not a measured feedback. | ||
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
- 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
- 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
- 18International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 19Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (ed.), Announcement on implementing export control on gallium- and germanium-related items. MOFCOM, Beijing, July 2023.back
- 29U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), Implementation of additional export controls: certain advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items. Federal Register, October 2022, as updated.back
- 3Y. Bengio (ed.), International AI Safety Report. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, London, January 2025.back
- 4European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, as amended.back
- 10Council of Europe (ed.), Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, CETS No. 225. Council of Europe, Vilnius, 2024.back
- 12United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution establishing the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence and the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance. United Nations, New York, August 2025.back
- 34ITU (ed.), Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2024. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2024.back
- 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024.back
- 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
- 20World Economic Forum (ed.), Future of Jobs Report 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
- 25P. Li, J. Yang, M. A. Islam and S. Ren, “Making AI less ‘thirsty’: uncovering and addressing the secret water footprint of AI models,” arXiv:2304.03271 (preprint), 2023.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Chapter 2
Key findings
Twelve findings carry the AI baseline. They are grouped by coupling, never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.
2.1Headline finding
ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-001
Data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the world total, and the IEA projects about 945 TWh by 2030, driven mainly by accelerated servers for AI.
| مورد | Bar, scaled to the largest value | مقدار |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 · observed estimate | 415 | |
| 2030 · IEA base case | 945 |
Source: IEA, Energy and AI1.
Implication
Because demand is clustered, the first effects fall on particular grids, water basins and communities: connection queues, local price pressure and competition for clean power. The global share stays small while local shares become large115.
What would move it
Grid connection queues at the largest clusters, efficiency gains in chips and cooling, and the pace of inference demand from AI agents would each move this finding.
2.2انرژی
ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-001
Data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the world total; the IEA projects about 945 TWh by 2030.1
ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-002
Data centres used about 4.4% of US electricity in 2023, with 6.7–12% projected for 2028.15
2.3رایانش
ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CMP-003
The training compute of frontier models has grown by four to five times a year since about 2010.14
ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CMP-004
The cost of using a model at GPT-3.5 level fell more than 280-fold between November 2022 and October 2024.2
2.4کانیها
ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-MIN-005
About 92% of leading-edge logic-chip capacity was in Taiwan in 2019; key mineral refining is concentrated in a few countries.1718
2.5پذیرش
ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ADO-006
78% of organisations reported using AI in 2024, up from 55% in 2023; corporate AI investment reached about US$252 billion.2
2.6Labour
ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-LAB-007
Between about a quarter and two-fifths of global employment is exposed to AI, depending on definition.1632
ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-LAB-008
Employers expect 170 million jobs to be created and 92 million displaced by 2030, with technology a leading driver.20
2.7Safety
ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SAF-009
Reported AI incidents reached a record 233 in 2024, up 56% on 2023.227
2.8حکمرانی
ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-010
Binding AI law has begun: the EU AI Act applies in phases from 2025, alongside a Council of Europe convention and UN governance bodies.41012
2.9توسعه
ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DEV-011
About 2.6 billion people remained offline in 2024, limiting who can benefit from AI.34
2.10Systemic
Expert inputEQL 2NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012
The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is an advanced-chip supply disruption coinciding with grid constraints at major data-centre clusters. § scenario
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
- 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
- 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
- 18International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024.back
- 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
- 20World Economic Forum (ed.), Future of Jobs Report 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
- 27Responsible AI Collaborative (ed.), AI Incident Database. incidentdatabase.ai, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
- 4European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, as amended.back
- 10Council of Europe (ed.), Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, CETS No. 225. Council of Europe, Vilnius, 2024.back
- 12United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution establishing the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence and the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance. United Nations, New York, August 2025.back
- 34ITU (ed.), Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2024. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2024.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Chapter 3
Systems and sectors at baseline
3.1Where each system stood at evidence close
ENE · Energy
Data-centre electricity use
415TWhabout 1.5% of world electricity; about 945 TWh projected by 2030.
گزارششده2024IEA1
NAT · National grid
Data centres’ share of US electricity
4.4%projected at 6.7–12% by 2028 in the national laboratory’s scenarios.
گزارششده2023LBNL15
CMP · Compute
Growth in frontier training compute
4–5×a yearsustained since about 2010.
Reported2010–2024Epoch AI14
ADO · Adoption
Organisations using AI
78%up from 55% in 2023; corporate AI investment reached US$252 billion.
Reported2024AI Index2
CHP · Chips
Leading-edge logic capacity in Taiwan
92%a single-region concentration in the AI supply chain.
Reported2019SIA–BCG17
SYS · Incidents
Reported AI incidents
233in 2024a record, up 56% on 2023.
Reported2024AI Index2
3.2Domain posture
Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through AI, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency through which AI carries risk into each domain.
| حوزه | Posture at baseline | پیوستگی | وضعیت |
|---|---|---|---|
| WAT | Cooling water demand rising at data-centre clusters; global volumes not consolidated. | AIC → WAT | Expert input EQL 2 |
| ENE | About 415 TWh in 2024, projected to about 945 TWh by 2030. | AIC → ENE | Reported EQL 4 |
| FOO | AI in agriculture is early; supply-chain optimisation spreading. | AIC → FOO | Expert input EQL 2 |
| HLT | Clinical and research uses grow; safety and bias concerns documented. | AIC → HLT | Inferred EQL 2 |
| BIO | Monitoring uses grow; physical footprint adds land and water pressure. | AIC ↔ BIO | Expert input EQL 2 |
| CLI | AI aids forecasting; data-centre emissions depend on the power mix. | AIC ↔ CLI | Inferred EQL 3 |
| INF | Data centres become critical infrastructure; grid connection queues lengthen. | AIC → INF | Reported EQL 3 |
| FIN | Corporate AI investment about US$252 billion in 2024; valuations concentrated. | AIC → FIN | Reported EQL 3 |
| DAT | Cloud and model concentration create common points of failure. | DAT ↔ AIC | Inferred EQL 3 |
| AIC | Compute scaling four to five times a year; costs falling fast. | the core system | Reported EQL 3 |
| MIN | Chips and their minerals concentrated in a few countries. | MIN → AIC | Reported EQL 3 |
| TRD | Export controls on chips, tools and minerals since 2022. | TRD → AIC | Reported EQL 4 |
3.3Sector screens
All sixteen sectors are screened for their exposure to AI, on the same grammar as every edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.
| کد | بخش | Baseline evidence | Exposure to watch | Evidence coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GS-00 | Cross-system | AI couples energy, water, minerals and labour36 | concentrated common dependencies | PARTIAL |
| GS-01 | آب | cooling demand at clusters37 | local water competition | THIN |
| GS-02 | انرژی | about 1.5% of electricity1 | grid strain at clusters | GOOD |
| GS-03 | غذا | early adoption | supply-chain dependence on AI tools | THIN |
| GS-04 | سلامت | clinical and research uses | safety, bias, privacy | PARTIAL |
| GS-05 | مالی | investment about US$252 billion2 | valuation concentration | PARTIAL |
| GS-06 | توسعه | 2.6 billion offline34 | unequal access to benefits | GOOD |
| GS-07 | اقلیم | emissions depend on power mix1 | demand growth against clean supply | PARTIAL |
| GS-08 | سانحه | AI in forecasting and response | over-reliance; failures under stress | THIN |
| GS-09 | زیرساخت | data centres as critical assets | connection queues; single points of failure | PARTIAL |
| GS-10 | شهرها | clusters in a few metro regions | local grid and water pressure | PARTIAL |
| GS-11 | تنوع زیستی | monitoring uses | land and water footprint | THIN |
| GS-12 | رصد زمین | AI-assisted analysis growing | model and data provenance | PARTIAL |
| GS-13 | سایبری و دیجیتال | AI changes attack and defence21 | automated attacks on infrastructure | PARTIAL |
| GS-14 | سیاستگذاری | binding AI law has begun410 | implementation capacity | GOOD |
| GS-15 | علم | AI accelerates research | reproducibility and dual use | PARTIAL |
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
- 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
- 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
- 36S. Valadbaygi (ed.), Global Systems Risk & Resilience Report 2026, Baseline Edition. GCRI for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto, 2026. NR-GLOBAL-SYSTEMS-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0.back
- 37S. Valadbaygi (ed.), Global Water Risk & Resilience Report 2026, Baseline Edition. GCRI for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto, 2026. NR-SECTOR-WATER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0.back
- 34ITU (ed.), Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2024. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2024.back
- 21World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
- 4European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, as amended.back
- 10Council of Europe (ed.), Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, CETS No. 225. Council of Europe, Vilnius, 2024.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Chapter 4
Risks and capability
Four AI risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence.
4.1Risk objects
Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.
InferredEQL 3RSK-XT01-MIN-001
Advanced-chip supply disruption
- محرک
- conflict, disaster or export control in a concentrated supply region
- مواجهه
- all AI compute; wider electronics
- آسیبپذیری
- about 92% of leading-edge capacity in one region (2019)17
- ظرفیت
- new fabs; stockpiles; diversification
- آبشار
- MIN → AIC → FIN, INF
- افق
- 1–5 years
ReportedEQL 3RSK-XT01-ENE-002
Grid and water constraints at data-centre clusters
- محرک
- fast load growth in a few regions
- مواجهه
- local grids, water basins, communities
- آسیبپذیری
- long connection queues; water stress
- ظرفیت
- grid build-out; efficiency; siting rules
- آبشار
- AIC → ENE, WAT → cities
- افق
- 1–3 years
InferredEQL 2RSK-XT01-SAF-003
Failures and misuse of agentic systems
InferredEQL 3RSK-XT01-LAB-004
Labour displacement outpacing transition
- محرک
- rapid adoption across tasks
- مواجهه
- a quarter to two-fifths of jobs1632
- آسیبپذیری
- weak retraining and social protection
- ظرفیت
- skills programmes; social protection
- آبشار
- AIC → labour → FIN, HLT
- افق
- 3–5 years
4.2Capability ladder
Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence for AI at the global level.
| کارکرد | Rung | سطح | Strongest public evidence at baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prevention and mitigation | EXISTS | risk-management frameworks published567 | |
| Monitoring and observation | EXISTS | incident databases and monitors2728 | |
| هشدار زودهنگام | LISTED | no shared warning system for systemic AI failures | |
| Preparedness and planning | EXISTS | national AI strategies widespread | |
| Redundancy and reserves | LISTED | chip and compute redundancy limited | |
| واکنش | EXISTS | incident response in firms; cross-border response untested | |
| Continuity of critical services | EXISTS | cloud continuity planning; large outages still occur | |
| بازیابی | EXISTS | standard IT recovery practice | |
| Adaptation | EXISTS | skills and education programmes expanding | |
| حمایت اجتماعی | LISTED | little AI-specific transition support | |
| مالی و بیمه | EXISTS | AI liability and insurance markets nascent | |
| Institutional coordination | EXISTS | summits, UN panel and dialogue created1213 | |
| Technical infrastructure | EXISTS | compute concentrated in few providers | |
| Workforce | LISTED | skills shortages widely reported | |
| Research capacity | ADEQUATE | large research base; safety research small relative to capability3 | |
| A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline. | |||
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
- 5NIST (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), NIST AI 100-1. NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 2023.back
- 6NIST (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile, NIST AI 600-1. NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 2024.back
- 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024.back
- 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
- 7ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Information technology, Artificial intelligence, Management system. ISO, Geneva, 2023.back
- 27Responsible AI Collaborative (ed.), AI Incident Database. incidentdatabase.ai, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
- 28OECD (ed.), OECD AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor. OECD.AI, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
- 12United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution establishing the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence and the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance. United Nations, New York, August 2025.back
- 13UK Government (ed.), The Bletchley Declaration by Countries Attending the AI Safety Summit, 1–2 November 2023. London, 2023.back
- 3Y. Bengio (ed.), International AI Safety Report. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, London, January 2025.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Chapter 5
Chip supply disruption under grid constraint
A conditional statement under stated assumptions, never a prediction.
5.1مفروضات
Scenario SCN-XT01-CHG-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.
- خط پایه
- the 2026 reference state in this edition
- محرکها
- a disruption to leading-edge chip supply from a single region, while large data-centre clusters face grid limits
- Analogues
- 2021 chip shortage; 2023 mineral export controls
- Interventions
- none modelled, the specification describes the unmitigated case
- Run state
- narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027
5.2The cascade, step by step
- 1
MIN → AIC
leading-edge chip output falls sharply
2021 کمبود
- 2
AIC → FIN
compute prices rise; investment plans stall
2021
- 3
AIC → INF
existing clusters run hotter and longer
peak events
- 4
ENE → AIC
grid limits cap new capacity at clusters
queues15
- 5
AIC → services
AI-dependent services degrade or ration
cloud outages
- 6
TRD → all
export controls and stockpiling amplify the shock
202319
5.3The scenario as a table of steps
How the shock in scenario SCN-XT01-CHG-01 would travel through Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems‘s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.
| گام | آنچه رخ میدهد | منبع |
|---|---|---|
| 01 Minerals to ai compute | Leading-edge chip output falls sharply. Analogue or source: 2021 shortage. | Edition XT-01, scenario SCN-XT01-CHG-01, step 1 |
| 02 AI compute to finance | Compute prices rise; investment plans stall. Analogue or source: 2021. | Edition XT-01, scenario SCN-XT01-CHG-01, step 2 |
| 03 AI compute to infrastructure | Existing clusters run hotter and longer. Analogue or source: peak events. | Edition XT-01, scenario SCN-XT01-CHG-01, step 3 |
| 04 Energy to ai compute | Grid limits cap new capacity at clusters. Analogue or source: queues [15]. | Edition XT-01, scenario SCN-XT01-CHG-01, step 4 |
| 05 AI compute to services | AI-dependent services degrade or ration. Analogue or source: cloud outages. | Edition XT-01, scenario SCN-XT01-CHG-01, step 5 |
| 06 Trade to all | Export controls and stockpiling amplify the shock. Analogue or source: 2023 [19]. | Edition XT-01, scenario SCN-XT01-CHG-01, step 6 |
A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: AI and Agentic Systems 2026, scenario SCN-XT01-CHG-01 (2026); AI and Agentic Systems 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 19Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (ed.), Announcement on implementing export control on gallium- and germanium-related items. MOFCOM, Beijing, July 2023.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Chapter 6
Readings from the other desks
The AI baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.
6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject
Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.
| Desk | ویراست | وضعیت | شناسه |
|---|---|---|---|
| GCRI Systems Evidence | Systems Evidence: Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems 2026 | Drafted, in stewardship review | NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 |
| GRF Public Deliberation | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| GRA Capital Readiness | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| Standards Progress | Standards Progress: Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems 2026 | در دست آمادهسازی | NR-NXS-XT-01-2026-BASELINE (reserved) |
| Academy Capability | Capability: Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems 2026 | در دست آمادهسازی | NR-RA-XT-01-2026-BASELINE (reserved) |
| Index Measurement | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit |
6.2Three lenses
One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.
GCRI · KEY T
Technical Truth
The evidence supports reading AI as physical infrastructure with fast-rising, clustered demand for power and water, and a highly concentrated supply chain. Evidence is strongest for electricity use and adoption, and weakest for water, inference energy and agentic failures.
ENE-001 · MIN-005 · SAF-009 · SYS-012
GRF · KEY M
Public Meaning
For most people AI arrives as a tool at work, a change in a job or a new data centre nearby. The baseline asks that public debate weigh the physical and social footprint of AI, power, water, work and access, alongside its benefits.
LAB-007 · DEV-011 · ENE-002
GRA · KEY F
Capital Meaning
Readiness implications only. Investment is large and concentrated, supply risk sits in a few regions, and liability and insurance for AI are nascent. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.
ADO-006 · MIN-005
NEXUS
سنتز
AI is scaling faster than the infrastructure and institutions around it. The 2027 programme should measure the physical couplings, test the chip–grid pathway, and build incident evidence for agentic systems before they become critical.
SYS-012 · X-01 · X-04
6.3GCRI reading: the model card
GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology
6.4Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.
Every model runs in a building on a grid in a basin. Treating AI as weightless software hides where its demands land: on particular substations, cooling systems and communities. Reading AI by location is the first step to managing it as infrastructure.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01
AI has an address
Leading-edge chips are made in very few places, from minerals refined in very few places, and run in very few clouds. Each concentration is efficient; together they form a chain whose weakest link is a single region.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02
Concentration is the risk
Systems that act on their own will fail in ways that chat interfaces do not. Before agents become critical to finance, health or infrastructure, the world needs incident evidence about them, not only principles.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03
Agents need evidence
About 2.6 billion people are offline. If AI’s benefits reach only the connected, its risks will still reach everyone. Access, skills and language belong in every account of AI readiness.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04
Access is the first safeguard
6.5Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 AI readiness pack
The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.
| مورد | ثبتخانه | State at baseline | First 2027 entry |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | AI risk state delta | baseline set by this edition | changes against the baseline |
| E2 | WEFH+B state delta | five global system readings set | indicator updates and freshness |
| E3 | Agenda and Portfolio movement | eight agenda items · six proposed objects | admission decisions |
| E4 | Federation delivery register | Canada, Global and Water issued | national readiness chapters |
| E5 | Consortium capability register | national consortia forming | first contributions |
| E6 | Leadership questions and challenges | هنوز هیچ | first challenge log |
| E7 | Foundry technical state | national environments prepared | first federation cut |
| E8 | Publication candidates | twelve findings carried forward | PUBLISH · HOLD dispositions |
| E9 | Universe readiness | one candidate mission | admission and role spine |
| E10 | Correction register | هیچ | first federation-wide cycle |
Publication dispositions
- انتشار
- Hold
- Needs evidence
- محدود
- جایگزینشده
6.6Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
Instruments that shape AI development and use, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.
- IN FORCE
- پذیرفتهشده
- ADOPTED · OPEN FOR SIGNATURE
- PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
| ابزار | نهاد | دامنه | وضعیت | ارتباط |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, AI Act4 | EU | اتحادیهٔ اروپا | IN FORCE · PHASED | risk-based obligations |
| Framework Convention on AI, CETS 22510 | شورای اروپا | open to all states | OPEN FOR SIGNATURE | human rights, rule of law |
| OECD AI Principles8 | OECD | adherents | ADOPTED · UPDATED 2024 | trustworthy AI |
| UNESCO Recommendation9 | UNESCO | global | ADOPTED 2021 | ethics |
| پیمان دیجیتال جهانی11 | UN General Assembly | global | ADOPTED 2024 | digital cooperation |
| UN scientific panel and dialogue12 | UN General Assembly | global | ESTABLISHED 2025 | evidence and dialogue |
| NIST AI RMF and GenAI profile56 | NIST | voluntary | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | risk management |
| ISO/IEC 420017 | ISO · IEC | بینالمللی | PUBLISHED | management systems |
| Hiroshima Code of Conduct30 | G7 | voluntary | PUBLISHED 2023 | advanced AI developers |
Changed since 2024
6.7Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
The review behind this edition covers water assessments, peer-reviewed hydrology and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.
Review protocol
- پرسش
- What does the published evidence establish about AI as infrastructure and its couplings?
- Sources searched
- energy and compute analyses; safety assessments; labour studies; governance instruments; peer-reviewed research and labelled preprints
- بازهٔ زمانی
- releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
- انتخاب
- sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
- گام بعد
- systematic reviews for agenda items X-01 to X-05 in 2027
| مرجع | نوع | سال | نقش | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bengio (ed.)3 | assessment | 2025 | supports | risks of advanced AI |
| Sevilla and Roldán14 | research note | 2024 | supports | compute growth |
| Strubell et al.23 | proceedings | 2019 | context | training energy |
| Patterson et al.24 | preprint | 2021 | context | training emissions |
| Li et al.25 | preprint | 2023 | context | water footprint |
| Bommasani et al.26 | preprint | 2021 | IRGC | foundation models |
| Cazzaniga et al.16 | staff note | 2024 | supports | labour exposure |
| مرجع | Issuer | سال | نقش | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy and AI1 | IEA | 2025 | supports | electricity demand |
| AI Index 20252 | Stanford HAI | 2025 | supports | adoption, cost, incidents |
| Data-centre energy report15 | LBNL | 2024 | supports | US electricity share |
| Governing AI for Humanity31 | UN advisory body | 2024 | context | global governance |
| مرجع | Issuer | سال | نقش | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Generative AI and jobs32 | ILO | 2025 | supports | مواجهه |
| Future of Jobs20 | WEF | 2025 | supports | job churn |
| Facts and Figures34 | ITU | 2024 | supports | people offline |
| Technology and Innovation Report33 | UNCTAD | 2025 | context | development |
| Global Cybersecurity Outlook21 | WEF | 2025 | context | cyber |
| مرجع | Issuer | سال | نقش | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Semiconductor supply chain17 | SIA · BCG | 2021 | supports | chip concentration |
| Critical Minerals Outlook18 | IEA | 2025 | supports | mineral refining |
| Export controls1929 | MOFCOM · BIS | 2022–23 | supports | trade controls |
| AI Incident Database27 | Responsible AI Collaborative | 2026 | supports | رخدادها |
| AI Incidents Monitor28 | OECD | 2026 | supports | رخدادها |
| Global Electricity Review22 | Ember | 2025 | context | power mix |
Where the evidence agrees
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 4European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, as amended.back
- 10Council of Europe (ed.), Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, CETS No. 225. Council of Europe, Vilnius, 2024.back
- 8OECD (ed.), Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, OECD/LEGAL/0449, as amended in 2024. OECD, Paris, 2024.back
- 9UNESCO (ed.), Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. UNESCO, Paris, 2021.back
- 11United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Pact for the Future, resolution 79/1, annex I: Global Digital Compact. United Nations, New York, 2024.back
- 12United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution establishing the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence and the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance. United Nations, New York, August 2025.back
- 5NIST (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), NIST AI 100-1. NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 2023.back
- 6NIST (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile, NIST AI 600-1. NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 2024.back
- 7ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Information technology, Artificial intelligence, Management system. ISO, Geneva, 2023.back
- 30G7 Hiroshima AI Process (ed.), Hiroshima Process International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems. G7, Hiroshima, 2023.back
- 3Y. Bengio (ed.), International AI Safety Report. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, London, January 2025.back
- 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
- 23E. Strubell, A. Ganesh and A. McCallum, “Energy and policy considerations for deep learning in NLP,” in Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pp. 3645–3650, 2019.back
- 24D. Patterson, J. Gonzalez, Q. Le et al., “Carbon emissions and large neural network training,” arXiv:2104.10350 (preprint, not peer-reviewed), 2021.back
- 25P. Li, J. Yang, M. A. Islam and S. Ren, “Making AI less ‘thirsty’: uncovering and addressing the secret water footprint of AI models,” arXiv:2304.03271 (preprint), 2023.back
- 26R. Bommasani, D. A. Hudson, E. Adeli et al., “On the opportunities and risks of foundation models,” arXiv:2108.07258 (preprint), 2021.back
- 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024.back
- 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 31UN High-level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Governing AI for Humanity: Final Report. United Nations, New York, September 2024.back
- 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
- 20World Economic Forum (ed.), Future of Jobs Report 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
- 34ITU (ed.), Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2024. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2024.back
- 33UNCTAD (ed.), Technology and Innovation Report 2025: Inclusive Artificial Intelligence for Development. UNCTAD, Geneva, 2025.back
- 21World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
- 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
- 18International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 19Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (ed.), Announcement on implementing export control on gallium- and germanium-related items. MOFCOM, Beijing, July 2023.back
- 29U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), Implementation of additional export controls: certain advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items. Federal Register, October 2022, as updated.back
- 27Responsible AI Collaborative (ed.), AI Incident Database. incidentdatabase.ai, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
- 28OECD (ed.), OECD AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor. OECD.AI, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
- 22Ember (ed.), Global Electricity Review 2025. Ember, London, 2025.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Chapter 7
The 2027 agenda
Eight bounded questions open the 2027 AI agenda. Each comes from a baseline finding, names the initiative that will carry it and the first output due in the 2027 edition.
7.1Questions for the operational series
- X-01
Where will data-centre demand exceed grid and water capacity first, and what does that do to local prices and reliability?
INI-XT01-GRD-01 · compute–grid–water; first output: cluster capacity register.
- X-02
How exposed is AI capability to a disruption in advanced chips, tools or minerals?
INI-XT01-CHP-02 · supply concentration; first output: single-point-of-failure map.
- X-03
How much energy does inference use as AI agents spread, compared with training?
INI-XT01-INF-03 · inference energy; first output: measured estimates by use.
- X-04
Which failure modes of agentic systems appear in real incidents, and how are they caught?
INI-XT01-SAF-04 · agentic incidents; first output: incident taxonomy and evidence grades.
- X-05
Is AI augmenting or substituting work, by occupation and region, on measured rather than modelled evidence?
INI-XT01-LAB-05 · measured labour effects; first output: evidence review.
- X-06
How is the EU AI Act being applied, and what evidence of compliance capacity exists?
To be admitted in 2027; first output: implementation note.
- X-07
How does AI change the cyber threat landscape for critical infrastructure?
With GS-13 cyber; first output: scoping note.
- X-08
Which AI capabilities in risk management have been tested in real operations?
Technology capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.
7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment
Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 AI portfolio. They are programme objects, no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.
| ID | موضوع | گونه | پرسش | وضعیت |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| INI-XT01-GRD-01 | Compute–grid–water capacity | Initiative | X-01 | پیشنهادشده |
| INI-XT01-CHP-02 | Chip and mineral supply concentration | Initiative | X-02 | پیشنهادشده |
| INI-XT01-INF-03 | Inference energy measurement | Initiative | X-03 | پیشنهادشده |
| INI-XT01-SAF-04 | Agentic incident evidence | Initiative | X-04 | پیشنهادشده |
| INI-XT01-LAB-05 | Measured labour effects | Initiative | X-05 | پیشنهادشده |
| MSN-XT01-2027-01 | Chip–grid compound Universe mission | مأموریت | X-02 | Candidate |
7.3The pathway
The AI edition reads national readiness chapters, the sector reports on energy, water and cyber, and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed; Canada, Global and Water are issued.
- 01
National readiness chapters
AI and compute in each national edition
CANADA ISSUED · 25 further national baselines
- 02
Sector couplings
GS-02 energy · GS-01 water · GS-13 cyber
GS-01 ISSUED · energy and cyber baselines
- 03
Technology system model
compute, energy, chips, labour, governance
v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence
- 04
Strategic links
SR-13 strategic technology · SR-04 minerals · SR-10 DPI
PLANNED · strategic baselines
- 05
جهان
annual proving environment
CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027
- 06
XT-01 report
this series
BASELINE ISSUED · 2027 annual edition
- 07
Evidence and correction
one graph, many projections
OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027
7.4Universe 2027, evidence pack for the AI candidate mission
- 01
مأموریت
- 02
Core Build · 1 month
- 03
Action · 1 week
- 04
Evidence seal
- 05
Portfolio correction
- 06
Next mandate
| مورد | سابقه | وضعیت | Timing |
|---|---|---|---|
| F1 | Annual mandate record | PLANNED | after the Q2 2027 alignment |
| F2 | Core Build record | PLANNED | one month before the exercise |
| F3 | شواهد مانور | PLANNED | during the Action week |
| F4 | Decision packets | PLANNED | exercise state only |
| F5 | Proof receipts | PLANNED | scoped to each recorded check |
| F6 | After-action report | PLANNED | within one quarter |
| F7 | Upgrade docket | PLANNED | routed to the Portfolio |
| F8 | Portfolio renewal | PLANNED | 2027 global annual edition |
| F9 | Public synthesis | PLANNED | public-safe extracts only |
مأموریت
- ID
- MSN-XT01-2027-01 · chip–grid compound disruption
- Role spine
- Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead, drawn from national pathways
- Receiving actors
- to be identified with the mandate
7.5Handoffs and routing
Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.
| یافته | Routed to | هدف | طبقه |
|---|---|---|---|
| ENE-001 · electricity | GS-02 Energy edition | grid coupling | PUBLIC |
| ENE-002 · US share | INI-XT01-GRD-01 | cluster capacity | PUBLIC |
| CMP-003 · compute | public record | reference for the 2027 series | PUBLIC |
| MIN-005 · chips and minerals | INI-XT01-CHP-02 · SR-04 | supply concentration | PUBLIC |
| LAB-007 · labour | INI-XT01-LAB-05 | measured effects | PUBLIC |
| SAF-009 · incidents | INI-XT01-SAF-04 · GS-13 | agentic incidents | PUBLIC |
| DEV-011 · access | GS-06 Development edition | access coupling | PUBLIC |
| SYS-012 · compound pathway | MSN-XT01-2027-01 | Universe candidate | CONSORTIUM |
| طبقه | Where it goes | Who can see it |
|---|---|---|
| PUBLIC | the published edition and its evidence bundle | anyone |
| CONSORTIUM | governed rooms of the federation | consortium members under agreement |
| CONTROLLED | need-to-know channels | named competent actors only |
7.6Feeds and signal register
| Feed | Producer | Latency | Feeds into |
|---|---|---|---|
| AI Incident Database | Responsible AI Collaborative | پیوسته | SAF-009 |
| AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor | OECD | پیوسته | SAF-009 |
| Electricity market reports | IEA | ماهانه | ENE-001 |
| Compute and model trends | Epoch AI | پیوسته | CMP-003 |
| Export-control notices | national authorities | برای هر اطلاعیه | MIN-005 |
| Grid interconnection queues | system operators | فصلی | RSK-XT01-ENE-002 |
| Model and system cards | developers | بهازای هر انتشار | capability register |
Escalation routes
- none · keep monitoring
- research question
- project
- risk object
- annual publication
- signal report
| ID | Signal | Corroboration | سامانهها | مسیر |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SIG-XT01-001 | Clustered data-centre load lengthening grid queues15 | CORROBORATED | ENE · INF | initiative X-01 |
| SIG-XT01-002 | Tightening export controls on chips, tools and minerals1929 | CORROBORATED | MIN · TRD | initiative X-02 |
| SIG-XT01-003 | Incidents involving autonomous agents | PARTIAL | AIC · DAT · FIN | initiative X-04 |
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 19Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (ed.), Announcement on implementing export control on gallium- and germanium-related items. MOFCOM, Beijing, July 2023.back
- 29U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), Implementation of additional export controls: certain advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items. Federal Register, October 2022, as updated.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Chapter 8
Systems in depth
One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.
8.1Compute and data centres
AI capability rests on compute, and compute rests on data centres: buildings full of accelerators that need power, cooling, land and connectivity.
| مؤلفه | وضعیت | شواهد | وضعیت |
|---|---|---|---|
| Training compute | four to five times a year since about 2010 | 14 | گزارششده |
| Inference | demand rising as use spreads; poorly measured | 1 | Inferred |
| هزینه | cost of fixed-level use collapsing | 2 | گزارششده |
| غلظت | compute concentrated in few providers and regions | 1 | Inferred |
پیوندها
- AIC → ENE electricity
- AIC → WAT cooling
- DAT ↔ AIC cloud dependence
Evidence to bind in 2027
- inference energy by use
- utilisation of deployed compute
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber
- SR-04 Minerals
- SR-13 Strategic technology
- XT-06 Semiconductors
8.2انرژی و آب
AI demand lands on particular grids and basins. The global share of electricity is small; local shares at clusters are large and rising.
| مؤلفه | وضعیت | شواهد | وضعیت |
|---|---|---|---|
| برق | about 1.5% of world use | 1 | گزارششده |
| Local grids | connection queues at clusters | 15 | گزارششده |
| آب | cooling demand at water-stressed sites | 2537 | Inferred |
| Emissions | depend on the power mix of each grid | 122 | گزارششده |
پیوندها
- AIC → ENE load growth
- AIC → WAT cooling demand
- ENE → AIC power availability
Evidence to bind in 2027
- grid capacity at clusters
- water use outside the United States
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber
- SR-04 Minerals
- SR-13 Strategic technology
- XT-06 Semiconductors
8.3Chips and minerals
The AI supply chain is among the most concentrated in the world, from mineral refining to chip fabrication.
| مؤلفه | وضعیت | شواهد | وضعیت |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fabrication | leading-edge capacity in one region | 17 | گزارششده |
| کانیها | refining concentrated in a few countries | 18 | گزارششده |
| Trade controls | chips, tools and minerals since 2022 | 1929 | گزارششده |
| New capacity | fabs under construction elsewhere | 17 | Inferred |
پیوندها
- MIN → AIC chips
- TRD → AIC controls
- WAT and ENE → fabs
Evidence to bind in 2027
- current capacity shares by node
- time to recover from a disruption
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber
- SR-04 Minerals
- SR-13 Strategic technology
- XT-06 Semiconductors
8.4Economy and workforce
AI is spreading through work faster than evidence on its effects. Exposure is broad; whether it brings augmentation or substitution is the open question.
| مؤلفه | وضعیت | شواهد | وضعیت |
|---|---|---|---|
| پذیرش | 78% of organisations in 2024 | 2 | گزارششده |
| مواجهه | a quarter to two-fifths of jobs | 1632 | گزارششده |
| Job churn | 170 million created and 92 million displaced by 2030 | 20 | گزارششده |
| Measured effects | limited causal evidence so far | , | Expert input |
پیوندها
- AIC → labour tasks and skills
- AIC → FIN productivity and investment
- labour → HLT income and wellbeing
Evidence to bind in 2027
- measured employment effects by occupation
- access to retraining
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber
- SR-04 Minerals
- SR-13 Strategic technology
- XT-06 Semiconductors
8.5Safety, security and failure modes
Harms are rising with use. Agentic systems that act on their own add new failure modes, while incident evidence remains thin.
| مؤلفه | وضعیت | شواهد | وضعیت |
|---|---|---|---|
| Incidents | record 233 reported in 2024 | 227 | گزارششده |
| ردهبندی ریسک | malicious use, malfunction, systemic risks | 3 | گزارششده |
| سایبری | AI changes attack and defence | 21 | Inferred |
| Agentic failures | little systematic evidence | , | Expert input |
پیوندها
- AIC → DAT cyber exposure
- AIC → FIN automated decisions
- AIC → information integrity
Evidence to bind in 2027
- agentic incident taxonomy
- evaluation results for deployed agents
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber
- SR-04 Minerals
- SR-13 Strategic technology
- XT-06 Semiconductors
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
- 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 25P. Li, J. Yang, M. A. Islam and S. Ren, “Making AI less ‘thirsty’: uncovering and addressing the secret water footprint of AI models,” arXiv:2304.03271 (preprint), 2023.back
- 37S. Valadbaygi (ed.), Global Water Risk & Resilience Report 2026, Baseline Edition. GCRI for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto, 2026. NR-SECTOR-WATER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0.back
- 22Ember (ed.), Global Electricity Review 2025. Ember, London, 2025.back
- 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
- 19Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (ed.), Announcement on implementing export control on gallium- and germanium-related items. MOFCOM, Beijing, July 2023.back
- 29U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), Implementation of additional export controls: certain advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items. Federal Register, October 2022, as updated.back
- 18International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024.back
- 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
- 20World Economic Forum (ed.), Future of Jobs Report 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
- 3Y. Bengio (ed.), International AI Safety Report. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, London, January 2025.back
- 27Responsible AI Collaborative (ed.), AI Incident Database. incidentdatabase.ai, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
- 21World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Annex A
روششناسی
How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.
A.1روشها
The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.
| No. | Derivation | Calculation | نتیجه |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | Growth in data-centre electricity to 2030 | 945 ÷ 415 | ≈ 2.3× |
| (2) | Increase in organisational AI use, 2023–2024 | 78 − 55 | 23 points |
| (3) | Net job change expected by 2030 | 170 − 92 | ≈ 78 million |
| (4) | Compute growth over five years at 4–5× a year | 4⁵ to 5⁵ | ≈ 1,000–3,000× |
| Strength | تعریف |
|---|---|
| STRONG | a disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region |
| MODERATE | an effect is documented but buffered or slower |
| WEAK | an effect is plausible but not documented at global scale |
| برچسب | قاعده |
|---|---|
| گزارششده | value as issued by its source, with year |
| Inferred | reasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement |
| برآوردی | Nexus analytical value with stated method |
| سناریو | conditional on stated assumptions |
| Expert input | structured editorial judgement awaiting evidence |
A.2Model card, Technology System Model v0
- Model ID
- MDL-XT01-AI · v0.1
- هدف
- represent AI as infrastructure coupled to energy, water, minerals, labour and institutions
- خانواده
- graph-based system of systems
- ورودیها
- the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
- روش
- expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
- اعتبارسنجی
- none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
- عدم قطعیت
- qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
- دامنهٔ اعتبار
- global scale; not for site, company or model-level use
- بازتولیدپذیری
- strength table and sources published in this edition
typed in v0
documented within one season
documented, buffered
plausible, undocumented
A.3The baseline evidence cut
Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.
- Cut ID
- DC-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-B0
- نوع
- baseline documentary cut
- Resolution policy
- pinned · as of 30 September 2026
- Sources pinned
- 40 cited sources, each at the edition and retrieval date in the references
- اجراهای مدل
- none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
- Digest
- computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
- Supersedes
- nothing, first cut of the series
- Superseded by
- the 2027 AI annual cut
تبارنامه
- 01
source edition
- 02
pinned citation
- 03
finding
- 04
page
- 05
publication record
| عنصر | Baseline 2026 | 2027 global annual |
|---|---|---|
| منابع | cited global publications, pinned by edition | national, regional and sector cuts through one graph |
| Analysis | stated methods and editorial estimates | typed analysis specifications |
| مدلها | Technology System Model v0 specification | model runs with receipts |
| یافتهها | twelve baseline findings | findings re-bound to federation evidence |
| بازبینی | five passes scheduled | five passes on the exact digest |
A.4Evidence age and coverage
A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.
| نشانگر | مشاهدهشده | منتشرشد | تناوب | Next release |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Data-centre electricity use | 2024 | Apr 2025 | دورهای | next IEA update |
| US data-centre share | 2023 | Dec 2024 | دورهای | next LBNL report |
| Organisations using AI | 2024 | Apr 2025 | سالانه | AI Index 2026 |
| Training compute trend | 2010–2024 | 2024 | پیوسته | پیوسته |
| Leading-edge chip capacity share | 2019 | 2021 | one-off | new studies |
| Reported AI incidents | 2024 | Apr 2025 | سالانه | AI Index 2026 |
| Jobs exposed to AI | 2024–2025 | 2024–2025 | دورهای | new estimates |
| People offline | 2024 | Nov 2024 | سالانه | سالانه |
| سیستم | پوشش | Thinnest dimension |
|---|---|---|
| انرژی | GOOD | inference against training |
| آب | THIN | use outside the United States |
| Compute and cost | GOOD | efficiency of deployed systems |
| Chips and minerals | PARTIAL | current capacity shares |
| پذیرش | PARTIAL | small firms and public sector |
| Labour | PARTIAL | measured, not modelled, effects |
| Safety | THIN | agentic incidents |
| حکمرانی | GOOD | implementation evidence |
A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources
Issued by the International Energy Agency from data-centre, grid and industry data with scenario modelling to 2030. Role: binds ENE-001 and the 2030 projection, labelled as a projection.
EVD-XT01-001
Energy and AI1
Issued by Stanford HAI from surveys, public datasets and incident databases. Annual. Role: binds adoption, cost, investment and incident findings.
EVD-XT01-002
Artificial Intelligence Index Report 20252
| Dimension | EVD-GLB-001 | EVD-GLB-002 |
|---|---|---|
| Completeness | company disclosure incomplete | survey samples skew to large firms |
| Timeliness | about a year after the data | about four months after the year |
| Revision | projections revised with new data | series revised annually |
| Method transparency | methods and scenarios published | methods published by chapter |
| External validation | compared with national laboratory estimates | widely cited; no formal audit |
Evidence cards to follow in 2027
A.6Publication acceptance record
Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.
| گروه | مساحت | موارد | قبول | N/A | در انتظار |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Identity and scope | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| D2 | Source and data | 12 | 9 | 1 | 2 |
| D3 | Analysis and models | 12 | 3 | 8 | 1 |
| D4 | Findings and claims | 9 | 8 | 0 | 1 |
| D5 | Figures, tables, maps | 10 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| D6 | Editorial and citations | 10 | 8 | 0 | 2 |
| D7 | Review and approval | 13 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| D8 | Artefact and design | 12 | 7 | 0 | 5 |
| D9 | Registry and release | 9 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
Publication gate
- Conditions met
- 14 of 23 at evidence close
- Blocking problems
- none recorded
- Open conditions
- reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer
Not applicable at baseline
- اجراهای مدل
- first runs in Q1 2027
- نقشهها
- plates in Q2 2027
- Waivers
- هیچ
A.7Status words
| وضعیت | معنای آن |
|---|---|
| مشاهدهشده | Measured directly and published by the source. |
| گزارششده | Published statistics of an official or institutional source. |
| اعلامشده | Stated by the body concerned; not independently measured. |
| برآوردی | A Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A. |
| مدلسازیشده | Produced by a stated model from cited inputs. |
| Inferred | Reasoned from cited evidence; not measured. |
| پیشبینی | A projection by the cited source. |
| Simulated | A simulation result under stated assumptions. |
| سناریو | A conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction. |
| Expert input | Expert judgement, recorded with its basis. |
| Candidate | Proposed for a later edition; not yet evidence. |
| Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject. | |
A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected
Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.
| گام | آنچه رخ میدهد | منبع |
|---|---|---|
| 01 Evidence arrives from the pillars | Foundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s. | |
| 02 The cut is sealed | On the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on. | |
| 03 The edition is assembled | The edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide. | |
| 04 The keys turn | At the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward. | |
| 05 The gate opens | A named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit. | |
| 06 Signed and deposited | The PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI. | |
| 07 Published on its desk’s site | Only then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part. | |
| 08 Corrections go to Standards | Method and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut. |
A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).
Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.
A.9Glossary and abbreviations
| واژه | معنا |
|---|---|
| Baseline Edition | the inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series |
| WEFH+B | water, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core |
| پیوستگی | a typed dependency through which one system transmits to another |
| Protection gap | the share of losses not covered by insurance |
| Capability ladder | LISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED |
| EQL | evidence-quality level, 1–5 |
| Evidence cut | a frozen resolution of exact sources and versions |
| NNC · NLC · NWG | National Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups |
| Abbreviation | Expansion |
|---|---|
| AI | artificial intelligence |
| AI RMF | NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework |
| BIS | US Bureau of Industry and Security |
| CETS | Council of Europe Treaty Series |
| GPU | graphics processing unit, used as an AI accelerator |
| HAI | Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence |
| IEA | آژانس بینالمللی انرژی |
| ILO | سازمان بینالمللی کار |
| ITU | اتحادیهٔ بینالمللی مخابرات |
| LBNL | Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory |
| TWh | terawatt-hour |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
A.10Technical annex
| مورد | Annex | فهرست مطالب | وضعیت |
|---|---|---|---|
| A.1 | Indicator definitions | the global indicator set, with units and sources | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.2 | Coupling strengths | the twenty-cell matrix and its rationale | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.3 | Scenario specification | SCN-XT01-CHG-01 assumptions and signposts | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.4 | Capability placements | rung evidence for fifteen functions | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.5 | Model diagnostics | first runs and validation | 2027 |
| A.6 | Sensitivity analyses | influence of coupling strengths | 2027 |
| A.7 | Cluster notes | cards for the major data-centre clusters | 2027 |
| A.8 | Review statements | pass-by-pass review record | AT RELEASE |
A.1 · indicator definition, data-centre electricity use
- Construct
- annual electricity consumed by data centres, including cooling
- واحد
- TWh a year
- روش
- IEA bottom-up estimate from server, storage, network and cooling loads
- منبع
- IEA, Energy and AI1
- عدم قطعیت
- company disclosure incomplete; range published
- محدودیتهای شناختهشده
- does not separate AI from other workloads exactly
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
- 3Y. Bengio (ed.), International AI Safety Report. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, London, January 2025.back
- 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Annex B
Data appendix
The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.
B.1The indicator set
| نشانگر | مقدار | واحد | سال | وضعیت | منبع |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Data-centre electricity use | ≈415 | TWh | 2024 | گزارششده | 1 |
| Share of world electricity | ≈1.5 | % | 2024 | گزارششده | 1 |
| Projected data-centre use | ≈945 | TWh | 2030 | سناریو | 1 |
| US data-centre share of electricity | 4.4 | % | 2023 | گزارششده | 15 |
| Frontier training compute growth | 4–5× | a year | 2010–2024 | گزارششده | 14 |
| Fall in cost of fixed-level use | >280× | fold | 2022–2024 | گزارششده | 2 |
| Organisations using AI | 78 | % | 2024 | گزارششده | 2 |
| Corporate AI investment | ≈252 | US$ billion | 2024 | گزارششده | 2 |
| Reported AI incidents | 233 | رخدادها | 2024 | گزارششده | 2 |
| Leading-edge logic capacity in Taiwan | 92 | % | 2019 | گزارششده | 17 |
| Jobs exposed to AI, IMF | ≈40 | % | 2024 | گزارششده | 16 |
| Jobs exposed to generative AI, ILO | ≈25 | % | 2025 | گزارششده | 32 |
| Jobs created by 2030 | 170 | million | 2025–2030 | گزارششده | 20 |
| Jobs displaced by 2030 | 92 | million | 2025–2030 | گزارششده | 20 |
| People offline | 2.6 | billion | 2024 | گزارششده | 34 |
B.2Global source register
The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.
Domains bound by the register
- WAT
- ENE
- FOO
- HLT
- BIO
- CLI
- FIN
- TRD
- MIN
- AIC
| منبع | رده | پوشش | Period | تناوب | نقش |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy and AI1 | intergovernmental | global | 2024–2030 | دورهای | ENE |
| AI Index 20252 | university | global | 2024 | سالانه | adoption |
| International AI Safety Report3 | expert panel | global | 2025 | دورهای | safety |
| Data-centre energy report15 | national laboratory | ایالات متحده | 2023 | دورهای | ENE |
| Compute trends14 | research institute | global | 2010–2024 | پیوسته | compute |
| Semiconductor supply chain17 | industry · consultancy | global | 2019 | one-off | chips |
| Critical Minerals Outlook18 | intergovernmental | global | 2024 | سالانه | MIN |
| Labour exposure1632 | IMF · ILO | global | 2024–2025 | دورهای | labour |
| Facts and Figures34 | UN agency | global | 2024 | سالانه | access |
| پایگاههای داده رخدادها2728 | civil society · OECD | global | پیوسته | پیوسته | safety |
B.3Regional reading, AI across ten clusters
Regional plates follow with the regional editions. This page gives the regional reading of AI infrastructure and exposure in table form, and ranks no region.
| منطقه | Principal hazards | Systems most exposed | Baseline evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| آمریکای شمالی | largest data-centre load; grid queues | power, water, labour | LBNL15; IEA1 |
| آمریکای جنوبی | early adoption; clean-power potential | energy, skills | assessments33 |
| اروپا | binding AI law; grid constraints | governance, power | AI Act4 |
| Eurasia | limited public data | access to chips | export controls29 |
| خاورمیانه و شمال آفریقا | new data-centre investment; water stress | water, power | IEA1 |
| آفریقا | connectivity gaps | access, skills | ITU34 |
| جنوب آسیا | large workforce exposure | labour, skills | ILO32 |
| شرق آسیا | chip manufacturing concentration | supply chain | SIA–BCG17 |
| ASEAN | fast-growing data-centre hubs | power, water | IEA1 |
| Oceania-Pacific | small-island access gaps | connectivity | ITU34 |
B.4Cluster card, leading-edge chip manufacturing
- supply chain
- single region
- chips
- minerals
- Systems in view
- compute, electronics, trade, finance
- Defining fact
- about 92% of leading-edge logic capacity in one region in 201917
- پیوندها
- MIN → AIC chips; ENE and WAT → fabs; TRD → AIC export controls
- Capability evidence
- new fabs announced in several regions; stockpiles limited
- شکافها
- current capacity shares; time to recover from disruption
- Agenda items
- X-02
Leading-edge chips depend on a handful of fabs, tool makers and mineral refiners. Each is efficient; together they form a chain with few alternatives.
SUPPLY
One region, one chain
Chip fabrication uses large volumes of ultra-pure water and reliable power, coupling chip supply to droughts and grid events.
PHYSICAL INPUTS
Fabs need water and power
Export controls on chips, tools and minerals since 2022 add policy risk to physical risk.
TRADE
Controls tighten
B.5How countries appear in the AI edition
Countries enter the AI edition through the readiness chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never ranked.
| Card field | آنچه نشان میدهد | منبع |
|---|---|---|
| WEFH+B state | each core system against peer distribution bands | national edition |
| پیوندها | the national dependency matrix | national edition |
| Risk objects | the national risk portfolio | national edition |
| Capability rungs | the national capability ladder | national edition |
| Evidence age | oldest and newest source dates | national source register |
Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme
countries and unions
clusters
flagship and sector
technology reports
How to read a country card
- Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
- Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
- Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
- Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such
| موج | Countries and unions | وضعیت |
|---|---|---|
| W0 | کانادا | ISSUED |
| W1 | United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, Switzerland | PLANNED |
| W2 | Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia | PLANNED |
B.6پروانهها
| محتوا | پروانه |
|---|---|
| Text | CC BY 4.0 |
| داده | on the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0 |
| ارقام | Nexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited |
| نقشهها | boundary source and licence printed on each plate |
| فراداده | CC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it |
| Third-party data, figures and text | The source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed |
| Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence. | |
B.7Formats and provenance
| قالب | گونه | وضعیت | چیست | شناسه |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Web edition | HTML | در این وبسایت | Draft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source. | NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 |
| Print edition | At release | A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release. | NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 | |
| Indicator data | CSV · JSON | در این وبسایت | 15 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release. | NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1 |
| ارقام | SVG · PNG | در این وبسایت | 4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder. | FIG-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-* |
| Slides | ثبت نشده | No slide deck is recorded for this edition. | ||
| گزارش مختصر شواهد | HTML · PDF | ثبت نشده | No evidence brief is recorded for this edition. | |
| Dataset with DOI | DataCite | At release | Concept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet. |
خاستگاه
- Edition pack
- The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
- Evidence cut
- DC-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
- بازتولیدپذیری
- sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
- Self-check
- 14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
- بازبینی
- five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
- ناشر ثبتشده
- GCRI for the Nexus Consortium
- اصلاحیهها
- Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
- 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
- 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
- 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
- 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024.back
- 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
- 20World Economic Forum (ed.), Future of Jobs Report 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
- 34ITU (ed.), Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2024. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2024.back
- 3Y. Bengio (ed.), International AI Safety Report. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, London, January 2025.back
- 18International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
- 27Responsible AI Collaborative (ed.), AI Incident Database. incidentdatabase.ai, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
- 28OECD (ed.), OECD AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor. OECD.AI, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
- 33UNCTAD (ed.), Technology and Innovation Report 2025: Inclusive Artificial Intelligence for Development. UNCTAD, Geneva, 2025.back
- 4European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, as amended.back
- 29U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), Implementation of additional export controls: certain advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items. Federal Register, October 2022, as updated.back
- AI and Agentic Systems 2026
- Annex C
References and record
Every source the edition rests on, the publication record, the corrections log and the open record.
C.140 sources
NR-CIT-1, editor first. A DOI is linked where the source has one; Nexus records carry a UNI once the catalogue allocates it (NS-1).
- 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 3Y. Bengio (ed.), International AI Safety Report. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, London, January 2025. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 4European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, as amended. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6
- 5NIST (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), NIST AI 100-1. NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 2023. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
- 6NIST (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile, NIST AI 600-1. NIST, Gaithersburg, MD, 2024. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
- 7ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Information technology, Artificial intelligence, Management system. ISO, Geneva, 2023. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
- 8OECD (ed.), Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence, OECD/LEGAL/0449, as amended in 2024. OECD, Paris, 2024. Cited in chapter 6
- 9UNESCO (ed.), Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. UNESCO, Paris, 2021. Cited in chapter 6
- 10Council of Europe (ed.), Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, CETS No. 225. Council of Europe, Vilnius, 2024. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6
- 11United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Pact for the Future, resolution 79/1, annex I: Global Digital Compact. United Nations, New York, 2024. Cited in chapter 6
- 12United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution establishing the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence and the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance. United Nations, New York, August 2025. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6
- 13UK Government (ed.), The Bletchley Declaration by Countries Attending the AI Safety Summit, 1–2 November 2023. London, 2023. Cited in chapter 4
- 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
- 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 18International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 19Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (ed.), Announcement on implementing export control on gallium- and germanium-related items. MOFCOM, Beijing, July 2023. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
- 20World Economic Forum (ed.), Future of Jobs Report 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 21World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 22Ember (ed.), Global Electricity Review 2025. Ember, London, 2025. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
- 23E. Strubell, A. Ganesh and A. McCallum, “Energy and policy considerations for deep learning in NLP,” in Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pp. 3645–3650, 2019. Cited in chapter 6
- 24D. Patterson, J. Gonzalez, Q. Le et al., “Carbon emissions and large neural network training,” arXiv:2104.10350 (preprint, not peer-reviewed), 2021. Cited in chapter 6
- 25P. Li, J. Yang, M. A. Islam and S. Ren, “Making AI less ‘thirsty’: uncovering and addressing the secret water footprint of AI models,” arXiv:2304.03271 (preprint), 2023. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 26R. Bommasani, D. A. Hudson, E. Adeli et al., “On the opportunities and risks of foundation models,” arXiv:2108.07258 (preprint), 2021. Cited in chapter 6
- 27Responsible AI Collaborative (ed.), AI Incident Database. incidentdatabase.ai, retrieved 2026-09-30. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 28OECD (ed.), OECD AI Incidents and Hazards Monitor. OECD.AI, retrieved 2026-09-30. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
- 29U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), Implementation of additional export controls: certain advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items. Federal Register, October 2022, as updated. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
- 30G7 Hiroshima AI Process (ed.), Hiroshima Process International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems. G7, Hiroshima, 2023. Cited in chapter 6
- 31UN High-level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Governing AI for Humanity: Final Report. United Nations, New York, September 2024. Cited in chapter 6
- 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
- 33UNCTAD (ed.), Technology and Innovation Report 2025: Inclusive Artificial Intelligence for Development. UNCTAD, Geneva, 2025. Cited in chapter 6
- 34ITU (ed.), Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2024. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2024. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6
- 35S. Valadbaygi (ed.), Reports, The Foundational Edition, Volumes I and II. Reports series, Edition 2026–2030, V1.0. GCRI for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto, 2026.
- 36S. Valadbaygi (ed.), Global Systems Risk & Resilience Report 2026, Baseline Edition. GCRI for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto, 2026. NR-GLOBAL-SYSTEMS-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0. Cited in chapter 3
- 37S. Valadbaygi (ed.), Global Water Risk & Resilience Report 2026, Baseline Edition. GCRI for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto, 2026. NR-SECTOR-WATER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 8
- 38S. Valadbaygi (ed.), Canada Systems Risk & Resilience Report 2026, Baseline Edition. GCRI for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto, 2026. NR-COUNTRY-CAN-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0.
- 39International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Energy Review 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025.
- 40IFRS Foundation (ed.), IFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures. ISSB, London, 2023.
C.2Publication record
انتشار
- عنوان
- Exponential Technology Report 2026, AI and Agentic Systems, Baseline Edition
- مجموعه
- Reports · Exponential Technology Series XT-01
- ویراست
- Baseline Edition 2026 · inaugural annual
- نسخه
- v1.0.0 · draft for stewardship review
- Publication ID
- NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
- بستن شواهد
- 30 September 2026
- Publication date
- اکتبر 2026
- DOI
- concept and version DOI at deposit
ناشر
- ناشر ثبتشده
- The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for the Nexus Consortium
- مکان
- Toronto
- ویراستار
- Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor
- متولیان
- GCRI · technical truth · GRF · public meaning · GRA · capital meaning
- پروانه
- text CC BY 4.0; data on the terms of each source
- Copyright
- © 2026 GCRI · Nexus Consortium
- زبان
- English (en-GB) source edition
- Correspondence
- Registry correction pathway · editorial office
Colophon
- قالب
- A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF
- Typefaces
- Space Grotesk (display) · Geist (text) · IBM Plex Sans Italic (standfirsts) · IBM Plex Mono (data)
- Design standard
- Reports Foundational Edition, Volume I, Part VII
- دسترسپذیری
- tagged PDF and HTML targets; text alternatives for every figure
- تولید
- Reports editorial team, GCRI
Release path for this version
| گام | آنچه رخ میدهد | زمان |
|---|---|---|
| پیشنویس | editorial self-check complete at evidence close | اکتبر 2026 |
| Steward review | five passes on the exact draft (keys T · M · F · N) | Q4 2026 |
| تأیید | publication authority approves the exact digest | before release |
| Deposit | concept and version DOI minted; registry pointer set | at release |
| جانشینی | the 2027 AI edition reports changes against this baseline | 2027 |
- Current version
- v1.0.0 draft, stewardship review
- Previous edition
- none, first edition of the series
- Next edition
- NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2027-v1.0.0
- Latest version
- resolve the concept DOI or the registry record
- Correction route
- Registry correction pathway
- Notice types
- erratum · addendum · supersession · withdrawal
C.3سیاههٔ اصلاحات
0correction notices. No edition has been released yet, so none can be corrected; the log below lists each edition’s current version.
| ویراست | نسخه | تاریخ | وضعیت | تغییر | Notice |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XT-01 | NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 | اکتبر 2026 | پیشنویس | Baseline Edition 2026, inaugural annual edition, | هیچ |
Notice types: erratum, addendum, supersession, withdrawal. A correction is a new version with a published notice; the earlier version stays resolvable, and no edition is ever edited in silence.
C.4Open record
This edition’s open record
- Publication ID
- NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
- Desk identifier and series alias
- NR-GCRI-XT-01-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 · NR-XTC-XT-01-2026-BL
- Collection
- NR-COL-2026-BASELINE (IsPartOf at deposit)
- DOI
- Concept and version DOI at deposit, on Zenodo with DataCite metadata
- Versions
- Each correction is a new version (isNewVersionOf); the concept DOI resolves to the latest
- Bundle
- RO-Crate 1.2 with CITATION.cff, CodeMeta and PROV-O provenance; a signed manifest
- پروانه
- CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0) for original material; metadata CC0 1.0
Credit and identity
- ORCID
- Your iD in the deposit and the contribution record; DataCite can then add the work to your ORCID record
- ROR
- Your organisation by its ROR identifier, never by a typed name alone
- CRediT
- Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Validation, Visualisation, Writing, review and editing
- حساب
- None needed to contribute; never a password
Find and follow
Search the open indexes for Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems; software is cited by its SWHID from Software Heritage, and a quantified scenario run is preregistered on OSF before it is run. Annotation is your choice: Hypothesis opens this page in its own viewer.
Mirrors and harvest
The DOI is canonical. At release each signed bundle is also given an IPFS content identifier and a bloxberg anchor as mirrors; both are listed in the record once they exist. Zenodo exposes every record over OAI-PMH, and reviews and endorsements can arrive through COAR Notify where the repository supports it.
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}C.5Where this edition sits among the six pillars
Foundry seals the evidence and Universe tests it; Reports publishes it; Standards takes its corrections and Academy teaches from it.
- F03 Sealed observations and indicator series Foundry Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
- F04 After-action and scenario findings for Universe After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
- F05 National Portfolio movement for chapter Foundry National Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
- Applied in editions Standards Nexus Standards: applied in editions.
- XT-01 edition Reports AI and Agentic Systems 2026, published in every format with its sources, citation and corrections.
- F06 Method and correction findings as change Standards Method and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
- F12 Q4 synthesis informs the next-year Universe Q4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
- Taught in the open Academy Risk Academy: taught in the open.
What Foundry and Universe hand to this edition, and what it hands to Standards, Universe and Academy. From the programme spine; XT-01 is a drafted Baseline Edition, so these handoffs run from its first operational quarter.
| تحویل | Between | What crosses, and when |
|---|---|---|
| F03 | Foundry to Reports | Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout). |
| F04 | Universe to Reports | After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review). |
| F05 | Foundry to Reports | National Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review). |
| Ring | Nexus Standards to Reports | Nexus Standards: applied in editions. |
| F06 | Reports to Nexus Standards | Method and correction findings as change proposals (correction). |
| F12 | Reports to Universe | Q4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal). |
| Ring | Reports to Risk Academy | Risk Academy: taught in the open. |
