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Exponential Technology Report 2026: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography

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Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026

Imprint

Editor
Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor, the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI)
Penerbit resmi
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto
Report number
NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE
Penutupan bukti
30 September 2026, cut DC-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-B0
Status
Draft under stewardship review; not yet released
DOI and UNI
Issued at deposit
Lisensi
CC BY 4.0 for Nexus-authored text, tables and figures; third-party material keeps its own licence
Cite as
Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Exponential Technology Report 2026: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI). https://therisk.global/nexus-reports/editions/xt-10/

Daftar isi

  1. ·

    Executive summary

  2. 1

    Chapter 1. Cryptography is infrastructure under change

  3. 2

    Chapter 2. Key findings

  4. 3

    Chapter 3. Systems and sectors at baseline

  5. 4

    Chapter 4. Risks and capability

  6. 5

    Chapter 5. Signature lag while key agreement migrates

  7. 6

    Chapter 6. Readings from the other desks

  8. 7

    Chapter 7. The 2027 agenda

  9. 8

    Chapter 8. Systems in depth

  10. A

    Annex A. Methodology

  11. B

    Annex B. Data appendix

  12. C

    Annex C. References and record

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Executive summary

The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.

7 min read1 figure0 tables15 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

S.1Abstract

Cybersecurity and advanced cryptography matter to the Nexus programme because every other infrastructure relies on them. They are also being changed. NIST finalised three post-quantum standards on 13 August 2024123 and selected a fifth algorithm, HQC, as a backup on 11 March 20256. The UK NCSC asks organisations to plan by 2028, start priority work by 2031 and finish by 203510. A 2025 preprint estimates that RSA-2048 could be factored with under a million noisy qubits in under a week, under stated assumptions22. Deployment has moved first where it is cheap. Cloudflare reported in October 2025 that most human traffic to its network used post-quantum key agreement, and OpenSSH made a post-quantum exchange its default in version 10.02324. Signatures and certificates lag, because they add size and cost23. Threat pressure is large and mostly ordinary. The CISA KEV catalogue is the public list of vulnerabilities exploited in the wild, and its count at the 30 September close is not bound, and the FBI recorded 859,532 complaints and USD 16.6 billion of reported losses for 202415. The cost and workforce evidence comes in part from vendors and is labelled weak. This baseline sets out what the evidence supports and where it is thin. It forecasts no capability date and ranks no country or vendor.

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the cybersecurity and cryptography baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

  1. Three NIST standards were finalised in August 2024; HQC is a backup selected in March 2025.16

    Are post-quantum standards ready?Reported

  2. The UK NCSC says 2035; the NIST IR 8547 draft of November 2024 proposes disallowing quantum-vulnerable algorithms after 2035.1044

    When must migration finish?Reported

  3. Vendor and open-source evidence shows wide deployment of hybrid key agreement.2324

    Is key agreement moving?Reported

  4. Slower. Post-quantum signatures add size, and broad certificate trust is not expected before 2027.23

    Are signatures moving?Reported

  5. A 2025 estimate: under a million noisy qubits in under a week, under stated assumptions.22

    How many qubits would break RSA-2048?Reported

  6. Exploited known vulnerabilities and ransomware recur across the sources read.131415

    What drives incidents?Reported

  7. Skills needs rose in 2025; no gap figure was published.20

    What does the workforce look like?Reported

  8. The lag of signatures and long-life devices behind key agreement. SCN-XT10-SIG-01

    What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 5NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CRY-001

NIST finalised three post-quantum cryptography standards on 13 August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA).

Figure S.1Standards finalised on 13 August 2024
ButirBar, scaled to the largest valueNilai
FIPS 203 · key establishment (ML-KEM)1
FIPS 204 · signatures (ML-DSA)1
FIPS 205 · backup signatures (SLH-DSA)1

Source: NIST publication pages for FIPS 203, 204 and 205123. Each bar counts one standard.

Standards exist, so migration is now an engineering and planning task. NIST added HQC as a backup key-encapsulation method on a different mathematical basis, with a final standard expected in 20276. Guidance on using key encapsulation was published in September 20257. The NIST transition draft IR 8547, published on 12 November 2024, proposes disallowing quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 203544.

S.4At a glance

3standar

NIST, August 2024123

2035milestone

NCSC finish date10

<1million

qubits for RSA-2048, estimate22

NOT BOUNDentries

CISA KEV count at the close

859,532complaints

FBI IC3, 202415

4.99USD million

average breach cost, 202618

S.5What each steward reads in it

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading cybersecurity and cryptography as protective infrastructure under change.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people the story arrives as a message about encryption, a breach notice or a ransomware headline.

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Breach and ransomware costs come from vendors and are weak evidence.

NEXUS

Sintesis

Cryptography is well described by standards and thinly measured as a system.

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

A baseline: the 2026 state of cybersecurity and advanced cryptography as infrastructure and the couplings through which it carries risk into other systems. It synthesises published evidence and ranks no country, company or asset.

What it is not

Not a forecast of when any machine will break any cipher, a technology ranking, an endorsement of any vendor or product, or an assessment of any programme. Standards, regulation and enforcement are decisions of competent authorities.

What comes next

National, regional and sector evidence feeds the 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography edition through the federation. Each edition reports what changed against this baseline: observations, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 7NIST (ed.), Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, SP 800-227 (publication page; final 18 September 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cryptography is infrastructure under change

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

8 min read2 figures1 table19 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is cybersecurity and cryptography risk concentrated?
  • Which couplings carry cybersecurity and cryptography shocks into other systems?
  • Which cybersecurity and cryptography capabilities hold under compound stress?
  • What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five footprint and governance chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • Skenario
  • Three lenses
  • Portofolio

1.2The argument

Cybersecurity is usually discussed as a contest between attackers and defenders. The 2026 evidence reads it as an infrastructure under change: the cryptography beneath every other infrastructure is being replaced, while ordinary vulnerabilities and ransomware keep producing most of the visible harm11315.

The standards evidence is strong. NIST finalised three post-quantum standards in 2024 and chose a backup in 20251236. National timelines exist: the NCSC asks for completion by 203510, and the NIST transition draft of November 2024 proposes disallowing quantum-vulnerable algorithms after 203544. A 2025 preprint lowered the estimated qubits for RSA-2048 to under a million, under stated assumptions22.

Deployment evidence is uneven. Key agreement has moved quickly where it is cheap, in browsers, content networks and secure shell2324. Signatures and certificates are harder, because they add size to every handshake23. Protocols built on messaging have added post-quantum steps2526.

The threat evidence is dominated by ordinary causes. Exploited known vulnerabilities, ransomware and fraud account for the reported harm131415. Cost and workforce evidence comes in part from vendors and is read as weak181920.

Figure 1.1How large are ransomware payments on-chain? USD million

Chainalysis estimates a fall of about 8% in on-chain ransomware payments from 2024 to 2025, and expects the 2025 total to grow as more payments are attributed. The 2024 figure was revised upward from USD 813 million. The series is a vendor estimate and covers on-chain payments only19.

ButirBar, scaled to the largest valueNilai
2024, updated estimate892
2025, more than820

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.

Figure ID FIG-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

820USD million

2025 floor, vendor estimate19

892USD million

2024 updated estimate19

813USD million

2024 original estimate19

12.5USD million

ransomware adjusted losses reported to the FBI, 202415

1.3The six-sector nexus: twenty couplings across five assessed sectors

The cybersecurity and cryptography-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their cybersecurity and cryptography content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings across the six sectors

Each line is one coupling from one sector to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events. Infrastructure: not assessed in this edition’s coupling matrix, so it is drawn hollow with no couplings. The hexagon is the estate doctrine: six sectors and fifteen relations.

  • Strong
  • Sedang
  • Weak
  • Not assessed in this edition

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated. Hexagon: the estate doctrine (Signature).

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT Air·WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
ENE EnergiWEAK
control network dependence, undocumented
·WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
power for facilities, undocumented
WEAK
no documented link
FOO PanganWEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
·WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
HLT KesehatanWEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
·WEAK
no documented link
BIO Keanekaragaman hayatiWEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    INF → DAT

    A capable machine would expose data protected by current public-key methods.

    Inferred RSA-2048 estimate22

  2. 02

    GOV → INF

    National timelines set migration dates for operators.

    Reported NCSC and NIST draft1044

  3. 03

    INF → FIN

    Exploited vulnerabilities and ransomware create cost and loss.

    Reported IC3, IBM, Chainalysis151819

  4. 04

    INF → INF

    Larger signatures slow handshakes and delay certificate migration.

    Inferred Cloudflare analysis23

  5. 05

    GOV → TRD

    Reporting duties and disclosure rules cross borders.

    Reported SEC rule and EU regulation2127

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 25Signal (ed.), Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets, SPQR triple ratchet (blog post, 2 October 2025; ML-KEM 768; gradual rollout; formal verification). Signal Messenger, Mountain View. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 26Apple (ed.), iMessage with PQ3: The new state of the art in quantum-secure messaging at scale (security blog post, 21 February 2024; Kyber-1024 and Kyber-768 hybrid with P-256; level 3 on its own scale). Apple, Cupertino. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 21US Securities and Exchange Commission (ed.), SEC adopts rules on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident disclosure by public companies (press release 2023-139; adopted 26 July 2023; Form 8-K Item 1.05 within four business days of a materiality determination). SEC, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 27European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 20 November 2024 (Article 71: in force on the twentieth day after publication; applies from 11 December 2027; Article 14, reporting obligations of manufacturers, from 11 September 2026; Chapter IV from 11 June 2026). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

Key findings

Twelve findings carry the cybersecurity and cryptography baseline. They are grouped by coupling and never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

7 min read1 figure0 tables18 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 5NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CRY-001

NIST finalised three post-quantum cryptography standards on 13 August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA).

Figure 2.1Standards finalised on 13 August 2024
ButirBar, scaled to the largest valueNilai
FIPS 203 · key establishment (ML-KEM)1
FIPS 204 · signatures (ML-DSA)1
FIPS 205 · backup signatures (SLH-DSA)1

Source: NIST publication pages for FIPS 203, 204 and 205123. Each bar counts one standard.

Implication

Standards exist, so migration is now an engineering and planning task. NIST added HQC as a backup key-encapsulation method on a different mathematical basis, with a final standard expected in 20276. Guidance on using key encapsulation was published in September 20257. The NIST transition draft IR 8547, published on 12 November 2024, proposes disallowing quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 203544.

What would move it

The HQC draft, sector migration progress and national directives would each move this finding.

2.2CRY

  1. ReportedEQL 5NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CRY-001

    NIST finalised FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) on 13 August 2024. ML-KEM has three parameter sets: 512, 768 and 1024.123

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CRY-002

    NIST selected HQC on 11 March 2025 as a backup key-encapsulation method based on codes rather than lattices, with a draft standard expected in about a year and a final standard in 2027.632

  3. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CRY-007

    A 2025 preprint estimates that RSA-2048 could be factored with fewer than one million noisy qubits in under a week, assuming a 0.1% gate error and a 1 microsecond cycle. The author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours.2237

2.3Tata kelola

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-003

    NIST published the initial public draft of the transition report IR 8547 on 12 November 2024. The draft proposes that quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms at 112 bits of security be deprecated after 2030 and that all such algorithms be disallowed after 2035.44

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-004

    The UK NCSC published migration timelines on 20 March 2025: assess and plan by 2028, do priority migration by 2031 and finish by 2035.10

2.4Infrastruktur

  1. ReportedEQL 2NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-005

    Cloudflare reported that most human traffic to its network used post-quantum key agreement in late October 2025, while 3.7% of origin servers supported it and an ML-DSA-44 signature adds about 15 kB to a TLS handshake. This is vendor evidence.23

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-006

    OpenSSH made a post-quantum key exchange its default in version 9.0 and switched the default to mlkem768x25519 in version 10.0. Version 10.1 warns when a connection does not use one.24

2.5THR

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-THR-008

    The CISA KEV count at the 30 September close is not bound. A 3 November read of the catalogue is post-close, context only. A 2025 joint advisory from 23 agencies in 13 countries reported router compromise through known vulnerabilities and no observed zero-day exploitation. A vendor report states that 31% of breaches began with exploited vulnerabilities.1417

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-THR-009

    The FBI received 859,532 complaints and USD 16.6 billion of reported losses in 2024, up 33% from 2023. It received 3,156 ransomware complaints and called ransomware the most pervasive threat to critical infrastructure.15

2.6Keuangan

  1. ReportedEQL 2NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-010

    Chainalysis estimates that ransomware actors received more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, about 8% below an updated USD 892 million for 2024. IBM puts the global average cost of a data breach at USD 4.99 million in 2026. Both are vendor estimates.1819

2.7SKL

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SKL-011

    In the ISC2 2025 study, 59% of respondents reported critical or significant skills needs, up from 44% in 2024. ISC2 published no workforce gap estimate in 2025.20

2.8Sistemik

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is the lag of signatures, certificates and long-life devices behind key agreement, while exploited ordinary vulnerabilities keep dominating incidents. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 7NIST (ed.), Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, SP 800-227 (publication page; final 18 September 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 32NIST (ed.), Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process, NIST IR 8545, by G. Alagic and others (publication page; March 2025; HQC is the only fourth-round key-establishment algorithm to be standardised). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 37Shor, P. W., Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer, SIAM Journal on Computing 26(5), 1484 to 1509, October 1997, doi:10.1137/S0097539795293172 (Crossref record and abstract). Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia. Observation year 1997. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1137/S0097539795293172back
  10. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 17Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (landing page; period 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; 48% of breaches involve ransomware; 31% begin with exploited vulnerabilities). Verizon Business, New York. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Systems and sectors at baseline

6 min read0 figures2 tables13 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

DAT · Cryptography

Post-quantum standards finalised by NIST

3standar

FIPS 203, 204 and 205.

Dilaporkan2024NIST123

DAT · Resource estimate

RSA-2048 noisy-qubit estimate

<1million qubits

under a week, under stated assumptions.

Reported2025preprint22

INF · Deployment

Share of human traffic on one network using post-quantum key agreement

>50%

vendor measurement, late October 2025.

Reported2025Cloudflare23

INF · Threat

Complaints received by the FBI

859,532complaints

USD 16.6 billion of reported losses.

Reported2024FBI IC315

FIN · Finance

Global average cost of a data breach

4.99USD million

vendor study, up 12%.

Dilaporkan2026IBM18

INF · Exploitation

Vulnerabilities in the CISA KEV catalogue

NOT BOUNDentries

count at the 30 September close not bound; the 3 November read is post-close, context only.

Tidak terikat2026CISA

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through cybersecurity and cryptography, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries cybersecurity and cryptography risk into each domain.

Table 3.1Each domain read in words, not scored
DomainPosture at baselineKeterkaitanStatus
WATWater utilities are among critical infrastructure sectors that report incidents; no sector figure is bound here.INF → WATExpert input EQL 1
ENERouter and edge-device compromise in telecom and transport networks shows exposure; energy-specific figures are not bound.INF → ENEExpert input EQL 1
FOONo documented coupling at baseline in the sources read.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
HLTHealth records are long-lived and exposed to later decryption; no figure is bound here.DAT → HLTExpert input EQL 1
BIONo documented coupling at baseline in the sources read.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
CLIEnergy and bandwidth cost of larger cryptographic objects is stated for one network only23; no climate figure is bound.INF → CLIExpert input EQL 1
INFThe core system: three standards finalised, hybrid key agreement widely deployed, signatures lagging, known vulnerabilities exploited.the core systemReported EQL 4
FINAverage breach cost USD 4.99 million in 2026; ransomware payments above USD 820 million in 2025; both vendor estimates.FIN ↔ INFReported EQL 2
DATLong-lived data face later decryption; migration is a planning task now.INF → DATReported EQL 4
AICNo documented coupling to other compute platforms is bound here; automated attack tooling claims are not evidenced in this edition.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
MINNo documented coupling at baseline; module and chip supply is not bound.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
TRDRegulation and reporting duties set by the EU and the US cross borders; export-control effects on cryptography are not bound.GOV ↔ TRDInferred EQL 2

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on cybersecurity and cryptography, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Table 3.2Sectors: baseline evidence and the exposure to watch
KodeSektorBaseline evidenceExposure to watchEvidence coverage
GS-00Cross-systemcryptography underlies every sectorsignature and device lagTHIN
GS-01Airsector figures not boundoperational technology exposureTHIN
GS-02Energirouter and edge exposure shown in advisories14grid control networksTHIN
GS-03Panganno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-04Kesehatanlong-lived records; no figure boundransomware and data breachTHIN
GS-05Keuanganbreach and ransomware costs from vendors1819migration costPARTIAL
GS-06Pengembanganaccess to tools and skillswidening gapsTHIN
GS-07Iklimno figure boundnone documentedTHIN
GS-08Bencanano documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-09Infrastrukturcritical infrastructure complaints reported15edge devicesPARTIAL
GS-10Kotano documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-11Keanekaragaman hayatino documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-12observasi Bumino documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-13Siber dan digitalstandards, deployment and threat evidence11323migration lagGOOD
GS-14KebijakanNCSC, NIST draft and EU timelines101144divergent datesPARTIAL
GS-15Sainsresource estimate and standards process221common benchmarksPARTIAL

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Risks and capability

Four cybersecurity and cryptography risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence.

5 min read0 figures1 table16 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. InferredEQL 4RSK-XT10-CRY-001

    Cryptographic transition lag

    Pendorong
    falling resource estimates and slow migration221
    Eksposur
    long-lived sensitive data; signatures on long-life devices
    Kerentanan
    inventory gaps; embedded and legacy systems
    Kapasitas
    standards and national timelines11012
    Efek berantai
    DAT → FIN, HLT, INF
    Cakrawala
    1 to 10 years
  2. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT10-INF-002

    Signature and certificate migration lag

    Pendorong
    larger signatures and slow trust-store change23
    Eksposur
    web, code signing, device identity
    Kerentanan
    performance limits; long-lived certificates
    Kapasitas
    new schemes under evaluation42
    Efek berantai
    INF → DAT
    Cakrawala
    1 to 5 years
  3. ReportedEQL 4RSK-XT10-THR-003

    Known vulnerabilities in edge devices

    Pendorong
    exploitation of known CVEs1314
    Eksposur
    routers, gateways, telecom and transport networks
    Kerentanan
    slow patching; exposed management planes
    Kapasitas
    catalogues, advisories and hardening guidance1314
    Efek berantai
    INF → ENE, FIN
    Cakrawala
    1 to 5 years
  4. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT10-GOV-004

    Fragmented timelines and duties

    Pendorong
    different dates in NCSC, NIST draft, EU and CISA material44101112
    Eksposur
    multinational operators and suppliers
    Kerentanan
    duplicate reporting; unclear product duties
    Kapasitas
    standards, roadmaps and shared guidance911
    Efek berantai
    GOV → INF, FIN
    Cakrawala
    1 to 5 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence for cybersecurity and cryptography at the global level.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
FungsiRungTingkatStrongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationEXISTSpost-quantum standards and guidance published17
Monitoring and observationEXISTSexploited-vulnerability catalogue maintained13
peringatan diniEXISTSjoint advisories issued by agencies14
Preparedness and planningEXISTSnational timelines and the NIST transition draft1044
Redundancy and reservesLISTEDno evidence of fallback algorithms deployed at scale; HQC is a backup standard in preparation6
ResponsLISTEDno tested response to a sudden break of a deployed algorithm
Continuity of critical servicesLISTEDmigration of critical systems not yet reported
PemulihanLISTEDnot applicable at baseline for cryptographic break; incident recovery figures are vendor-reported18
AdaptationEXISTSframework and agility guidance published97
Perlindungan sosialLISTEDnot applicable at baseline
Keuangan dan asuransiLISTEDcost evidence is from vendors; no insurance data bound18
Institutional coordinationEXISTSagencies co-seal advisories; EU and national roadmaps1114
Technical infrastructureEXISTSopen-source and network deployments of hybrid key agreement2324
Tenaga kerjaLISTEDskills needs reported; no gap figure published20
Research capacityADEQUATEpublic standardisation process and published estimates226
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 42NIST (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography: Additional Digital Signature Schemes (project page; call for proposals of September 2022 closed 1 June 2023; 40 first-round and 14 second-round candidates; Round 3 candidates announced 14 May 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  7. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 9NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29 (publication page; 26 February 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 7NIST (ed.), Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, SP 800-227 (publication page; final 18 September 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Signature lag while key agreement migrates

A conditional statement under stated assumptions, never a prediction.

2 min read0 figures0 tables2 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

5.1Asumsi

Scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.

Garis dasar
the 2026 reference state in this edition
Pendorong
key agreement is widely hybrid while signatures, certificates and long-life devices stay on current methods, and a hardware milestone arrives sooner than planned
Analogues
the fall in resource estimates from 2019 to 2025; the 2024 standards221
Interventions
none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case
Run state
narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027

5.2The cascade, step by step

  1. 1

    INF → DAT

    a hardware milestone lowers confidence in public-key signatures

    2025

  2. 2

    DAT → INF

    long-life devices and certificates cannot be updated quickly

    2025

  3. 3

    INF → FIN

    operators re-prioritise migration spending

    2026

  4. 4

    GOV → INF

    national timelines and reporting duties diverge

    2026

  5. 5

    INF → HLT

    archived records and device identities become the first exposure

    2026

  6. 6

    FIN → INF

    spending shifts to inventory and agility

    2026

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

How the shock in scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01 would travel through Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography’s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.

LangkahApa yang terjadiSumber
01 Infrastructure to datA hardware milestone lowers confidence in public-key signatures. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 1
02 DAT to infrastructureLong-life devices and certificates cannot be updated quickly. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 2
03 Infrastructure to financeOperators re-prioritise migration spending. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 3
04 Governance to infrastructureNational timelines and reporting duties diverge. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 4
05 Infrastructure to healthArchived records and device identities become the first exposure. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 5
06 Finance to infrastructureSpending shifts to inventory and agility. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 6

A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01 (2026); Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Readings from the other desks

The cybersecurity and cryptography baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

15 min read0 figures8 tables35 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

MejaEdisiStatusPengenal
GCRI Systems EvidenceSystems Evidence: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026Drafted, in stewardship reviewNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
GRF Public DeliberationOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
GRA Capital ReadinessOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Standards ProgressStandards Progress: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026Dalam persiapanNR-NXS-XT-10-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Academy CapabilityCapability: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026Dalam persiapanNR-RA-XT-10-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Index MeasurementOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading cybersecurity and cryptography as protective infrastructure under change. Standards are finalised, key agreement has moved, and signatures and long-life devices have not. Evidence is strongest for standards and official threat records, and weakest for migration progress, cost and workforce.

CRY-001 · GOV-004 · INF-005 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people the story arrives as a message about encryption, a breach notice or a ransomware headline. The baseline asks that public debate separate standards from deployment, and ordinary vulnerabilities from distant machines.

CRY-001 · THR-009 · INF-006

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Breach and ransomware costs come from vendors and are weak evidence1819. Migration has costs that fall on operators. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

FIN-010 · CRY-001

NEXUS

Sintesis

Cryptography is well described by standards and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind migration progress, publish a comparable deployment table and test the signature pathway before the next hardware milestone.

SYS-012 · C-01 · C-02

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for cybersecurity and cryptography. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
QuarterEdisiPertanyaanBatas wilayah
Q1State and AgendaApa yang penting tahun ini, dan bagaimana posisi awalnya?observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2Evidence and BuildWhat new evidence and capability exist?a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3Uji Tekanan dan KesiapanWhat do scenarios and tests show?simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4Annual Synthesis and RenewalWhat changed in the year, and what renews?release follows review, not event publicity deadlines
Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or bodyPeranContribution route
GCRI CanadaLead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
The Global Risks Forum (GRF)leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
The Global Risks Alliance (GRA)finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standardspreparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methodsStandards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Akademi Risikolearning pathways tied to the agenda questionsAcademy gateway · learning by review
Nexus Standards and Academytechnology chapter inputs: GCRI evidence, NXS standards, RA capabilitytechnology editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

  • Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
  • Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
  • Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

  • Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
  • Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
  • Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

NIST finished three standards in 2024. Deployment is a different record, and it is moving at different speeds for key agreement and signatures. Keeping them apart avoids both alarm and complacency.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

Standards are not deployment

Exploited known vulnerabilities, ransomware and fraud account for the reported harm. A distant machine is a planning question; an unpatched router is an incident now.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Ordinary causes dominate

Telemetry from vendors is useful and unaudited. This edition labels each vendor figure and asks for primary data before costs and payments are compared.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Vendor evidence needs a label

No consolidated series of migration progress was found. A shared indicator table would show where inventory, signatures and devices are stuck.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Measurement is the missing layer

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 cybersecurity and cryptography readiness pack
ButirDaftarState at baselineFirst 2027 entry
E1Cybersecurity and Cryptography risk state deltabaseline set by this editionchanges against the baseline
E2WEFH+B state deltafive global system readings setindicator updates and freshness
E3Agenda and Portfolio movementeight agenda items · 6 proposed objectsadmission decisions
E4Federation delivery registernational chapters in preparationnational chapters
E5Consortium capability registernational consortia formingfirst contributions
E6Leadership questions and challengesbelum adafirst challenge log
E7Foundry technical statenational environments preparedfirst federation cut
E8Publication candidatestwelve findings carried forwardPUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9Universe readinessone candidate missionadmission and role spine
E10Correction registertidak adafirst federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

  • Terbitkan
  • Hold
  • Needs evidence
  • Terbatas
  • Digantikan

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

  • IN FORCE
  • PUBLISHED
  • DRAFT
  • PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
InstrumenBadanLingkupStatusRelevansi
FIPS 203, 204 and 205123NISTUS, used globallyPUBLISHED 2024post-quantum algorithms
NIST IR 8547 initial public draft44NISTUSDRAFT 2024migration
NIST SP 800-2277NISTUSPUBLISHED 2025key-encapsulation guidance
NIST SP 800-2328NISTUSPUBLISHED 2025lightweight cryptography
NIST CSF 2.09NISTglobal, voluntaryPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYrisk outcomes
NCSC migration timelines10UK NCSCUKPUBLISHED 2025timeline
EU coordinated roadmap1131European Commission and Member StatesEUPUBLISHED 2025migration milestones
CNSA 2.030NSAUS national security systemsPUBLISHEDmigration timetable
Undang-Undang Ketahanan Siber27Uni EropaEUIN FORCE · STAGEDproduct duties
SEC cybersecurity disclosure rules21US SECUS listed companiesIN FORCEincident disclosure

Changed since 2024

  • Post-close, context only: NIST published the final IR 8547 transition report on 27 October 20265
  • NIST published SP 800-227 on key encapsulation in September 2025 and SP 800-232 on lightweight cryptography in August 202578
  • The UK NCSC published its migration timelines in March 202510

To watch in 2027

  • The HQC draft standard expected about a year after March 20256
  • National roadmaps due under the EU coordinated roadmap1131
  • Staged application dates of the EU Cyber Resilience Act27

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers cybersecurity and cryptography assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

Pertanyaan
What does the published evidence establish about cybersecurity and advanced cryptography as infrastructure and its couplings?
Sources searched
preprints and journals; standards bodies and agencies; roadmaps and regulation; threat and cost reports
Jendela
releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
Seleksi
sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
Langkah berikutnya
systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and preprints
RujukanJenisTahunPeranUsed for
Gidney22preprint2025supportsresource estimate
Shor37journal article1997IRGCfactoring algorithm
Mosca38journal article2018IRGCmigration timing
Table 6.6Institutional flagships
RujukanIssuerTahunPeranUsed for
Signal triple ratchet post25protocol post2025konteksmessaging design
Apple PQ3 post26protocol post2024konteksmessaging design
OpenSSH page24project documentation2025supportsprotocol default
RFC 844643IETF standard2018IRGCTLS 1.3
Table 6.7Standards, policy and strategies
RujukanIssuerTahunPeranUsed for
NIST FIPS 203, 204 dan 205123NIST2024supportsstandar
NIST IR 8547 initial draft44NIST2024supportstransition plan
NCSC timelines10UK NCSC2025supportstimeline
EU roadmap page11Komisi Eropa2025supportsroadmap date
CSF 2.09NIST2024konteksrisk framework
NIST IR 854532NIST2025konteksfourth-round status
NIST SP 1800-3839NIST NCCoE2023konteksmigration practice guide
OMB M-23-0241US OMB2022konteksfederal inventory memorandum
Table 6.8Threat, cost and field overviews
RujukanIssuerTahunPeranUsed for
FBI IC3 report15FBI2025supportscomplaints and losses
ENISA Threat Landscape 202516ENISA2025supportsincident count
Cost of a Data Breach 202618IBM2026konteksvendor cost
Crypto crime ransomware analysis19Chainalysis2026konteksvendor payments
Workforce study20ISC22025supportsskills needs
Data Breach Investigations page17Verizon2026konteksvendor sample
Digital Defense Report36Microsoft2025konteksvendor report

Where the evidence agrees

  • Post-quantum standards are finalised and migration should begin110
  • Exploited known vulnerabilities recur across sources1417
  • Signatures are harder to migrate than key agreement23

Where it is unsettled

  • When a cryptographically relevant machine could exist2238
  • How fast sectors are migrating, since no common series exists12
  • How vendor cost and payment estimates compare with primary data1819

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 7NIST (ed.), Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, SP 800-227 (publication page; final 18 September 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 8NIST (ed.), Ascon-Based Lightweight Cryptography Standards for Constrained Devices, SP 800-232 (publication page; final 13 August 2025; Ascon-AEAD128, Ascon-Hash256, Ascon-XOF128, Ascon-CXOF128). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 9NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29 (publication page; 26 February 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 31NIS Cooperation Group, EU PQC Workstream (ed.), A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1, 11 June 2025 (roadmap PDF: by 31 December 2026 all Member States have taken the First Steps and set initial national roadmaps; by 31 December 2030 the transition for high-risk use cases is complete; by 31 December 2035 the transition for medium-risk use cases is complete and for low-risk use cases as far as feasible). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 30Stern, M. B. (NSA Cybersecurity), Updates to the CNSA 2.0 FAQ, post to the NIST pqc-forum mailing list, 13 January 2025 (NSA has updated its guidance on the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0, listing the NIST standards that define the CNSA 2.0 algorithms, with updated transition timelines; the NSA documents themselves refused automated access and no date from them is used). National Security Agency, Fort Meade. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  14. 27European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 20 November 2024 (Article 71: in force on the twentieth day after publication; applies from 11 December 2027; Article 14, reporting obligations of manufacturers, from 11 September 2026; Chapter IV from 11 June 2026). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 21US Securities and Exchange Commission (ed.), SEC adopts rules on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident disclosure by public companies (press release 2023-139; adopted 26 July 2023; Form 8-K Item 1.05 within four business days of a materiality determination). SEC, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15; no dates on the page; PDF not opened). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 37Shor, P. W., Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer, SIAM Journal on Computing 26(5), 1484 to 1509, October 1997, doi:10.1137/S0097539795293172 (Crossref record and abstract). Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia. Observation year 1997. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1137/S0097539795293172back
  20. 38Mosca, M., Cybersecurity in an Era with Quantum Computers: Will We Be Ready?, IEEE Security and Privacy 16(5), 38 to 41, September 2018, doi:10.1109/MSP.2018.3761723 (Crossref record). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/MSP.2018.3761723back
  21. 25Signal (ed.), Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets, SPQR triple ratchet (blog post, 2 October 2025; ML-KEM 768; gradual rollout; formal verification). Signal Messenger, Mountain View. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 26Apple (ed.), iMessage with PQ3: The new state of the art in quantum-secure messaging at scale (security blog post, 21 February 2024; Kyber-1024 and Kyber-768 hybrid with P-256; level 3 on its own scale). Apple, Cupertino. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  23. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 43Rescorla, E., The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, RFC 8446, Proposed Standard, August 2018 (RFC Editor record). Internet Engineering Task Force. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  25. 32NIST (ed.), Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process, NIST IR 8545, by G. Alagic and others (publication page; March 2025; HQC is the only fourth-round key-establishment algorithm to be standardised). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  26. 39NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (ed.), Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography, NIST SP 1800-38, by W. Newhouse, M. Souppaya, W. Barker and C. Brown (publication page; preliminary draft of volume A published for comment on 24 April 2023 and superseded by an updated preliminary draft on 19 December 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  27. 41US Office of Management and Budget (ed.), Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Memorandum M-23-02, signed by Director S. D. Young, 18 November 2022 (memorandum PDF; directs agencies to conduct a prioritised inventory of cryptographic systems). OMB, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  28. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  29. 16European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; 4,875 incidents analysed; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026 corrected figures; PDF not opened). ENISA, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  30. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  31. 17Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (landing page; period 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; 48% of breaches involve ransomware; 31% begin with exploited vulnerabilities). Verizon Business, New York. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  32. 36Microsoft (ed.), Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2025 (sixth annual report, covering July 2024 to June 2025; announced in the Microsoft On the Issues post by A. Hogan-Burney, 16 October 2025; the report itself was not opened and no figure is used). Microsoft, Redmond. Vendor report, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  33. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  34. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  35. 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

The 2027 agenda

Eight bounded questions open the 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography agenda. Each comes from a baseline finding, names the initiative that will carry it and the first output due in the 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography edition.

5 min read0 figures6 tables3 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

7.1Questions for the operational series

  1. C-01

    How far has each sector inventoried its cryptography, and how fast is migration to post-quantum methods in each sector?

    INI-XT10-INV-01 · inventory and migration; first output: sector migration register.

  2. C-02

    How many certificates and signatures in deployed systems can move to post-quantum methods, and at what size and cost?

    INI-XT10-SIG-02 · signatures and certificates; first output: deployment table.

  3. C-03

    What share of embedded and long-life devices can receive cryptographic updates?

    INI-XT10-EDG-03 · long-life devices; first output: device update map.

  4. C-04

    How long do exploited vulnerabilities stay open, and how does that compare across sources?

    INI-XT10-KEV-04 · exploitation and patching; first output: time-to-fix series.

  5. C-05

    How can migration progress be measured on a common basis?

    INI-XT10-MSR-05 · migration measurement; first output: indicator table.

  6. C-06

    Which national roadmaps set migration dates, and how do they differ?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: roadmap overlay.

  7. C-07

    What workforce exists for cryptographic migration and incident response?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: scoping note.

  8. C-08

    Which readiness capabilities have been tested in real migrations, and which are only planned?

    Readiness capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.

7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment

Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography portfolio. They are programme objects: no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.

Table 7.1Objects proposed for the first operational quarter
IDObjekJenisPertanyaanStatus
INI-XT10-INV-01Inventory and migrationInitiativeC-01DIUSULKAN
INI-XT10-SIG-02Signatures and certificatesInitiativeC-02DIUSULKAN
INI-XT10-EDG-03Long-life devicesInitiativeC-03DIUSULKAN
INI-XT10-KEV-04Exploitation and patchingInitiativeC-04DIUSULKAN
INI-XT10-MSR-05Migration measurementInitiativeC-05DIUSULKAN
MSN-XT10-2027-01Signature lag Universe missionMisiC-02Kandidat

7.3The pathway

The cybersecurity and cryptography edition reads national readiness chapters, the coupled sector reports on cyber and digital systems, and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed; the global energy and lifeline editions are drafted. This page states what exists today and what comes next.

  1. 01

    National readiness chapters

    cyber and cryptographic readiness in each national edition

    IN PREPARATION · national baselines

  2. 02

    Sector couplings

    GS-13 cyber and digital · XT-02 quantum · SR-10 systemic cyber risk

    GS-13 DRAFTED · sector baselines

  3. 03

    Technology system model

    cryptography, deployment, threat, workforce, governance

    v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence

  4. 04

    Strategic links

    SR-02 lifeline systems · SR-13 strategic technology

    PLANNED · strategic baselines

  5. 05

    Semesta

    annual proving environment

    CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027

  6. 06

    XT-10 report

    this series

    BASELINE DRAFT · 2027 annual edition

  7. 07

    Evidence and correction

    one graph, many projections

    OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027

7.4Universe 2027: evidence pack for the cybersecurity and cryptography candidate mission

  1. 01

    Mandat

  2. 02

    Core Build · 1 month

  3. 03

    Action · 1 week

  4. 04

    Evidence seal

  5. 05

    Portfolio correction

  6. 06

    Mandat berikutnya

Table 7.2Universe 2027: evidence pack for the cybersecurity and cryptography candidate mission
ButirCatatanStatusWaktu
F1Annual mandate recordPLANNEDafter the Q2 2027 alignment
F2Core Build recordPLANNEDone month before the exercise
F3Bukti latihanPLANNEDduring the Action week
F4Decision packetsPLANNEDexercise state only
F5Proof receiptsPLANNEDscoped to each recorded check
F6After-action reportPLANNEDwithin one quarter
F7Upgrade docketPLANNEDrouted to the Portfolio
F8Portfolio renewalPLANNED2027 global annual edition
F9Public synthesisPLANNEDpublic-safe extracts only

Misi

ID
MSN-XT10-2027-01 · Signature lag Universe mission
Role spine
Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead: drawn from national pathways
Receiving actors
to be identified with the mandate

7.5Handoffs and routing

Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.

Table 7.3Handoffs and routing
TemuanDiteruskan keTujuanKelas
CRY-001 · standardsINI-XT10-INV-01inventory and migrationPUBLIC
CRY-002 · HQC backupINI-XT10-INV-01inventory and migrationPUBLIC
GOV-004 · NCSC timelinesregional consortiaroadmap overlayPUBLIC
INF-005 · deploymentINI-XT10-SIG-02signatures and certificatesPUBLIC
INF-006 · protocol defaultsINI-XT10-EDG-03long-life devicesPUBLIC
THR-008 · exploitationINI-XT10-KEV-04exploitation and patchingPUBLIC
FIN-010 · costINI-XT10-MSR-05migration measurementPUBLIC
SYS-012 · compound pathwayMSN-XT10-2027-01Universe candidateCONSORTIUM
Table 7.4Routing rules by publication class
KelasWhere it goesWho can see it
PUBLICthe published edition and its evidence bundleanyone
CONSORTIUMgoverned rooms of the federationconsortium members under agreement
CONTROLLEDneed-to-know channelsnamed competent actors only

7.6Feeds and signal register

Table 7.5Feeds watched from 2027
FeedProducerLatencyFeeds into
NIST post-quantum project pagesNISTper rilisCRY-001
NCSC guidance pagesUK NCSCper rilisGOV-004
CISA KEV catalogue and advisoriesCISAberkelanjutanTHR-008
FBI IC3 annual reportFBItahunanTHR-009
ENISA threat landscapeENISAtahunanTHR-008
Network and project deployment notesvendors and open-source projectsper kejadianINF-005
Breach cost and payment reportsvendorstahunanFIN-010

Escalation routes

  • none · keep monitoring
  • research question
  • project
  • risk object
  • annual publication
  • signal report
Table 7.6Signals at baseline
IDSignalCorroborationSistemRute
SIG-XT10-001NIST IR 8547 draft proposes 2030 and 2035 transition dates44PARTIALDAT · GOVresearch question C-01
SIG-XT10-002Hybrid key agreement on most human traffic to one network23PARTIALINFresearch question C-02
SIG-XT10-003Ransomware payments fell about 8% in 202519PARTIALFIN · INFresearch question C-04

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

10 min read0 figures5 tables25 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

8.1Cryptographic platforms and protocols

Cryptography reaches users through protocols and libraries. Evidence is strongest for standards texts and open-source defaults, and weakest for signatures and embedded devices.

3standar

finalised by NIST in 2024123

3parameter sets

ML-KEM 512, 768 and 10241

10.0version

OpenSSH release that made mlkem768x25519 the default24

Table 8.1State at baseline
KomponenStatusBuktiStatus
Key establishmentML-KEM standardised; HQC selected as backup16Dilaporkan
Secure shellpost-quantum default since version 9.0; warning from 10.124Dilaporkan
Messaginghybrid post-quantum steps described by two providers2526Dilaporkan
Signatures and certificatesstandards exist; deployment lags2323Dilaporkan

Keterkaitan

  • CRY → INF deployment
  • INF → DAT exposure
  • GOV → INF timelines

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • signature deployment
  • device update capability

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

8.2Performance, bandwidth and energy of cryptography

Post-quantum objects are larger than the ones they replace. The cost shows first in handshakes and certificate chains.

≈15kB

ML-DSA-44 signature size added to a TLS handshake23

≈7kB

FN-DSA-512 signature size added, as stated23

≈15%

handshake slowdown from adding 9 kB, as stated23

Table 8.2State at baseline
KomponenStatusBuktiStatus
Handshake sizelarger signatures add kilobytes to each connection23Dilaporkan
Lightweight methodsNIST published Ascon-based standards for constrained devices8Dilaporkan
Key-encapsulation useNIST guidance on secure use published in 20257Dilaporkan
Energy costnot published on a common basis for migration23Expert input

Keterkaitan

  • INF → CLI energy and bandwidth
  • CRY → INF performance
  • ENE ↔ INF facility power

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • energy cost of migration
  • device performance limits

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

8.3Modules, devices and supply chain

Long-life devices and validated modules limit how fast cryptography can change. The sources read give no supply figures.

NOT BOUNDentries

CISA KEV count at the close

23agencies

co-sealed the 2025 router advisory14

0zero-days

observed in that campaign, as stated14

Table 8.3State at baseline
KomponenStatusBuktiStatus
Edge devicesrouters and gateways compromised through known vulnerabilities14Dilaporkan
Validated modulestransition of older module validations runs through 2026 per the CISA page1233Dilaporkan
Product dutiesEU product law adds reporting duties in stages2740Dilaporkan
Chip and module supplynot bound12Expert input

Keterkaitan

  • INF → ENE edge exposure
  • GOV → INF product duties
  • MIN → INF module supply

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • device update capability
  • module and chip supply

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

8.4Economy, cost and workforce

Cost and workforce evidence is thin and partly from vendors. The figures below are weak evidence and are read as such.

4.99USD million

average breach cost, vendor study 202618

820USD million

on-chain ransomware payments floor, 202519

59%

respondents with critical or significant skills needs, 202520

Table 8.4State at baseline
KomponenStatusBuktiStatus
Breach costUSD 4.99 million average, up 12%, from a vendor study18Dilaporkan
Ransomware paymentsmore than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025; vendor estimate19Dilaporkan
Tenaga kerjaskills needs up from 44% to 59%; no gap figure20Dilaporkan
Losses to the FBIUSD 16.6 billion in 2024, mostly fraud15Dilaporkan

Keterkaitan

  • INF → FIN cost
  • FIN → DAT migration spending
  • HLT → INF workforce

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • primary cost data
  • workforce size

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

8.5Security, cryptography and governance watch

Governance is moving on three fronts: migration timelines, product and incident duties, and cybercrime law. Dates differ by authority.

2035milestone

NCSC date to finish migration10

11 Sep 2026date

EU product law reporting duties start27

4business days

SEC filing window after a materiality determination21

Table 8.5State at baseline
KomponenStatusBuktiStatus
Migration timelinesNCSC 2028, 2031 and 2035; NIST transition draft; EU roadmap101144Dilaporkan
Product and entity dutiesEU product law and network security directive2728Dilaporkan
PengungkapanUS listed companies disclose material incidents within four business days of the determination21Dilaporkan
Cybercrime lawa UN convention opened for signature in October 2025; 95 signatures and 3 of the 40 ratifications needed for entry into force by the close29Dilaporkan

Keterkaitan

  • GOV → INF timelines
  • GOV → TRD cross-border duties
  • INF → DAT exposure

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • text of national roadmaps
  • migration progress by sector

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 25Signal (ed.), Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets, SPQR triple ratchet (blog post, 2 October 2025; ML-KEM 768; gradual rollout; formal verification). Signal Messenger, Mountain View. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 26Apple (ed.), iMessage with PQ3: The new state of the art in quantum-secure messaging at scale (security blog post, 21 February 2024; Kyber-1024 and Kyber-768 hybrid with P-256; level 3 on its own scale). Apple, Cupertino. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 8NIST (ed.), Ascon-Based Lightweight Cryptography Standards for Constrained Devices, SP 800-232 (publication page; final 13 August 2025; Ascon-AEAD128, Ascon-Hash256, Ascon-XOF128, Ascon-CXOF128). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 7NIST (ed.), Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, SP 800-227 (publication page; final 18 September 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 33NIST (ed.), Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS 140-3 (publication page; published 22 March 2019; supersedes FIPS 140-2; the FIPS 140-3 transition project page states that FIPS 140-2 validations move to the historical list on 21 September 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  14. 27European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 20 November 2024 (Article 71: in force on the twentieth day after publication; applies from 11 December 2027; Article 14, reporting obligations of manufacturers, from 11 September 2026; Chapter IV from 11 June 2026). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 40European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 on the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity scheme (EUCC) under Regulation (EU) 2019/881, Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 7 February 2024 (applies from 27 February 2025). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 21US Securities and Exchange Commission (ed.), SEC adopts rules on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident disclosure by public companies (press release 2023-139; adopted 26 July 2023; Form 8-K Item 1.05 within four business days of a materiality determination). SEC, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  23. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 28European Parliament and Council, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022, p. 80. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  25. 29United Nations, United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 79/243 of 24 December 2024 (UN Treaty Collection, chapter XVIII, entry 16: opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025, with 72 signatures there; 95 signatures and 3 ratifications dated on or before 30 September 2026; entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

Metodologi

How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.

14 min read0 figures13 tables19 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

A.1Metode

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

Table A.1Methods
No.DerivationCalculationHasil
(1)Fall in estimated qubits for RSA-2048, 2019 to 202520 ÷ 1about 20 times
(2)Share of FBI reported losses from cyber threats, 20241.571 ÷ 16.6about 9.5%
(3)Share of FBI complaints that reported a loss, 2024256,256 ÷ 859,532about 29.8%
(4)Change in on-chain ransomware payments, 2024 to 2025(820 − 892) ÷ 892about −8%, a floor
Table A.2Coupling strength scale (matrix and model card)
StrengthDefinisi
STRONGa disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region
MODERATEan effect is documented but buffered or slower
WEAKan effect is plausible but not documented at global scale
Table A.3Status grammar
LabelAturan
Dilaporkanvalue as issued by its source, with year
Inferredreasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement
EstimasiNexus analytical value with stated method
Skenarioconditional on stated assumptions
Expert inputstructured editorial judgement awaiting evidence

A.2Model card, Cybersecurity and Cryptography System Model v0

Model ID
MDL-XT10-CRYPTO · v0.1
Tujuan
represent cybersecurity and cryptography as protective infrastructure coupled to networks, devices, finance, workforce and regulation
Keluarga
graph-based system of systems
Masukan
the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
Metode
expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
Validasi
none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
Ketidakpastian
qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
Domain validitas
global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
Reproduksibilitas
strength table and sources published in this edition
20couplings

typed in v0

0strong

documented within one season

0moderate

documented, buffered

20weak

plausible, undocumented

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID
DC-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-B0
Jenis
baseline documentary cut
Resolution policy
pinned · as of 30 September 2026
Sources pinned
44 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
Model runs
none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
Ringkasan
computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
Supersedes
nothing, first cut of the series
Superseded by
the 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography annual cut

Garis keturunan

  1. 01

    source edition

  2. 02

    pinned citation

  3. 03

    finding

  4. 04

    page

  5. 05

    publication record

Table A.4From the baseline cut to the federation cut
ElemenBaseline 20262027 global annual
Sumbercited global publications, pinned by editionnational, regional and sector cuts through one graph
Analysisstated methods and editorial estimatestyped analysis specifications
ModelCybersecurity and Cryptography System Model v0 specificationmodel runs with receipts
Temuantwelve baseline findingsfindings re-bound to federation evidence
Tinjauanfive passes scheduledfive passes on the exact digest

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

Table A.5Evidence age and coverage
IndikatorTeramatiDirilisKadensiNext release
Post-quantum standards2024Aug 2024berkalaHQC draft
Transition report2024 draft · 2026 finalNov 2024 · Oct 2026berkalanext revision
NCSC timelines2025Mar 2025berkalanext revision
EU roadmap2025Jun 2025berkalanational roadmaps
Deployment analysis2025Oct 2025berkelanjutannext annual review
KEV count2026page read 2026-11-03berkelanjutandaily additions
FBI complaints and losses2024Apr 2025tahunannext annual report
Breach cost20262026 reporttahunannext annual report
Table A.6Coverage by system at baseline
SistemCakupanThinnest dimension
StandarGOODmigration progress
DeploymentPARTIALsignatures and devices
Tata kelolaPARTIALroadmap text and dates
Threat recordsPARTIALcommon incident basis
BiayaTHINprimary cost data
Tenaga kerjaTHINsize and gap
SupplyTHINmodule and chip supply
Advanced cryptographyTHINhomomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge deployment
Table A.7Designed empty states: what is not bound, what would fill it and why
BidangSource that would fill itBlocker
Post-quantum migration progress by sector and countrynational agencies, regulators, sector bodiesno consolidated series found; CISA collects inventories but publishes no totals on the page read12
Signature and certificate deployment on a common basiscertificate transparency data, browser and operating-system vendorsonly one vendor analysis read; it expects first post-quantum certificates in 202623
Share of embedded and long-life devices that can receive cryptographic updatesdevice makers, sector regulatorsnot retrieved; no figure used
Milestones in the EU coordinated roadmap, from the primary documentEuropean Commission roadmap document11the library page states no milestones; the roadmap PDF sets milestones for the end of 2026, 2030 and 203531
NSA CNSA 2.0 timetable from the NSA documentsNSA CNSA 2.0 publications30the NSA pages returned an access error; no date is used
NIST IR 8547 final text, including any dates for deprecating algorithmsNIST IR 8547 final PDF5published 27 October 2026, after the evidence close (post-close, context only); the page states no dates and the PDF was not opened; the baseline binds the November 2024 draft44
Verizon DBIR statistics from the report itselfVerizon Data Breach Investigations Report 202617only the landing page was read; the sample size is not stated there
IBM Cost of a Data Breach details such as detection timeIBM report18the landing page gives the average cost and a few findings only
Chainalysis payments from the full report and off-chain paymentsChainalysis report and law-enforcement data19one blog page read; on-chain only; the 2024 total was revised
Time from vulnerability disclosure to exploitation on a common basisCISA, vendors, CVE Program1334the CVE metrics count published records by quarter, not time to exploitation34; no series found
Global incident counts on a common basisENISA, Europol, national agencies1635the ENISA page gives a count of 4,875 incidents for the EU period; the Europol assessment page loads by script and no count was read35
Cybersecurity workforce size and gapISC2, national statistics20ISC2 published no gap estimate in 2025; no other series read
Deployment of homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proofs and multiparty computationstandards bodies, vendors, national agenciesnot retrieved; no figure used
Export-control and regulatory effects on cryptographic productsnational authoritiesnot reviewed

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Published by the UK National Cyber Security Centre on 20 March 2025, version 1.0. Periodic guidance. Role: binds GOV-004. Coverage: UK guidance for organisations.

EVD-XT10-001

NCSC migration timelines10

Issued by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology on 13 August 2024. One-off. Role: binds CRY-001 and the standards tiles. Coverage: US federal standards used globally.

EVD-XT10-002

NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205 pages123

Table A.8Quality dimensions at baseline
DimensionEVD-XT10-001EVD-XT10-002
Completenessthree milestone years; no sector detailthree standards; HQC backup in preparation
Timelinesspublished March 2025issued at publication
Revisionversion 1.0 at the readerrata noted for future revision
Method transparencyguidance text publicselection process published
External validationagency authoritypublic review rounds

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

  • NIST IR 8547 final5: dates for algorithms, if any, in the PDF
  • NIS Cooperation Group31: initial national roadmaps due by the end of 2026
  • NSA30: CNSA 2.0 documents
  • Verizon17 and IBM18: full reports

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

Table A.9Publication acceptance record
KelompokBidangButirLintasanN/ATertunda
D1Identity and scope8800
D2Source and data12912
D3Analysis and models12381
D4Findings and claims9801
D5Figures, tables, maps10622
D6Editorial and citations10802
D7Review and approval130013
D8Artefact and design12705
D9Registry and release9009

Gerbang publikasi

Conditions met
14 of 23 at evidence close
Blocking problems
none recorded
Open conditions
reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer

Not applicable at baseline

Model runs
first runs in Q1 2027
Peta
plates in Q2 2027
Waivers
tidak ada

A.7Status words

Table A.10The status every value carries
StatusArtinya
TeramatiMeasured directly and published by the source.
DilaporkanPublished statistics of an official or institutional source.
DinyatakanStated by the body concerned; not independently measured.
EstimasiA Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A.
DimodelkanProduced by a stated model from cited inputs.
InferredReasoned from cited evidence; not measured.
PrakiraanA projection by the cited source.
SimulatedA simulation result under stated assumptions.
SkenarioA conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction.
Expert inputExpert judgement, recorded with its basis.
KandidatProposed for a later edition; not yet evidence.
Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject.

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

LangkahApa yang terjadiSumber
01 Evidence arrives from the pillarsFoundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s.
02 The cut is sealedOn the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on.
03 The edition is assembledThe edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide.
04 The keys turnAt the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward.
05 The gate opensA named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit.
06 Signed and depositedThe PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI.
07 Published on its desk’s siteOnly then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part.
08 Corrections go to StandardsMethod and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

Table A.11Series terms
IstilahMakna
Baseline Editionthe inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series
WEFH+Bwater, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core
Keterkaitana typed dependency through which one system transmits to another
Kesenjangan perlindunganthe share of losses not covered by insurance
Capability ladderLISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED
EQLevidence-quality level, 1–5
Potongan buktia frozen resolution of exact sources and versions
NNC · NLC · NWGNational Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups
Table A.12Abbreviations used in this edition
AbbreviationExpansion
CBOMcryptographic bill of materials
CVECommon Vulnerabilities and Exposures
FIPSFederal Information Processing Standard
HQCHamming quasi-cyclic key-encapsulation method
IC3FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center
IRNIST Internal Report
KEVKnown Exploited Vulnerabilities
ML-DSAmodule-lattice digital signature algorithm
ML-KEMmodule-lattice key-encapsulation mechanism
NCSCUK National Cyber Security Centre
SLH-DSAstateless hash-based digital signature algorithm
TLSTransport Layer Security

A.10Technical annex

Table A.13Technical annex
ButirAnnexDaftar isiStatus
A.1Indicator definitionsthe global indicator set, with units and sourcesIN THIS EDITION
A.2Coupling strengthsthe twenty-cell matrix and its rationaleIN THIS EDITION
A.3Scenario specificationSCN-XT10-SIG-01 assumptions and signpostsIN THIS EDITION
A.4Capability placementsrung evidence for fifteen functionsIN THIS EDITION
A.5Model diagnosticsfirst runs and validation2027
A.6Sensitivity analysesinfluence of coupling strengths2027
A.7Cluster notescards for the major deployment and threat clusters2027
A.8Review statementspass-by-pass review recordAT RELEASE

A.1 · indicator definition: post-quantum share of human traffic

Construct
share of human-initiated web requests to one network that use hybrid post-quantum key agreement
Unit
percent of requests
Metode
vendor measurement on its own network, excluding automated traffic
Sumber
Cloudflare analysis, 202523
Ketidakpastian
the post states a majority and later over 50%; no exact value was read
Batasan yang diketahui
one network; client support drives the figure; signatures are not covered

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 31NIS Cooperation Group, EU PQC Workstream (ed.), A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1, 11 June 2025 (roadmap PDF: by 31 December 2026 all Member States have taken the First Steps and set initial national roadmaps; by 31 December 2030 the transition for high-risk use cases is complete; by 31 December 2035 the transition for medium-risk use cases is complete and for low-risk use cases as far as feasible). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 30Stern, M. B. (NSA Cybersecurity), Updates to the CNSA 2.0 FAQ, post to the NIST pqc-forum mailing list, 13 January 2025 (NSA has updated its guidance on the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0, listing the NIST standards that define the CNSA 2.0 algorithms, with updated transition timelines; the NSA documents themselves refused automated access and no date from them is used). National Security Agency, Fort Meade. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15; no dates on the page; PDF not opened). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 17Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (landing page; period 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; 48% of breaches involve ransomware; 31% begin with exploited vulnerabilities). Verizon Business, New York. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 34CVE Program (ed.), CVE Program metrics (page and the data file it publishes; quarterly counts of published CVE Records, for 2025: 12,009, 11,701, 11,738 and 12,796; no measure of time from disclosure to exploitation). MITRE, Bedford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 16European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; 4,875 incidents analysed; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026 corrected figures; PDF not opened). ENISA, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 35Europol (ed.), Steal, deal and repeat: How cybercriminals trade and exploit your data, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2025 (report page; publication reported by the European Commission on 16 June 2025; the page loads its content by script and no figure is used). Europol, The Hague. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Data appendix

The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.

10 min read0 figures8 tables21 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

B.1The indicator set

Table B.1Global baseline indicator set
IndikatorNilaiUnitTahunStatusSumber
NIST post-quantum standards finalised3standar2024Dilaporkan123
ML-KEM parameter sets3sets2024Dilaporkan1
NIST IR 8547 initial draft published12 Novdate2024Dilaporkan44
NIST IR 8547 draft: algorithms disallowed after2035year2024Dilaporkan44
Post-close, context only: NIST IR 8547 final published27 Octdate2026Dilaporkan5
HQC selection announced11 Mardate2025Dilaporkan6
NCSC first milestone2028year2025Dilaporkan10
NCSC last milestone2035year2025Dilaporkan10
RSA-2048 noisy-qubit estimate<1million2025Dilaporkan22
Assumed gate error in estimate0.1%2025Dilaporkan22
Origin servers supporting post-quantum key agreement3.7%2025Dilaporkan23
ML-DSA-44 signature added to a TLS handshake≈15kB2025Dilaporkan23
CISA KEV entriesNOT BOUNDentries2026NOT BOUND
Agencies co-sealing the 2025 advisory23agencies2025Dilaporkan14
FBI complaints859,532complaints2024Dilaporkan15
FBI reported losses16.6USD billion2024Dilaporkan15
Incidents analysed in the ENISA period4,875insiden2025Dilaporkan16

B.2Global source register

The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.

Domains bound by the register

  • INF
  • DAT
  • FIN
  • TRD
  • HLT
  • ENE
  • WAT
  • MIN
  • CLI
  • FOO
Table B.3Global source register
SumberKategoriCakupanPeriodKadensiPeran
NIST FIPS pages123national standards bodyUS and global2024one-offstandar
NIST IR 8547 draft44national standards bodyUS2024berkalatransition
NCSC timelines10national agencyUK2025berkalatimeline
European Commission page11EU institutionEU2025berkelanjutanroadmap
Katalog CISA KEV13national agencyglobal entries2026berkelanjutanexploitation
FBI IC3 report15national agencyUS complaints2024tahunankerugian
ENISA threat landscape16EU agencyEU2025tahunaninsiden
Cloudflare analysis23vendorone network2025berkelanjutandeployment
IBM Cost of a Data Breach18vendorglobal sample2026tahunancost
ISC2 workforce study20professional bodyglobal survey2025tahunanskills

B.3Regional reading, cybersecurity and cryptography across ten clusters

Regional plates follow with the regional editions. This page gives the regional reading of cybersecurity and cryptographic readiness in table form and ranks no region.

Table B.4Regional reading, cybersecurity and cryptography across ten clusters
KawasanPrincipal hazardsSystems most exposedBaseline evidence
Amerika Utarafederal migration directives; standards authorship; incident reportingcryptography, threatNIST44; FBI15; CISA12
Amerika Selatanmigration planningcryptographyregional evidence (not bound)
EropaEU roadmap, Cyber Resilience Act and national timelinescryptography, regulationEuropean Commission11; NCSC10; ENISA16
Eurasianational standards programmescryptographyregional evidence (not bound)
Timur Tengah dan Afrika Utaranational programmesthreatregional evidence (not bound)
Afrikaskills and accessworkforceregional evidence (not bound)
Asia Selatannational programmescryptography, skillsregional evidence (not bound)
Asia Timurnational standards programmescryptographyregional evidence (not bound)
ASEANregional cooperation; the UN convention was opened for signature in Hanoi in 2025governanceUN convention29
Oceania-Pacificco-sealed the 2025 advisory with partnersthreatCISA14

B.4Cluster card: hybrid key-agreement deployment

  • deployment
  • key agreement
  • protocols
  • signatures
Systems in view
web protocol, secure shell, messaging protocols, content networks
Defining events
OpenSSH 10.0 default and the 2025 network measurement2324
Keterkaitan
GOV → INF timelines; INF → DAT exposure
Capability evidence
open-source defaults and protocol designs reported242526
Kesenjangan
signature deployment; embedded devices; sector totals
Butir agenda
C-02 · C-03

Hybrid key agreement is on by default in major open-source and network deployments, and most human traffic to one large network used it in late 2025 [23] [24].

KEY AGREEMENT

Wide hybrid deployment

Apple and Signal describe ongoing post-quantum rekeying in their messaging protocols [25] [26].

MESSAGING

Post-quantum protocol steps

Signatures add size to every handshake, and trust in new certificates is not expected to be broad before 2027 [23].

SIGNATURES

The harder step

B.5How countries appear in the cybersecurity and cryptography edition

Countries enter the cybersecurity and cryptography edition through the readiness chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never ranked.

Table B.5How countries appear in the cybersecurity and cryptography edition
Card fieldApa yang ditampilkannyaSumber
WEFH+B stateeach core system against peer distribution bandsnational edition
Keterkaitanthe national dependency matrixnational edition
Risk objectsthe national risk portfolionational edition
Capability rungsthe national capability laddernational edition
Evidence ageoldest and newest source datesnational source register

Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme

26nasional

countries and unions

10regional

clusters

16global

flagship and sector

14strategic

sistem laporan

20frontier

technology reports

How to read a country card

  • Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
  • Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
  • Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
  • Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such
Table B.6National Baseline Editions in the 2026 programme
GelombangCountries and unionsStatus
W0KanadaISSUED
W1United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, SwitzerlandPLANNED
W2Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, AustraliaPLANNED

B.6Lisensi

Table B.7Licences of each kind of material
MaterialLisensi
TextCC BY 4.0
Dataon the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0
AngkaNexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited
Petaboundary source and licence printed on each plate
MetadataCC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it
Third-party data, figures and textThe source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed
Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence.

B.7Formats and provenance

Table B.8This edition in every format
FormatJenisStatusApa ituPengenal
Web editionHTMLDi situs iniDraft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source.NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Print editionPDFAt releaseA4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release.NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Indicator dataCSV · JSONDi situs ini17 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release.NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1
AngkaSVG · PNGDi situs ini4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder.FIG-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-*
SlidesPDFTidak dicatatNo slide deck is recorded for this edition.
Ringkasan buktiHTML · PDFTidak dicatatNo evidence brief is recorded for this edition.
Dataset with DOIDataCiteAt releaseConcept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet.

Asal-usul data

Edition pack
The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
Potongan bukti
DC-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
Reproduksibilitas
sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
Self-check
14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
Tinjauan
five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
Penerbit resmi
GCRI for the Nexus Consortium
Koreksi
Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15; no dates on the page; PDF not opened). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 16European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; 4,875 incidents analysed; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026 corrected figures; PDF not opened). ENISA, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 29United Nations, United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 79/243 of 24 December 2024 (UN Treaty Collection, chapter XVIII, entry 16: opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025, with 72 signatures there; 95 signatures and 3 ratifications dated on or before 30 September 2026; entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  19. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 25Signal (ed.), Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets, SPQR triple ratchet (blog post, 2 October 2025; ML-KEM 768; gradual rollout; formal verification). Signal Messenger, Mountain View. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 26Apple (ed.), iMessage with PQ3: The new state of the art in quantum-secure messaging at scale (security blog post, 21 February 2024; Kyber-1024 and Kyber-768 hybrid with P-256; level 3 on its own scale). Apple, Cupertino. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

References and record

Every source the edition rests on, the publication record, the corrections log and the open record.

16 min read0 figures1 table0 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

C.144 sources

NR-CIT-1, editor first. A DOI is linked where the source has one; Nexus records carry a UNI once the catalogue allocates it (NS-1).

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 8
  2. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  3. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  4. 4POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (publication page; published 12 November 2024; the page states no deprecation dates and records the draft as obsoleted on 27 October 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  5. 5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15; no dates on the page; PDF not opened). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  6. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  7. 7NIST (ed.), Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, SP 800-227 (publication page; final 18 September 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  8. 8NIST (ed.), Ascon-Based Lightweight Cryptography Standards for Constrained Devices, SP 800-232 (publication page; final 13 August 2025; Ascon-AEAD128, Ascon-Hash256, Ascon-XOF128, Ascon-CXOF128). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
  9. 9NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29 (publication page; 26 February 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  10. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  11. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  12. 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  13. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 3, chapter 4
  14. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  15. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  16. 16European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; 4,875 incidents analysed; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026 corrected figures; PDF not opened). ENISA, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  17. 17Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (landing page; period 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; 48% of breaches involve ransomware; 31% begin with exploited vulnerabilities). Verizon Business, New York. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 6
  18. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  19. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  20. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  21. 21US Securities and Exchange Commission (ed.), SEC adopts rules on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident disclosure by public companies (press release 2023-139; adopted 26 July 2023; Form 8-K Item 1.05 within four business days of a materiality determination). SEC, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 6, chapter 8
  22. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6
  23. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  24. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  25. 25Signal (ed.), Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets, SPQR triple ratchet (blog post, 2 October 2025; ML-KEM 768; gradual rollout; formal verification). Signal Messenger, Mountain View. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 6, chapter 8
  26. 26Apple (ed.), iMessage with PQ3: The new state of the art in quantum-secure messaging at scale (security blog post, 21 February 2024; Kyber-1024 and Kyber-768 hybrid with P-256; level 3 on its own scale). Apple, Cupertino. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 6, chapter 8
  27. 27European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 20 November 2024 (Article 71: in force on the twentieth day after publication; applies from 11 December 2027; Article 14, reporting obligations of manufacturers, from 11 September 2026; Chapter IV from 11 June 2026). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 6, chapter 8
  28. 28European Parliament and Council, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022, p. 80. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 8
  29. 29United Nations, United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 79/243 of 24 December 2024 (UN Treaty Collection, chapter XVIII, entry 16: opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025, with 72 signatures there; 95 signatures and 3 ratifications dated on or before 30 September 2026; entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 8
  30. 30Stern, M. B. (NSA Cybersecurity), Updates to the CNSA 2.0 FAQ, post to the NIST pqc-forum mailing list, 13 January 2025 (NSA has updated its guidance on the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0, listing the NIST standards that define the CNSA 2.0 algorithms, with updated transition timelines; the NSA documents themselves refused automated access and no date from them is used). National Security Agency, Fort Meade. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  31. 31NIS Cooperation Group, EU PQC Workstream (ed.), A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1, 11 June 2025 (roadmap PDF: by 31 December 2026 all Member States have taken the First Steps and set initial national roadmaps; by 31 December 2030 the transition for high-risk use cases is complete; by 31 December 2035 the transition for medium-risk use cases is complete and for low-risk use cases as far as feasible). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  32. 32NIST (ed.), Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process, NIST IR 8545, by G. Alagic and others (publication page; March 2025; HQC is the only fourth-round key-establishment algorithm to be standardised). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 6
  33. 33NIST (ed.), Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS 140-3 (publication page; published 22 March 2019; supersedes FIPS 140-2; the FIPS 140-3 transition project page states that FIPS 140-2 validations move to the historical list on 21 September 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 8
  34. 34CVE Program (ed.), CVE Program metrics (page and the data file it publishes; quarterly counts of published CVE Records, for 2025: 12,009, 11,701, 11,738 and 12,796; no measure of time from disclosure to exploitation). MITRE, Bedford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.
  35. 35Europol (ed.), Steal, deal and repeat: How cybercriminals trade and exploit your data, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2025 (report page; publication reported by the European Commission on 16 June 2025; the page loads its content by script and no figure is used). Europol, The Hague. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.
  36. 36Microsoft (ed.), Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2025 (sixth annual report, covering July 2024 to June 2025; announced in the Microsoft On the Issues post by A. Hogan-Burney, 16 October 2025; the report itself was not opened and no figure is used). Microsoft, Redmond. Vendor report, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  37. 37Shor, P. W., Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer, SIAM Journal on Computing 26(5), 1484 to 1509, October 1997, doi:10.1137/S0097539795293172 (Crossref record and abstract). Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia. Observation year 1997. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1137/S0097539795293172 Cited in chapter 2, chapter 6
  38. 38Mosca, M., Cybersecurity in an Era with Quantum Computers: Will We Be Ready?, IEEE Security and Privacy 16(5), 38 to 41, September 2018, doi:10.1109/MSP.2018.3761723 (Crossref record). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/MSP.2018.3761723 Cited in chapter 6
  39. 39NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (ed.), Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography, NIST SP 1800-38, by W. Newhouse, M. Souppaya, W. Barker and C. Brown (publication page; preliminary draft of volume A published for comment on 24 April 2023 and superseded by an updated preliminary draft on 19 December 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  40. 40European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 on the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity scheme (EUCC) under Regulation (EU) 2019/881, Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 7 February 2024 (applies from 27 February 2025). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 8
  41. 41US Office of Management and Budget (ed.), Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Memorandum M-23-02, signed by Director S. D. Young, 18 November 2022 (memorandum PDF; directs agencies to conduct a prioritised inventory of cryptographic systems). OMB, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  42. 42NIST (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography: Additional Digital Signature Schemes (project page; call for proposals of September 2022 closed 1 June 2023; 40 first-round and 14 second-round candidates; Round 3 candidates announced 14 May 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4
  43. 43Rescorla, E., The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, RFC 8446, Proposed Standard, August 2018 (RFC Editor record). Internet Engineering Task Force. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  44. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8

C.2Publication record

Publikasi

Judul
Exponential Technology Report 2026: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography, Baseline Edition
Seri
Reports · Exponential Technology Series XT-10
Edisi
Baseline Edition 2026 · inaugural annual
Versi
v1.0.0 · draft for stewardship review
Publication ID
NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Penutupan bukti
30 September 2026
Publication date
Oktober 2026
DOI
concept and version DOI at deposit

Penerbit

Penerbit resmi
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for the Nexus Consortium
Tempat
Toronto
Editor
Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor
Pengelola
GCRI · technical truth · GRF · public meaning · GRA · capital meaning
Lisensi
text CC BY 4.0; data on the terms of each source
Copyright
© 2026 GCRI · Nexus Consortium
Bahasa
English (en-GB) source edition
Correspondence
Registry correction pathway · editorial office

Colophon

Format
A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF
Typefaces
Space Grotesk (display) · Geist (text) · IBM Plex Sans Italic (standfirsts) · IBM Plex Mono (data)
Design standard
Reports Foundational Edition, Volume I, Part VII
Aksesibilitas
tagged PDF and HTML targets; text alternatives for every figure
Produksi
Reports editorial team, GCRI

Release path for this version

Table C.1Release path for this version
LangkahApa yang terjadiKapan
Drafeditorial self-check complete at evidence closeOktober 2026
Steward reviewfive passes on the exact draft (keys T · M · F · N)Q4 2026
Persetujuanpublication authority approves the exact digestbefore release
Depositconcept and version DOI minted; registry pointer setat release
Suksesithe 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography edition reports changes against this baseline2027
Current version
v1.0.0 draft, stewardship review
Previous edition
none, first edition of the series
Next edition
NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2027-v1.0.0
Latest version
resolve the concept DOI or the registry record
Correction route
Registry correction pathway
Notice types
erratum · addendum · supersession · withdrawal

C.3Log koreksi

0correction notices. No edition has been released yet, so none can be corrected; the log below lists each edition’s current version.

EdisiVersiTanggalStatusPerubahanPemberitahuan
XT-10NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0Oktober 2026DrafBaseline Edition 2026, inaugural annual edition,Tidak ada

Notice types: erratum, addendum, supersession, withdrawal. A correction is a new version with a published notice; the earlier version stays resolvable, and no edition is ever edited in silence.

C.4Catatan terbuka

This edition’s open record

Publication ID
NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Desk identifier and series alias
NR-GCRI-XT-10-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 · NR-XTC-XT-10-2026-BL
Collection
NR-COL-2026-BASELINE (IsPartOf at deposit)
DOI
Concept and version DOI at deposit, on Zenodo with DataCite metadata
Versions
Each correction is a new version (isNewVersionOf); the concept DOI resolves to the latest
Bundle
RO-Crate 1.2 with CITATION.cff, CodeMeta and PROV-O provenance; a signed manifest
Lisensi
CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0) for original material; metadata CC0 1.0

Credit and identity

ORCID
Your iD in the deposit and the contribution record; DataCite can then add the work to your ORCID record
ROR
Your organisation by its ROR identifier, never by a typed name alone
CRediT
Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Validation, Visualisation, Writing, review and editing
Akun
None needed to contribute; never a password

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C.5Where this edition sits among the six pillars

Foundry seals the evidence and Universe tests it; Reports publishes it; Standards takes its corrections and Academy teaches from it.

  1. F03 Sealed observations and indicator series Foundry Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
  2. F04 After-action and scenario findings for Universe After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
  3. F05 National Portfolio movement for chapter Foundry National Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
  4. Applied in editions Standards Nexus Standards: applied in editions.
  5. XT-10 edition Reports Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026, published in every format with its sources, citation and corrections.
  6. F06 Method and correction findings as change Standards Method and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
  7. F12 Q4 synthesis informs the next-year Universe Q4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
  8. Taught in the open Academy Risk Academy: taught in the open.

What Foundry and Universe hand to this edition, and what it hands to Standards, Universe and Academy. From the programme spine; XT-10 is a drafted Baseline Edition, so these handoffs run from its first operational quarter.

Serah terimaBetweenWhat crosses, and when
F03Foundry to ReportsSealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
F04Universe to ReportsAfter-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
F05Foundry to ReportsNational Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
RingNexus Standards to ReportsNexus Standards: applied in editions.
F06Reports to Nexus StandardsMethod and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
F12Reports to UniverseQ4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
RingReports to Risk AcademyRisk Academy: taught in the open.
LaporanBerkontribusi

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CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.