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Global Cyber and digital systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of the World’s Cyber and Digital Systems.

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Global Cyber and Digital Systems 2026

Imprint

編集者
Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor, the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI)
正式な発行者
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto
Report number
NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE
エビデンス締め切り
30 September 2026, cut DC-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-B0
ステータス
Draft under stewardship review; not yet released
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Issued at deposit
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Cite as
Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Global Cyber and digital systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of the World’s Cyber and Digital Systems. (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI). https://therisk.global/nexus-reports/editions/gs-13/

目次

  1. ·

    Executive summary

  2. 1

    Chapter 1. The digital layer is where the systems meet

  3. 2

    Chapter 2. Key findings

  4. 3

    Chapter 3. Systems and sectors at baseline

  5. 4

    Chapter 4. Risks and capability

  6. 5

    Chapter 5. Provider failure under a ransomware wave

  7. 6

    Chapter 6. Readings from the other desks

  8. 7

    Chapter 7. The 2027 agenda

  9. 8

    Chapter 8. Systems in depth

  10. A

    Annex A. Methodology

  11. B

    Annex B. Data appendix

  12. C

    Annex C. References and record

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Executive summary

The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.

6 min read1 figure0 tables13 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

S.1Abstract

The world enters 2027 with a digital layer that is larger, more concentrated and more contested than at any earlier baseline. An estimated 6 billion people (74%) use the Internet in 2025, yet 2.2 billion remain offline, and use is 94% in high-income countries against 23% in low-income countries48. Crime follows the connection. Victims in the United States reported 1,008,597 complaints and USD 20.877 billion in losses to the FBI in 2025, up 26% in losses2. On-chain ransomware payments fell about 8% to USD 820 million in 2025 while claimed attacks rose 50%29. In Europe, phishing opened about 60% of the intrusions that ENISA analysed and vulnerability exploitation 21.3%3. The catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilities held 1,767 entries on 3 November 20267. Governance is moving: 139 of 194 countries had a national incident response team in 20244, the UN Convention against Cybercrime opened for signature in October 20259, and EU reporting duties for products begin on 11 September 202620. Resilience is the weak point. A single faulty content update crashed endpoints through a mismatch of 21 expected and 20 supplied inputs14, submarine cables suffer about 200 faults a year12, and ransomware disrupted care in 44.4% of US provider attacks studied for 2016 to 202123. This baseline sets out what the evidence supports and where it is thin. It ranks no country and recommends no policy.

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the cyber and digital systems baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

  1. About 6 billion (74%) in 2025; 2.2 billion are offline.48

    How many people are online?Reported

  2. No global figure exists on one basis. US victims reported USD 20.877 billion in 2025.2

    What does cybercrime cost?Reported

  3. Claimed attacks rose 50% in 2025 but on-chain payments fell about 8%.29

    Is ransomware growing?Reported

  4. Phishing about 60% and exploitation of vulnerabilities 21.3% in the EU data.3

    How do intrusions begin?Reported

  5. 1,767 entries in the catalogue; 361 flagged for ransomware use.7

    How exposed are exploited flaws?Reported

  6. 139 of 194 countries had a national incident response team in 2024.4

    Are states building capacity?Reported

  7. A UN treaty opened for signature in 2025; EU duties apply in stages from 2025 to 2027.92021

    Is law catching up?Reported

  8. A failure at a concentrated provider that coincides with ransomware on health and public services. SCN-GS13-CPF-01

    What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-001

In 2025 about 6 billion people use the Internet and 2.2 billion remain offline; use is 94% in high-income countries and 23% in low-income countries.

Figure S.1Internet use by group, 2025 (% of population)
項目Bar, scaled to the largest value値
High-income countries94
世界74
Low-income countries23

Source: ITU, Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 202548.

Connectivity is the precondition for digital services and for the exposure that comes with them. Africa stands at 36% Internet use and least developed countries at 34%. Urban dwellers use the Internet at 85% against 58% for rural dwellers, and 77% of men against 71% of women48.

S.4At a glance

74%

people using the Internet, 202548

20.9USD billion

losses reported to the FBI, 20252

820USD million

on-chain ransomware payments, 202529

4,875インシデント

analysed by ENISA, July 2024 to June 20253

1,767entries

known exploited vulnerabilities, 20267

313shutdowns

recorded in 52 countries, 202527

S.5What each steward reads in it

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading the digital layer as the coupling layer of the WEFH+B system.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people cyber risk arrives as a scam, a locked hospital system or a service that stops.

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Reported losses are large, ransomware payments are volatile and law now sets reporting duties for financial entities and essential services.

NEXUS

統合

The digital layer is well measured at the level of connection and crime reports and thinly measured at the level of utility incidents, patch speed and outcomes.

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

A baseline: the 2026 state of the world’s cyber and digital systems and the couplings through which it carries risk into other systems. It synthesises published evidence and ranks no country, company or asset.

What it is not

Not a ranking of countries or companies, a forecast of attacks, an attribution of any incident, a vulnerability disclosure or an assessment of any operator, vendor, regulator or government. Cybersecurity law, incident response and the operation of networks rest with national authorities, operators and companies.

What comes next

National, regional and sector evidence feeds the 2027 cyber and digital systems edition through the federation. Each edition reports what changed against this baseline: observations, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 20Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 21Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 27Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition (eds.), Rising Repression Meets Global Resistance: Internet Shutdowns in 2025 (annual report, March 2026). Access Now, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

The digital layer is where the systems meet

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

7 min read2 figures1 table15 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is cyber and digital systems risk concentrated?
  • Which couplings carry cyber and digital systems shocks into other systems?
  • Which cyber and digital systems capabilities hold under compound stress?
  • What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five coupling chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • シナリオ
  • Three lenses
  • ポートフォリオ

1.2The argument

Digital systems are usually reported as a sector: networks, software, crime. The 2026 evidence reads them as the layer on which almost every other system now runs. Clinics, power and treatment control rooms, payments, logistics and public services all depend on connectivity, software and data1923.

Connection is still unequal. About 6 billion people use the Internet, 2.2 billion do not, and use is 94% in high-income countries against 23% in low-income countries48. Where people connect, crime follows. US victims reported USD 20.877 billion in losses to the FBI in 2025, and phishing opened about 60% of the intrusions that ENISA analysed in Europe23.

Concentration is the structural risk. A single content update with a mismatch between 21 expected and 20 supplied inputs crashed endpoints14, and the World Bank notes that cloud market concentration can pose systemic risks to vital sectors30. Physical routes are also concentrated: about 200 submarine cable faults occur each year12.

Governance is catching up unevenly. 139 of 194 countries had a national incident response team in 20244, a UN treaty opened for signature in October 20259, and EU duties for incident reporting, product security and financial entities apply in stages192021. Evidence on outcomes lags the rules.

Figure 1.1How uneven is connectivity? Internet use by group, 2025 (% of population)

The gap between high-income and low-income countries is 71 percentage points. People who come online late meet the same threats with less capacity: only 88 countries have submitted ICT skills data since 202048.

項目Bar, scaled to the largest value値
High-income countries94
アジア太平洋77
Arab States70
アフリカ36
Low-income countries23

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.

Figure ID FIG-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

2.2billion

people offline, 202548

55%

of the world’s population covered by 5G, 202548

4%

of people in low-income countries covered by 5G48

88countries

submitting ICT skills data since 202048

1.3The six-sector nexus: twenty couplings across five assessed sectors

The cyber and digital systems-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their cyber and digital systems content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings across the six sectors

Each line is one coupling from one sector to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events. Infrastructure: not assessed in this edition’s coupling matrix, so it is drawn hollow with no couplings. The hexagon is the estate doctrine: six sectors and fifteen relations.

  • Strong
  • 中程度
  • Weak
  • Not assessed in this edition

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated. Hexagon: the estate doctrine (Signature).

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT 水·MODERATE
shared control networks · pump and cooling load
WEAK
irrigation telemetry
MODERATE
treatment control · clinic supply
WEAK
monitoring sensors
ENE エネルギーSTRONG
power for treatment and control systems
·MODERATE
cold chain · logistics systems
STRONG
hospital IT · devices · backup power
WEAK
monitoring networks
FOO 食料WEAK
demand telemetry
WEAK
load control
·MODERATE
food safety traceability
WEAK
land data
HLT 健康WEAK
surveillance data
WEAK
load
WEAK
outbreak data
·WEAK
zoonosis data
BIO 生物多様性WEAK
catchment data
WEAK
resource data
WEAK
pest and pollinator data
WEAK
disease data
·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    INF → ENE → HLT

    A digital outage or ransomware event reduces power or hospital systems; clinics lose records and devices.

    Reported 2016 to 2021 health ransomware study23

  2. 02

    INF → ALL

    A faulty update at a concentrated provider disables endpoints across sectors at once.

    Reported 2024 content update failure14

  3. 03

    INF → TRD

    A cable fault or shipping disruption degrades connectivity for regions served by few routes.

    Reported about 200 faults a year1213

  4. 04

    DAT → FIN

    Ransomware and fraud drain finance and interrupt payments.

    Reported FBI losses and on-chain payments229

  5. 05

    AIC → DAT

    AI-supported tools speed phishing and exploitation of known flaws.

    Inferred ENISA and exploit study324

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 30World Bank (ed.), Digital Progress and Trends Report 2025: Strengthening AI Foundations. World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 20Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 21Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 24Fang, R., Bindu, R., Gupta, A. and Kang, D., LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilities, arXiv preprint 2404.08144, April 2024 (not peer reviewed; 15 vulnerabilities). Cornell University, Ithaca. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Key findings

Twelve findings carry the cyber and digital systems baseline. They are grouped by coupling and never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

6 min read1 figure0 tables17 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-001

In 2025 about 6 billion people use the Internet and 2.2 billion remain offline; use is 94% in high-income countries and 23% in low-income countries.

Figure 2.1Internet use by group, 2025 (% of population)
項目Bar, scaled to the largest value値
High-income countries94
世界74
Low-income countries23

Source: ITU, Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 202548.

Implication

Connectivity is the precondition for digital services and for the exposure that comes with them. Africa stands at 36% Internet use and least developed countries at 34%. Urban dwellers use the Internet at 85% against 58% for rural dwellers, and 77% of men against 71% of women48.

What would move it

The next ITU estimates, the 2030 connectivity targets in the Global Digital Compact and the pace of affordable mobile data in low-income countries would each move this finding4831.

2.2インフラ

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-001

    An estimated 6 billion people (74%) use the Internet in 2025, up from 5.8 billion (71%) in 2024; 2.2 billion remain offline, and use is 94% in high-income countries against 23% in low-income countries.48

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-005

    The catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilities held 1,767 entries on 3 November 2026, of which 361 are flagged as used in ransomware campaigns; 283 entries were added in 2026 by that date against 245 in 2025. The NVD published 48,150 records in 2025 against 39,953 in 2024, excluding rejected records.78

  3. ReportedEQL 3NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-008

    Submarine cables suffer about 200 faults a year, over 80% caused by fishing and anchoring according to the ITU, while the Internet Society reports that most are natural or human error; the two issuers also differ on the share of international traffic carried (over 99% against 97 to 98%).1213

  4. ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-011

    The vendor’s root cause analysis of the July 2024 content update failure found a mismatch between 21 inputs validated and 20 supplied, which caused an out-of-bounds read and system crashes on endpoints; the World Bank notes that cloud market concentration can pose systemic risks to vital sectors.1430

2.3Data and digital

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-002

    Victims in the United States filed 1,008,597 complaints with the FBI in 2025 and reported USD 20.877 billion in losses, up 26%; cyber-enabled fraud was 45% of complaints.2

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-004

    ENISA analysed 4,875 incidents from July 2024 to June 2025: phishing opened about 60% of intrusions, exploitation of vulnerabilities 21.3%, and hacktivism made up almost 80% of recorded incidents, mostly low-impact denial of service.3

2.4金融

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-003

    On-chain ransomware payments were about USD 820 million in 2025, down about 8%, while claimed attacks rose 50%; the FBI recorded 3,611 ransomware complaints with reported losses of more than USD 32 million. The two series measure different things.292

2.5ガバナンス

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-006

    The 2024 Global Cybersecurity Index covered 194 countries with an average score of 65.7 out of 100; 139 had a national incident response team and 55 did not, and 46 countries sit in the highest of five tiers.4

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-007

    The UN Convention against Cybercrime was adopted on 24 December 2024 and opened for signature on 25 October 2025; at the access date it had 96 signatories and 3 States Parties against the 40 needed for entry into force.910

2.6健康

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-HLT-009

    From 2016 to 2021, 374 ransomware attacks on US health care delivery organisations exposed the data of nearly 42 million patients; annual attacks rose from 43 to 91 and 44.4% disrupted care.23

2.7AIC

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-010

    ENISA reports that AI-supported phishing reportedly made up more than 80% of observed social engineering activity worldwide by early 2025, and in the WEF survey 87% of respondents named AI-related vulnerabilities as the fastest-growing risk; a 2024 preprint found that one model exploited 87% of 15 one-day vulnerabilities.3524

2.8システミック

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a failure at a concentrated digital provider that coincides with a ransomware wave on health and public services and a loss of connectivity. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 31United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Global Digital Compact, A/79/L.2 (September 2024). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 8NIST (ed.), National Vulnerability Database, CVE API version 2.0 (records published in 2024 and in 2025, excluding rejected records, counted by the editors from four quarterly queries per year; 39,953 and 48,150). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 30World Bank (ed.), Digital Progress and Trends Report 2025: Strengthening AI Foundations. World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 10United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution 80/16 on the final report of the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (endorses A/80/257; Global Mechanism from 2026). United Nations, New York, December 2025. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 5World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 (January 2026; executive survey, perceptions rather than measured rates). World Economic Forum, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 24Fang, R., Bindu, R., Gupta, A. and Kang, D., LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilities, arXiv preprint 2404.08144, April 2024 (not peer reviewed; 15 vulnerabilities). Cornell University, Ithaca. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Systems and sectors at baseline

7 min read0 figures2 tables19 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

INF · Connectivity

People using the Internet

74%

6 billion; 2.2 billion offline.

報告値2025ITU48

DAT · Data

Losses reported to the FBI by victims in the United States

20.9USD billion

1,008,597 complaints; losses up 26%.

Reported2025FBI IC32

FIN · Finance

On-chain ransomware payments

820USD million

down about 8%; claimed attacks up 50%.

Reported2025Chainalysis29

INF · Infrastructure

Entries in the known exploited vulnerabilities catalogue

1,767entries

361 flagged as used in ransomware campaigns.

報告値2026CISA7

GOV · Governance

Countries with a national incident response team

139of 194

55 had none or none in progress.

報告値2024ITU4

SYS · Cross-system

Survey respondents naming AI-related vulnerabilities as the fastest-growing risk

87%

perception in an executive survey, not a measured rate.

報告値2026WEF5

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through cyber and digital systems, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries cyber and digital systems risk into each domain.

Table 3.1Each domain read in words, not scored
分野Posture at baseline結合ステータス
WATTreatment, pumping and distribution depend on control systems and telemetry; the EU lists drinking and waste water as sectors under its cyber law, and a joint advisory names the sector among those where state-sponsored actors were found. Incident counts are not consolidated here.INF → WATReported EQL 3
ENEGrid and fuel operations run on digital control; a joint advisory reports pre-positioning on networks of energy providers and the EU lists energy under its cyber law. Operational incident data are not consolidated here.INF → ENEReported EQL 3
FOOCold chains, traceability and logistics run on software; no consolidated series of digital incidents in food systems was found.INF → FOOExpert input EQL 2
HLT374 ransomware attacks on US providers in 2016 to 2021 exposed nearly 42 million patients and 44.4% disrupted care.INF → HLTReported EQL 4
BIOMonitoring networks and sensor data support nature observation; the evidence is not consolidated here.DAT → BIOExpert input EQL 2
CLIWeather and climate services depend on data links and compute; no consolidated cyber evidence for these services was found.DAT → CLIExpert input EQL 2
INFNetworks, cables, devices and software carry the layer: 74% of people online, about 200 cable faults a year and a 2024 update failure show how concentration cascades.the core systemReported EQL 4
FINUSD 20.877 billion in US victim-reported losses; USD 820 million in on-chain ransomware payments; EU financial entities fall under DORA from 17 January 2025.DAT → FINReported EQL 4
DATData are the target and the evidence: incident data are voluntary, partial and not on a common basis worldwide.the core systemReported EQL 4
AICAI changes both attack and defence: reported AI-supported phishing, a survey of fast-growing AI vulnerabilities and an exploit study on one-day flaws; measured effects are thin.AIC → DATReported EQL 3
MINChips, cables and devices rest on materials and manufacturing; no consolidated cyber evidence for these supply chains was found in this edition.MIN → INFExpert input EQL 2
TRDCable routes carry over 97% of international data traffic by two issuers’ estimates; maritime and logistics were a high-value target in the EU threat data.INF ↔ TRDReported EQL 3

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on cyber and digital systems, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Table 3.2Sectors: baseline evidence and the exposure to watch
コード部門Baseline evidenceExposure to watchEvidence coverage
GS-00Cross-systemone digital layer under every system30concentrated provider failurePARTIAL
GS-01水control systems named in advisories2619treatment control compromiseTHIN
GS-02エネルギーgrid operators fall under EU cyber law1926attack on control systemsTHIN
GS-03Food and Agrifood Systemstraceability and cold-chain software; no serieslogistics outageTHIN
GS-04Health and One Health374 attacks on US providers, 2016 to 202123ransomware and care deliveryPARTIAL
GS-05金融と経済USD 20.877 billion in US losses2; DORA21payment and fraudPARTIAL
GS-06Development and Humanitarian2.2 billion offline48; 313 shutdowns27access and disconnectionGOOD
GS-07気候と地球システムno consolidated cyber evidence founddata link lossTHIN
GS-08Disaster and Resilience2024 update failure14; cable faults12cascading outagePARTIAL
GS-09Infrastructure, Transport and Logisticsabout 200 cable faults a year12; maritime targets3route and port disruptionPARTIAL
GS-10Cities and Urban Systemsurban Internet use 85%, rural 58%48service dependenceTHIN
GS-11生物多様性と生態系monitoring networks only; no figuresensor and data lossTHIN
GS-12Earth Observation and Planetary Intelligencespace dependence named by 15% of survey respondents5loss of data linksTHIN
GS-13Cyber and Digital Systemsthis edition; twelve findingsprovider failure under ransomwarePARTIAL
GS-14Policy, Institutions and Governance194 countries in the index4; UN treaty9law and capacity gapsGOOD
GS-15Science and Engineering Frontierpost-quantum standards1617; exploit study24cryptographic transitionPARTIAL

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 5World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 (January 2026; executive survey, perceptions rather than measured rates). World Economic Forum, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 30World Bank (ed.), Digital Progress and Trends Report 2025: Strengthening AI Foundations. World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 26CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, joint advisory AA24-038A (7 February 2024). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 21Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 27Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition (eds.), Rising Repression Meets Global Resistance: Internet Shutdowns in 2025 (annual report, March 2026). Access Now, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 16NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (13 August 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 17NIST (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography standardisation project page (FIPS 203, 204 and 205 published 13 August 2024; HQC selected 11 March 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 24Fang, R., Bindu, R., Gupta, A. and Kang, D., LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilities, arXiv preprint 2404.08144, April 2024 (not peer reviewed; 15 vulnerabilities). Cornell University, Ithaca. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Risks and capability

Four cyber and digital systems risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence.

6 min read0 figures1 table25 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. ReportedEQL 4RSK-GS13-INF-001

    Concentrated provider or software update failure

    要因
    a faulty update or outage at a provider used across sectors14
    曝露
    endpoints, cloud services and managed platforms in many sectors
    脆弱性
    market concentration and dependence on single vendors30
    能力
    staged roll-outs; test environments; vendor root cause reporting14
    カスケード
    INF → HLT, FIN, TRD
    ホライズン
    1 to 3 years
  2. ReportedEQL 4RSK-GS13-DAT-002

    Ransomware and extortion against essential services

    要因
    ransomware-as-a-service, access brokers and extortion329
    曝露
    health care, public administration, manufacturing and logistics2323
    脆弱性
    unpatched known flaws; weak backups; thin staffing37
    能力
    incident reporting duties; response teams; payment tracing1921
    カスケード
    DAT → HLT, FIN, INF
    ホライズン
    1 to 5 years
  3. ReportedEQL 3RSK-GS13-INF-003

    Submarine cable and connectivity disruption

    要因
    fishing, anchoring, natural hazards and hostile acts1213
    曝露
    regions served by few routes and landing points
    脆弱性
    limited repair vessels and long repair times13
    能力
    route diversity; regional repair arrangements; the ITU advisory body12
    カスケード
    INF → FIN, HLT, TRD
    ホライズン
    1 to 5 years
  4. InferredEQL 3RSK-GS13-AIC-004

    Faster exploitation and AI-supported intrusion

    要因
    AI-supported phishing and automated exploitation of known flaws324
    曝露
    organisations with slow patching and large attack surfaces
    脆弱性
    days between disclosure and exploitation3
    能力
    basic hygiene; patch discipline; AI security assessment, now done by 64% of surveyed organisations5
    カスケード
    AIC → DAT → FIN, HLT
    ホライズン
    1 to 5 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence for cyber and digital systems at the global level.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
機能RungレベルStrongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationEXISTSframeworks and hygiene guidance widespread; implementation uneven153
Monitoring and observationADEQUATEcatalogues of exploited flaws and shared threat data; coverage thin outside the US and Europe73
早期警報EXISTSjoint advisories and vulnerability catalogues; no common global warning standard2526
Preparedness and planningEXISTSnational strategies and response teams in 139 of 194 countries4
Redundancy and reservesLISTEDroute diversity and spare capacity documented; repair capacity short13
対応DEMONSTRATEDsensor recovery to about 99% within weeks after the 2024 update failure; asset freezes by the FBI142
Continuity of critical servicesLISTEDsector duties in law; testing under real conditions not consolidated1921
復旧DEMONSTRATEDendpoints restored after the 2024 failure; ransomware recovery uneven1423
AdaptationEXISTStransition to post-quantum cryptography standards under way161718
社会保障LISTEDvictim support and fraud recovery documented but not consolidated
金融と保険LISTEDfinancial-sector resilience law applies from 2025; insurance evidence not opened2138
Institutional coordinationEXISTSEU reporting channels; UN Global Mechanism from 2026; treaty not yet in force10199
Technical infrastructureEXISTS5G covers 55% of people and 3G or better 96%; low-income coverage far lower48
労働力LISTEDskills shortages reported; no workforce gap estimate published in 20256
Research capacityADEQUATEstrong applied research and published standards; open incident data thin1624
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 30World Bank (ed.), Digital Progress and Trends Report 2025: Strengthening AI Foundations. World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 21Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 24Fang, R., Bindu, R., Gupta, A. and Kang, D., LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilities, arXiv preprint 2404.08144, April 2024 (not peer reviewed; 15 vulnerabilities). Cornell University, Ithaca. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 5World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 (January 2026; executive survey, perceptions rather than measured rates). World Economic Forum, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 15NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29 (February 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 25CISA, FBI, NSA and partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, joint cybersecurity advisory (27 August 2025). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 26CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, joint advisory AA24-038A (7 February 2024). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 16NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (13 August 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 17NIST (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography standardisation project page (FIPS 203, 204 and 205 published 13 August 2024; HQC selected 11 March 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 18Moody, D. et al., Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (November 2024; proposes deprecation after 2030 and disallowance after 2035 for quantum-vulnerable algorithms; a draft). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 38IBM (ed.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025, conducted by the Ponemon Institute (600 organisations, breaches from March 2024 to February 2025), as described in the IBM release of 30 July 2025 (global average cost USD 4.44 million; the gated report itself was not opened and no figure is used). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  22. 10United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution 80/16 on the final report of the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (endorses A/80/257; Global Mechanism from 2026). United Nations, New York, December 2025. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  23. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  25. 6ISC2 (ed.), 2025 ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (December 2025; 16,029 respondents; states that it includes no estimate of the workforce gap). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Provider failure under a ransomware wave

A conditional statement under stated assumptions, never a prediction.

2 min read0 figures0 tables3 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

5.1前提

Scenario SCN-GS13-CPF-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.

ベースライン
the 2026 reference state in this edition
要因
a faulty update or outage at a provider used across sectors that coincides with a ransomware wave on health and public services and a loss of connectivity on one regional route
Analogues
the July 2024 content update failure14; health ransomware attacks of 2016 to 202123; cable faults12
Interventions
none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case
Run state
narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027

5.2The cascade, step by step

  1. 1

    INF → ALL

    a faulty update disables endpoints in several sectors at once

    2024

  2. 2

    DAT → HLT

    ransomware hits hospitals while recovery teams are busy elsewhere

    2016 to 2021

  3. 3

    INF → TRD

    a cable fault cuts redundancy for one region

    年次

  4. 4

    INF → ENE

    control and billing systems are degraded or switched to manual operation

    not observed here

  5. 5

    DAT → FIN

    payment and fraud handling is interrupted

    2025

  6. 6

    HLT → INF

    clinics fall back to paper while data recovery is delayed

    2016 to 2021

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

How the shock in scenario SCN-GS13-CPF-01 would travel through Global Cyber and Digital Systems‘s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.

ステップ何が起きるか出典
01 Infrastructure to allA faulty update disables endpoints in several sectors at once. Analogue or source: 2024.Edition GS-13, scenario SCN-GS13-CPF-01, step 1
02 DAT to healthRansomware hits hospitals while recovery teams are busy elsewhere. Analogue or source: 2016 to 2021.Edition GS-13, scenario SCN-GS13-CPF-01, step 2
03 Infrastructure to tradeA cable fault cuts redundancy for one region. Analogue or source: annual.Edition GS-13, scenario SCN-GS13-CPF-01, step 3
04 Infrastructure to energyControl and billing systems are degraded or switched to manual operation. Analogue or source: not observed here.Edition GS-13, scenario SCN-GS13-CPF-01, step 4
05 DAT to financePayment and fraud handling is interrupted. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition GS-13, scenario SCN-GS13-CPF-01, step 5
06 Health to infrastructureClinics fall back to paper while data recovery is delayed. Analogue or source: 2016 to 2021.Edition GS-13, scenario SCN-GS13-CPF-01, step 6

A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Global Cyber and Digital Systems 2026, scenario SCN-GS13-CPF-01 (2026); Global Cyber and Digital Systems 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Readings from the other desks

The cyber and digital systems baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

17 min read0 figures8 tables45 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

デスク版状況識別子
GCRI Systems EvidenceSystems Evidence: Cyber and Digital Systems 2026Drafted, in stewardship reviewNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
GRF Public DeliberationOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
GRA Capital ReadinessCapital Readiness: Cyber and Digital Systems 2026準備中NR-GRA-GS-13-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Standards ProgressStandards Progress: Cyber and Digital Systems 2026準備中NR-NXS-GS-13-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Academy CapabilityCapability: Cyber and Digital Systems 2026準備中NR-RA-GS-13-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Index MeasurementOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading the digital layer as the coupling layer of the WEFH+B system. Connection is spreading, crime follows it, and concentration is the structural risk. Evidence is strongest for connectivity and for US and EU incident data, and weakest for utility incidents and for losses outside the United States.

INF-001 · DAT-004 · INF-011 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people cyber risk arrives as a scam, a locked hospital system or a service that stops. The baseline asks that public debate keep the 2.2 billion people offline in view alongside the security story, and treat digital resilience as shared infrastructure.

INF-001 · DAT-002 · HLT-009

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Reported losses are large, ransomware payments are volatile and law now sets reporting duties for financial entities and essential services22921. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

DAT-002 · FIN-003

NEXUS

統合

The digital layer is well measured at the level of connection and crime reports and thinly measured at the level of utility incidents, patch speed and outcomes. The 2027 programme should bind regional route evidence, test provider failure under ransomware, and bind incident data on a common basis.

SYS-012 · C-01 · C-02

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for cyber and digital systems. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
Quarter版問い境界
Q1State and Agenda今年は何が重要で、出発点はどこか。observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2Evidence and BuildWhat new evidence and capability exist?a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3ストレステスト と準備状況What do scenarios and tests show?simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4Annual Synthesis and RenewalWhat changed in the year, and what renews?release follows review, not event publicity deadlines
Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or body役割Contribution route
GCRI CanadaLead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
グローバル・リスク・フォーラム(Global Risks Forum、GRF)leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
グローバル・リスク・アライアンス(Global Risks Alliance、GRA)finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standardspreparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methodsStandards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Risk Academylearning pathways tied to the agenda questionsAcademy gateway · learning by review
Reports sector deskscyber and digital chapter inputs: GCRI evidence, GRA readiness, NXS standards, RA capabilitysector editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

  • Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
  • Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
  • Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

  • Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
  • Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
  • Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

Every large digital failure this decade has been a health event, a payments event and a services event at once. Treating cyber as a security specialism understates how it carries risk between systems. This edition asks where a digital failure goes next.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

The digital layer is a coupling, not a sector

A single update, a single route or a single platform can reach many sectors. The evidence on concentration is partial and mostly qualitative. Measuring dependence on shared providers and routes is the first adaptation.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Concentration is the common factor

Reporting duties for incidents, products and financial entities now apply or are scheduled, and a UN treaty has opened for signature. The data to show whether they work will take years to accumulate [9] [19] [20] [21].

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Rules are arriving faster than outcome data

The 2.2 billion people offline and the countries without a national response team sit outside most security debates. Closing the gaps is not separate from resilience; it is part of it.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Connection is the unfinished half

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 cyber and digital systems readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 cyber and digital systems readiness pack
項目登録State at baselineFirst 2027 entry
E1Cyber and digital systems risk state deltabaseline set by this editionchanges against the baseline
E2WEFH+B state deltafive global system readings setindicator updates and freshness
E3Agenda and Portfolio movementeight agenda items · 6 proposed objectsadmission decisions
E4Federation delivery registernational chapters in preparationnational chapters
E5Consortium capability registernational consortia formingfirst contributions
E6Leadership questions and challengesまだありませんfirst challenge log
E7Foundry technical statenational environments preparedfirst federation cut
E8Publication candidatestwelve findings carried forwardPUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9Universe readinessone candidate missionadmission and role spine
E10Correction registerなしfirst federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

  • 公開
  • Hold
  • Needs evidence
  • 制限付き
  • 置き換え済み

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

  • IN FORCE
  • 採択済み
  • PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE
  • PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
インストゥルメント機関対象範囲ステータス関連性
NIS2 Directive (EU) 2022/255519欧州連合EUIN FORCEessential entities
Cyber Resilience Act (EU) 2024/284720欧州連合EUIN FORCEproducts
Digital Operational Resilience Act (EU) 2022/255421欧州連合EUIN FORCEfinancial entities
AI Act (EU) 2024/168922欧州連合EUIN FORCEAI systems
UN Convention against Cybercrime9国際連合globalADOPTED 2024 · NOT IN FORCEcybercrime
NIST サイバーセキュリティ・フレームワーク 2.015NISTglobal usePUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYのガバナンス
FIPS 203 module-lattice key encapsulation16NISTUS federalPUBLISHED 2024post-quantum
IEC 62443 control-system security42IECglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYcontrol systems
ISO/IEC 27001:202241ISO と IECglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYmanagement systems

Changed since 2024

  • The UN Convention against Cybercrime opened for signature on 25 October 20259
  • The UN General Assembly endorsed the final report of the working group and operationalised the Global Mechanism from 202610
  • NIST selected a further key encapsulation algorithm for standardisation on 11 March 202517

To watch in 2027

  • Ratifications of the UN Convention against Cybercrime toward the 40 needed9
  • Application of EU Cyber Resilience Act reporting duties from 11 September 2026 and the main duties from 11 December 202720
  • Final form of the NIST timetable for retiring quantum-vulnerable algorithms18

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers cyber and digital systems assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

問い
What does the published evidence establish about the world’s cyber and digital systems and its couplings?
Sources searched
agency flagships; regulator and national statistical reports; peer-reviewed studies; legal texts
期間
releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
選択
sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
次の段階
systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and assessments
参照番号種類年役割Used for
Neprash et al.23journal article2022supportshealth ransomware trends
Fang et al.24preprint2024contextexploit of one-day flaws
Abouk and Powell45journal article2024contextcare effects of ransomware
NIST post-quantum project17project record2025contextstandardisation status
NIST サイバーセキュリティ・フレームワーク 2.015枠組み2024contextgovernance function
IMF Global Financial Stability Report ch. 335の評価2024contextfinancial-sector cyber risk
Table 6.6Institutional flagships
参照番号Issuer年役割Used for
Facts and Figures 202548ITU2025supportsconnectivity
Facts and Figures 20261ITU2026post-close, context onlyconnectivity
Global Cybersecurity Index 20244ITU2024supportsnational capacity
Submarine cable resilience article12ITU and ICPC2026supportscable faults
Inflection Point report11UNODC2025contextscam centres
Digital Progress and Trends Report 202530世界銀行2025contextcompute and concentration
グローバル・デジタル・コンパクト31UN General Assembly2024contextconnectivity commitments
Table 6.7Statistics, crime and markets
参照番号Issuer年役割Used for
Annual Report 20252FBI IC32026supportsvictim-reported losses
Threat Landscape 20253ENISA2025supportsintrusion vectors
Global Cybersecurity Outlook 20265WEF2026contextexecutive survey
Workforce Study 20256ISC22025contextskills and resources
Ransomware analysis 202629Chainalysis2026supportson-chain payments
Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2628UK Government2026supportsbusiness prevalence
Crypto Crime Report 202633Chainalysis2026contextnot used for a figure
Data Breach Investigations Report 202632Verizon2026contextnot used for a figure
Cost of a Data Breach 202538IBM2025contextnot used for a figure
Annual Review 202536UK NCSC2025contextnot used for a figure
Threat Assessment 202537Europol2025contextnot used for a figure
Digital Defense Report 202539Microsoft2025contextnot used for a figure
DDoS threat report47Cloudflare2025contextnot used for a figure
Table 6.8Law, standards and infrastructure
参照番号Issuer年役割Used for
NIS2 指令19欧州連合2022supportsincident reporting duties
サイバー・レジリエンス法20欧州連合2024supportsproduct duties
デジタル・オペレーショナル・レジリエンス法21欧州連合2022supportsfinancial entities
AI Act22欧州連合2024contextAI duties
UN Convention against Cybercrime9UNODC2025supportstreaty status
ブダペスト条約40欧州評議会2001contextearlier treaty
Joint advisories2526national agencies2024 to 2025supportsstate-sponsored activity
Catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilities7CISA2026supportsexploited flaws
National Vulnerability Database8NIST2026supportspublished records
Root cause analysis14CrowdStrike2024supportsupdate failure
Internet Society brief13Internet Society2025supportscable resilience
Mapping of submarine cables44TeleGeography2025contextcable count
Incident disclosure rule46US SEC2023contextdisclosure duty

Where the evidence agrees

  • Phishing and exploitation of known flaws open most intrusions37
  • Concentration of providers and routes raises systemic risk121430
  • Connectivity gaps between income groups remain large48

Where it is unsettled

  • How much cybercrime costs worldwide, on one basis233
  • Whether ransomware is growing: claimed attacks and payments move in opposite directions292
  • How large the AI effect on intrusions is, measured rather than surveyed3524

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 21Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 20Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 22Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (AI Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 15NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29 (February 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 16NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (13 August 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 42IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, developed jointly with ISA99 (parts on general concepts, policies and procedures, system requirements and component requirements, as listed on the IEC System Committee Smart Energy page; no figure is used). International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2026 (current page). Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  11. 41ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, third edition, October 2022, with Amendment 1:2024 on climate action changes (publisher preview of the amendment opened). International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 10United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution 80/16 on the final report of the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (endorses A/80/257; Global Mechanism from 2026). United Nations, New York, December 2025. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 17NIST (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography standardisation project page (FIPS 203, 204 and 205 published 13 August 2024; HQC selected 11 March 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 18Moody, D. et al., Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (November 2024; proposes deprecation after 2030 and disallowance after 2035 for quantum-vulnerable algorithms; a draft). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 24Fang, R., Bindu, R., Gupta, A. and Kang, D., LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilities, arXiv preprint 2404.08144, April 2024 (not peer reviewed; 15 vulnerabilities). Cornell University, Ithaca. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 45Abouk, R. and Powell, D., Ransomware Attacks, ED Visits and Inpatient Admissions in Targeted and Nearby Hospitals, JAMA 331(24), 2129 to 2131, 2024 (research letter; Crossref record and summary opened: case-control study of disruptive attacks on California hospitals, 2014 to 2020). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  18. 35IMF (ed.), Global Financial Stability Report, April 2024, chapter 3, Cyber Risk: A Growing Concern for Macrofinancial Stability (Crossref record and chapter abstract opened; no figure is used). International Monetary Fund, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  19. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 1POST-CLOSE, context only: ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2026 (released 3 November 2026, after the 30 September 2026 evidence close; supports no baseline claim). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026 (estimates, with 2025 comparison). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  23. 11UNODC (ed.), Inflection Point: Global Implications of Scam Centres, Underground Banking and Illicit Online Marketplaces in Southeast Asia (April 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Bangkok. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 30World Bank (ed.), Digital Progress and Trends Report 2025: Strengthening AI Foundations. World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  25. 31United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Global Digital Compact, A/79/L.2 (September 2024). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  26. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  27. 5World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 (January 2026; executive survey, perceptions rather than measured rates). World Economic Forum, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  28. 6ISC2 (ed.), 2025 ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (December 2025; 16,029 respondents; states that it includes no estimate of the workforce gap). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  29. 28UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and partners (eds.), Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026 (30 April 2026; survey of businesses and charities). UK Government, London. Observation year 2026 (survey covering the preceding 12 months). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  30. 33Chainalysis (ed.), Crypto Crime Reaches Record High in 2025 as Nation-State Sanctions Evasion Moves On-Chain at Scale, introduction to the 2026 Crypto Crime Report, 8 January 2026 (illicit cryptocurrency addresses received at least USD 154 billion in 2025, a lower-bound estimate; not used for a figure). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  31. 32Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report, executive summary (incidents 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; third-party involvement in 48% of breaches and exploitation of vulnerabilities in 31% of known initial access vectors; a commercial dataset and no figure is bound). Verizon, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  32. 38IBM (ed.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025, conducted by the Ponemon Institute (600 organisations, breaches from March 2024 to February 2025), as described in the IBM release of 30 July 2025 (global average cost USD 4.44 million; the gated report itself was not opened and no figure is used). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  33. 36UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, 14 October 2025 (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; collection page opened, no figure is used). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  34. 37Europol (ed.), Steal, deal and repeat: How cybercriminals trade and exploit your data, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2025, June 2025 (report page and European Commission news item of 16 June 2025 opened; no figure is used). Europol, The Hague. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  35. 39Microsoft (ed.), Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2025 (sixth annual report, July 2024 to June 2025), as described in the Microsoft On the Issues post of 16 October 2025, Extortion and ransomware drive over half of cyberattacks (the report itself was not opened; no figure is used). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  36. 47Cloudflare (ed.), 2025 Q4 DDoS threat report: A record-setting 31.4 Tbps attack caps a year of massive DDoS assaults, 5 February 2026 (no figure is used). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  37. 40Council of Europe (ed.), Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), ETS No. 185, opened for signature in Budapest on 23 November 2001 (details confirmed from the preamble of its Second Additional Protocol as presented to the UK Parliament, Miscellaneous Series No. 9 (2022); the Council of Europe site blocked access and no figure is used). Council of Europe, Strasbourg. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  38. 25CISA, FBI, NSA and partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, joint cybersecurity advisory (27 August 2025). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  39. 26CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, joint advisory AA24-038A (7 February 2024). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  40. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  41. 8NIST (ed.), National Vulnerability Database, CVE API version 2.0 (records published in 2024 and in 2025, excluding rejected records, counted by the editors from four quarterly queries per year; 39,953 and 48,150). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  42. 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  43. 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  44. 44TeleGeography (ed.), How Many Submarine Cables Are There, Anyway? (post on the Submarine Cable Map; the version reposted by SubOptic on 22 May 2025 gives 570 in-service systems and 81 planned as of February 2025, and the update of 23 September 2026 gives 607 in service and 102 planned). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  45. 46US Securities and Exchange Commission (ed.), Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, final rule, Release Nos. 33-11216 and 34-97989, Federal Register 88(149), 51896 to 51945, 4 August 2023 (no figure is used). SEC, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

The 2027 agenda

Eight bounded questions open the 2027 cyber and digital systems agenda. Each comes from a baseline finding, names the initiative that will carry it and the first output due in the 2027 cyber and digital systems edition.

5 min read0 figures6 tables4 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

7.1Questions for the operational series

  1. C-01

    How would a failure at a concentrated digital provider that coincides with a ransomware wave travel through health, power and public services at once?

    INI-GS13-CPF-01 · provider failure under ransomware; first output: concurrency analysis for six regions.

  2. C-02

    Which operational technology and control systems in utilities have incident data on a common basis?

    INI-GS13-OTI-02 · utility incident data; first output: reporting-channel register.

  3. C-03

    How do ransomware attacks on health services change care outcomes beyond the 2016 to 2021 study period?

    INI-GS13-HRW-03 · health ransomware and care; first output: data scoping note.

  4. C-04

    Which submarine routes and landing points are single points of failure, and where is repair capacity short?

    INI-GS13-CBL-04 · cable routes and repair; first output: route dependence map.

  5. C-05

    Where do connectivity gaps coincide with weak cyber capacity, and what would closing them take?

    INI-GS13-GAP-05 · connectivity and capacity; first output: tier-and-access table.

  6. C-06

    How are EU reporting duties for incidents and exploited vulnerabilities being used in practice?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: duty-to-data overlay.

  7. C-07

    What is the measured, not surveyed, effect of AI on intrusion speed and volume?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: scoping note.

  8. C-08

    Which cyber capabilities have been tested in real incidents, and which are only planned?

    Cyber capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.

7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment

Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 cyber and digital portfolio. They are programme objects: no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.

Table 7.1Objects proposed for the first operational quarter
IDオブジェクト種別問い状況
INI-GS13-CPF-01Provider failure under ransomwareInitiativeC-01提案中
INI-GS13-OTI-02Utility incident dataInitiativeC-02提案中
INI-GS13-HRW-03Health ransomware and careInitiativeC-03提案中
INI-GS13-CBL-04Cable routes and repairInitiativeC-04提案中
INI-GS13-GAP-05Connectivity and capacityInitiativeC-05提案中
MSN-GS13-2027-01Provider failure under ransomware Universe mission使命C-01Candidate

7.3The pathway

The cyber and digital edition reads national cyber and digital chapters, regional connectivity and incident evidence and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed; the Canada and global chapters are drafted. This page states what exists today and what comes next.

  1. 01

    National cyber and digital chapters

    digital and cyber content of each national edition

    DRAFTED · further national baselines

  2. 02

    Route and incident evidence

    shared cables, exchange points and reporting channels

    PLANNED · regional Baseline Editions

  3. 03

    Cyber and digital sector model

    the digital layer under the system of systems

    v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence

  4. 04

    Global and strategic links

    GLB · SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems · SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk

    PLANNED · strategic baselines

  5. 05

    ユニバース

    annual proving environment

    CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027

  6. 06

    Global Cyber and Digital Systems Report

    this series

    BASELINE DRAFT · 2027 annual edition

  7. 07

    エビデンスと訂正

    one graph, many projections

    OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027

7.4Universe 2027: evidence pack for the cyber and digital systems candidate mission

  1. 01

    任務

  2. 02

    Core Build · 1 month

  3. 03

    Action · 1 week

  4. 04

    Evidence seal

  5. 05

    Portfolio correction

  6. 06

    Next mandate

Table 7.2Universe 2027: evidence pack for the cyber and digital systems candidate mission
項目記録状況時期
F1Annual mandate recordPLANNEDafter the Q2 2027 alignment
F2Core Build recordPLANNEDone month before the exercise
F3演習の証拠PLANNEDduring the Action week
F4Decision packetsPLANNEDexercise state only
F5Proof receiptsPLANNEDscoped to each recorded check
F6After-action reportPLANNEDwithin one quarter
F7Upgrade docketPLANNEDrouted to the Portfolio
F8Portfolio renewalPLANNED2027 global annual edition
F9Public synthesisPLANNEDpublic-safe extracts only

使命

ID
MSN-GS13-2027-01 · Provider failure under ransomware Universe mission
Role spine
Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead: drawn from national pathways
Receiving actors
to be identified with the mandate

7.5Handoffs and routing

Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.

Table 7.3Handoffs and routing
調査結果Routed to目的クラス
INF-001 · connectivitypublic recordreference for the 2027 seriesPUBLIC
DAT-002 · crime reportsINI-GS13-GAP-05connectivity and capacityPUBLIC
INF-005 · exploited flawsINI-GS13-OTI-02utility incident dataPUBLIC
HLT-009 · health ransomwareINI-GS13-HRW-03health ransomware and carePUBLIC
GOV-006 · capacity indexpublic recordcountry tier overlayPUBLIC
INF-008 · cable faultsINI-GS13-CBL-04cable routes and repairPUBLIC
INF-011 · update failureINI-GS13-CPF-01 · key F reviewprovider failure under ransomwarePUBLIC
SYS-012 · compound pathwayMSN-GS13-2027-01Universe candidateCONSORTIUM
Table 7.4Routing rules by publication class
クラスWhere it goesWho can see it
PUBLICthe published edition and its evidence bundleanyone
CONSORTIUMgoverned rooms of the federationconsortium members under agreement
CONTROLLEDneed-to-know channelsnamed competent actors only

7.6Feeds and signal register

Table 7.5Feeds watched from 2027
FeedProducerLatencyFeeds into
Catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilitiesCISA継続的INF-005
National Vulnerability DatabaseNIST継続的INF-005
Measuring digital development dataITU年次INF-001
Internet Crime Complaint Center reportsFBI年次DAT-002
Threat LandscapeENISA年次DAT-004
Treaty status pageUNODC継続的GOV-007
Internet shutdowns dataAccess Now年次INF-001

Escalation routes

  • none · keep monitoring
  • research question
  • project
  • risk object
  • annual publication
  • signal report
Table 7.6Signals at baseline
IDSignalCorroborationシステムルート
SIG-GS13-001Entries added to the exploited vulnerabilities catalogue in 2026 exceed those added in 20257CORROBORATEDINF · DATresearch question C-02
SIG-GS13-002Claimed ransomware attacks rose while on-chain payments fell29PARTIALFIN · DATinitiative C-03
SIG-GS13-003Submarine cable faults persist at about 200 a year1213CORROBORATEDINF · TRDinitiative C-04

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

7 min read0 figures5 tables13 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

8.1Digital systems and water

Treatment, pumping and distribution run on control systems and telemetry. Cyber risk reaches water services through operational technology, and the evidence on incidents is thin.

4sectors

named as primary compromise targets in a joint advisory, including water and wastewater26

2sectors

drinking water and waste water listed in the EU cyber directive19

0系列

consolidated incident series found for water utilities

Table 8.1State at baseline
構成要素状況エビデンスステータス
Advisory evidenceUS and allied agencies confirm compromise of IT environments in communications, energy, transport and water sectors26報告値
Legal coveragedrinking water and waste water are sectors under the EU directive with reporting duties19報告値
インシデントデータno common-basis series for utility incidents3Expert input
Control system practicestandards exist; adoption not consolidated42Inferred

連動

  • ENE → WAT power for control systems
  • WAT → ENE shared control networks
  • WAT → HLT treatment and clinic supply

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • incident data at water utilities
  • time to recover control systems

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-04 Health and One Health
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk

8.2Digital systems and energy

Grids and fuel systems run on digital control. A joint advisory reports pre-positioning on networks of energy providers, and the EU treats energy as a sector under its cyber law.

1advisory

assesses pre-positioning for disruption in a crisis26

24時間

early warning deadline under the EU directive19

72時間

incident notification deadline under the EU directive19

Table 8.2State at baseline
構成要素状況エビデンスステータス
Pre-positioningagencies assess with high confidence that actors are positioned to move from IT to OT networks26報告値
Reporting dutyearly warning within 24 hours and notification within 72 hours of a significant incident19報告値
運用データno consolidated series of operational incidents3Expert input
Product dutiesthe Cyber Resilience Act applies to products from 11 December 202720報告値

連動

  • INF → ENE control and billing systems
  • ENE → INF power for networks
  • ENE → HLT power for hospital systems

Evidence to bind in 2027

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-04 Health and One Health
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk

8.3Digital systems and food

Food systems depend on software for cold chains, traceability, payments and logistics. No consolidated series of digital incidents in food systems was found.

≈60%

of intrusions opened by phishing in EU data, all sectors3

21.3%

of intrusions opened by exploitation of vulnerabilities, all sectors3

0系列

incident series found for food systems

Table 8.3State at baseline
構成要素状況エビデンスステータス
Cold chain and logisticsdepend on power and software; no series3Expert input
トレーサビリティdepends on shared data systems; not consolidated3Expert input
決済fraud and ransomware affect payments, as shown in finance data2Inferred
Logistics targetingmaritime and logistics are a high-value sector in EU data3報告値

連動

  • ENE → FOO cold chain and logistics
  • INF → FOO traceability systems
  • DAT → FIN → FOO payments

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • incident series for food sector software
  • cold-chain outage records

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-04 Health and One Health
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk

8.4Digital systems and health

Health services depend on records, devices and connectivity. Ransomware attacks on providers disrupt care and expose patient data, and the best evidence is from the United States.

374attacks

on US providers, 2016 to 202123

42million

patients exposed, nearly, 2016 to 202123

44.4%

of attacks disrupted care delivery23

Table 8.4State at baseline
構成要素状況エビデンスステータス
Frequencyannual ransomware attacks rose from 43 to 91, 2016 to 202123報告値
Care disruptionelectronic system downtime in 41.7% and cancelled care in 10.2%23報告値
Scale of breacha 2024 claims processor breach affected 192.7 million individuals, the largest entry on the US federal breach portal34報告値
Legal coveragehealthcare providers are in the sectors covered by the EU directive19報告値

連動

  • ENE → HLT hospital power
  • INF → HLT records and devices
  • DAT → HLT patient data

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • health ransomware data after 2021
  • non-US evidence on care effects

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-04 Health and One Health
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk

8.5Digital systems, nature and extremes

Monitoring networks support nature and weather services, and concentration in providers and routes turns single faults into wide events. Evidence is strongest for the update failure and cable faults, and absent for nature.

21入力

expected by the validator against 20 supplied to the interpreter in the 2024 update14

≈200faults

submarine cable faults a year12

313shutdowns

recorded in 52 countries, 202527

Table 8.5State at baseline
構成要素状況エビデンスステータス
Update failuremismatch of 21 and 20 inputs caused an out-of-bounds read and crashes14報告値
Cable faultsabout 200 a year; causes reported differently by two issuers1213報告値
Shutdownsrecord number of deliberate shutdowns in 202527報告値
Nature monitoringno consolidated cyber evidence for monitoring networks30Expert input

連動

  • INF → ALL provider failure
  • INF → TRD route disruption
  • DAT → BIO monitoring data

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • evidence on monitoring networks for nature
  • repair vessel availability

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-04 Health and One Health
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 26CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, joint advisory AA24-038A (7 February 2024). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 42IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, developed jointly with ISA99 (parts on general concepts, policies and procedures, system requirements and component requirements, as listed on the IEC System Committee Smart Energy page; no figure is used). International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2026 (current page). Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 20Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 34US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (ed.), Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS, Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, archive listing (Change Healthcare, Inc., business associate, hacking or IT incident, submitted 19 July 2024: 192,700,000 individuals affected, the largest entry on the portal). HHS OCR, Washington. Observation year 2024 (count as listed at the access date). Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 27Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition (eds.), Rising Repression Meets Global Resistance: Internet Shutdowns in 2025 (annual report, March 2026). Access Now, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 30World Bank (ed.), Digital Progress and Trends Report 2025: Strengthening AI Foundations. World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

方法論

How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.

15 min read0 figures13 tables21 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

A.1手法

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

Table A.1Methods
No.DerivationCalculation結果
(1)Share of catalogue entries flagged for ransomware use, 3 November 2026361 ÷ 1,767≈20.4%
(2)Growth in NVD records published, 2025 against 2024, excluding rejected records (sum of four quarterly counts each year)48,150 ÷ 39,953≈20.5% more
(3)FBI reported ransomware losses against on-chain ransomware payments, 2025USD 820 million ÷ USD 32.3 million≈25 times, a scope difference, not an error
(4)Countries without a national incident response team, 2024194 − 13955
Table A.2Coupling strength scale (matrix and model card)
Strength定義
STRONGa disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region
MODERATEan effect is documented but buffered or slower
WEAKan effect is plausible but not documented at global scale
Table A.3Status grammar
ラベル規則
報告値value as issued by its source, with year
Inferredreasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement
推定Nexus analytical value with stated method
シナリオconditional on stated assumptions
Expert inputstructured editorial judgement awaiting evidence

A.2Model card, Cyber and Digital Sector Model v0

Model ID
MDL-GS13-CYBER · v0.1
目的
represent the global digital layer and its couplings to water, energy, food, health and nature
ファミリー
graph-based system of systems
入力
the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
手法
expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
検証
none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
不確実性
qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
有効性の適用範囲
global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
再現性
strength table and sources published in this edition
20couplings

typed in v0

2strong

documented within one season

4moderate

documented, buffered

14weak

plausible, undocumented

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID
DC-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-B0
種類
baseline documentary cut
Resolution policy
pinned · as of 30 September 2026
Sources pinned
48 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
Model runs
none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
Digest
computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
Supersedes
nothing, first cut of the series
Superseded by
the 2027 cyber and digital systems annual cut

系譜

  1. 01

    source edition

  2. 02

    pinned citation

  3. 03

    finding

  4. 04

    page

  5. 05

    publication record

Table A.4From the baseline cut to the federation cut
要素Baseline 20262027 global annual
出典cited global publications, pinned by editionnational, regional and sector cuts through one graph
Analysisstated methods and editorial estimatestyped analysis specifications
モデルCyber and Digital Sector Model v0 specificationmodel runs with receipts
調査結果twelve baseline findingsfindings re-bound to federation evidence
審査five passes scheduledfive passes on the exact digest

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

Table A.5Evidence age and coverage
指標観測公開済み周期Next release
Internet use and coverage2025November 2025年次next Facts and Figures
Victim-reported cybercrime20252026年次next IC3 report
Intrusion vectors in the EUJuly 2024 to June 2025October 2025年次next Threat Landscape
Known exploited vulnerabilities2021 to 20263 November 2026継続的継続的
National cybersecurity capacity20242024定期的next index
Treaty signatures and parties20263 November 2026継続的継続的
Submarine cable faultsabout 200 a yearFebruary 2026one-offfollow-up reports
Internet shutdowns2025March 2026年次next KeepItOn report
Ransomware payments2025February 2026年次next analysis
Health ransomware trends2016 to 20212022one-offfollow-up studies
Table A.6Coverage by system at baseline
システム対象範囲Thinnest dimension
接続性GOODquality and affordability by country
Crime and fraudPARTIALlosses outside the United States
Threat landscapePARTIALregions beyond the EU and US
VulnerabilitiesGOODtime to patch, by vendor
ガバナンスGOODtreaty status after access
重要サービスTHINutility incident data on a common basis
健康PARTIALdata after 2021
レジリエンスPARTIALtested capabilities beyond recovery from one update failure
Table A.7Designed empty states: what is not bound, what would fill it and why
分野Source that would fill itBlocker
Global cybercrime losses on one basisnational police and crime agencies; UNODCthe FBI series covers United States victims only and no common global series was found; a commercial lower-bound figure for receipts by illicit crypto addresses33 measures flows, not losses, and is not used
Ransomware: reconciliation of claimed attacks, payments and reported lossesChainalysis29; FBI IC32; national reporting channelsthe series use different bases and are not reconciled in this edition
Third-party involvement and exploitation shares in breaches, 2026Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report 202632only the executive summary was opened (third-party involvement 48%, exploitation 31% of known initial access vectors); a commercial dataset, not bound in this edition
Final count of people affected by the 2024 health claims processor breachUS Department of Health and Human Services breach portal; company notice34the federal breach portal lists 192.7 million individuals34; whether the count is final is not stated
Cyber incidents at utilities, by sector and regionoperators, regulators and national authoritiesincident data are not published on a common basis; only advisories on compromise were opened26
Time between vulnerability disclosure and exploitation, by vendorCISA catalogue7; ENISA3the catalogue holds dates added, not dates of first exploitation; only ENISA’s statement of exploitation within days is cited
Cybersecurity workforce shortfallISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study6the 2025 study states that it includes no estimate of the workforce gap
Share of Internet users with digital safety skillsITU Facts and Figures 202548only 88 countries have submitted ICT skills data since 2020, rarely for all skill areas; no global share is published
Financial stability losses from cyber incidentsIMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2024, chapter 335only the chapter abstract was read; no figure is used
Operation of the UN Global Mechanism after 2026, from the final report textworking group final report A/80/25743the report of 24 July 2025 was opened and sets out elements for the Global Mechanism, endorsed by the General Assembly10; operation after 2026 is not yet observed
Treaty ratifications after the access dateUN Treaty Collection; UNODC9status changes continuously; the page was read on 3 November 2026 only
Application dates of EU acts after any later amendmentOfficial Journal consolidated versions19202122the texts as first published were opened; later amendments were not checked
Capability rungs beyond recovery from one update failure and asset freezesoperators, regulators, ministriesnot reviewed
Cost of a data breach, by sector and regionIBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 202538report is gated; only the IBM release was read and no figure is used

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Issued by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (October 2025) from 4,875 incidents curated from open sources and member state reports. Annual. Role: binds DAT-004 and the intrusion vector figure.

EVD-GS13-001

ENISA Threat Landscape 20253

Compiled by the ITU from official national statistics and ITU estimates (November 2025). Annual. Role: binds INF-001 and the connectivity tiles.

EVD-GS13-002

ITU Facts and Figures 202548

Released 3 November 2026, after the evidence close. Annual. Role: context only. It binds no baseline claim and no figure in this edition.

EVD-GS13-003

ITU Facts and Figures 20261 (post-close, context only)

Table A.8Quality dimensions at baseline
DimensionEVD-GS13-001EVD-GS13-002
Completenessopen sources and shared reports; not a census2025 aggregates are ITU estimates computed with the published method
Timelinessabout 4 months after the period endsweeks after the end of the year
Revisionannual editionannual edition with revised back series
Method transparencymethodology publishedindicator definitions published
External validationreviewed by national liaison and response teamsmember state review

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

  • FBI IC32: complaints by state and sector tables
  • ENISA3: incident dataset by sector
  • ITU4: country tier table
  • CISA7: dates of first exploitation, if published

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

Table A.9Publication acceptance record
グループエリア項目合格N/A保留中
D1Identity and scope8800
D2Source and data12912
D3Analysis and models12381
D4Findings and claims9801
D5Figures, tables, maps10622
D6Editorial and citations10802
D7Review and approval130013
D8Artefact and design12705
D9Registry and release9009

Publication gate

Conditions met
14 of 23 at evidence close
Blocking problems
none recorded
Open conditions
reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer

Not applicable at baseline

Model runs
first runs in Q1 2027
地図
plates in Q2 2027
Waivers
なし

A.7Status words

Table A.10The status every value carries
ステータス意味
観測Measured directly and published by the source.
報告値Published statistics of an official or institutional source.
申告済みStated by the body concerned; not independently measured.
推定A Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A.
モデル化Produced by a stated model from cited inputs.
InferredReasoned from cited evidence; not measured.
予報A projection by the cited source.
SimulatedA simulation result under stated assumptions.
シナリオA conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction.
Expert inputExpert judgement, recorded with its basis.
CandidateProposed for a later edition; not yet evidence.
Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject.

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

ステップ何が起きるか出典
01 Evidence arrives from the pillarsFoundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s.
02 The cut is sealedOn the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on.
03 The edition is assembledThe edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide.
04 The keys turnAt the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward.
05 The gate opensA named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit.
06 Signed and depositedThe PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI.
07 Published on its desk’s siteOnly then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part.
08 Corrections go to StandardsMethod and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

Table A.11Series terms
用語意味
Baseline Editionthe inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series
WEFH+Bcyber and digital systems, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core
結合a typed dependency through which one system transmits to another
保障ギャップthe share of losses not covered by insurance
Capability ladderLISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED
EQLevidence-quality level, 1–5
証拠の区切りa frozen resolution of exact sources and versions
NNC・NLC・NWGNational Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups
Table A.12Abbreviations used in this edition
AbbreviationExpansion
CIRTcomputer incident response team
CISAUS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
DORAデジタル・オペレーショナル・レジリエンス法
ENISAEuropean Union Agency for Cybersecurity
FBI IC3Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Complaint Center
GCIGlobal Cybersecurity Index
ITU国際電気通信連合
KEVknown exploited vulnerabilities
NIS2second Network and Information Security Directive
NVDNational Vulnerability Database
OToperational technology
WEFWorld Economic Forum

A.10Technical annex

Table A.13Technical annex
項目Annex目次ステータス
A.1Indicator definitionsthe global indicator set, with units and sourcesIN THIS EDITION
A.2Coupling strengthsthe twenty-cell matrix and its rationaleIN THIS EDITION
A.3Scenario specificationSCN-GS13-CPF-01 assumptions and signpostsIN THIS EDITION
A.4Capability placementsrung evidence for fifteen functionsIN THIS EDITION
A.5Model diagnosticsfirst runs and validation2027
A.6感度分析influence of coupling strengths2027
A.7Route and exchange notescards for the major shared cable routes and exchange pointsWITH REGIONAL EDITIONS
A.8Review statementspass-by-pass review recordAT RELEASE

A.1 · indicator definition: national incident response team

Construct
a national team with responsibility for responding to cyber incidents, as reported by countries
単位
count of countries
手法
country questionnaire compiled by the ITU for the Global Cybersecurity Index
出典
ITU Global Cybersecurity Index 20244
不確実性
self-reported; verified with country focal points where possible
既知の限界
presence of a team does not measure its capacity, staffing or independence

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 33Chainalysis (ed.), Crypto Crime Reaches Record High in 2025 as Nation-State Sanctions Evasion Moves On-Chain at Scale, introduction to the 2026 Crypto Crime Report, 8 January 2026 (illicit cryptocurrency addresses received at least USD 154 billion in 2025, a lower-bound estimate; not used for a figure). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  2. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 32Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report, executive summary (incidents 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; third-party involvement in 48% of breaches and exploitation of vulnerabilities in 31% of known initial access vectors; a commercial dataset and no figure is bound). Verizon, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 34US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (ed.), Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS, Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, archive listing (Change Healthcare, Inc., business associate, hacking or IT incident, submitted 19 July 2024: 192,700,000 individuals affected, the largest entry on the portal). HHS OCR, Washington. Observation year 2024 (count as listed at the access date). Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 26CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, joint advisory AA24-038A (7 February 2024). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 6ISC2 (ed.), 2025 ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (December 2025; 16,029 respondents; states that it includes no estimate of the workforce gap). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 35IMF (ed.), Global Financial Stability Report, April 2024, chapter 3, Cyber Risk: A Growing Concern for Macrofinancial Stability (Crossref record and chapter abstract opened; no figure is used). International Monetary Fund, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 43United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Final report of the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies 2021 to 2025, A/80/257, transmitted by note of the Secretary-General of 24 July 2025 (includes additional elements for the Global Mechanism). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 10United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution 80/16 on the final report of the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (endorses A/80/257; Global Mechanism from 2026). United Nations, New York, December 2025. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 20Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 21Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 22Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (AI Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 38IBM (ed.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025, conducted by the Ponemon Institute (600 organisations, breaches from March 2024 to February 2025), as described in the IBM release of 30 July 2025 (global average cost USD 4.44 million; the gated report itself was not opened and no figure is used). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  20. 1POST-CLOSE, context only: ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2026 (released 3 November 2026, after the 30 September 2026 evidence close; supports no baseline claim). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026 (estimates, with 2025 comparison). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Data appendix

The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.

10 min read0 figures8 tables18 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

B.1The indicator set

Table B.1Global baseline indicator set
指標値単位年状況出典
People using the Internet74%2025報告値48
People using the Internet6billion2025報告値48
Internet use, high-income countries94%2025報告値48
Internet use, low-income countries23%2025報告値48
Population covered by 5G55%2025報告値48
Complaints to the FBI1,008,597complaints2025報告値2
Losses reported to the FBI20.877USD billion2025報告値2
Cryptocurrency investment fraud losses, US7.2USD billion2025報告値2
Ransomware complaints to the FBI3,611complaints2025報告値2
On-chain ransomware payments820USD million2025報告値29
Incidents analysed by ENISA4,875インシデント2025報告値3
Phishing share of observed intrusions, EU≈60%2025報告値3
Known exploited vulnerabilities in the catalogue1,767entries2026報告値7
Catalogue entries added283entries2026報告値7
NVD records published, excluding rejected48,150記録2025報告値8
NVD records published, excluding rejected39,953記録2024報告値8
Countries with a national incident response team139of 1942024報告値4
UN Convention against Cybercrime signatories96signatories2026報告値9
Submarine cable faults≈200a year2026報告値12
Internet shutdowns recorded313shutdowns2025報告値27
UK businesses reporting a breach or attack43%2026報告値28
Survey respondents naming AI vulnerabilities fastest-growing87%2026報告値5

B.2Global source register

The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.

Domains bound by the register

  • INF
  • DAT
  • FIN
  • GOV
  • HLT
  • AIC
  • TRD
  • WAT
  • ENE
  • FOO
Table B.3Global source register
出典カテゴリー対象範囲Period周期役割
ITU Facts and Figures 202548intergovernmental agencyglobal2025年次connectivity
FBI IC3 Annual Report 20252law enforcement米国2025年次crime reports
ENISA Threat Landscape 20253EU agencyEU2025年次threat landscape
ITU Global Cybersecurity Index 20244intergovernmental agencyglobal2024定期的national capacity
CISA known exploited vulnerabilities7national agencyglobal entries2026継続的exploited flaws
UNODC Convention page9UN agencyglobal2026継続的treaty status
ITU article on cable resilience12intergovernmental agencyglobal2026one-offcable faults
Access Now KeepItOn report27civil society coalitionglobal2025年次shutdowns
UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey28national government英国2026年次business prevalence
Chainalysis ransomware analysis29commercial analyticsglobal on-chain2025年次payments

B.3Regional reading: the digital layer across ten clusters

Map plates follow with the regional Baseline Editions, when boundary sources and public-safe resolutions are bound. This page gives the regional reading in table form and ranks no region.

Table B.4Regional reading: the digital layer across ten clusters
地域Principal hazardsSystems most exposedBaseline evidence
北米victim-reported fraud and ransomware; concentrated cloud providersfinance, health, servicesFBI report2
南アメリカconnectivity gaps between and within countrieshouseholds, servicesITU Americas range 88 to 93% with CIS and Europe48
ヨーロッパphishing, exploitation, hacktivist denial of service and state-aligned espionagepublic administration, transport, financeENISA3; EU legal acts192021
Eurasiaconnectivity and shutdown recordsservices, mediaITU48; Access Now27
中東・北アフリカArab States Internet use at 70%; cable routes through shared seashouseholds, tradeITU48; cable faults12
アフリカInternet use at 36%; regional cable outages noted by the Internet Societyhouseholds, health, servicesITU48; ISOC13
南アジアshutdown records and fast-growing useservices, householdsAccess Now27
東アジアstate-sponsored activity named in joint advisories; high connectivitytelecommunications, governmentに関する勧告25
ASEANscam compounds and cyber-enabled fraud operationshouseholds, financeUNODC11
Oceania-Pacificsmall island dependence on few cableshouseholds, servicesITU48; cable faults12

B.4Route card: international submarine cable systems

  • cable
  • landing point
  • repair
  • shared route
Systems in view
connectivity, finance, health, public services
Defining facts
about 200 faults a year; over 99% of international data traffic by the ITU’s estimate, 97 to 98% by the Internet Society’s1213
連動
INF → FIN payments; INF → HLT records; INF → TRD logistics
Capability evidence
ITU and cable industry advisory body formed in 2024; regional repair arrangements under discussion1213
ギャップ
repair vessel availability; landing point diversity by country
Agenda items
C-04 · C-05

The ITU reports that over 80% of cable faults come from fishing and anchoring; the Internet Society states that most disruption is natural or human error [12] [13].

ROUTE

Fishing and anchoring

A region served by few routes shares its connectivity risk, so a local fault can degrade many services.

SECURITY

集中度

The ITU article and the Internet Society brief are policy analyses, not an attribution of fault to any actor [12] [13].

LEARNING

Public advisories

B.5How countries appear in the cyber and digital systems edition

Countries enter the cyber and digital edition through the digital chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never ranked.

Table B.5How countries appear in the cyber and digital systems edition
Card field表示内容出典
WEFH+B stateeach core system against peer distribution bandsnational edition
連動the national dependency matrixnational edition
Risk objectsthe national risk portfolionational edition
Capability rungsthe national capability laddernational edition
Evidence ageoldest and newest source datesnational source register

Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme

26国

countries and unions

10regional

clusters

16global

flagship and sector

14strategic

システム レポート

20frontier

technology reports

How to read a country card

  • Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
  • Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
  • Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
  • Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such
Table B.6National Baseline Editions in the 2026 programme
ウェーブCountries and unions状況
W0カナダISSUED
W1United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, SwitzerlandPLANNED
W2Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, AustraliaPLANNED

B.6ライセンス

Table B.7Licences of each kind of material
資料ライセンス
TextCC BY 4.0
データon the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0
数字Nexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited
地図boundary source and licence printed on each plate
メタデータCC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it
Third-party data, figures and textThe source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed
Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence.

B.7Formats and provenance

Table B.8This edition in every format
形式種別状況概要識別子
Web editionHTMLこのサイトDraft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source.NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Print editionPDFAt releaseA4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release.NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Indicator dataCSV · JSONこのサイト22 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release.NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1
数字SVG · PNGこのサイト4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder.FIG-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-*
SlidesPDF記録なしNo slide deck is recorded for this edition.
エビデンス・ブリーフHTML · PDF記録なしNo evidence brief is recorded for this edition.
Dataset with DOIDataCiteAt releaseConcept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet.

来歴

Edition pack
The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
証拠の区切り
DC-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
再現性
sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
Self-check
14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
審査
five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
正式な発行者
GCRI for the Nexus Consortium
訂正
Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 8NIST (ed.), National Vulnerability Database, CVE API version 2.0 (records published in 2024 and in 2025, excluding rejected records, counted by the editors from four quarterly queries per year; 39,953 and 48,150). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 27Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition (eds.), Rising Repression Meets Global Resistance: Internet Shutdowns in 2025 (annual report, March 2026). Access Now, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 28UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and partners (eds.), Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026 (30 April 2026; survey of businesses and charities). UK Government, London. Observation year 2026 (survey covering the preceding 12 months). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 5World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 (January 2026; executive survey, perceptions rather than measured rates). World Economic Forum, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 20Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 21Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 25CISA, FBI, NSA and partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, joint cybersecurity advisory (27 August 2025). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 11UNODC (ed.), Inflection Point: Global Implications of Scam Centres, Underground Banking and Illicit Online Marketplaces in Southeast Asia (April 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Bangkok. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

References and record

Every source the edition rests on, the publication record, the corrections log and the open record.

15 min read0 figures1 table0 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

C.148 sources

NR-CIT-1, editor first. A DOI is linked where the source has one; Nexus records carry a UNI once the catalogue allocates it (NS-1).

  1. 1POST-CLOSE, context only: ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2026 (released 3 November 2026, after the 30 September 2026 evidence close; supports no baseline claim). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026 (estimates, with 2025 comparison). Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  2. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  3. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  4. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  5. 5World Economic Forum (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2026 (January 2026; executive survey, perceptions rather than measured rates). World Economic Forum, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  6. 6ISC2 (ed.), 2025 ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (December 2025; 16,029 respondents; states that it includes no estimate of the workforce gap). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  7. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7
  8. 8NIST (ed.), National Vulnerability Database, CVE API version 2.0 (records published in 2024 and in 2025, excluding rejected records, counted by the editors from four quarterly queries per year; 39,953 and 48,150). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 6
  9. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  10. 10United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution 80/16 on the final report of the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (endorses A/80/257; Global Mechanism from 2026). United Nations, New York, December 2025. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6
  11. 11UNODC (ed.), Inflection Point: Global Implications of Scam Centres, Underground Banking and Illicit Online Marketplaces in Southeast Asia (April 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Bangkok. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  12. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  13. 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  14. 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 8
  15. 15NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29 (February 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  16. 16NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (13 August 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  17. 17NIST (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography standardisation project page (FIPS 203, 204 and 205 published 13 August 2024; HQC selected 11 March 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  18. 18Moody, D. et al., Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (November 2024; proposes deprecation after 2030 and disallowance after 2035 for quantum-vulnerable algorithms; a draft). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  19. 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  20. 20Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 6, chapter 8
  21. 21Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  22. 22Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (AI Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  23. 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 8
  24. 24Fang, R., Bindu, R., Gupta, A. and Kang, D., LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilities, arXiv preprint 2404.08144, April 2024 (not peer reviewed; 15 vulnerabilities). Cornell University, Ithaca. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  25. 25CISA, FBI, NSA and partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, joint cybersecurity advisory (27 August 2025). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  26. 26CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, joint advisory AA24-038A (7 February 2024). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  27. 27Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition (eds.), Rising Repression Meets Global Resistance: Internet Shutdowns in 2025 (annual report, March 2026). Access Now, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 3, chapter 8
  28. 28UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and partners (eds.), Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026 (30 April 2026; survey of businesses and charities). UK Government, London. Observation year 2026 (survey covering the preceding 12 months). Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  29. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7
  30. 30World Bank (ed.), Digital Progress and Trends Report 2025: Strengthening AI Foundations. World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  31. 31United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Global Digital Compact, A/79/L.2 (September 2024). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 6
  32. 32Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report, executive summary (incidents 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; third-party involvement in 48% of breaches and exploitation of vulnerabilities in 31% of known initial access vectors; a commercial dataset and no figure is bound). Verizon, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  33. 33Chainalysis (ed.), Crypto Crime Reaches Record High in 2025 as Nation-State Sanctions Evasion Moves On-Chain at Scale, introduction to the 2026 Crypto Crime Report, 8 January 2026 (illicit cryptocurrency addresses received at least USD 154 billion in 2025, a lower-bound estimate; not used for a figure). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  34. 34US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (ed.), Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS, Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, archive listing (Change Healthcare, Inc., business associate, hacking or IT incident, submitted 19 July 2024: 192,700,000 individuals affected, the largest entry on the portal). HHS OCR, Washington. Observation year 2024 (count as listed at the access date). Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 8
  35. 35IMF (ed.), Global Financial Stability Report, April 2024, chapter 3, Cyber Risk: A Growing Concern for Macrofinancial Stability (Crossref record and chapter abstract opened; no figure is used). International Monetary Fund, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  36. 36UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, 14 October 2025 (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; collection page opened, no figure is used). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  37. 37Europol (ed.), Steal, deal and repeat: How cybercriminals trade and exploit your data, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2025, June 2025 (report page and European Commission news item of 16 June 2025 opened; no figure is used). Europol, The Hague. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  38. 38IBM (ed.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025, conducted by the Ponemon Institute (600 organisations, breaches from March 2024 to February 2025), as described in the IBM release of 30 July 2025 (global average cost USD 4.44 million; the gated report itself was not opened and no figure is used). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  39. 39Microsoft (ed.), Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2025 (sixth annual report, July 2024 to June 2025), as described in the Microsoft On the Issues post of 16 October 2025, Extortion and ransomware drive over half of cyberattacks (the report itself was not opened; no figure is used). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  40. 40Council of Europe (ed.), Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), ETS No. 185, opened for signature in Budapest on 23 November 2001 (details confirmed from the preamble of its Second Additional Protocol as presented to the UK Parliament, Miscellaneous Series No. 9 (2022); the Council of Europe site blocked access and no figure is used). Council of Europe, Strasbourg. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  41. 41ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, third edition, October 2022, with Amendment 1:2024 on climate action changes (publisher preview of the amendment opened). International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  42. 42IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, developed jointly with ISA99 (parts on general concepts, policies and procedures, system requirements and component requirements, as listed on the IEC System Committee Smart Energy page; no figure is used). International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2026 (current page). Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
  43. 43United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Final report of the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies 2021 to 2025, A/80/257, transmitted by note of the Secretary-General of 24 July 2025 (includes additional elements for the Global Mechanism). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.
  44. 44TeleGeography (ed.), How Many Submarine Cables Are There, Anyway? (post on the Submarine Cable Map; the version reposted by SubOptic on 22 May 2025 gives 570 in-service systems and 81 planned as of February 2025, and the update of 23 September 2026 gives 607 in service and 102 planned). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  45. 45Abouk, R. and Powell, D., Ransomware Attacks, ED Visits and Inpatient Admissions in Targeted and Nearby Hospitals, JAMA 331(24), 2129 to 2131, 2024 (research letter; Crossref record and summary opened: case-control study of disruptive attacks on California hospitals, 2014 to 2020). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  46. 46US Securities and Exchange Commission (ed.), Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, final rule, Release Nos. 33-11216 and 34-97989, Federal Register 88(149), 51896 to 51945, 4 August 2023 (no figure is used). SEC, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  47. 47Cloudflare (ed.), 2025 Q4 DDoS threat report: A record-setting 31.4 Tbps attack caps a year of massive DDoS assaults, 5 February 2026 (no figure is used). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  48. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6

C.2Publication record

公開

タイトル
Global Cyber and digital systems Risk & Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition
シリーズ
Reports · Global Sector Series GS-13
版
Baseline Edition 2026 · inaugural annual
バージョン
v1.0.0 · draft for stewardship review
Publication ID
NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
エビデンス締め切り
30 September 2026
Publication date
2026 年 10 月
DOI
concept and version DOI at deposit

発行者

正式な発行者
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for the Nexus Consortium
場所
Toronto
編集者
Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor
スチュワード
GCRI · technical truth · GRF · public meaning · GRA · capital meaning
ライセンス
text CC BY 4.0; data on the terms of each source
Copyright
© 2026 GCRI · Nexus Consortium
言語
English (en-GB) source edition
Correspondence
Registry correction pathway · editorial office

Colophon

形式
A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF
Typefaces
Space Grotesk (display) · Geist (text) · IBM Plex Sans Italic (standfirsts) · IBM Plex Mono (data)
Design standard
Reports Foundational Edition, Volume I, Part VII
アクセシビリティ
tagged PDF and HTML targets; text alternatives for every figure
生産
Reports editorial team, GCRI

Release path for this version

Table C.1Release path for this version
ステップ何が起きるかいつ
草案editorial self-check complete at evidence close2026 年 10 月
Steward reviewfive passes on the exact draft (keys T · M · F · N)Q4 2026
承認publication authority approves the exact digestbefore release
Depositconcept and version DOI minted; registry pointer setat release
承継the 2027 cyber and digital systems edition reports changes against this baseline2027
Current version
v1.0.0 draft, stewardship review
Previous edition
none, first edition of the series
Next edition
NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2027-v1.0.0
Latest version
resolve the concept DOI or the registry record
Correction route
Registry correction pathway
Notice types
erratum · addendum · supersession · withdrawal

C.3訂正履歴

0correction notices. No edition has been released yet, so none can be corrected; the log below lists each edition’s current version.

版バージョン日付状況変化通知
GS-13NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.02026 年 10 月草案Baseline Edition 2026, inaugural annual edition,なし

Notice types: erratum, addendum, supersession, withdrawal. A correction is a new version with a published notice; the earlier version stays resolvable, and no edition is ever edited in silence.

C.4Open record

This edition’s open record

Publication ID
NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Desk identifier and series alias
NR-GCRI-GS-13-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 · NR-SEC-GS-13-2026-BL
Collection
NR-COL-2026-BASELINE (IsPartOf at deposit)
DOI
Concept and version DOI at deposit, on Zenodo with DataCite metadata
版
Each correction is a new version (isNewVersionOf); the concept DOI resolves to the latest
Bundle
RO-Crate 1.2 with CITATION.cff, CodeMeta and PROV-O provenance; a signed manifest
ライセンス
CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0) for original material; metadata CC0 1.0

Credit and identity

ORCID
Your iD in the deposit and the contribution record; DataCite can then add the work to your ORCID record
ROR
Your organisation by its ROR identifier, never by a typed name alone
CRediT
Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Validation, Visualisation, Writing, review and editing
アカウント
None needed to contribute; never a password

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C.5Where this edition sits among the six pillars

Foundry seals the evidence and Universe tests it; Reports publishes it; Standards takes its corrections and Academy teaches from it.

  1. F03 Sealed observations and indicator series Foundry Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
  2. F04 After-action and scenario findings for Universe After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
  3. F05 National Portfolio movement for chapter Foundry National Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
  4. Applied in editions Standards Nexus Standards: applied in editions.
  5. GS-13 edition Reports Global Cyber and Digital Systems 2026, published in every format with its sources, citation and corrections.
  6. F06 Method and correction findings as change Standards Method and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
  7. F12 Q4 synthesis informs the next-year Universe Q4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
  8. Taught in the open Academy Risk Academy: taught in the open.

What Foundry and Universe hand to this edition, and what it hands to Standards, Universe and Academy. From the programme spine; GS-13 is a drafted Baseline Edition, so these handoffs run from its first operational quarter.

引き継ぎBetweenWhat crosses, and when
F03Foundry to ReportsSealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
F04Universe to ReportsAfter-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
F05Foundry to ReportsNational Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
RingNexus Standards to ReportsNexus Standards: applied in editions.
F06Reports to Nexus StandardsMethod and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
F12Reports to UniverseQ4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
RingReports to Risk AcademyRisk Academy: taught in the open.
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GCRI システム・エビデンスデスクグローバル部門のリスクとレジリエンス

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