Skip to content

Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

8 min read0 figures5 tables18 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

目次
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Digital systems fail together
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Shared provider failure that overlaps a power or network loss
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
    1. 8.1 Common causes
    2. 8.2 Domino effects
    3. 8.3 Inter-systemic feedbacks
    4. 8.4 Shared vulnerabilities
    5. 8.5 Thresholds and tipping
  11. A方法論
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

8.1Common causes

One cause can strike many services at once: a faulty update, a configuration change, a hostile campaign or a hazard. The shared cause matters more than the sector.

4,875インシデント

analysed by ENISA, Jul 2024 to Jun 20251

≥5年

longest reported intrusion persistence6

204インシデント

nationally significant, UK, to Aug 20258

Table 8.1Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionエビデンスステータス
Software faultsone update reached millions of devices3報告値
Configuration changesa file grew past a built-in limit and an edge network failed5報告値
Cyber operationslong-lived access reported in operator networks67報告値
Ransomware in governmenta 2022 attack led to a national emergency declaration25報告値

Pathways in this mechanism

  • DAT → INF software and configuration
  • CYB → INF hostile access
  • CYB → DAT ransomware

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • common cause tagging of incidents
  • frequency of concurrent causes

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.2Domino effects

A failure in one layer removes an input from the next. A provider fault reaches the services that rely on it, and then the people who rely on those services.

8.5million

Windows devices affected, 18 July 20243

≈14.5時間

AWS event, first impact to end, Oct 20254

≈5.8時間

Cloudflare event, to full resolution, Nov 20255

Table 8.2Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionエビデンスステータス
Software to servicesone vendor update disabled many organisations’ machines3報告値
DNS to cloud servicesone empty record at a regional endpoint spread to dependent services4報告値
Edge to sitesa failed proxy returned errors to sites that rely on the network5報告値
Manufacturer to suppliersone cyber event reached over 5,000 UK organisations9報告値

Pathways in this mechanism

  • DAT → INF → FIN
  • INF → DAT
  • CYB → FIN

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • sequence timing of service loss
  • dependence of public services on named layers

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.3Inter-systemic feedbacks

Digital services depend on what they power and what powers them. Payments need networks, networks need power, and recovery needs the same services that failed.

20.7billion

UPI transactions in October 202513

≈313.3million

Pix transactions in one day, 5 Dec 202514

2.2billion

X-Road transactions a year15

Table 8.3Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionエビデンスステータス
Payments to commercelarge flows run on shared national rails1314報告値
Data exchange to servicesone layer carries billions of transactions between agencies15報告値
Power to digitalexchanges and data centres need continuous power§ matrixInferred
Financial feedbackevent losses feed budgets and delay upgrades9Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • DAT → FIN
  • ENE → DAT
  • DAT ↔ INF

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • outage data for payment rails
  • control-network dependence data

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.4Shared vulnerabilities

Different services share the same weak points: widely deployed software, single cloud regions, shared edge networks and long-lived access to operator networks.

<1%

of Windows machines hit by the July 2024 update3

≥5年

longest reported intrusion persistence6

2.2billion

people offline, 202510

Table 8.4Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionエビデンスステータス
Common softwarea shared platform spreads one fault widely3報告値
Single-region dependenceservices that rely on one regional endpoint fail together4報告値
Operator networksaccess reported in communications, energy, transport and water6報告値
Offline usersdigital-only services leave people without a connection outside1026報告値

Pathways in this mechanism

  • DAT → INF software
  • INF → DAT region and edge
  • DAT → DEV exclusion

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • provider concentration by region
  • share of services with an offline path

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.5Thresholds and tipping

A system can absorb stress until a threshold is crossed. Fallback paths, restoration practice and legal cooperation are such thresholds for digital infrastructure.

40ratifications

needed for the UN Convention against Cybercrime to enter into force17

17Jan 2025

date financial-sector ICT rules began to apply19

79%

adults with an account, 202512

Table 8.5Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionエビデンスステータス
Restoration capacityservice returned after the 2024 and 2025 events; times not consolidated345報告値
Legal cooperationthe treaty enters into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth ratification17報告値
Oversight of providersan EU framework addresses concentration among ICT providers to finance19報告値
Tipping in networkscascades can become abrupt in interdependent networks35Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • INF → INF cascade thresholds
  • DAT → FIN fallback
  • CYB → INF repeated disruption

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • fallback coverage across services
  • cascade thresholds at operating scale

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 25BleepingComputer, Costa Rica declares national emergency after Conti ransomware attacks (press report of 9 May 2022: declaration on 8 May 2022 under Decree No. 42542; Ministry of Finance and other bodies affected). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 9Infosecurity Magazine, JLR hack UK’s costliest ever, hitting economy with GBP 1.9bn loss (press report of the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement of 22 October 2025; Category 3; over 5,000 organisations); the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement itself returned an error and was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 15e-Estonia (ed.), X-Road (programme page: 2.2 billion transactions a year; more than 3,800 e-services; outgoing data digitally signed and encrypted). e-Estonia, Tallinn. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 26Clark, J., Metz, A. and Casher, C., ID4D Global Dataset 2021, Volume 1: Global ID Coverage Estimates (World Bank Open Knowledge Repository record, handle 10986/38440, and report opened: just under 850 million people without official proof of identity as of 2021, around half of them children, most in lower-income countries in Africa and South Asia; estimates built for 194 countries). World Bank, Washington, 2022. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 17United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime (treaty page: signing ceremony in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025; seventy-one States and the European Union; article 65, entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 19European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (ed.), Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (page: applied from 17 January 2025; oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers). EIOPA, Frankfurt. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 12World Bank (ed.), The Global Findex Database 2025 (publication page: 79% of adults globally have an account). World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 35Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464(7291), 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

Downloads

Draft, not yet releasedReview copies of a draft in stewardship review. The released edition carries its DOI and replaces them.

  • 印刷

    • PDF, A4

      The designed print edition, A4: cover, imprint and licence, how to cite, contents with page numbers, every chapter, figure, table and annex.

      PDF108 pages1002 KBTagged, with bookmarks

      SHA-256 527d8c4aa99f307d44839000e55b321e64c7189e9f7a713ffd2ce589b9fdb043

    • PDF, US Letter

      The designed print edition, US Letter: cover, imprint and licence, how to cite, contents with page numbers, every chapter, figure, table and annex.

      PDF114 pages1013 KBTagged, with bookmarks

      SHA-256 2aa5ed29ae85f74c7ca121dfb92b8245d0db5f0d0b8796a0a0c3c6036941c5ef

  • Web edition

  • データバンドル

    • Indicators, CSV

      15 indicators with unit, year, status and source

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-indicators.csv1 KB

      SHA-256 72cde562d3f1452f2bfd8892d8b46e82b39fcf347b6b74d4f562a06fd3dff41e

    • Indicators, JSON

      The same indicators with the edition’s identity and licence

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-indicators.json2 KB

      SHA-256 7f1faed971f614336a3044667d2ba50adc3acb16a17e2c4bab077286d5ee7592

    • Findings, CSV

      12 findings with status, evidence-quality level and references

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-findings.csv3 KB

      SHA-256 4cee8b61c5d7bf7a133040d1cac6ef52ee26aec7b9ed281e13eb79357f6df168

  • Citation files

    • Citation, BibTeX

      For LaTeX and reference managers

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.bib1 KB

      SHA-256 c74fdd53cec8f49f4d608f50b984cc324abfceb36099199d75f945dd797d825f

    • Citation, RIS

      For Zotero, EndNote and Mendeley

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.ris1 KB

      SHA-256 5f6df7a14f9b9436ac23708b0134a3976b6a20d3aeb8e7cd866031a8707518a1

    • Citation, CITATION.cff

      Citation File Format 1.2.0, for GitHub, Zenodo and software catalogues

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.cff1 KB

      SHA-256 b64e1b420ed1f15568e3ac5d97c64b4d4f7dd623334d97f40960e807a505dc5e

Check a file with its SHA-256: shasum -a 256 <file> (macOS, Linux) or Get-FileHash <file> (Windows). Text, tables and figures by Nexus: CC BY 4.0; each source keeps its own licence.

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 8: Systems in depth. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

報告書貢献する

Send evidence or a correction on Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

GCRI システム・エビデンスデスク戦略システム

CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.

Your role here

What you can do from this page.

  • ReaderFound an error? Every correction is public.Corrections log
  • ContributorSend evidence, data or a correction to this desk.Contribute
  • ReviewerReview for this desk; verified reviews are credited.Become a reviewer
  • Editor, steward or boardQueues, decisions and production are in the workspace.My workspace