Systems in depth
One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.
अनुक्रमणिका
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1The digital layer is where the systems meet
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Provider failure under a ransomware wave
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
8.1Digital systems and water
Treatment, pumping and distribution run on control systems and telemetry. Cyber risk reaches water services through operational technology, and the evidence on incidents is thin.
consolidated incident series found for water utilities
| घटक | स्थिती | पुरावा | स्थिती |
|---|---|---|---|
| Advisory evidence | US and allied agencies confirm compromise of IT environments in communications, energy, transport and water sectors | 26 | नोंदवलेले |
| Legal coverage | drinking water and waste water are sectors under the EU directive with reporting duties | 19 | नोंदवलेले |
| Incident data | no common-basis series for utility incidents | 3 | Expert input |
| Control system practice | standards exist; adoption not consolidated | 42 | Inferred |
Couplings
- ENE → WAT power for control systems
- WAT → ENE shared control networks
- WAT → HLT treatment and clinic supply
Evidence to bind in 2027
- incident data at water utilities
- time to recover control systems
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-04 Health and One Health
- GS-05 Finance and Economy
- SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
8.2Digital systems and energy
Grids and fuel systems run on digital control. A joint advisory reports pre-positioning on networks of energy providers, and the EU treats energy as a sector under its cyber law.
| घटक | स्थिती | पुरावा | स्थिती |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-positioning | agencies assess with high confidence that actors are positioned to move from IT to OT networks | 26 | नोंदवलेले |
| Reporting duty | early warning within 24 hours and notification within 72 hours of a significant incident | 19 | नोंदवलेले |
| Operational data | no consolidated series of operational incidents | 3 | Expert input |
| Product duties | the Cyber Resilience Act applies to products from 11 December 2027 | 20 | नोंदवलेले |
Couplings
- INF → ENE control and billing systems
- ENE → INF power for networks
- ENE → HLT power for hospital systems
Evidence to bind in 2027
- operational incident counts
- recovery time for control systems
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-04 Health and One Health
- GS-05 Finance and Economy
- SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
8.3Digital systems and food
Food systems depend on software for cold chains, traceability, payments and logistics. No consolidated series of digital incidents in food systems was found.
incident series found for food systems
| घटक | स्थिती | पुरावा | स्थिती |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cold chain and logistics | depend on power and software; no series | 3 | Expert input |
| Traceability | depends on shared data systems; not consolidated | 3 | Expert input |
| Payments | fraud and ransomware affect payments, as shown in finance data | 2 | Inferred |
| Logistics targeting | maritime and logistics are a high-value sector in EU data | 3 | नोंदवलेले |
Couplings
- ENE → FOO cold chain and logistics
- INF → FOO traceability systems
- DAT → FIN → FOO payments
Evidence to bind in 2027
- incident series for food sector software
- cold-chain outage records
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-04 Health and One Health
- GS-05 Finance and Economy
- SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
8.4Digital systems and health
Health services depend on records, devices and connectivity. Ransomware attacks on providers disrupt care and expose patient data, and the best evidence is from the United States.
| घटक | स्थिती | पुरावा | स्थिती |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frequency | annual ransomware attacks rose from 43 to 91, 2016 to 2021 | 23 | नोंदवलेले |
| Care disruption | electronic system downtime in 41.7% and cancelled care in 10.2% | 23 | नोंदवलेले |
| Scale of breach | a 2024 claims processor breach affected 192.7 million individuals, the largest entry on the US federal breach portal | 34 | नोंदवलेले |
| Legal coverage | healthcare providers are in the sectors covered by the EU directive | 19 | नोंदवलेले |
Couplings
- ENE → HLT hospital power
- INF → HLT records and devices
- DAT → HLT patient data
Evidence to bind in 2027
- health ransomware data after 2021
- non-US evidence on care effects
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-04 Health and One Health
- GS-05 Finance and Economy
- SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
8.5Digital systems, nature and extremes
Monitoring networks support nature and weather services, and concentration in providers and routes turns single faults into wide events. Evidence is strongest for the update failure and cable faults, and absent for nature.
| घटक | स्थिती | पुरावा | स्थिती |
|---|---|---|---|
| Update failure | mismatch of 21 and 20 inputs caused an out-of-bounds read and crashes | 14 | नोंदवलेले |
| Cable faults | about 200 a year; causes reported differently by two issuers | 1213 | नोंदवलेले |
| Shutdowns | record number of deliberate shutdowns in 2025 | 27 | नोंदवलेले |
| Nature monitoring | no consolidated cyber evidence for monitoring networks | 30 | Expert input |
Couplings
- INF → ALL provider failure
- INF → TRD route disruption
- DAT → BIO monitoring data
Evidence to bind in 2027
- evidence on monitoring networks for nature
- repair vessel availability
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-04 Health and One Health
- GS-05 Finance and Economy
- SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 26CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, joint advisory AA24-038A (7 February 2024). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 42IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, developed jointly with ISA99 (parts on general concepts, policies and procedures, system requirements and component requirements, as listed on the IEC System Committee Smart Energy page; no figure is used). International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2026 (current page). Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 20Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 23Neprash, H.T. et al., Trends in Ransomware Attacks on US Hospitals, Clinics, and Other Health Care Delivery Organizations, 2016-2021, JAMA Health Forum 3(12), e224873, 2022 (open access full text). American Medical Association, Chicago. Observation year 2022 (data 2016 to 2021). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 34US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (ed.), Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS, Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, archive listing (Change Healthcare, Inc., business associate, hacking or IT incident, submitted 19 July 2024: 192,700,000 individuals affected, the largest entry on the portal). HHS OCR, Washington. Observation year 2024 (count as listed at the access date). Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 14CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (August 2024). CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 27Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalition (eds.), Rising Repression Meets Global Resistance: Internet Shutdowns in 2025 (annual report, March 2026). Access Now, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 30World Bank (ed.), Digital Progress and Trends Report 2025: Strengthening AI Foundations. World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back