Readings from the other desks
The cybersecurity and cryptography baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.
Conteúdo
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Cryptography is infrastructure under change
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Signature lag while key agreement migrates
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 6.1 The other desks’ editions of this subject
- 6.2 Three lenses
- 6.3 Standards, Academy and steward contributions
- 6.4 GCRI reading: the model card
- 6.5 Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
- 6.6 Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography readiness pack
- 6.7 Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
- 6.8 Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMetodologia
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject
Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.
| Escritório | Edição | Situação | Identificador |
|---|---|---|---|
| GCRI Systems Evidence | Systems Evidence: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026 | Drafted, in stewardship review | NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 |
| GRF Public Deliberation | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| GRA Capital Readiness | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| Standards Progress | Standards Progress: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026 | Em preparação | NR-NXS-XT-10-2026-BASELINE (reserved) |
| Academy Capability | Capability: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026 | Em preparação | NR-RA-XT-10-2026-BASELINE (reserved) |
| Index Measurement | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit |
6.2Three lenses
One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.
GCRI · KEY T
Technical Truth
The evidence supports reading cybersecurity and cryptography as protective infrastructure under change. Standards are finalised, key agreement has moved, and signatures and long-life devices have not. Evidence is strongest for standards and official threat records, and weakest for migration progress, cost and workforce.
CRY-001 · GOV-004 · INF-005 · SYS-012
GRF · KEY M
Public Meaning
For most people the story arrives as a message about encryption, a breach notice or a ransomware headline. The baseline asks that public debate separate standards from deployment, and ordinary vulnerabilities from distant machines.
CRY-001 · THR-009 · INF-006
GRA · KEY F
Capital Meaning
Readiness implications only. Breach and ransomware costs come from vendors and are weak evidence1819. Migration has costs that fall on operators. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.
FIN-010 · CRY-001
NEXUS
Síntese
Cryptography is well described by standards and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind migration progress, publish a comparable deployment table and test the signature pathway before the next hardware milestone.
SYS-012 · C-01 · C-02
6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions
How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for cybersecurity and cryptography. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.
| Quarter | Edição | Pergunta | Limite |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | State and Agenda | O que importa este ano e qual é a situação de partida? | observed baseline stays distinct from planned work |
| Q2 | Evidence and Build | What new evidence and capability exist? | a configured capability is not a validated result |
| Q3 | Teste de estresse e Prontidão | What do scenarios and tests show? | simulated loss or performance is not observed impact |
| Q4 | Annual Synthesis and Renewal | What changed in the year, and what renews? | release follows review, not event publicity deadlines |
| Steward or body | Função | Contribution route |
|---|---|---|
| O Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada) | Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T) | science and practice communities · GCRI gateway |
| O Global Risks Forum (GRF) | leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M) | policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway |
| The Global Risks Alliance (GRA) | finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F) | finance and insurance · GRA gateway |
| Nexus Standards | preparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methods | Standards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI |
| Risk Academy | learning pathways tied to the agenda questions | Academy gateway · learning by review |
| Nexus Standards and Academy | technology chapter inputs: GCRI evidence, NXS standards, RA capability | technology editorial board |
Standards drafts used in this edition
- Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
- Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
- Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech
Standards calendar to watch
- Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
- Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
- Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition
6.4GCRI reading: the model card
GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology
6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.
NIST finished three standards in 2024. Deployment is a different record, and it is moving at different speeds for key agreement and signatures. Keeping them apart avoids both alarm and complacency.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01
Standards are not deployment
Exploited known vulnerabilities, ransomware and fraud account for the reported harm. A distant machine is a planning question; an unpatched router is an incident now.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02
Ordinary causes dominate
Telemetry from vendors is useful and unaudited. This edition labels each vendor figure and asks for primary data before costs and payments are compared.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03
Vendor evidence needs a label
No consolidated series of migration progress was found. A shared indicator table would show where inventory, signatures and devices are stuck.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04
Measurement is the missing layer
6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography readiness pack
The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.
| Item | Registrar | State at baseline | First 2027 entry |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | Cybersecurity and Cryptography risk state delta | baseline set by this edition | changes against the baseline |
| E2 | WEFH+B state delta | five global system readings set | indicator updates and freshness |
| E3 | Agenda and Portfolio movement | eight agenda items · 6 proposed objects | admission decisions |
| E4 | Federation delivery register | national chapters in preparation | national chapters |
| E5 | Consortium capability register | national consortia forming | first contributions |
| E6 | Leadership questions and challenges | nenhum ainda | first challenge log |
| E7 | Foundry technical state | national environments prepared | first federation cut |
| E8 | Publication candidates | twelve findings carried forward | PUBLISH · HOLD dispositions |
| E9 | Universe readiness | one candidate mission | admission and role spine |
| E10 | Correction register | nenhum | first federation-wide cycle |
Publication dispositions
- Publicar
- Hold
- Needs evidence
- Restrito
- Substituído
6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.
- IN FORCE
- PUBLISHED
- DRAFT
- PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
| Instrumento | Órgão | Escopo | Situação | Relevância |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203, 204 and 205123 | NIST | US, used globally | PUBLISHED 2024 | post-quantum algorithms |
| NIST IR 8547 initial public draft44 | NIST | US | DRAFT 2024 | migration |
| NIST SP 800-2277 | NIST | US | PUBLISHED 2025 | key-encapsulation guidance |
| NIST SP 800-2328 | NIST | US | PUBLISHED 2025 | lightweight cryptography |
| NIST CSF 2.09 | NIST | global, voluntary | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | risk outcomes |
| NCSC migration timelines10 | UK NCSC | UK | PUBLISHED 2025 | timeline |
| EU coordinated roadmap1131 | European Commission and Member States | EU | PUBLISHED 2025 | migration milestones |
| CNSA 2.030 | NSA | US national security systems | PUBLISHED | migration timetable |
| Regulamento de Ciber-Resiliência27 | União Europeia | EU | IN FORCE · STAGED | product duties |
| SEC cybersecurity disclosure rules21 | US SEC | US listed companies | IN FORCE | incident disclosure |
Changed since 2024
6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
The review behind this edition covers cybersecurity and cryptography assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.
Review protocol
- Pergunta
- What does the published evidence establish about cybersecurity and advanced cryptography as infrastructure and its couplings?
- Sources searched
- preprints and journals; standards bodies and agencies; roadmaps and regulation; threat and cost reports
- Janela
- releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
- Seleção
- sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
- Próxima etapa
- systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
| Referência | Tipo | Ano | Função | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gidney22 | preprint | 2025 | supports | resource estimate |
| Shor37 | journal article | 1997 | do IRGC | factoring algorithm |
| Mosca38 | journal article | 2018 | do IRGC | migration timing |
| Referência | Issuer | Ano | Função | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Signal triple ratchet post25 | protocol post | 2025 | context | messaging design |
| Apple PQ3 post26 | protocol post | 2024 | context | messaging design |
| OpenSSH page24 | project documentation | 2025 | supports | protocol default |
| RFC 844643 | IETF standard | 2018 | do IRGC | TLS 1.3 |
| Referência | Issuer | Ano | Função | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NIST FIPS 203, 204 e 205123 | NIST | 2024 | supports | normas |
| NIST IR 8547 initial draft44 | NIST | 2024 | supports | transition plan |
| NCSC timelines10 | UK NCSC | 2025 | supports | timeline |
| EU roadmap page11 | Comissão Europeia | 2025 | supports | roadmap date |
| CSF 2.09 | NIST | 2024 | context | risk framework |
| NIST IR 854532 | NIST | 2025 | context | fourth-round status |
| NIST SP 1800-3839 | NIST NCCoE | 2023 | context | migration practice guide |
| OMB M-23-0241 | US OMB | 2022 | context | federal inventory memorandum |
| Referência | Issuer | Ano | Função | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FBI IC3 report15 | FBI | 2025 | supports | complaints and losses |
| ENISA Threat Landscape 202516 | ENISA | 2025 | supports | incident count |
| Cost of a Data Breach 202618 | IBM | 2026 | context | vendor cost |
| Crypto crime ransomware analysis19 | Chainalysis | 2026 | context | vendor payments |
| Workforce study20 | ISC2 | 2025 | supports | skills needs |
| Data Breach Investigations page17 | Verizon | 2026 | context | vendor sample |
| Digital Defense Report36 | Microsoft | 2025 | context | vendor report |
Where the evidence agrees
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7NIST (ed.), Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, SP 800-227 (publication page; final 18 September 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 8NIST (ed.), Ascon-Based Lightweight Cryptography Standards for Constrained Devices, SP 800-232 (publication page; final 13 August 2025; Ascon-AEAD128, Ascon-Hash256, Ascon-XOF128, Ascon-CXOF128). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 9NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29 (publication page; 26 February 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 31NIS Cooperation Group, EU PQC Workstream (ed.), A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1, 11 June 2025 (roadmap PDF: by 31 December 2026 all Member States have taken the First Steps and set initial national roadmaps; by 31 December 2030 the transition for high-risk use cases is complete; by 31 December 2035 the transition for medium-risk use cases is complete and for low-risk use cases as far as feasible). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 30Stern, M. B. (NSA Cybersecurity), Updates to the CNSA 2.0 FAQ, post to the NIST pqc-forum mailing list, 13 January 2025 (NSA has updated its guidance on the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0, listing the NIST standards that define the CNSA 2.0 algorithms, with updated transition timelines; the NSA documents themselves refused automated access and no date from them is used). National Security Agency, Fort Meade. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 27European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 20 November 2024 (Article 71: in force on the twentieth day after publication; applies from 11 December 2027; Article 14, reporting obligations of manufacturers, from 11 September 2026; Chapter IV from 11 June 2026). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 21US Securities and Exchange Commission (ed.), SEC adopts rules on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident disclosure by public companies (press release 2023-139; adopted 26 July 2023; Form 8-K Item 1.05 within four business days of a materiality determination). SEC, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15; no dates on the page; PDF not opened). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 37Shor, P. W., Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer, SIAM Journal on Computing 26(5), 1484 to 1509, October 1997, doi:10.1137/S0097539795293172 (Crossref record and abstract). Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, Philadelphia. Observation year 1997. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1137/S0097539795293172back
- 38Mosca, M., Cybersecurity in an Era with Quantum Computers: Will We Be Ready?, IEEE Security and Privacy 16(5), 38 to 41, September 2018, doi:10.1109/MSP.2018.3761723 (Crossref record). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/MSP.2018.3761723back
- 25Signal (ed.), Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets, SPQR triple ratchet (blog post, 2 October 2025; ML-KEM 768; gradual rollout; formal verification). Signal Messenger, Mountain View. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 26Apple (ed.), iMessage with PQ3: The new state of the art in quantum-secure messaging at scale (security blog post, 21 February 2024; Kyber-1024 and Kyber-768 hybrid with P-256; level 3 on its own scale). Apple, Cupertino. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 43Rescorla, E., The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, RFC 8446, Proposed Standard, August 2018 (RFC Editor record). Internet Engineering Task Force. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 32NIST (ed.), Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process, NIST IR 8545, by G. Alagic and others (publication page; March 2025; HQC is the only fourth-round key-establishment algorithm to be standardised). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 39NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (ed.), Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography, NIST SP 1800-38, by W. Newhouse, M. Souppaya, W. Barker and C. Brown (publication page; preliminary draft of volume A published for comment on 24 April 2023 and superseded by an updated preliminary draft on 19 December 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 41US Office of Management and Budget (ed.), Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Memorandum M-23-02, signed by Director S. D. Young, 18 November 2022 (memorandum PDF; directs agencies to conduct a prioritised inventory of cryptographic systems). OMB, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 16European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; 4,875 incidents analysed; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026 corrected figures; PDF not opened). ENISA, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 17Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (landing page; period 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; 48% of breaches involve ransomware; 31% begin with exploited vulnerabilities). Verizon Business, New York. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 36Microsoft (ed.), Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2025 (sixth annual report, covering July 2024 to June 2025; announced in the Microsoft On the Issues post by A. Hogan-Burney, 16 October 2025; the report itself was not opened and no figure is used). Microsoft, Redmond. Vendor report, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back