Skip to content

Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Readings from the other desks

The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

17 min read0 figures8 tables41 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

İçindekiler
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Digital systems fail together
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Shared provider failure that overlaps a power or network loss
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
    1. 6.1 The other desks’ editions of this subject
    2. 6.2 Three lenses
    3. 6.3 Standards, Academy and steward contributions
    4. 6.4 GCRI reading: the model card
    5. 6.5 Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
    6. 6.6 Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 digital public infrastructure readiness pack
    7. 6.7 Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
    8. 6.8 Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMetodoloji
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

MasaBaskıStatüTanımlayıcı
GCRI Systems EvidenceSystems Evidence: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk 2026Drafted, in stewardship reviewNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
GRF Public DeliberationOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
GRA Capital ReadinessCapital Readiness: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk 2026HazırlanıyorNR-GRA-SR-10-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Standards ProgressOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Academy CapabilityOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Index MeasurementOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading digital public infrastructure as one dependent stack. Common causes recur across providers, failures spread through shared software, cloud and edge layers, and recovery depends on thresholds such as fallback paths and restoration practice. Evidence is strongest for single events and weakest for cross-layer dependency data.

DAT-001 · DAT-002 · CYB-004 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people digital failure arrives as a card that will not work, an app that will not load or an office that has stopped. The baseline asks that public debate treat digital services as shared and keep offline access and recovery, not only prevention, in view.

DAT-001 · DAT-003 · DEV-009

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. A single event can carry large losses, as the 2025 manufacturer case shows, and large payment flows run on shared rails91314. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

FIN-008 · FIN-010

NEXUS

Sentez

Digital risk is well described event by event and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind dependency data, test the shared provider and power compound loss, and map recovery thresholds before the next large event.

SYS-012 · D-01 · D-03

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for digital public infrastructure. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
QuarterBaskıSoruSınır
Q1State and AgendaBu yıl ne önemli ve başlangıç durumu nedir?observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2Evidence and BuildWhat new evidence and capability exist?a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3Stres Testi ve HazırlıkWhat do scenarios and tests show?simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4Annual Synthesis and RenewalWhat changed in the year, and what renews?release follows review, not event publicity deadlines
Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or bodyRolContribution route
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
Global Risks Forum (GRF)leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
Global Risks Alliance (GRA)finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standardspreparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methodsStandards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Risk Akademisilearning pathways tied to the agenda questionsAcademy gateway · learning by review
Reports strategic desksdigital chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readinessstrategic editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

  • Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
  • Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
  • Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

  • Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
  • Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
  • Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

Identity, payments and data exchange run on cloud, software and edge layers. Treating each layer alone understates how a fault in one becomes a fault in all. This edition reads the stack.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

Digital systems are one stack

Prevention fails sometimes. The published timelines for the 2025 cloud and edge events show that restoration practice is a distinct and measurable asset.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Recovery is part of resilience

Agency reporting describes long-lived access to operator networks rather than visible outages. The risk is a capability held in reserve, which is hard to count and easy to underestimate.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Cyber evidence is mostly about access

A data-exchange layer that signs and encrypts what it sends reduces one kind of risk. It does not reach the 2.2 billion people who are offline, and safeguards must cover both.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Design and inclusion travel together

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 digital public infrastructure readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 digital public infrastructure readiness pack
KalemSicilState at baselineFirst 2027 entry
E1Global risk state deltabaseline set by this editionchanges against the baseline
E2WEFH+B state deltafive global system readings setindicator updates and freshness
E3Agenda and Portfolio movementeight agenda items · 6 proposed objectsadmission decisions
E4Federation delivery registernational chapters in preparationnational chapters
E5Consortium capability registernational consortia formingfirst contributions
E6Leadership questions and challengeshenüz yokfirst challenge log
E7Foundry technical statenational environments preparedfirst federation cut
E8Publication candidatestwelve findings carried forwardPUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9Universe readinessone candidate missionadmission and role spine
E10Correction registeryokfirst federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

  • Yayımlayın
  • Hold
  • Needs evidence
  • Kısıtlı
  • Yerini başkası aldı

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

  • IN FORCE
  • KABUL EDİLDİ
  • PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE
  • PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
AraçKuruluşKapsamDurumİlgililik
NIS2 Direktifi18Avrupa BirliğiEUIN FORCEnetwork security
Dijital Operasyonel Dayanıklılık Yasası19Avrupa BirliğiEUAPPLIED 2025financial sector ICT risk
Siber Dayanıklılık Yasası29Avrupa BirliğiEUIN FORCEproducts with digital elements
European Digital Identity Framework30Avrupa BirliğiEUIN FORCEdigital identity wallets
UN Convention against Cybercrime1743Birleşmiş MilletlerglobalOPEN FOR SIGNATUREcybercrime cooperation
Küresel Dijital Mutabakat16Birleşmiş MilletlerglobalADOPTED 2024digital public infrastructure
Evrensel DPI Güvenceleri Çerçevesi32UNDP and partnersglobalPUBLISHED · GUIDANCEsafeguards
NIST Siber Güvenlik Çerçevesi 2.024NISTglobal usePUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYcyber risk
ISO/IEC 27001 information security31ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYsecurity management
Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals42CISAUSPUBLISHED · GUIDANCEbaseline practices
Recommendation on Digital Security of Critical Activities41OECDglobalADOPTED 2019digital security

Changed since 2024

  • The UN Convention against Cybercrime opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 202517
  • The EU rules on financial-sector ICT risk have applied since 17 January 202519
  • The G20 welcomed a framework for systems of digital public infrastructure in 202327

To watch in 2027

  • Entry into force of the UN Convention after the fortieth ratification1743
  • Member State transposition of the EU network security directive18
  • Oversight of critical ICT third-party providers in the financial sector19
  • Application of international law to cyber operations40

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers digital public infrastructure assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

Soru
What does the published evidence establish about the world’s digital public infrastructure and systemic cyber risk and its couplings?
Sources searched
agency advisories; provider post-incident reports; peer-reviewed interdependency literature; access and payment statistics
Zaman aralığı
releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
Seçim
sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
Sonraki adım
systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and assessments
ReferansTürYılRolUsed for
Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly34journal article2001çerçevesiinterdependencies
Buldyrev et al.35journal article2010supportszincirleme arıza
Helbing37journal article2013çerçevesinetworked risk
Perrow, Normal Accidents36book1984çerçevesitight coupling
Zscheischler et al.38journal article2018çerçevesicompound events
Tikk, Kaska and Vihul33report2010bağlamnational-scale cyber incident
Table 6.6Institutional flagships
ReferansIssuerYılRolUsed for
ENISA Threat Landscape 20251ENISA2025supportsincident counts
ENISA Threat Landscape 20242ENISA2024bağlamprime threats
Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A6CISA and partners2024supportspre-positioning
Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A7CISA and partners2025supportstelecom campaign
Annual Review 20258UK NCSC2025supportsincident load
Global Financial Stability Report, April 202423IMF2024bağlamcyber risk and finance
Küresel Dijital Mutabakat16Birleşmiş Milletler2024bağlamdigital public infrastructure
Table 6.7Statistics, losses and access
ReferansIssuerYılRolUsed for
Facts and Figures 202510ITU2025supportsoffline population
Facts and Figures 202611ITU2026bağlamnewer estimates
Global Findex 202512Dünya Bankası2025supportsaccount ownership
ID4D Global Dataset 202126Dünya Bankası2022bağlampeople without identity
UPI statistics report13NPCI data2025supportspayment volume
Pix daily record report14Banco Central do Brasil data2025supportspayment peak
Cost of a Data Breach 202621IBM2026bağlambreach cost
Data Breach Investigations Report 202622Verizon2026bağlaminitial access
Table 6.8Standards, directives and operators
ReferansIssuerYılRolUsed for
Microsoft statement on the 2024 outage3Microsoft2024supportssoftware failure
Post-event summary, October 20254Amazon Web Services2025supportscloud failure
Outage report, 18 November 20255Cloudflare2025supportsedge failure
X-Road programme page15e-Estonia2025supportsdata exchange
Cyber event statement9Cyber Monitoring Centre2025supportsevent loss
Log4j review39Cyber Safety Review Board2022bağlamshared software
Costa Rica emergency report25press2022bağlampublic-sector ransomware

Where the evidence agrees

  • Failures cross services through shared software, cloud and edge layers345
  • Several agencies report long-lived access in operator networks67
  • Access to digital services is uneven across income groups10

Where it is unsettled

  • How much reported access could be used to disrupt services67
  • How large cross-layer cascades are at operating scale3435
  • How to count significant incidents on one basis across countries18

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 9Infosecurity Magazine, JLR hack UK’s costliest ever, hitting economy with GBP 1.9bn loss (press report of the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement of 22 October 2025; Category 3; over 5,000 organisations); the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement itself returned an error and was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 18European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (policy page: in force January 2023; transposition deadline 17 October 2024; 18 critical sectors). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 19European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (ed.), Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (page: applied from 17 January 2025; oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers). EIOPA, Frankfurt. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 29European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 20 November 2024 (text opened: in force on the twentieth day after publication; applies from 11 December 2027, with Article 14 from 11 September 2026 and Chapter IV from 11 June 2026). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  7. 30European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework, Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 30 April 2024 (text opened; in force on the twentieth day after publication). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 17United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime (treaty page: signing ceremony in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025; seventy-one States and the European Union; article 65, entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 43United Nations General Assembly (ed.), resolution 79/243, United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes, A/RES/79/243, adopted 24 December 2024 (text opened: opens the Convention for signature in Hanoi in 2025; article 65, entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  10. 16United Nations (ed.), Global Digital Compact (programme page; negotiated by 193 Member States; opened for endorsement in September 2024; commitment to increase investment in digital public goods and digital public infrastructure). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 32Office of the UN Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology and UNDP (eds.), The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Framework, with A Guide to Building Safe and Inclusive DPI for Societies, September 2024 (initiative launched in 2023; interim report April 2024; initiative site opened; no figure is used). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 24NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (programme page; two-year anniversary note of 24 February 2026; intended for industry, government and organisations). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 31ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, third edition, approved October 2022, amended by Amendment 1:2024 (catalogue record and scope read at a national standards body; no figure is used). International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  14. 42CISA (ed.), Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (first released October 2022, version 1.0.1 March 2023; version 2.0 released 10 December 2025 and aligned with NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, per the CISA bulletin of that date and the IPA translation page; no figure is used). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 41OECD (ed.), Recommendation of the Council on Digital Security of Critical Activities, OECD/LEGAL/0456, adopted 11 December 2019 on proposal of the Digital Policy Committee (instrument text opened; replaces the 2008 Recommendation on the Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures). OECD, Paris. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 27G20 (ed.), G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration, New Delhi, 9 to 10 September 2023 (text opened through the G20 Information Centre; section E welcomes the G20 Framework for Systems of Digital Public Infrastructure, a voluntary and suggested framework, and India’s plan for a Global Digital Public Infrastructure Repository). G20 Presidency of India, New Delhi. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  17. 40Schmitt, M.N. (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Crossref record opened). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, February 2017. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  18. 34Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (Crossref record and abstract opened). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  19. 35Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464(7291), 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  20. 37Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497(7447), 51 to 59, May 2013 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  21. 36Perrow, C., Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books, New York, 1984 (library catalogue record opened; later editions by Princeton University Press). Observation year 1984. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  22. 38Zscheischler, J. et al., Future climate risk from compound events, Nature Climate Change 8(6), 469 to 477, May 2018 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  23. 33Tikk, E., Kaska, K. and Vihul, L., International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations (case studies of Estonia 2007, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2008, Lithuania 2008 and Georgia 2008; publication page and PDF opened). Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, 2010. Observation year 2007. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  24. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  25. 2ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2024 (publication page; published 19 September 2024; seven prime threats; no counts on the page). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  26. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  27. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  28. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  29. 23International Monetary Fund (ed.), Global Financial Stability Report, April 2024 (publication page: risk of extreme losses from cyber incidents has increased; the financial sector is highly exposed; chapter figures not read). IMF, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  30. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  31. 11POST-CLOSE, context only: ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures statistics page (2026 edition: 6.3 billion online, 76%; about 2 billion offline; materials dated November 2026), read as a newer estimate and not used in findings. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  32. 12World Bank (ed.), The Global Findex Database 2025 (publication page: 79% of adults globally have an account). World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  33. 26Clark, J., Metz, A. and Casher, C., ID4D Global Dataset 2021, Volume 1: Global ID Coverage Estimates (World Bank Open Knowledge Repository record, handle 10986/38440, and report opened: just under 850 million people without official proof of identity as of 2021, around half of them children, most in lower-income countries in Africa and South Asia; estimates built for 194 countries). World Bank, Washington, 2022. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  34. 21IBM (ed.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (report page: global average cost of USD 4.99 million, up 12% on the previous year, described as a record). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  35. 22Verizon (ed.), Data Breach Investigations Report 2026 (report page: 31% of breaches begin with software vulnerabilities; coverage 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025). Verizon, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  36. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  37. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  38. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  39. 15e-Estonia (ed.), X-Road (programme page: 2.2 billion transactions a year; more than 3,800 e-services; outgoing data digitally signed and encrypted). e-Estonia, Tallinn. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  40. 39Cyber Safety Review Board (ed.), Review of the December 2021 Log4j Event, 11 July 2022, as described in the WaterISAC post of 19 July 2022, CISA Releases Report of its Review into Log4j Vulnerabilities and Response (the Board describes Log4j as an endemic vulnerability that will remain in systems for many years; the report itself was blocked on the CISA site and not opened; no figure is used). Department of Homeland Security, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  41. 25BleepingComputer, Costa Rica declares national emergency after Conti ransomware attacks (press report of 9 May 2022: declaration on 8 May 2022 under Decree No. 42542; Ministry of Finance and other bodies affected). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

İndirilenler

Draft, not yet releasedReview copies of a draft in stewardship review. The released edition carries its DOI and replaces them.

  • Yazdır

    • PDF, A4

      The designed print edition, A4: cover, imprint and licence, how to cite, contents with page numbers, every chapter, figure, table and annex.

      PDF108 pages1002 KBTagged, with bookmarks

      SHA-256 527d8c4aa99f307d44839000e55b321e64c7189e9f7a713ffd2ce589b9fdb043

    • PDF, US Letter

      The designed print edition, US Letter: cover, imprint and licence, how to cite, contents with page numbers, every chapter, figure, table and annex.

      PDF114 pages1013 KBTagged, with bookmarks

      SHA-256 2aa5ed29ae85f74c7ca121dfb92b8245d0db5f0d0b8796a0a0c3c6036941c5ef

  • Web edition

  • Data bundle

    • Indicators, CSV

      15 indicators with unit, year, status and source

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-indicators.csv1 KB

      SHA-256 72cde562d3f1452f2bfd8892d8b46e82b39fcf347b6b74d4f562a06fd3dff41e

    • Indicators, JSON

      The same indicators with the edition’s identity and licence

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-indicators.json2 KB

      SHA-256 7f1faed971f614336a3044667d2ba50adc3acb16a17e2c4bab077286d5ee7592

    • Findings, CSV

      12 findings with status, evidence-quality level and references

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-findings.csv3 KB

      SHA-256 4cee8b61c5d7bf7a133040d1cac6ef52ee26aec7b9ed281e13eb79357f6df168

  • Citation files

    • Citation, BibTeX

      For LaTeX and reference managers

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.bib1 KB

      SHA-256 c74fdd53cec8f49f4d608f50b984cc324abfceb36099199d75f945dd797d825f

    • Citation, RIS

      For Zotero, EndNote and Mendeley

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.ris1 KB

      SHA-256 5f6df7a14f9b9436ac23708b0134a3976b6a20d3aeb8e7cd866031a8707518a1

    • Citation, CITATION.cff

      Citation File Format 1.2.0, for GitHub, Zenodo and software catalogues

      NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.cff1 KB

      SHA-256 b64e1b420ed1f15568e3ac5d97c64b4d4f7dd623334d97f40960e807a505dc5e

Check a file with its SHA-256: shasum -a 256 <file> (macOS, Linux) or Get-FileHash <file> (Windows). Text, tables and figures by Nexus: CC BY 4.0; each source keeps its own licence.

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 6: Readings from the other desks. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

RaporlarKatkıda bulunun

Send evidence or a correction on Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the GCRI Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

GCRI Sistemler Kanıt MasasıStratejik Sistemler

CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.

Your role here

What you can do from this page.

  • ReaderFound an error? Every correction is public.Corrections log
  • ContributorSend evidence, data or a correction to this desk.Contribute
  • ReviewerReview for this desk; verified reviews are credited.Become a reviewer
  • Editor, steward or boardQueues, decisions and production are in the workspace.My workspace