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Strategic Systems Report 2026: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk

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Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk 2026

Imprint

编辑
Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor, the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI)
正式出版方
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto
Report number
NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE
证据截止
30 September 2026, cut DC-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-B0
状态
Draft under stewardship review; not yet released
DOI and UNI
Issued at deposit
许可协议
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Cite as
Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Strategic Systems Report 2026: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI). https://therisk.global/nexus-reports/editions/sr-10/

目录

  1. ·

    Executive summary

  2. 1

    Chapter 1. Digital systems fail together

  3. 2

    Chapter 2. Key findings

  4. 3

    Chapter 3. Systems and sectors at baseline

  5. 4

    Chapter 4. Risks and capability

  6. 5

    Chapter 5. Shared provider failure that overlaps a power or network loss

  7. 6

    Chapter 6. Readings from the other desks

  8. 7

    Chapter 7. The 2027 agenda

  9. 8

    Chapter 8. Systems in depth

  10. A

    Annex A. Methodology

  11. B

    Annex B. Data appendix

  12. C

    Annex C. References and record

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Executive summary

The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.

5 min read1 figure0 tables12 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

S.1Abstract

Digital public infrastructure is the shared layer that identity, payments and data exchange run on, and that cloud and network providers carry. The 2024 to 2025 evidence shows the same mechanisms at work in very different events. A single software update on 18 July 2024 affected an estimated 8.5 million Windows devices3. A fault in the DNS records for one regional endpoint disrupted many cloud services on 19 and 20 October 20254. A configuration file that grew past a built-in limit disrupted a global edge network on 18 November 20255. Government agencies reported long-lived access to the networks of communications, energy, transport and water operators6 and a global campaign against telecommunications and transport networks7. The UK handled 204 nationally significant incidents in one year, up from 898. The rails carry large flows: UPI processed 20.7 billion transactions in October 202513 and Pix 313.3 million in one day in December 202514. Access is not yet universal: about 2.2 billion people were offline in 202510. This baseline reads these events as mechanisms, not as a list. It ranks no country or provider, attributes no attack and recommends no policy.

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the digital public infrastructure baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

  1. Yes: software faults, configuration changes, hazards and hostile access recur across providers.3456

    Do digital failures have common causes?Reported

  2. Through shared dependence on a few software, cloud and edge layers.345

    How do failures spread?Reported

  3. No: agencies describe long-lived access as well as disruption.67

    Is the threat only about outages?Reported

  4. The UK handled 204 nationally significant incidents in one year; ENISA analysed 4,875.81

    How large is the incident load?Reported

  5. UPI reached 20.7 billion transactions in a month; Pix 313.3 million in a day.1314

    How large are the payment rails?Reported

  6. About 2.2 billion people were offline in 2025, mostly in lower-income countries.10

    Who is still outside?Reported

  7. One national data-exchange layer signs and encrypts all outgoing data.15

    Does design help?Reported

  8. A shared provider failure that overlaps a power or network loss. SCN-SR10-DPI-01

    What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-006

The UK handled 204 nationally significant incidents from September 2024 to August 2025, up from 89 the year before, and 18 highly significant incidents, up from 12.

Figure S.1UK nationally significant incidents, by reporting year
条目Bar, scaled to the largest value数值
Sep 2023 to Aug 202489
Sep 2024 to Aug 2025204

Source: NCSC8. Both values as published. The 204 includes the 18 highly significant incidents.

Nationally significant incidents made up 48% of the 429 incidents handled. The count measures what one agency handled and classed, so it is a sign of load on that agency and of reporting practice as much as of threat8.

S.4At a glance

8.5million

devices, July 20243

204起事件

nationally significant, UK8

4,875起事件

ENISA, to June 20251

20.7billion

UPI transactions, October 202513

2.2billion

people offline, 202510

79%

adults with an account, 202512

S.5What each steward reads in it

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading digital public infrastructure as one dependent stack.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people digital failure arrives as a card that will not work, an app that will not load or an office that has stopped.

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. A single event can carry large losses, as the 2025 manufacturer case shows, and large payment flows run on shared rails.

NEXUS

综合

Digital risk is well described event by event and thinly measured as a system.

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

A baseline: the 2026 state of the world’s digital public infrastructure and systemic cyber risk and the couplings through which it carries risk into other systems. It synthesises published evidence and ranks no country, company or asset.

What it is not

Not a cyber-security ranking, a threat attribution, a vulnerability disclosure or an assessment of any provider, operator, regulator or government. Operation, protection and recovery of digital systems rest with owners, operators and competent authorities.

What comes next

National, regional and sector evidence feeds the 2027 digital public infrastructure edition through the federation. Each edition reports what changed against this baseline: observations, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 15e-Estonia (ed.), X-Road (programme page: 2.2 billion transactions a year; more than 3,800 e-services; outgoing data digitally signed and encrypted). e-Estonia, Tallinn. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 12World Bank (ed.), The Global Findex Database 2025 (publication page: 79% of adults globally have an account). World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Digital systems fail together

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

6 min read2 figures1 table10 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is digital public infrastructure risk concentrated?
  • Which couplings carry digital public infrastructure shocks into other systems?
  • Which digital public infrastructure capabilities hold under compound stress?
  • What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five mechanism chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • 情景
  • Three lenses
  • 组合

1.2The argument

Digital public infrastructure is usually discussed by layer: identity, payments, data exchange, cloud, networks. The 2024 and 2025 evidence reads them as one dependent stack. Payments need identity, identity needs data exchange, and all of them run on a few cloud, software and edge providers345.

The causes repeat. A software update in 2024 reached millions of machines in hours3. A DNS fault at one regional endpoint in 2025 disrupted many services4. A configuration file passed a built-in limit in 20255. State-sponsored actors were reported inside operator networks for years6 and across telecommunications networks since at least 20217.

The load is large and growing. The UK handled 204 nationally significant incidents in one year8. UPI reached 20.7 billion transactions in a month and Pix 313.3 million in a day1314. Yet 2.2 billion people remained offline in 202510, so the rails are not yet shared by all.

The edition therefore asks the same four questions of every event: what was the common cause, how did it spread, what was shared, and what threshold was crossed. It makes no attribution and ranks no provider.

Figure 1.1How many people are online and offline? billion people, 2025

About three quarters of people were online in 2025 and 2.2 billion were not, most of them in low and middle income countries. Services that move to digital-only leave the offline group outside10.

条目Bar, scaled to the largest value数值
People online6
People offline2.2

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.

Figure ID FIG-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

6.0billion

people online, 202510

2.2billion

people offline, 202510

94%

Internet use in high-income countries10

23%

Internet use in low-income countries10

1.3The six-sector nexus: twenty couplings across five assessed sectors

The digital public infrastructure-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their digital public infrastructure content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings across the six sectors

Each line is one coupling from one sector to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events. Infrastructure: not assessed in this edition’s coupling matrix, so it is drawn hollow with no couplings. The hexagon is the estate doctrine: six sectors and fifteen relations.

  • Strong
  • 中等
  • Weak
  • Not assessed in this edition

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated. Hexagon: the estate doctrine (Signature).

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT 水·MODERATE
cooling for data centres
WEAK
灌溉
WEAK
safe supply
WEAK
flows
ENE 能源MODERATE
pumping · control networks
·MODERATE
payments · logistics · cold chain
STRONG
digital records · hospitals · telecoms
WEAK
land use
FOO 食品WEAK
withdrawals
WEAK
bioenergy
·WEAK
营养
WEAK
土地用途转换
HLT 卫生WEAK
workforce
WEAK
workforce
WEAK
labour
·WEAK
residues
BIO 生物多样性WEAK
natural infrastructure
WEAK
水文学
WEAK
pollination
WEAK
zoonoses
·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    DAT → INF → FIN

    A software fault spreads through a shared vendor to many operators and their payments.

    Reported 2024 outage3

  2. 02

    INF → DAT

    A DNS fault at one regional endpoint spreads to services that rely on it.

    Reported 2025 cloud event4

  3. 03

    INF → DAT

    A configuration file passes a built-in limit at an edge network and many sites fail.

    Reported 2025 edge event5

  4. 04

    CYB → ENE, WAT

    Long-lived access in operator networks sits beside the control of energy and water systems.

    Reported agency advisory6

  5. 05

    CYB → FIN

    A cyber event at one manufacturer spreads to its supplier network.

    Reported JLR 20259

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 9Infosecurity Magazine, JLR hack UK’s costliest ever, hitting economy with GBP 1.9bn loss (press report of the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement of 22 October 2025; Category 3; over 5,000 organisations); the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement itself returned an error and was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Key findings

Twelve findings carry the digital public infrastructure baseline. They are grouped by coupling and never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

5 min read1 figure0 tables12 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-006

The UK handled 204 nationally significant incidents from September 2024 to August 2025, up from 89 the year before, and 18 highly significant incidents, up from 12.

Figure 2.1UK nationally significant incidents, by reporting year
条目Bar, scaled to the largest value数值
Sep 2023 to Aug 202489
Sep 2024 to Aug 2025204

Source: NCSC8. Both values as published. The 204 includes the 18 highly significant incidents.

Implication

Nationally significant incidents made up 48% of the 429 incidents handled. The count measures what one agency handled and classed, so it is a sign of load on that agency and of reporting practice as much as of threat8.

What would move it

The next NCSC review, ENISA reporting and any common definition of a significant incident would each move this finding.

2.2Data and digital

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-001

    A single software update affected an estimated 8.5 million Windows devices on 18 July 2024, which Microsoft put at less than one percent of all Windows machines.3

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-002

    A latent race condition in the DNS management system for one database service left an empty record for its regional endpoint. The event ran from 11:48 PM PDT on 19 October to 2:20 PM PDT on 20 October 2025, and services that rely on that region’s endpoints were affected.4

  3. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-003

    A database permissions change caused a feature file to roughly double in size and exceed a built-in limit on 18 November 2025. Core traffic resumed at about 14:30 UTC and all systems were normal at 17:06 UTC. The provider stated that no cyber attack was involved.5

  4. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-011

    The Estonian X-Road data-exchange layer handles 2.2 billion transactions a year across more than 3,800 e-services, and all outgoing data is digitally signed and encrypted.15

2.3CYB

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-004

    Agencies assessed in February 2024 that a state-sponsored actor was pre-positioning on networks in communications, energy, transportation and water sectors, with access maintained for at least five years in some victim environments.6

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-005

    A joint advisory of 27 August 2025 describes a state-sponsored campaign against telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging and military networks, active since at least 2021.7

  3. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-006

    The UK handled 204 nationally significant incidents from September 2024 to August 2025, up from 89 the year before, and 18 highly significant incidents, up from 12.8

  4. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-007

    ENISA analysed 4,875 incidents between 1 July 2024 and 30 June 2025 for the EU threat landscape.1

2.4金融

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-008

    The Cyber Monitoring Centre estimated the UK financial impact of the 2025 Jaguar Land Rover cyber event at about GBP 1.9 billion, with over 5,000 UK organisations affected, and placed it at Category 3 on its five-level scale.9

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-010

    UPI processed 20.7 billion transactions worth Rs 27.28 lakh crore in October 2025, and Pix recorded about 313.3 million transactions worth R$ 179.9 billion in one day, on 5 December 2025.1314

2.5发展

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DEV-009

    About 6 billion people used the Internet in 2025 and 2.2 billion did not. Use was 94% in high-income countries and 23% in low-income countries, and 85% in urban areas against 58% in rural areas.10

2.6系统性

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a failure at a shared cloud, identity or payment provider that overlaps a power or network loss. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 15e-Estonia (ed.), X-Road (programme page: 2.2 billion transactions a year; more than 3,800 e-services; outgoing data digitally signed and encrypted). e-Estonia, Tallinn. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 9Infosecurity Magazine, JLR hack UK’s costliest ever, hitting economy with GBP 1.9bn loss (press report of the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement of 22 October 2025; Category 3; over 5,000 organisations); the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement itself returned an error and was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Systems and sectors at baseline

6 min read0 figures2 tables17 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

DAT · Software

Windows devices hit by one update

8.5million

under 1% of Windows machines, 18 July 2024.

Reported2024Microsoft3

CYB · Threat

Nationally significant incidents, UK

204a year

up from 89 the year before.

Reported2024 to 2025NCSC8

FIN · Payments

UPI transactions in one month

20.7billion

October 2025, a record.

Reported2025NPCI data13

DEV · Access

People offline

2.2billion

94% online in high-income countries, 23% in low-income.

报告值2025ITU10

INF · Cloud

Hours from first impact to the end of one cloud event

14.5小时

DNS fault at one regional endpoint, 19 to 20 October 2025.

报告值2025AWS4

FIN · Inclusion

Adults with an account

79%

global share, Global Findex 2025.

报告值2025世界银行12

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through digital public infrastructure, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries digital public infrastructure risk into each domain.

Table 3.1Each domain read in words, not scored
领域Posture at baseline耦合状态
WATWater operators were among the sectors where state-sponsored access was reported6; control networks depend on telecoms and power.WAT ↔ DATReported EQL 3
ENEEnergy operators were among the sectors where access was reported6; every digital rail depends on power.ENE → DATReported EQL 3
FOOFood supply uses payment and logistics systems; no consolidated series here.DAT → FOOExpert input EQL 2
HLTHealth claims and records run on shared platforms; a 2024 claims-platform breach affected 192.7 million individuals28.DAT → HLTReported EQL 2
BIOBiodiversity monitoring data runs on shared digital services; not consolidated here.DAT → BIOExpert input EQL 2
CLIHeat and storm events strain data centres and grids; not consolidated here.CLI → DATExpert input EQL 2
INFThe core layer: a DNS fault at one regional endpoint and a configuration file limit disrupted many services in 202545.the core systemReported EQL 4
FINUPI handled 20.7 billion transactions in October 2025 and Pix 313.3 million in one day1314.DAT → FINReported EQL 3
DATOne update reached 8.5 million devices; the UK handled 204 nationally significant incidents38.DAT ↔ INFReported EQL 4
AICMachine-learning services run on a few cloud platforms; no consolidated figure here.AIC ↔ DATExpert input EQL 2
MINHardware, cables and data-centre equipment depend on refined minerals; sibling editions hold the data.MIN → INFInferred EQL 2
TRDDigital trade and cross-border payments depend on shared rails; no figure here.DAT ↔ TRDInferred EQL 2

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on digital public infrastructure, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Table 3.2Sectors: baseline evidence and the exposure to watch
代码部门Baseline evidenceExposure to watchEvidence coverage
GS-00Cross-systemdigital layers couple every sector34; the US lists sixteen critical infrastructure sectors, including communications, energy, IT and water20provider failure with power lossPARTIAL
GS-01水water operators among sectors with reported access6control-network intrusionTHIN
GS-02能源energy operators among sectors with reported access6intrusion and grid controlPARTIAL
GS-03Food and agrifoodpayments and logistics run on shared railspayment outageTHIN
GS-04卫生claims platform breach affected 192.7 million people28platform outage or breachTHIN
GS-05Finance and economyUPI 20.7 billion and Pix 313.3 million in a day1314payment rail outagePARTIAL
GS-06发展2.2 billion people offline10exclusion from digital servicesGOOD
GS-07气候heat and storms strain data centresconcurrent hazardsTHIN
GS-08灾害digital services needed in recoveryloss of communicationsTHIN
GS-09基础设施cloud and edge providers sit under many services45regional endpoint faultGOOD
GS-10城市dense dependence on digital servicesmulti-service outageTHIN
GS-11生物多样性monitoring data on shared servicesloss of data servicesTHIN
GS-12地球观测positioning and timing signals underpin networkssignal interferenceTHIN
GS-13网络与数字long-lived access reported67; 4,875 incidents1disruptive attacksGOOD
GS-14政策network security and financial resilience rules1819implementation gapsPARTIAL
GS-15科学interdependency science is mature3435data at operating scalePARTIAL

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 12World Bank (ed.), The Global Findex Database 2025 (publication page: 79% of adults globally have an account). World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 28US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (ed.), Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS, Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, archive listing (Change Healthcare, Inc., business associate, hacking or IT incident, submitted 19 July 2024: 192,700,000 individuals affected, the largest entry on the portal; an interim count of about 100 million notices in October 2024 was superseded). HHS OCR, Washington. Observation year 2024 (count as listed at the access date). Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 20CISA (ed.), Critical Infrastructure Sectors (page: sixteen sectors, including Communications, Energy, Information Technology and Water and Wastewater). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 18European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (policy page: in force January 2023; transposition deadline 17 October 2024; 18 critical sectors). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 19European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (ed.), Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (page: applied from 17 January 2025; oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers). EIOPA, Frankfurt. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 34Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (Crossref record and abstract opened). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  17. 35Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464(7291), 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

Risks and capability

Four global risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence; loss metrics are added only where they can be modelled.

6 min read0 figures1 table22 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR10-DAT-001

    Common-vendor software failure

    驱动因素
    one faulty update on a widely deployed platform3
    风险暴露
    airlines, hospitals, banks, broadcasters
    脆弱性
    concentrated vendors; automatic update paths
    能力
    staged roll-out; manual fallback; recovery playbooks
    级联
    DAT → INF → FIN, HLT
    地平线
    年度
  2. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR10-INF-002

    Regional cloud or edge fault

    驱动因素
    a DNS fault or a configuration file limit at a shared provider45
    风险暴露
    services that rely on one region or one edge network
    脆弱性
    single-region dependence; hidden dependencies between provider services
    能力
    multi-region design; fallback paths; incident reporting
    级联
    INF → DAT → FIN
    地平线
    1 to 3 years
  3. InferredEQL 3RSK-SR10-CYB-003

    Pre-positioned access in operator networks

    驱动因素
    state-sponsored access reported in several sectors67
    风险暴露
    communications, energy, transport and water operators
    脆弱性
    internet-facing devices; long dwell time
    能力
    logging; phishing-resistant authentication; segmentation24
    级联
    CYB → DAT → INF
    地平线
    1 to 5 years
  4. InferredEQL 3RSK-SR10-DEV-004

    Exclusion as services go digital-only

    驱动因素
    services move online while 2.2 billion people are offline10
    风险暴露
    low-income, rural and unidentified populations26
    脆弱性
    no identity, device or connection
    能力
    inclusive design; assisted channels; safeguards32
    级联
    DAT → DEV
    地平线
    1 to 10 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence at the global level, from a policy listing to performance in real events.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
职能Rung级别Strongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationEXISTSsecurity standards and frameworks widespread; implementation uneven243142
Monitoring and observationADEQUATEthreat reporting by agencies; provider data uneven168
早期预警EXISTSadvisories from agencies; no common cross-sector warning
Preparedness and planningEXISTSnetwork security and financial resilience rules in force or being applied1819
Redundancy and reservesLISTEDmulti-region and fallback design not consolidated
响应DEMONSTRATEDproviders restored services after the 2024 and 2025 events345
Continuity of critical servicesEXISTSmanual fallbacks in many services; testing uneven
恢复DEMONSTRATEDcauses published after the 2025 cloud and edge events45
AdaptationEXISTSdigital public infrastructure safeguards published1632
社会保护LISTEDsupport during long outages not consolidated
金融与保险EXISTSevent classification and loss estimates now published9; protection gaps in sibling editions
Institutional coordinationEXISTSEU and national frameworks; a UN treaty open for signature171819
Technical infrastructureEXISTSsigned and encrypted data exchange in one national layer15
劳动力LISTEDskills for security and operations not consolidated
Research capacityADEQUATEinterdependency science mature343537
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 24NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (programme page; two-year anniversary note of 24 February 2026; intended for industry, government and organisations). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 26Clark, J., Metz, A. and Casher, C., ID4D Global Dataset 2021, Volume 1: Global ID Coverage Estimates (World Bank Open Knowledge Repository record, handle 10986/38440, and report opened: just under 850 million people without official proof of identity as of 2021, around half of them children, most in lower-income countries in Africa and South Asia; estimates built for 194 countries). World Bank, Washington, 2022. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 32Office of the UN Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology and UNDP (eds.), The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Framework, with A Guide to Building Safe and Inclusive DPI for Societies, September 2024 (initiative launched in 2023; interim report April 2024; initiative site opened; no figure is used). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  10. 31ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, third edition, approved October 2022, amended by Amendment 1:2024 (catalogue record and scope read at a national standards body; no figure is used). International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  11. 42CISA (ed.), Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (first released October 2022, version 1.0.1 March 2023; version 2.0 released 10 December 2025 and aligned with NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, per the CISA bulletin of that date and the IPA translation page; no figure is used). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 18European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (policy page: in force January 2023; transposition deadline 17 October 2024; 18 critical sectors). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 19European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (ed.), Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (page: applied from 17 January 2025; oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers). EIOPA, Frankfurt. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 16United Nations (ed.), Global Digital Compact (programme page; negotiated by 193 Member States; opened for endorsement in September 2024; commitment to increase investment in digital public goods and digital public infrastructure). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 9Infosecurity Magazine, JLR hack UK’s costliest ever, hitting economy with GBP 1.9bn loss (press report of the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement of 22 October 2025; Category 3; over 5,000 organisations); the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement itself returned an error and was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 17United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime (treaty page: signing ceremony in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025; seventy-one States and the European Union; article 65, entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 15e-Estonia (ed.), X-Road (programme page: 2.2 billion transactions a year; more than 3,800 e-services; outgoing data digitally signed and encrypted). e-Estonia, Tallinn. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 34Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (Crossref record and abstract opened). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  21. 35Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464(7291), 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  22. 37Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497(7447), 51 to 59, May 2013 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

Shared provider failure that overlaps a power or network loss

A conditional statement under stated assumptions, never a prediction.

2 min read0 figures0 tables3 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

5.1假设

Scenario SCN-SR10-DPI-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.

基线
the 2026 reference state in this edition
驱动因素
a configuration or DNS fault at a shared cloud or edge provider, coinciding with a regional power or network loss
Analogues
cloud event, October 2025; edge event, November 2025; software outage, 2024345
干预措施
none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case
Run state
narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027

5.2The cascade, step by step

  1. 1

    INF → DAT

    a shared provider fault removes a regional endpoint or an edge network

    2025

  2. 2

    DAT → FIN

    payment and identity checks fail or time out at dependent services

    2025

  3. 3

    ENE → INF

    a regional power loss cuts exchanges and data centres to batteries and generators

    2026

  4. 4

    DAT → HLT

    records, claims and dispatch services degrade

    2024

  5. 5

    DAT → DEV

    services with no offline path exclude users with no fallback

    2025

  6. 6

    INF → FIN

    payments pause; losses accumulate

    2024

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

How the shock in scenario SCN-SR10-DPI-01 would travel through Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk’s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.

步骤发生的事项来源
01 Infrastructure to datA shared provider fault removes a regional endpoint or an edge network. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition SR-10, scenario SCN-SR10-DPI-01, step 1
02 DAT to financePayment and identity checks fail or time out at dependent services. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition SR-10, scenario SCN-SR10-DPI-01, step 2
03 Energy to infrastructureA regional power loss cuts exchanges and data centres to batteries and generators. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition SR-10, scenario SCN-SR10-DPI-01, step 3
04 DAT to healthRecords, claims and dispatch services degrade. Analogue or source: 2024.Edition SR-10, scenario SCN-SR10-DPI-01, step 4
05 DAT to developmentServices with no offline path exclude users with no fallback. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition SR-10, scenario SCN-SR10-DPI-01, step 5
06 Infrastructure to financePayments pause; losses accumulate. Analogue or source: 2024.Edition SR-10, scenario SCN-SR10-DPI-01, step 6

A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk 2026, scenario SCN-SR10-DPI-01 (2026); Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Readings from the other desks

The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

17 min read0 figures8 tables41 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

办事处版本状态标识符
GCRI Systems EvidenceSystems Evidence: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk 2026Drafted, in stewardship reviewNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
GRF Public DeliberationOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
GRA Capital ReadinessCapital Readiness: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk 2026筹备中NR-GRA-SR-10-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Standards ProgressOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Academy CapabilityOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Index MeasurementOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading digital public infrastructure as one dependent stack. Common causes recur across providers, failures spread through shared software, cloud and edge layers, and recovery depends on thresholds such as fallback paths and restoration practice. Evidence is strongest for single events and weakest for cross-layer dependency data.

DAT-001 · DAT-002 · CYB-004 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people digital failure arrives as a card that will not work, an app that will not load or an office that has stopped. The baseline asks that public debate treat digital services as shared and keep offline access and recovery, not only prevention, in view.

DAT-001 · DAT-003 · DEV-009

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. A single event can carry large losses, as the 2025 manufacturer case shows, and large payment flows run on shared rails91314. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

FIN-008 · FIN-010

NEXUS

综合

Digital risk is well described event by event and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind dependency data, test the shared provider and power compound loss, and map recovery thresholds before the next large event.

SYS-012 · D-01 · D-03

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for digital public infrastructure. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
Quarter版本问题边界
Q1State and Agenda今年什么最重要,起点在哪里?observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2Evidence and BuildWhat new evidence and capability exist?a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3压力测试 与准备度What do scenarios and tests show?simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4Annual Synthesis and RenewalWhat changed in the year, and what renews?release follows review, not event publicity deadlines
Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or body角色Contribution route
GCRI CanadaLead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
全球风险论坛(Global Risks Forum,GRF)leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
全球风险联盟(Global Risks Alliance,GRA)finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standardspreparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methodsStandards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Risk Academylearning pathways tied to the agenda questionsAcademy gateway · learning by review
Reports strategic desksdigital chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readinessstrategic editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

  • Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
  • Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
  • Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

  • Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
  • Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
  • Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

Identity, payments and data exchange run on cloud, software and edge layers. Treating each layer alone understates how a fault in one becomes a fault in all. This edition reads the stack.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

Digital systems are one stack

Prevention fails sometimes. The published timelines for the 2025 cloud and edge events show that restoration practice is a distinct and measurable asset.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Recovery is part of resilience

Agency reporting describes long-lived access to operator networks rather than visible outages. The risk is a capability held in reserve, which is hard to count and easy to underestimate.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Cyber evidence is mostly about access

A data-exchange layer that signs and encrypts what it sends reduces one kind of risk. It does not reach the 2.2 billion people who are offline, and safeguards must cover both.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Design and inclusion travel together

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 digital public infrastructure readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 digital public infrastructure readiness pack
条目登记State at baselineFirst 2027 entry
E1Global risk state deltabaseline set by this editionchanges against the baseline
E2WEFH+B state deltafive global system readings setindicator updates and freshness
E3Agenda and Portfolio movementeight agenda items · 6 proposed objectsadmission decisions
E4Federation delivery registernational chapters in preparationnational chapters
E5Consortium capability registernational consortia formingfirst contributions
E6Leadership questions and challenges暂无first challenge log
E7Foundry technical statenational environments preparedfirst federation cut
E8Publication candidatestwelve findings carried forwardPUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9Universe readinessone candidate missionadmission and role spine
E10Correction register无first federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

  • 发布
  • Hold
  • Needs evidence
  • 受限
  • 已被取代

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

  • IN FORCE
  • 已采用
  • PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE
  • PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
工具机构范围状态相关性
NIS2 指令18欧洲联盟EUIN FORCEnetwork security
《数字运营韧性法》19欧洲联盟EUAPPLIED 2025financial sector ICT risk
《网络韧性法》29欧洲联盟EUIN FORCEproducts with digital elements
European Digital Identity Framework30欧洲联盟EUIN FORCEdigital identity wallets
UN Convention against Cybercrime1743联合国globalOPEN FOR SIGNATUREcybercrime cooperation
《全球数字契约》16联合国globalADOPTED 2024digital public infrastructure
通用 DPI 保障框架32UNDP and partnersglobalPUBLISHED · GUIDANCEsafeguards
NIST 网络安全框架 2.024NISTglobal usePUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYcyber risk
ISO/IEC 27001 information security31ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYsecurity management
Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals42CISAUSPUBLISHED · GUIDANCEbaseline practices
Recommendation on Digital Security of Critical Activities41OECDglobalADOPTED 2019digital security

Changed since 2024

  • The UN Convention against Cybercrime opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 202517
  • The EU rules on financial-sector ICT risk have applied since 17 January 202519
  • The G20 welcomed a framework for systems of digital public infrastructure in 202327

To watch in 2027

  • Entry into force of the UN Convention after the fortieth ratification1743
  • Member State transposition of the EU network security directive18
  • Oversight of critical ICT third-party providers in the financial sector19
  • Application of international law to cyber operations40

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers digital public infrastructure assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

问题
What does the published evidence establish about the world’s digital public infrastructure and systemic cyber risk and its couplings?
Sources searched
agency advisories; provider post-incident reports; peer-reviewed interdependency literature; access and payment statistics
窗口期
releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
遴选
sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
下一步
systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and assessments
编号类型年份角色Used for
Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly34journal article2001框架interdependencies
Buldyrev et al.35journal article2010supports级联失效
Helbing37journal article2013框架networked risk
Perrow, Normal Accidents36book1984框架紧密耦合
Zscheischler et al.38journal article2018框架compound events
Tikk, Kaska and Vihul33report2010contextnational-scale cyber incident
Table 6.6Institutional flagships
编号Issuer年份角色Used for
ENISA Threat Landscape 20251ENISA2025supportsincident counts
ENISA Threat Landscape 20242ENISA2024contextprime threats
Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A6CISA and partners2024supportspre-positioning
Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A7CISA and partners2025supportstelecom campaign
Annual Review 20258UK NCSC2025supportsincident load
Global Financial Stability Report, April 202423IMF2024contextcyber risk and finance
《全球数字契约》16联合国2024contextdigital public infrastructure
Table 6.7Statistics, losses and access
编号Issuer年份角色Used for
Facts and Figures 202510ITU2025supportsoffline population
Facts and Figures 202611ITU2026contextnewer estimates
Global Findex 202512世界银行2025supportsaccount ownership
ID4D Global Dataset 202126世界银行2022contextpeople without identity
UPI statistics report13NPCI data2025supportspayment volume
Pix daily record report14Banco Central do Brasil data2025supportspayment peak
Cost of a Data Breach 202621IBM2026contextbreach cost
Data Breach Investigations Report 202622Verizon2026contextinitial access
Table 6.8Standards, directives and operators
编号Issuer年份角色Used for
Microsoft statement on the 2024 outage3Microsoft2024supportssoftware failure
Post-event summary, October 20254Amazon Web Services2025supportscloud failure
Outage report, 18 November 20255Cloudflare2025supportsedge failure
X-Road programme page15e-Estonia2025supportsdata exchange
Cyber event statement9Cyber Monitoring Centre2025supportsevent loss
Log4j review39Cyber Safety Review Board2022contextshared software
Costa Rica emergency report25press2022contextpublic-sector ransomware

Where the evidence agrees

  • Failures cross services through shared software, cloud and edge layers345
  • Several agencies report long-lived access in operator networks67
  • Access to digital services is uneven across income groups10

Where it is unsettled

  • How much reported access could be used to disrupt services67
  • How large cross-layer cascades are at operating scale3435
  • How to count significant incidents on one basis across countries18

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 9Infosecurity Magazine, JLR hack UK’s costliest ever, hitting economy with GBP 1.9bn loss (press report of the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement of 22 October 2025; Category 3; over 5,000 organisations); the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement itself returned an error and was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 18European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (policy page: in force January 2023; transposition deadline 17 October 2024; 18 critical sectors). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 19European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (ed.), Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (page: applied from 17 January 2025; oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers). EIOPA, Frankfurt. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 29European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 20 November 2024 (text opened: in force on the twentieth day after publication; applies from 11 December 2027, with Article 14 from 11 September 2026 and Chapter IV from 11 June 2026). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  7. 30European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework, Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 30 April 2024 (text opened; in force on the twentieth day after publication). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 17United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime (treaty page: signing ceremony in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025; seventy-one States and the European Union; article 65, entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 43United Nations General Assembly (ed.), resolution 79/243, United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes, A/RES/79/243, adopted 24 December 2024 (text opened: opens the Convention for signature in Hanoi in 2025; article 65, entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  10. 16United Nations (ed.), Global Digital Compact (programme page; negotiated by 193 Member States; opened for endorsement in September 2024; commitment to increase investment in digital public goods and digital public infrastructure). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 32Office of the UN Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology and UNDP (eds.), The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Framework, with A Guide to Building Safe and Inclusive DPI for Societies, September 2024 (initiative launched in 2023; interim report April 2024; initiative site opened; no figure is used). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 24NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (programme page; two-year anniversary note of 24 February 2026; intended for industry, government and organisations). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 31ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, third edition, approved October 2022, amended by Amendment 1:2024 (catalogue record and scope read at a national standards body; no figure is used). International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  14. 42CISA (ed.), Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (first released October 2022, version 1.0.1 March 2023; version 2.0 released 10 December 2025 and aligned with NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, per the CISA bulletin of that date and the IPA translation page; no figure is used). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 41OECD (ed.), Recommendation of the Council on Digital Security of Critical Activities, OECD/LEGAL/0456, adopted 11 December 2019 on proposal of the Digital Policy Committee (instrument text opened; replaces the 2008 Recommendation on the Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures). OECD, Paris. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 27G20 (ed.), G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration, New Delhi, 9 to 10 September 2023 (text opened through the G20 Information Centre; section E welcomes the G20 Framework for Systems of Digital Public Infrastructure, a voluntary and suggested framework, and India’s plan for a Global Digital Public Infrastructure Repository). G20 Presidency of India, New Delhi. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  17. 40Schmitt, M.N. (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Crossref record opened). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, February 2017. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  18. 34Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (Crossref record and abstract opened). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  19. 35Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464(7291), 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  20. 37Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497(7447), 51 to 59, May 2013 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  21. 36Perrow, C., Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books, New York, 1984 (library catalogue record opened; later editions by Princeton University Press). Observation year 1984. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  22. 38Zscheischler, J. et al., Future climate risk from compound events, Nature Climate Change 8(6), 469 to 477, May 2018 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  23. 33Tikk, E., Kaska, K. and Vihul, L., International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations (case studies of Estonia 2007, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2008, Lithuania 2008 and Georgia 2008; publication page and PDF opened). Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, 2010. Observation year 2007. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  24. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  25. 2ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2024 (publication page; published 19 September 2024; seven prime threats; no counts on the page). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  26. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  27. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  28. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  29. 23International Monetary Fund (ed.), Global Financial Stability Report, April 2024 (publication page: risk of extreme losses from cyber incidents has increased; the financial sector is highly exposed; chapter figures not read). IMF, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  30. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  31. 11POST-CLOSE, context only: ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures statistics page (2026 edition: 6.3 billion online, 76%; about 2 billion offline; materials dated November 2026), read as a newer estimate and not used in findings. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  32. 12World Bank (ed.), The Global Findex Database 2025 (publication page: 79% of adults globally have an account). World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  33. 26Clark, J., Metz, A. and Casher, C., ID4D Global Dataset 2021, Volume 1: Global ID Coverage Estimates (World Bank Open Knowledge Repository record, handle 10986/38440, and report opened: just under 850 million people without official proof of identity as of 2021, around half of them children, most in lower-income countries in Africa and South Asia; estimates built for 194 countries). World Bank, Washington, 2022. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  34. 21IBM (ed.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (report page: global average cost of USD 4.99 million, up 12% on the previous year, described as a record). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  35. 22Verizon (ed.), Data Breach Investigations Report 2026 (report page: 31% of breaches begin with software vulnerabilities; coverage 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025). Verizon, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  36. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  37. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  38. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  39. 15e-Estonia (ed.), X-Road (programme page: 2.2 billion transactions a year; more than 3,800 e-services; outgoing data digitally signed and encrypted). e-Estonia, Tallinn. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  40. 39Cyber Safety Review Board (ed.), Review of the December 2021 Log4j Event, 11 July 2022, as described in the WaterISAC post of 19 July 2022, CISA Releases Report of its Review into Log4j Vulnerabilities and Response (the Board describes Log4j as an endemic vulnerability that will remain in systems for many years; the report itself was blocked on the CISA site and not opened; no figure is used). Department of Homeland Security, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  41. 25BleepingComputer, Costa Rica declares national emergency after Conti ransomware attacks (press report of 9 May 2022: declaration on 8 May 2022 under Decree No. 42542; Ministry of Finance and other bodies affected). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

The 2027 agenda

Eight bounded questions open the 2027 digital public infrastructure agenda. Each comes from a baseline finding, names the initiative that will carry it and the first output due in the 2027 digital public infrastructure edition.

5 min read0 figures6 tables5 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

7.1Questions for the operational series

  1. D-01

    How would a failure at a shared cloud, identity or payment provider that overlaps a power or network loss spread through health, payments and public services at once?

    INI-SR10-CMP-01 · shared provider and power compound loss; first output: dependency analysis for six regions.

  2. D-02

    Which shared layers (software, cloud regions, DNS, identity) sit behind the most public services?

    INI-SR10-DEP-02 · shared layers; first output: dependency register.

  3. D-03

    How long do identity and payment services take to return after major outages, and what limits recovery?

    INI-SR10-RST-03 · restoration times; first output: restoration table.

  4. D-04

    Which countries run national identity, payment and data-exchange systems, and on what design?

    INI-SR10-INV-04 · national system inventory; first output: inventory note.

  5. D-05

    How do long-lived access reports translate into disruption risk for operators?

    INI-SR10-ACC-05 · access and disruption; first output: scoping note.

  6. D-06

    Which bodies publish incident data on a comparable basis?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: coverage note.

  7. D-07

    How do offline populations interact with services that move to digital-only?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: scoping note.

  8. D-08

    Which digital capabilities have been tested in real outages, and which are only planned?

    Digital capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.

7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment

Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 digital portfolio. They are programme objects: no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.

Table 7.1Objects proposed for the first operational quarter
ID对象类型问题状态
INI-SR10-CMP-01Shared provider and power compound lossInitiativeD-01拟议
INI-SR10-DEP-02Shared layersInitiativeD-02拟议
INI-SR10-RST-03Restoration timesInitiativeD-03拟议
INI-SR10-INV-04National system inventoryInitiativeD-04拟议
INI-SR10-ACC-05Access and disruptionInitiativeD-05拟议
MSN-SR10-2027-01Shared provider and power loss Universe mission使命D-01Candidate

7.3The pathway

The digital public infrastructure edition reads national digital chapters, sector editions and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed and its first editions are drafted. This page states what exists today and what comes next.

  1. 01

    National digital chapters

    identity, payment and data-exchange reading in each national edition

    IN PREPARATION · national baselines

  2. 02

    Sector editions

    cyber and digital, finance, health, infrastructure

    PLANNED · sector Baseline Editions

  3. 03

    Digital public infrastructure model

    the global digital system of systems

    v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence

  4. 04

    Strategic links

    SR-02 lifeline systems · SR-03 supply chains · SR-13 strategic technology infrastructure

    PLANNED · strategic baselines

  5. 05

    宇宙

    annual proving environment

    CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027

  6. 06

    Digital Public Infrastructure Report

    this series

    BASELINE DRAFT · 2027 annual edition

  7. 07

    证据与更正

    one graph, many projections

    OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027

7.4Universe 2027: evidence pack for the digital public infrastructure candidate mission

  1. 01

    任务授权

  2. 02

    Core Build · 1 month

  3. 03

    Action · 1 week

  4. 04

    Evidence seal

  5. 05

    Portfolio correction

  6. 06

    Next mandate

Table 7.2Universe 2027: evidence pack for the digital public infrastructure candidate mission
条目记录状态时间安排
F1Annual mandate recordPLANNEDafter the Q2 2027 alignment
F2Core Build recordPLANNEDone month before the exercise
F3演练证据PLANNEDduring the Action week
F4Decision packetsPLANNEDexercise state only
F5Proof receiptsPLANNEDscoped to each recorded check
F6After-action reportPLANNEDwithin one quarter
F7Upgrade docketPLANNEDrouted to the Portfolio
F8Portfolio renewalPLANNED2027 digital public infrastructure annual edition
F9Public synthesisPLANNEDpublic-safe extracts only

使命

ID
MSN-SR10-2027-01 · Shared provider and power loss Universe mission
Role spine
Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead: drawn from national pathways
Receiving actors
to be identified with the mandate

7.5Handoffs and routing

Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.

Table 7.3Handoffs and routing
发现Routed to目的类别
DAT-001 · software failureINI-SR10-DEP-02shared layersPUBLIC
DAT-002 · cloud failureINI-SR10-DEP-02shared layersPUBLIC
DAT-003 · edge failureINI-SR10-RST-03restoration timesPUBLIC
CYB-004 · pre-positioningINI-SR10-ACC-05access and disruptionPUBLIC
CYB-006 · incident loadsector editionscommon incident basisPUBLIC
FIN-010 · payment railsINI-SR10-INV-04national system inventoryPUBLIC
DEV-009 · offline populationINI-SR10-INV-04national system inventoryPUBLIC
SYS-012 · compound pathwayMSN-SR10-2027-01Universe candidateCONSORTIUM
Table 7.4Routing rules by publication class
类别Where it goesWho can see it
PUBLICthe published edition and its evidence bundleanyone
CONSORTIUMgoverned rooms of the federationconsortium members under agreement
CONTROLLEDneed-to-know channelsnamed competent actors only

7.6Feeds and signal register

Table 7.5Feeds watched from 2027
FeedProducerLatencyFeeds into
Incident and advisory feedsCISA and partner agencies每个事件CYB-004
EU threat landscapeENISA年度CYB-007
National incident reviewUK NCSC年度CYB-006
Provider incident reportscloud, edge and software providers每个事件DAT-002
Payment rail statisticsnational payment bodies每月FIN-010
Connectivity statisticsITU年度DEV-009
Event classificationCyber Monitoring Centre每个事件FIN-008

Escalation routes

  • none · keep monitoring
  • research question
  • project
  • risk object
  • annual publication
  • signal report
Table 7.6Signals at baseline
IDSignalCorroboration系统路径
SIG-SR10-001Single-vendor software outage in 20243CORROBORATEDDAT · INFrisk object RSK-SR10-DAT-001
SIG-SR10-002Multi-year access reported in several sectors67CORROBORATEDCYB · INFresearch question D-05
SIG-SR10-003Regional cloud fault and edge fault in 202545CORROBORATEDINF · DATresearch question D-01

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

8 min read0 figures5 tables18 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

8.1Common causes

One cause can strike many services at once: a faulty update, a configuration change, a hostile campaign or a hazard. The shared cause matters more than the sector.

4,875起事件

analysed by ENISA, Jul 2024 to Jun 20251

≥5年

longest reported intrusion persistence6

204起事件

nationally significant, UK, to Aug 20258

Table 8.1Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action证据状态
Software faultsone update reached millions of devices3报告值
Configuration changesa file grew past a built-in limit and an edge network failed5报告值
Cyber operationslong-lived access reported in operator networks67报告值
Ransomware in governmenta 2022 attack led to a national emergency declaration25报告值

Pathways in this mechanism

  • DAT → INF software and configuration
  • CYB → INF hostile access
  • CYB → DAT ransomware

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • common cause tagging of incidents
  • frequency of concurrent causes

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.2Domino effects

A failure in one layer removes an input from the next. A provider fault reaches the services that rely on it, and then the people who rely on those services.

8.5million

Windows devices affected, 18 July 20243

≈14.5小时

AWS event, first impact to end, Oct 20254

≈5.8小时

Cloudflare event, to full resolution, Nov 20255

Table 8.2Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action证据状态
Software to servicesone vendor update disabled many organisations’ machines3报告值
DNS to cloud servicesone empty record at a regional endpoint spread to dependent services4报告值
Edge to sitesa failed proxy returned errors to sites that rely on the network5报告值
Manufacturer to suppliersone cyber event reached over 5,000 UK organisations9报告值

Pathways in this mechanism

  • DAT → INF → FIN
  • INF → DAT
  • CYB → FIN

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • sequence timing of service loss
  • dependence of public services on named layers

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.3Inter-systemic feedbacks

Digital services depend on what they power and what powers them. Payments need networks, networks need power, and recovery needs the same services that failed.

20.7billion

UPI transactions in October 202513

≈313.3million

Pix transactions in one day, 5 Dec 202514

2.2billion

X-Road transactions a year15

Table 8.3Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action证据状态
Payments to commercelarge flows run on shared national rails1314报告值
Data exchange to servicesone layer carries billions of transactions between agencies15报告值
Power to digitalexchanges and data centres need continuous power§ matrixInferred
Financial feedbackevent losses feed budgets and delay upgrades9Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • DAT → FIN
  • ENE → DAT
  • DAT ↔ INF

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • outage data for payment rails
  • control-network dependence data

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.4Shared vulnerabilities

Different services share the same weak points: widely deployed software, single cloud regions, shared edge networks and long-lived access to operator networks.

<1%

of Windows machines hit by the July 2024 update3

≥5年

longest reported intrusion persistence6

2.2billion

people offline, 202510

Table 8.4Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action证据状态
Common softwarea shared platform spreads one fault widely3报告值
单一区域依赖services that rely on one regional endpoint fail together4报告值
Operator networksaccess reported in communications, energy, transport and water6报告值
Offline usersdigital-only services leave people without a connection outside1026报告值

Pathways in this mechanism

  • DAT → INF software
  • INF → DAT region and edge
  • DAT → DEV exclusion

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • provider concentration by region
  • share of services with an offline path

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.5Thresholds and tipping

A system can absorb stress until a threshold is crossed. Fallback paths, restoration practice and legal cooperation are such thresholds for digital infrastructure.

40ratifications

needed for the UN Convention against Cybercrime to enter into force17

17Jan 2025

date financial-sector ICT rules began to apply19

79%

adults with an account, 202512

Table 8.5Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action证据状态
Restoration capacityservice returned after the 2024 and 2025 events; times not consolidated345报告值
Legal cooperationthe treaty enters into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth ratification17报告值
Oversight of providersan EU framework addresses concentration among ICT providers to finance19报告值
Tipping in networkscascades can become abrupt in interdependent networks35Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • INF → INF cascade thresholds
  • DAT → FIN fallback
  • CYB → INF repeated disruption

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • fallback coverage across services
  • cascade thresholds at operating scale

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-13 Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 25BleepingComputer, Costa Rica declares national emergency after Conti ransomware attacks (press report of 9 May 2022: declaration on 8 May 2022 under Decree No. 42542; Ministry of Finance and other bodies affected). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 9Infosecurity Magazine, JLR hack UK’s costliest ever, hitting economy with GBP 1.9bn loss (press report of the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement of 22 October 2025; Category 3; over 5,000 organisations); the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement itself returned an error and was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 15e-Estonia (ed.), X-Road (programme page: 2.2 billion transactions a year; more than 3,800 e-services; outgoing data digitally signed and encrypted). e-Estonia, Tallinn. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 26Clark, J., Metz, A. and Casher, C., ID4D Global Dataset 2021, Volume 1: Global ID Coverage Estimates (World Bank Open Knowledge Repository record, handle 10986/38440, and report opened: just under 850 million people without official proof of identity as of 2021, around half of them children, most in lower-income countries in Africa and South Asia; estimates built for 194 countries). World Bank, Washington, 2022. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 17United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime (treaty page: signing ceremony in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025; seventy-one States and the European Union; article 65, entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 19European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (ed.), Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (page: applied from 17 January 2025; oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers). EIOPA, Frankfurt. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 12World Bank (ed.), The Global Findex Database 2025 (publication page: 79% of adults globally have an account). World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 35Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464(7291), 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

方法论

How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.

12 min read0 figures13 tables10 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

A.1方法

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

Table A.1Methods
否。DerivationCalculation结果
(1)ENISA incidents per month in the period4,875 ÷ 12≈ 406
(2)Growth in UK nationally significant incidents204 ÷ 89≈ 2.3 times
(3)Duration of the AWS event, first impact to end11:48 PM to 2:20 PM PDT14 h 32 min, ≈ 14.5 h
(4)Duration of the Cloudflare event, first impact to full resolution11:20 to 17:06 UTC5 h 46 min, ≈ 5.8 h
Table A.2Coupling strength scale (matrix and model card)
Strength定义
STRONGa disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region
MODERATEan effect is documented but buffered or slower
WEAKan effect is plausible but not documented at global scale
Table A.3Status grammar
标签规则
报告值value as issued by its source, with year
Inferredreasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement
估计值Nexus analytical value with stated method
情景conditional on stated assumptions
Expert inputstructured editorial judgement awaiting evidence

A.2Model card, Digital Public Infrastructure Model v0

Model ID
MDL-SR10-DPI · v0.1
目的
represent digital public infrastructure as a dependent stack and the mechanisms by which failures spread between identity, payments, data exchange, cloud, networks and the services that rely on them
类别
graph-based system of systems
输入
the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
方法
expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
验证
none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
不确定性
qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
有效域
global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
可复现性
strength table and sources published in this edition
20couplings

typed in v0

1strong

documented within one season

3moderate

documented, buffered

16weak

plausible, undocumented

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID
DC-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-B0
类型
baseline documentary cut
Resolution policy
pinned · as of 30 September 2026
Sources pinned
43 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
模型运行
none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
摘要
computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
Supersedes
nothing, first cut of the series
Superseded by
the 2027 digital public infrastructure annual cut

沿袭

  1. 01

    source edition

  2. 02

    pinned citation

  3. 03

    finding

  4. 04

    page

  5. 05

    publication record

Table A.4From the baseline cut to the federation cut
要素Baseline 20262027 global annual
来源cited global publications, pinned by editionnational, regional and sector cuts through one graph
Analysisstated methods and editorial estimatestyped analysis specifications
模型Digital Public Infrastructure Model v0 specificationmodel runs with receipts
发现twelve baseline findingsfindings re-bound to federation evidence
审核five passes scheduledfive passes on the exact digest

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

Table A.5Evidence age and coverage
指标观测已发布节奏Next release
Software outage2024Jul 2024one-offnone scheduled
Cloud eventOct 2025Oct 2025每个事件next provider report
Edge eventNov 2025Nov 2025每个事件next provider report
Cyber advisories2024 to 2025Feb 2024 · Aug 2025每个事件next joint advisory
EU incident countsJul 2024 to Jun 2025Oct 2025 · v1.3 Sep 2026年度next ENISA report
UK incident countsSep 2024 to Aug 2025Oct 2025年度next NCSC review
连通性2025Nov 2025年度next ITU release
Account ownership20252025triennialnext Findex
Payment volumesOct 2025 · Dec 2025Nov 2025 · Dec 2025每月next monthly release
Event loss estimate2025Oct 2025每个事件may be revised
Table A.6Coverage by system at baseline
系统覆盖范围Thinnest dimension
Software and cloudPARTIALcross-provider dependency
网络PARTIALcross-operator dependency
标识THINnational system coverage
支付PARTIALoutage and fraud data
数据交换THINcoverage beyond one country
Cyber threatPARTIALoperator-level data
Access and inclusionGOODidentity coverage by country
Event lossesTHINcommon loss basis
Table A.7Designed empty states: what is not bound, what would fill it and why
领域Source that would fill itBlocker
Which public services depend on which shared digital rails, at national scaleoperators, regulators and national statistics officessecurity-sensitive and not published on a common basis
Restoration times for identity and payment services after major outagesoperator and regulator reportsnot retrieved; no consolidated series
ENISA sector breakdown and top threatsENISA Threat Landscape 2025 full report1the publication page was read; the PDF was not opened and the page notes corrected figures in version 1.3
Share of cloud and edge traffic by provider and regionproviders and network measurement bodiesnot retrieved
Outage and fraud data for national payment railscentral banks and payment bodiesonly volume reports were read; no incident series found
Official statistics pages for UPI and PixNPCI and Banco Central do Brasil1314official statistics pages returned no figures; values come from press reports of the official data
People without official identity from the dataset itselfWorld Bank ID4D Global Dataset26resolved: the 2021 dataset report was opened; no country-level coverage series is bound in this edition
Number of individuals affected by the 2024 health claims platform breachUS Department of Health and Human Services breach portal28resolved: the portal archive lists 192.7 million individuals; the interim count of about 100 million is superseded
Full text of the G20 declaration on digital public infrastructureG20 New Delhi Leaders Declaration27resolved: the declaration text was opened
National inventories of identity, payment and data-exchange systemsnational authoritiesno common register found
Common loss basis for cyber eventsinsurers and event classifiersone classified event read; no series
Capability rungs beyond restorationoperators, regulators, ministriesnot reviewed

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Issued by the cloud provider. One-off. Role: binds DAT-002. Coverage: one region and services that rely on it. Times are stated in Pacific time.

EVD-SR10-001

AWS post-event summary on the October 2025 disruption4

Issued by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity. Annual. Role: binds CYB-007. Reporting period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; the page notes corrections in version 1.3.

EVD-SR10-002

ENISA Threat Landscape 20251

Table A.8Quality dimensions at baseline
DimensionEVD-SR10-001EVD-SR10-002
Completenessevent-specific; customer impact varied within the windowincidents analysed; sector split not read
Timelinesspublished days after the eventabout 3 months after the period
Revisionsingle summaryversion 1.3 corrected figures
Method transparencyroot cause and timeline statedthreat-centric method stated
外部验证provider statementagency review

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

  • AWS4: service-level detail by customer region
  • ENISA1: sector breakdown of incidents
  • CISA67: follow-up advisories
  • NCSC8: sector pages of the annual review

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

Table A.9Publication acceptance record
集团区域条目通过N/A待处理
D1Identity and scope8800
D2Source and data12912
D3Analysis and models12381
D4Findings and claims9801
D5Figures, tables, maps10622
D6Editorial and citations10802
D7Review and approval130013
D8Artefact and design12705
D9Registry and release9009

Publication gate

Conditions met
14 of 23 at evidence close
Blocking problems
none recorded
Open conditions
reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer

Not applicable at baseline

模型运行
first runs in Q1 2027
地图
plates in Q2 2027
Waivers
无

A.7Status words

Table A.10The status every value carries
状态含义
观测Measured directly and published by the source.
报告值Published statistics of an official or institutional source.
已申报Stated by the body concerned; not independently measured.
估计值A Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A.
模型生成Produced by a stated model from cited inputs.
InferredReasoned from cited evidence; not measured.
预报A projection by the cited source.
SimulatedA simulation result under stated assumptions.
情景A conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction.
Expert inputExpert judgement, recorded with its basis.
CandidateProposed for a later edition; not yet evidence.
Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject.

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

步骤发生的事项来源
01 Evidence arrives from the pillarsFoundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s.
02 The cut is sealedOn the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on.
03 The edition is assembledThe edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide.
04 The keys turnAt the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward.
05 The gate opensA named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit.
06 Signed and depositedThe PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI.
07 Published on its desk’s siteOnly then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part.
08 Corrections go to StandardsMethod and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

Table A.11Series terms
术语含义
Baseline Editionthe inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series
WEFH+Bwater, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core
耦合a typed dependency through which one system transmits to another
保障缺口the share of losses not covered by insurance
Capability ladderLISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED
EQLevidence-quality level, 1–5
证据切片a frozen resolution of exact sources and versions
NNC · NLC · NWGNational Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups
Table A.12Abbreviations used in this edition
AbbreviationExpansion
CISAUS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CMCCyber Monitoring Centre
CSFCybersecurity Framework
DNSDomain Name System
DORA《数字运营韧性法》
DPIdigital public infrastructure
ENISAEuropean Union Agency for Cybersecurity
ITU国际电信联盟
NCSCUK National Cyber Security Centre
NIS2second Network and Information Security Directive
NPCINational Payments Corporation of India
UPIUnified Payments Interface

A.10Technical annex

Table A.13Technical annex
条目Annex目录状态
A.1Indicator definitionsthe global indicator set, with units and sourcesIN THIS EDITION
A.2Coupling strengthsthe twenty-cell matrix and its rationaleIN THIS EDITION
A.3Scenario specificationSCN-SR10-DPI-01 assumptions and signpostsIN THIS EDITION
A.4Capability placementsrung evidence for fifteen functionsIN THIS EDITION
A.5Model diagnosticsfirst runs and validation2027
A.6敏感性分析influence of coupling strengths2027
A.7Regional notesregional digital cardsWITH REGIONAL EDITIONS
A.8Review statementspass-by-pass review recordAT RELEASE

A.1 · indicator definition: nationally significant incident

Construct
a cyber incident that the national agency classes in the top three categories of its classification model
单位
incidents per year
方法
incident management data of one national agency
来源
NCSC Annual Review8
不确定性
classification and reporting practice change over time
已知局限
one country; not comparable with counts from other agencies

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 26Clark, J., Metz, A. and Casher, C., ID4D Global Dataset 2021, Volume 1: Global ID Coverage Estimates (World Bank Open Knowledge Repository record, handle 10986/38440, and report opened: just under 850 million people without official proof of identity as of 2021, around half of them children, most in lower-income countries in Africa and South Asia; estimates built for 194 countries). World Bank, Washington, 2022. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 28US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (ed.), Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS, Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, archive listing (Change Healthcare, Inc., business associate, hacking or IT incident, submitted 19 July 2024: 192,700,000 individuals affected, the largest entry on the portal; an interim count of about 100 million notices in October 2024 was superseded). HHS OCR, Washington. Observation year 2024 (count as listed at the access date). Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 27G20 (ed.), G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration, New Delhi, 9 to 10 September 2023 (text opened through the G20 Information Centre; section E welcomes the G20 Framework for Systems of Digital Public Infrastructure, a voluntary and suggested framework, and India’s plan for a Global Digital Public Infrastructure Repository). G20 Presidency of India, New Delhi. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  7. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Data appendix

The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.

9 min read0 figures8 tables15 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

B.1The indicator set

Table B.1Global baseline indicator set
指标数值单位年份状态来源
Windows devices affected8.5million2024报告值3
AWS event, first impact to end≈ 14.5小时2025报告值4
Cloudflare event, to full resolution≈ 5.8小时2025报告值5
Longest reported intrusion persistence≥ 5年2024报告值6
ENISA incidents analysed4,875起事件Jul 2024 to Jun 2025报告值1
UK incidents handled429起事件Sep 2024 to Aug 2025报告值8
UK nationally significant incidents204起事件Sep 2024 to Aug 2025报告值8
UK highly significant incidents18起事件Sep 2024 to Aug 2025报告值8
Jaguar Land Rover event, UK financial impact≈ 1.9GBP billion2025估计值9
People online≈ 6.0billion2025报告值10
People offline2.2billion2025报告值10
Adults with an account79%2025报告值12
UPI volume, October 202520.7billion transactions2025报告值13
Pix peak day, 5 December 2025≈ 313.3million transactions2025报告值14
X-Road transactions2.2billion a year2025报告值15

B.2Global source register

The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.

Domains bound by the register

  • DAT
  • INF
  • CYB
  • FIN
  • DEV
  • ENE
  • HLT
  • AIC
  • MIN
  • TRD
Table B.3Global source register
来源类别覆盖范围Period节奏角色
Microsoft statement3vendorglobal2024one-offsoftware failure
AWS post-event summary4cloud providerUS-EAST-1 and dependents2025每个事件cloud failure
Cloudflare outage report5edge providerglobal2025每个事件edge failure
CISA advisory AA24-038A6national agenciesUS and partners2024每个事件cyber access
CISA advisory AA25-239A7national agenciesglobal2025每个事件telecom campaign
ENISA Threat Landscape1EU agencyEU2024 to 2025年度起事件
NCSC Annual Review8national agencyUK2024 to 2025年度incident load
国际电联《事实与数据》10UN agencyglobal2025年度connectivity
World Bank Global Findex12multilateral bankglobal2025triennialaccount ownership
X-Road page15national programme爱沙尼亚2025持续data exchange

B.3Regional reading, ten regional clusters

Map plates follow with the regional Baseline Editions, when boundary sources and public-safe resolutions are bound. This page gives the regional reading in table form and ranks no region.

Table B.4Regional reading, ten regional clusters
区域Principal hazardsSystems most exposedBaseline evidence
北美cloud region concentration; operator access reportspower, water, telecomsCISA advisory6; AWS4
南美洲instant payment rail at national scalepayments, identityPix record14
欧洲network security and financial resilience rules; threat landscapenetworks, financeENISA1; NIS218; DORA19
Eurasiaregional data not boundnot boundnot bound
中东和北非regional data not boundnot boundnot bound
非洲regional data not bound; low Internet use in low-income countriesidentity, accessITU10
南亚instant payment rail at national scalepayments, identityUPI volume13
东亚regional data not boundnot boundnot bound
ASEANregional data not boundnot boundnot bound
Oceania-Pacificregional data not bound; telecom campaign reported in allied statestelecomsCISA advisory7

B.4Regional card: United Kingdom incident load

  • country
  • national agency
  • incident handling
  • annual review
Systems in view
essential services, critical infrastructure, government functions
Defining reading
204 nationally significant incidents in the year to August 20258
耦合
CYB → INF · INF → DAT
Capability evidence
annual public review of incident handling8
缺口
sector split; comparison with other national bodies
Agenda items
D-02 · D-05

The agency handled 429 incidents in the year, 204 of them nationally significant and 18 highly significant [8].

THREAT

Incident load

Nationally significant incidents rose from 89 to 204 and highly significant ones from 12 to 18 [8].

TREND

A rising count

The review reports what one agency handled. It is not an attribution of any incident to an actor [8].

LEARNING

A public review

B.5How countries appear in the global edition

Countries enter the digital public infrastructure edition through the digital chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never placed in a league table.

Table B.5How countries appear in the global edition
Card field显示内容来源
WEFH+B stateeach core system against peer distribution bandsnational edition
耦合the national dependency matrixnational edition
Risk objectsthe national risk portfolionational edition
Capability rungsthe national capability laddernational edition
Evidence ageoldest and newest source datesnational source register

Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme

26国家

countries and unions

10regional

clusters

16global

flagship and sector

14strategic

系统 报告

20frontier

technology reports

How to read a country card

  • Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
  • Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
  • Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
  • Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such
Table B.6National Baseline Editions in the 2026 programme
波次Countries and unions状态
W0加拿大ISSUED
W1United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, SwitzerlandPLANNED
W2Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, AustraliaPLANNED

B.6许可

Table B.7Licences of each kind of material
材料许可协议
TextCC BY 4.0
数据on the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0
数据Nexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited
地图boundary source and licence printed on each plate
元数据CC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it
Third-party data, figures and textThe source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed
Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence.

B.7Formats and provenance

Table B.8This edition in every format
格式类型状态概述标识符
Web editionHTML本站内容Draft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source.NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Print editionPDFAt releaseA4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release.NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Indicator dataCSV · JSON本站内容15 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release.NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1
数据SVG · PNG本站内容4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder.FIG-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-*
SlidesPDF未记录No slide deck is recorded for this edition.
证据简报HTML · PDF未记录No evidence brief is recorded for this edition.
Dataset with DOIDataCiteAt releaseConcept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet.

来源追溯

Edition pack
The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
证据切片
DC-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
可复现性
sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
Self-check
14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
审核
five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
正式出版方
GCRI for the Nexus Consortium
更正
Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 9Infosecurity Magazine, JLR hack UK’s costliest ever, hitting economy with GBP 1.9bn loss (press report of the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement of 22 October 2025; Category 3; over 5,000 organisations); the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement itself returned an error and was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 12World Bank (ed.), The Global Findex Database 2025 (publication page: 79% of adults globally have an account). World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 15e-Estonia (ed.), X-Road (programme page: 2.2 billion transactions a year; more than 3,800 e-services; outgoing data digitally signed and encrypted). e-Estonia, Tallinn. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 18European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (policy page: in force January 2023; transposition deadline 17 October 2024; 18 critical sectors). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 19European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (ed.), Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (page: applied from 17 January 2025; oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers). EIOPA, Frankfurt. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

References and record

Every source the edition rests on, the publication record, the corrections log and the open record.

15 min read0 figures1 table0 notesNR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

C.143 sources

NR-CIT-1, editor first. A DOI is linked where the source has one; Nexus records carry a UNI once the catalogue allocates it (NS-1).

  1. 1ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; 4,875 incidents; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  2. 2ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2024 (publication page; published 19 September 2024; seven prime threats; no counts on the page). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  3. 3Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices, less than one percent of all Windows machines). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  4. 4Amazon Web Services (ed.), Summary of the Amazon DynamoDB service disruption in the Northern Virginia (US-EAST-1) Region, 19 to 20 October 2025 (post-event summary). Amazon Web Services, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  5. 5Cloudflare (ed.), Cloudflare outage on November 18, 2025 (incident report). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  6. 6CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A on state-sponsored actor persistent access to critical infrastructure networks, 7 February 2024 (page text read to character 100,000 of 132,303). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  7. 7CISA and partner agencies (eds.), Joint cybersecurity advisory AA25-239A on state-sponsored actor compromise of networks worldwide, 27 August 2025 (revised 3 September 2025). CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  8. 8National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), NCSC Annual Review 2025, incident management chapter and news item (period 1 September 2024 to 31 August 2025; 429 incidents; 204 nationally significant; 18 highly significant). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  9. 9Infosecurity Magazine, JLR hack UK’s costliest ever, hitting economy with GBP 1.9bn loss (press report of the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement of 22 October 2025; Category 3; over 5,000 organisations); the Cyber Monitoring Centre statement itself returned an error and was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  10. 10ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures 2025 (press release of 17 November 2025: about 6 billion online, 2.2 billion offline; 94% and 23% by income group; 85% urban and 58% rural). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  11. 11POST-CLOSE, context only: ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures statistics page (2026 edition: 6.3 billion online, 76%; about 2 billion offline; materials dated November 2026), read as a newer estimate and not used in findings. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  12. 12World Bank (ed.), The Global Findex Database 2025 (publication page: 79% of adults globally have an account). World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  13. 13Entrackr, UPI hits all-time high of 20.7 bn transactions in October (press report of NPCI data: 20.7 billion transactions, Rs 27.28 lakh crore, up 25% and 16% year on year); the NPCI statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  14. 14Agência Brasil, Pix bate recorde e supera 313 milhões de transações em um dia (press report of Banco Central do Brasil data: about 313.3 million transactions and R$ 179.9 billion on 5 December 2025; previous record 297.4 million on 28 November 2025); the central bank statistics page returned no figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  15. 15e-Estonia (ed.), X-Road (programme page: 2.2 billion transactions a year; more than 3,800 e-services; outgoing data digitally signed and encrypted). e-Estonia, Tallinn. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  16. 16United Nations (ed.), Global Digital Compact (programme page; negotiated by 193 Member States; opened for endorsement in September 2024; commitment to increase investment in digital public goods and digital public infrastructure). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  17. 17United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime (treaty page: signing ceremony in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025; seventy-one States and the European Union; article 65, entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  18. 18European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (policy page: in force January 2023; transposition deadline 17 October 2024; 18 critical sectors). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  19. 19European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (ed.), Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (page: applied from 17 January 2025; oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers). EIOPA, Frankfurt. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  20. 20CISA (ed.), Critical Infrastructure Sectors (page: sixteen sectors, including Communications, Energy, Information Technology and Water and Wastewater). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3
  21. 21IBM (ed.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (report page: global average cost of USD 4.99 million, up 12% on the previous year, described as a record). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  22. 22Verizon (ed.), Data Breach Investigations Report 2026 (report page: 31% of breaches begin with software vulnerabilities; coverage 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025). Verizon, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  23. 23International Monetary Fund (ed.), Global Financial Stability Report, April 2024 (publication page: risk of extreme losses from cyber incidents has increased; the financial sector is highly exposed; chapter figures not read). IMF, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  24. 24NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 (programme page; two-year anniversary note of 24 February 2026; intended for industry, government and organisations). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  25. 25BleepingComputer, Costa Rica declares national emergency after Conti ransomware attacks (press report of 9 May 2022: declaration on 8 May 2022 under Decree No. 42542; Ministry of Finance and other bodies affected). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
  26. 26Clark, J., Metz, A. and Casher, C., ID4D Global Dataset 2021, Volume 1: Global ID Coverage Estimates (World Bank Open Knowledge Repository record, handle 10986/38440, and report opened: just under 850 million people without official proof of identity as of 2021, around half of them children, most in lower-income countries in Africa and South Asia; estimates built for 194 countries). World Bank, Washington, 2022. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  27. 27G20 (ed.), G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration, New Delhi, 9 to 10 September 2023 (text opened through the G20 Information Centre; section E welcomes the G20 Framework for Systems of Digital Public Infrastructure, a voluntary and suggested framework, and India’s plan for a Global Digital Public Infrastructure Repository). G20 Presidency of India, New Delhi. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  28. 28US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (ed.), Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS, Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, archive listing (Change Healthcare, Inc., business associate, hacking or IT incident, submitted 19 July 2024: 192,700,000 individuals affected, the largest entry on the portal; an interim count of about 100 million notices in October 2024 was superseded). HHS OCR, Washington. Observation year 2024 (count as listed at the access date). Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 3
  29. 29European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 20 November 2024 (text opened: in force on the twentieth day after publication; applies from 11 December 2027, with Article 14 from 11 September 2026 and Chapter IV from 11 June 2026). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  30. 30European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework, Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 30 April 2024 (text opened; in force on the twentieth day after publication). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  31. 31ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, third edition, approved October 2022, amended by Amendment 1:2024 (catalogue record and scope read at a national standards body; no figure is used). International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  32. 32Office of the UN Secretary-General’s Envoy on Technology and UNDP (eds.), The Universal Digital Public Infrastructure Safeguards Framework, with A Guide to Building Safe and Inclusive DPI for Societies, September 2024 (initiative launched in 2023; interim report April 2024; initiative site opened; no figure is used). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  33. 33Tikk, E., Kaska, K. and Vihul, L., International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations (case studies of Estonia 2007, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2008, Lithuania 2008 and Georgia 2008; publication page and PDF opened). Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallinn, 2010. Observation year 2007. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  34. 34Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (Crossref record and abstract opened). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  35. 35Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464(7291), 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  36. 36Perrow, C., Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books, New York, 1984 (library catalogue record opened; later editions by Princeton University Press). Observation year 1984. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  37. 37Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497(7447), 51 to 59, May 2013 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  38. 38Zscheischler, J. et al., Future climate risk from compound events, Nature Climate Change 8(6), 469 to 477, May 2018 (Crossref record opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  39. 39Cyber Safety Review Board (ed.), Review of the December 2021 Log4j Event, 11 July 2022, as described in the WaterISAC post of 19 July 2022, CISA Releases Report of its Review into Log4j Vulnerabilities and Response (the Board describes Log4j as an endemic vulnerability that will remain in systems for many years; the report itself was blocked on the CISA site and not opened; no figure is used). Department of Homeland Security, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  40. 40Schmitt, M.N. (ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Crossref record opened). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, February 2017. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  41. 41OECD (ed.), Recommendation of the Council on Digital Security of Critical Activities, OECD/LEGAL/0456, adopted 11 December 2019 on proposal of the Digital Policy Committee (instrument text opened; replaces the 2008 Recommendation on the Protection of Critical Information Infrastructures). OECD, Paris. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  42. 42CISA (ed.), Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (first released October 2022, version 1.0.1 March 2023; version 2.0 released 10 December 2025 and aligned with NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, per the CISA bulletin of that date and the IPA translation page; no figure is used). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  43. 43United Nations General Assembly (ed.), resolution 79/243, United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes, A/RES/79/243, adopted 24 December 2024 (text opened: opens the Convention for signature in Hanoi in 2025; article 65, entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6

C.2Publication record

发布

标题
Strategic Systems Report 2026: Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk, Baseline Edition
系列
Reports · Strategic Systems Series SR-10
版本
Baseline Edition 2026 · inaugural annual
版本
v1.0.0 · draft for stewardship review
Publication ID
NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
证据截止
30 September 2026
Publication date
2026 年 10 月
DOI
concept and version DOI at deposit

发布方

正式出版方
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for the Nexus Consortium
地点
Toronto
编辑
Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor
管理方
GCRI · technical truth · GRF · public meaning · GRA · capital meaning
许可协议
text CC BY 4.0; data on the terms of each source
Copyright
© 2026 GCRI · Nexus Consortium
语言
English (en-GB) source edition
Correspondence
Registry correction pathway · editorial office

Colophon

格式
A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF
Typefaces
Space Grotesk (display) · Geist (text) · IBM Plex Sans Italic (standfirsts) · IBM Plex Mono (data)
Design standard
Reports Foundational Edition, Volume I, Part VII
无障碍
tagged PDF and HTML targets; text alternatives for every figure
生产
Reports editorial team, GCRI

Release path for this version

Table C.1Release path for this version
步骤发生的事项何时
草稿editorial self-check complete at evidence close2026 年 10 月
Steward reviewfive passes on the exact draft (keys T · M · F · N)Q4 2026
批准publication authority approves the exact digestbefore release
Depositconcept and version DOI minted; registry pointer setat release
继任the 2027 digital public infrastructure edition reports changes against this baseline2027
Current version
v1.0.0 draft, stewardship review
Previous edition
none, first edition of the series
Next edition
NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2027-v1.0.0
Latest version
resolve the concept DOI or the registry record
Correction route
Registry correction pathway
Notice types
erratum · addendum · supersession · withdrawal

C.3更正记录

0correction notices. No edition has been released yet, so none can be corrected; the log below lists each edition’s current version.

版本版本日期状态变化通知
SR-10NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.02026 年 10 月草稿Baseline Edition 2026, inaugural annual edition,无

Notice types: erratum, addendum, supersession, withdrawal. A correction is a new version with a published notice; the earlier version stays resolvable, and no edition is ever edited in silence.

C.4Open record

This edition’s open record

Publication ID
NR-STRATEGIC-DPI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Desk identifier and series alias
NR-GCRI-SR-10-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 · NR-STR-SR-10-2026-BL
Collection
NR-COL-2026-BASELINE (IsPartOf at deposit)
DOI
Concept and version DOI at deposit, on Zenodo with DataCite metadata
版本
Each correction is a new version (isNewVersionOf); the concept DOI resolves to the latest
Bundle
RO-Crate 1.2 with CITATION.cff, CodeMeta and PROV-O provenance; a signed manifest
许可协议
CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0) for original material; metadata CC0 1.0

Credit and identity

ORCID
Your iD in the deposit and the contribution record; DataCite can then add the work to your ORCID record
ROR
Your organisation by its ROR identifier, never by a typed name alone
CRediT
Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Validation, Visualisation, Writing, review and editing
账户
None needed to contribute; never a password

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C.5Where this edition sits among the six pillars

Foundry seals the evidence and Universe tests it; Reports publishes it; Standards takes its corrections and Academy teaches from it.

  1. F03 Sealed observations and indicator series Foundry Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
  2. F04 After-action and scenario findings for Universe After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
  3. F05 National Portfolio movement for chapter Foundry National Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
  4. Applied in editions Standards Nexus Standards: applied in editions.
  5. SR-10 edition Reports Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk 2026, published in every format with its sources, citation and corrections.
  6. F06 Method and correction findings as change Standards Method and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
  7. F12 Q4 synthesis informs the next-year Universe Q4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
  8. Taught in the open Academy Risk Academy: taught in the open.

What Foundry and Universe hand to this edition, and what it hands to Standards, Universe and Academy. From the programme spine; SR-10 is a drafted Baseline Edition, so these handoffs run from its first operational quarter.

移交BetweenWhat crosses, and when
F03Foundry to ReportsSealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
F04Universe to ReportsAfter-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
F05Foundry to ReportsNational Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
RingNexus Standards to ReportsNexus Standards: applied in editions.
F06Reports to Nexus StandardsMethod and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
F12Reports to UniverseQ4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
RingReports to Risk AcademyRisk Academy: taught in the open.
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Send evidence or a correction on Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the GCRI Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

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CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.