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Quantum computing, sensing and communication

Quantum computing, sensing and communication exploit quantum mechanical effects to process information and make measurements. They promise new capabilities and pose a long-term threat to current public-key cryptography. Quantum Technologies stewards this page for the Nexus Consortium.

02The method

What quantum computing, sensing and communication covers.

  1. 01

    Core methods

    quantum algorithm design; quantum error correction; quantum key distribution; quantum sensing and metrology; hardware characterisation; post-quantum migration planning.

  2. 02

    Data and instruments

    quantum processor benchmarks; device calibration records; experimental testbeds; cryptographic inventories; sensor field trial data.

  3. 03

    Ukuqinisekiswa

    Hardware is characterised through standard benchmarking protocols and cross-platform comparison. Claims of advantage are tested against classical methods.

  4. 04

    Imida

    Noise, decoherence and engineering constraints limit current devices. Timelines for practical capability are uncertain.

  5. 05

    Use in risk decisions

    Quantum technology assessment informs when to migrate critical systems to quantum-resistant cryptography. Quantum sensing may improve navigation and subsurface monitoring for infrastructure.

03Reference practice

Quantum technology is entering standardisation.

ReferenceInto eyimiselayo
NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205Post-quantum key establishment and signatures
ISO/IEC JTC 3Quantum technology standards
ETSI quantum-safe cryptography workQuantum key distribution and migration
04Inkqubo yokusebenza

Indlela inkqubo eqhuba ngayo.

Process explorer · Process

Quantum computing, sensing and communication: Post-quantum cryptography migration

8 steps4 stages

Inkqubo yokusebenza

Quantum computing, sensing and communication: Post-quantum cryptography migration

NIST published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 on 13 August 2024; the migration steps are common practice, and the IR 8547 timeline is a draft.

  1. 01 Discover

    1. 01Cryptographic inventoryDatasetOrganisations must find where vulnerable algorithms are used and plan to replace or update them. The inventory lists algorithms and keys.
    2. 02Prioritise by data lifetime and exposureStepIR 8547 names the harvest now, decrypt later threat. Systems holding long-lived sensitive data come first.
  2. 02 Plan

    1. 03Select standardised algorithmsStepFIPS 203, 204 and 205 specify ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA. Falcon and HQC were selected for ongoing standardisation.
    2. 04Vendor roadmapsDataset · National DeskHardware security modules and libraries need vendor support for the selected algorithms. Roadmaps come from each vendor.
  3. 03 Deploy

    1. 05Hybrid deploymentModelIR 8547 says migration may start with hybrids of quantum-resistant and quantum-vulnerable algorithms, secure if one component is secure.
    2. 06TestExerciseInteroperability, performance and fallback are tested before cut-over.
    3. 07Cut over and retireDecision · National DeskIn draft IR 8547, 112-bit public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030 and quantum-vulnerable ones disallowed after 2035.
  4. 04 Sustain

    1. 08Crypto agilityStepCrypto agility is the ability to replace and adapt cryptographic algorithms while preserving security and ongoing operations.

Neutral outline of a published external standard or method, from its issuing body. Not a record of operation. Nexus does not perform, certify or approve any step shown. A gate or decision belongs to the party the source names.

05In systemic risk work

Plan the migration, not the date.

The main systemic risk from quantum computing is to public-key cryptography, and data recorded now can be decrypted later. Because the timing of a cryptographically relevant machine is uncertain, the risk-relevant work is inventory and migration planning, which takes years for large systems.

  • Inventory cryptographic dependencies.
  • Prioritise long-lived confidential data.
  • Separate sensing and computing claims; maturity differs.
  • Applications on Quantum and Cyber and Digital Resilience.
07Ubugcini

Who maintains this page.

Quantum Technologies stewards quantum computing, sensing and communication: it keeps this description current and reviews how the method is applied across the platforms.

08Imithombo

Where this page’s references lead.

Amaqumrhu namaxwebhu eli phepha elifundwa ngokuthelekiswa nawo. Imeko neenguqulelo ziyatshintsha; ikhonkco ngalinye liya kwiqumrhu elikhuphayo.

09Imibuzo

Imibuzo neempendulo.

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Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

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