Resilience metrics for lifelines
Service performance over time during and after disruption is described by robustness, rapidity of recovery and lost service, so that interventions can be compared on the same curve.
GCRI · Critical Infrastructure
Reliability and resilience engineering is the method this platform stewards for the network. It designs infrastructure to withstand, absorb and recover from failure through redundancy, diversity, protection and planned restoration, and it measures how well systems perform when stressed.
Reliability and resilience engineering studies how systems fail, how failures can be prevented and how systems absorb, adapt and recover from disruption. It addresses both technical components and the organisations that operate them. In critical infrastructure and cities and built environment, resilience engineering identifies critical components and recovery bottlenecks across connected systems. It informs redundancy, spares and restoration priorities. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.
Service performance over time during and after disruption is described by robustness, rapidity of recovery and lost service, so that interventions can be compared on the same curve.
Component failure rates and network structure are combined to estimate service availability, and the components that dominate unavailability are identified.
Crews, spares and access are modelled to estimate restoration curves, and options to shorten them are compared.
Night lights, population density and flood water over Western Europe, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.
Imephu esebenzisanayo idinga i-JavaScript; uhlu lwezendlalelo nemithombo luphansi.
Izendlalelo 3
Infrastructure exposure, for this page
Ikhibhodi, kugxilwe emephini
Bamba u-Ctrl noma u-⌘ bese uskrola ukuze usondeze
Okutholakala kwakamuva
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © abanikele ku-OpenStreetMap (ODbL) · Natural Earth
Iyalayisha izithombe zakamuva ze-NASA.
Donsa ukuze unyakazise. U-Ctrl noma u-⌘ bese uskrola, ucindezele ngeminwe emibili noma izinkinobho ukuze usondeze; beka isikhombi ukuze ubone amanani aphansi kwaso; ukusetha kabusha kubuyisela esifundeni.
Infrastructure exposure, framed on Western Europe.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.
Izendlalelo nezinsuku
Datasets and records used by reliability and resilience engineering on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.
| Idatha | Indima | Label |
|---|---|---|
| Outage and failure records | Failure rates | OBSERVED |
| Asset registers | Network composition | Published statistics |
| Restoration records from past events | Recovery curves | OBSERVED |
| Hazard scenarios | Stress inputs | MODELLED |
The screen a team would use to follow this method: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Critical infrastructure · Resilience engineering · Run R-6113
nodes: assets · edges: dependencies
| N3 | 1343 | 44 | Critical |
| N4 | 6363 | 14 | Normal |
| N5 | 7309 | 6 | Normal |
| N6 | 2249 | 36 | Normal |
Reliability predictions are compared with field failure data. Exercises and post-event reviews check whether recovery performed as planned.
| Check | How it is done |
|---|---|
| Back-casting events | Models reproduce outage and restoration patterns of past events |
| Common-cause review | Redundant elements are checked for shared failure causes |
| Operator review | Assumptions about crews and spares are confirmed with operators |
Common-cause failures and rare events are hard to estimate from limited data. Human and organisational factors resist quantification.
A hazard footprint takes out co-located assets in every layer; fragmentation, dependency between layers and overload of the survivors then spread the failure. The 3D view separates the layers by depth. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Western Europe; the model itself is not tied to a place.
Controls
Readouts
| Step | Transport working (%) | Power working (%) | Telecoms working (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 89 | 89 | 89 |
| 1 | 44 | 56 | 72 |
| 2 | 39 | 39 | 39 |
| 3 | 28 | 39 | 33 |
| 4 | 17 | 39 | 33 |
| 5 | 17 | 39 | 11 |
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Critical infrastructure and critical entities: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
Izingozi
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-0 Umthethosisekelo nezimisoNS-3 Ama-UNI amarekhodi obungozi (uhlelo lolimi, ukuqhathanisa nezinhlelo ezindala, igunya lokwabela)NS-9 Ama-UNI omongo (ukufakwa, izibonelo, izibonelo zohlelo)NS-10 Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)NS-11 Ukuqinisekisa nokuqapha (ubufakazi, izifakazelo, ukuqapha ukuhambisana ngaphandle kokwethembana)NRS-H61 Umndeni wezingozi: Ukwehluleka okulandelanayo (NHS-1 sys.cascade)NRS-H94 Umndeni wezingozi: Izehlakalo ze-inthanethi zesistimu (NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)NRS-H107 Umndeni wezingozi: Ukugxila nokufana kwengqalasizinda yedijithali (NHS-1 tech.digital-concentration)NRS-K31 Iphrofayela yephakethe lomkhakha: Ukuqina kwe-inthanethi kazwelonke (DOMAIN-031)NRS-K36 Iphrofayela yephakethe lomkhakha: Ingqalasizinda ebalulekile (DOMAIN-036)NRS-K48 Iphrofayela yephakethe lomkhakha: Ukuqina kwesistimu yezezimali (DOMAIN-048)Observation
Example geography
Critical Infrastructure stewards reliability and resilience engineering for the Consortium and reviews how it is applied across platforms.
The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.
The couplings between the systems in resilience engineering for infrastructure: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
Ungalokothi uthumele idatha yomuntu siqu, imininingwane ebucayi yengqalasizinda noma noma yini ongenalo ilungelo lokuyabelana ngayo. Umnikelo ubuyekezwa ngaphambi kokusetshenziswa; ukuwuthumela akunikezi ubuqambi noma amalungelo okuhlela, futhi ukusekela akuthengi muphumela.
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