Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI)
The methods Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience relies on, the assumptions they carry and the limits of what they can show.
Fig.How a finding is reviewed before it is published. Design, not a record.
The Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience methods page sets out the methods the platform relies on, among them cybersecurity and cryptography, software and safety-critical systems engineering, and communications and network technology, with their assumptions, validation and limits. Each analysis lists its assumptions and data, reports ranges and confidence beside central estimates, is checked against observations or other models, and states what it cannot show.
For methods and uncertainty, in GCRI's spatial-intelligence reading, the map opens on true-colour imagery, night lights and land cover with true colour from NASA GIBS, framed on Europe; every other NASA layer, live feed and forecast waits in the layer list.
The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.
Layers 3
Connected activity, for this page
Keyboard, with the map focused
Hold Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll to zoom
Latest available
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth
Loading the latest NASA imagery.
Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.
For methods and uncertainty, in GCRI's spatial-intelligence reading, the map opens on true-colour imagery, night lights and land cover with true colour from NASA GIBS, framed on Europe; every other NASA layer, live feed and forecast waits in the layer list.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date; indicators, not assessments of any place; claim ceiling INTEGRATED.
Layers and dates
| Source | Why it matters here | How it is reported |
|---|---|---|
| Incident data | Under-reporting and inconsistent definitions | Sources and definitions stated |
| Dependency maps | Providers rarely disclose dependencies | Inferred links labelled |
| Attack likelihood | Adversaries adapt | Scenarios rather than probabilities |
| Loss estimates | Indirect losses hard to measure | Ranges with methods |
Accumulation scenarios state the dependency assumptions and the share of affected organisations assumed.
Each analysis lists its assumptions and the data it depends on.
Ranges and confidence are reported alongside central estimates.
Models are checked against observations and, where possible, against other models.
What an analysis cannot show is stated beside what it can.
Each term as this page uses it. Where a standard-setting body defines the term, the wording follows that body.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Uncertainty quantification | Characterising and propagating the uncertainties in a model to state confidence in its outputs. |
| Sensitivity analysis | Repeating an analysis under different assumptions to show how much the result depends on them. |
| Model validation | Comparing model predictions with independent observations to judge fitness for a stated use. |
| Cybersecurity and cryptography | Cybersecurity and cryptography protect information systems and data from unauthorised access, disruption and manipulation. |
The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.
The current service level is R0: information and enquiries. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.