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GCRI · Digital Public Infrastructure

Digital service resilience

When identity, payment or benefit systems fail, people cannot prove who they are, get paid or receive help. Public digital services must withstand outages, cyber attacks and surges in demand, and degrade gracefully when they cannot. This page sets out how digital public services fail and recover, how resilience is measured, and what evidence serves the agencies and regulators responsible.

01नोंदणी करा

Digital service resilience on the record.

02The question

Digital service resilience: how the risk develops.

Outage, cyber and operational controls. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

यंत्रणा

Shared components fail together

Services that share an identity layer, payment switch or hosting platform fail together when that component fails.

यंत्रणा

Demand surges overwhelm

Benefit applications in a crisis, tax deadlines and enrolment periods can overload systems designed for normal demand.

यंत्रणा

Attacks target public systems

Ransomware and denial-of-service attacks on public systems disrupt services and can expose the personal data of many people.

यंत्रणा

Fallbacks protect people

Offline modes, manual processes and alternative channels let people still receive essential services during outages.

03भूगोल

Connected activity in India.

Night lights, population density and true-colour imagery over India, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.

परस्परसंवादी नकाशासाठी JavaScript आवश्यक आहे; स्तरांची यादी आणि स्रोत खाली आहेत.

स्तर 3

Connected activity, for this page

नवीनतम उपलब्ध

NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap योगदानकर्ते (ODbL) · Natural Earth

NASA ची नवीनतम प्रतिमा लोड होत आहे.

हलवण्यासाठी ओढा. झूम करण्यासाठी Ctrl किंवा ⌘ धरून स्क्रोल करा, पिंच करा किंवा बटणे वापरा; पॉइंटरखालील मूल्यांसाठी त्यावर फिरवा; पूर्ववत केल्यास प्रदेशाकडे परत येते.

Connected activity, framed on India.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.

Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · NASA HLS S30Sources and licences

  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
  • VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
  • Natural Earth वापरून तयार केले. naturalearthdata.com वर मोफत व्हेक्टर आणि रास्टर नकाशा डेटा. सार्वजनिक क्षेत्र
  • © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
  • Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; प्रतिमा NASA GIBS द्वारे. प्रकाशित रंग नकाशावरून रंग पुन्हा रेखाटले; दाखवलेल्या ठिकाणी मूल्ये षट्कोनी पेशींमध्ये सरासरी केली (सुधारित). NASA मुक्त डेटा
  • ग्लोब आणि सपाट नकाशावरील संदर्भ: NASA GIBS संदर्भ स्तरांमधून किनारपट्ट्या, सीमा, रस्ते आणि स्थळनावे (OpenStreetMap डेटा, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap योगदानकर्ते); पर्यायी आधार म्हणून Blue Marble प्रतिमा; ASTER GDEM उंची रंग निर्देशांकातून 3D भूप्रदेश आणि उंचीचे वाचन (5 m ते 200 m वर्ग, सुवाच्यतेसाठी अतिशयोक्त). सीमा प्रकाशित केल्याप्रमाणे रेखाटल्या आहेत आणि कोणत्याही प्रदेशाबाबत कोणतीही भूमिका सूचित करत नाहीत.
  • थेट घटना: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); घटना सूचक आहेत आणि त्यांचे मूळ स्रोत दुवे कायम ठेवतात.
  • Observed (EO): NASA HLS S30 (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • NASA GIBS: NASA च्या Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS) चा भाग असलेल्या NASA Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS) च्या सेवांद्वारे पुरवलेल्या प्रतिमांच्या वापराची आम्ही नोंद घेतो.
  • पर्यायी स्तर (स्तरांच्या यादीत 5 स्रोत: थेट, अंदाज, निरीक्षित आणि संदर्भ) सुरू केल्यावर त्यांच्या प्रदात्याचे श्रेय नकाशावर आणि येथे दाखवतात; अंदाज हे प्रारूपाचे निष्कर्ष आहेत आणि व्युत्पन्न निर्देशांक हे अंदाज आहेत.

स्तर आणि तारखा

  • Night-time lights, daily: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Oct 2026
  • Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
  • Flood water, 3-day composite: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Oct 2026
  • True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
  • भू-आच्छादन प्रकार (IGBP), वार्षिक: MODIS Terra आणि Aqua भू-आच्छादन (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024
  • Enhanced vegetation index, rolling 8 days: MODIS Terra EVI, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026

04Across the domains

Digital public services must stay up when other domains fail.

05देखरेख करा

DPI service health.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

DPI service health

Digital service resilience · Payment switch · Today

  • Transactions today
    3,798,4234सक्रिय
  • Authentication success, %
    99.0सामान्य
  • Availability, % this month
    99.55सामान्य
  • Grievances open
    464लक्ष ठेवा
All rails operationalGCRI · Digital Public Infrastructure

Throughput

Rails

Identity verify3580.2सामान्य
Instant payment7510.4सामान्य
डेटा देवाणघेवाण9900.5Degraded
Offline fallbackलागू नाहीलागू नाहीStandby
DPI service health: the screen's structure, terms and states for Digital service resilience.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
06निर्देशक

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeलेबल
Availability of critical public digital servicespercent of timemonthlyService monitoringनिरीक्षित
Major outagescount and durationannualIncident recordsनिरीक्षित
Cyber incidents affecting public servicescountannualNational CSIRT reportsPublished statistics
Services with tested offline fallbackpercent of critical servicesper assessmentContinuity test recordsनोंदवलेले
Peak load capacity relative to normalratioper testLoad testingनिरीक्षित
Recovery time after major outageshoursper incidentIncident recordsनिरीक्षित
07Simulator

Stocks, flows, delays and a tipping threshold.

Two stocks, pressure and adaptive capacity, joined by a reinforcing growth loop, a delayed balancing response and damage when pressure outruns capacity; past the threshold the system can tip. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows India; the model itself is not tied to a place.

नियंत्रणे

Growth of pressure
6.0% a year
Efficacy of capacity in reducing pressure
4.0% a year
Investment response to perceived pressure
20%
Perception delay
4.0 years
Tipping threshold of pressure
60 index
Amplification past the threshold
2.0 times
Years simulated
50 वर्षे

वाचने

Peak pressure
113 index
Capacity at the end
186 index
Years over the threshold
15.8 years
आकडे, पद्धती आणि स्रोत
वर्षPressureक्षमताPerceived
020.050.020.0
423.344.921.2
827.242.224.0
1231.742.327.7
1636.845.532.2
2042.351.537.2
2447.960.342.6
2853.271.348.0
3257.884.353.1
3666.498.458.4
4082.7115.969.7
4497.8139.783.8
48109.1169.497.3

पद्धती

  1. System dynamics Forrester (1961), Industrial Dynamics, MIT Press; Sterman (2000), Business Dynamics
  2. Critical transitions and tipping points Scheffer and others (2009), Early-warning signals for critical transitions, Nature 461
  3. Causal loop diagram Sterman (2000), Business Dynamics, McGraw-Hill
  4. Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
  5. One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley

डेटा

या प्रारूपात कोणताही निरीक्षित डेटा येत नाही: ते नियंत्रणांनी ठरवलेल्या अध्यापनाच्या मूल्यांवर चालते, जी कार्यक्रमाच्या स्वतःच्या पुराव्याने बदलायची आहेत.

Stocks, flows, delays and a tipping threshold. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: System dynamics (Forrester (1961), Industrial Dynamics, MIT Press; Sterman (2000), Business Dynamics); Critical transitions and tipping points (Scheffer and others (2009), Early-warning signals for critical transitions, Nature 461); Causal loop diagram (Sterman (2000), Business Dynamics, McGraw-Hill).
08स्रोत

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

स्रोतWhat it givesLicence class
National CSIRT and cyber agency reportsIncidents affecting public servicesPublic, terms per agency
Published post-incident reviews of government digital servicesCauses and recovery of outagesPublic records, terms per publisher
NIS2 Directive requirements for public administrationResilience obligations for public entities in the EUPublic, EU terms
Government service performance dashboardsAvailability and usage of digital servicesOpen data where published
ENISA reports on public sector cybersecurityThreats and good practicePublic, ENISA terms
09प्रतिरूप आणि शृंखला परिणाम सिम्युलेटर

Model digital service resilience as a system. Run the cascade.

Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Cyber and digital resilience law alignment: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.

धोके

  • Dam failure
  • Sea-ice loss
  • Coastal erosion (set off downstream)
  • River flood (set off downstream)
  • Flash flood (set off downstream)
  • मोठ्या प्रमाणावर विस्थापन (पुढील परिणामांना चालना)
  • Biodiversity loss (set off downstream)
  • व्यापक वीज खंडित (पुढील परिणामांना चालना)
  • Water supply shortfall (set off downstream)
  • Arctic winter sea-ice collapse (set off downstream)
  • Polar vortex disruption (set off downstream)

नियंत्रणे

  • NS-10 धोरणे आणि कलमे (यंत्र-वाचनीय दायित्वे: व्याख्या, बंधन, मूल्यमापन आणि अंमलबजावणी)
  • NS-11 सत्यापन आणि देखरेख (पुरावा, प्रमाणपत्रे, शून्य-विश्वास अनुरूपता निरीक्षण)
  • NS-9 संदर्भित UNI (उपयोजने, उदाहरणे, कार्यक्रम उदाहरणे)
  • NRS-X6 Cyber and digital security risk
  • NRS-H93 Hazard family: Identity, trust and cryptographic failure (NHS-1 cyber.identity)
  • NRS-K31 Domain pack profile: Cyber national resilience (DOMAIN-031)
  • NRS-H54 Hazard family: Signal and platform disruption (NHS-1 cyber.platform)
  • NRS-H86 Hazard family: Telecom and data-centre failure (NHS-1 infra.digital)
  • NRS-H94 Hazard family: Systemic cyber events (NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)

निरीक्षण

  • NIST National Vulnerability Database APIs (listed for reference)
  • CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue (listed for reference)
  • EUR-Lex Cellar (EU legal acts and delegated acts) (listed for reference)
  • Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
  • Legal measures pillar of the Global Cybersecurity Index

उदाहरणादाखल भूगोल

  • North America: 243 hexagonal cells
  • आज रात्रीचे दिवे, खंडित वीज (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
  • ढगांमधून पृष्ठजल, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 रडार), NASA GIBS
  • पावसाचा दर, शेवटचा अर्धा तास (IMERG), NASA GIBS
  • Vegetation disturbance alerts, 30 m (OPERA DIST-ALERT), NASA GIBS
10Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Digital Public Infrastructure prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Digital government agenciesWhere to add redundancy, capacity and fallbacksDependency maps; continuity reviews
Social protection and tax agenciesHow to keep services available at peak and in crisesLoad testing evidence
Regulators and auditorsWhat resilience to require and checkIncident and availability evidence

Outputs this topic produces

  • Shared component dependency maps
  • Surge and load testing designs
  • Fallback and continuity reviews
  • Evidence notes for resilience requirements
11Methods and evidence

How digital service resilience is modelled, measured and tested.

The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.

Datasets and provenance

The data classes behind digital service resilience and what is recorded about each before it is used.

Data classProvenance recordedResolution statedLicence checked
Satellite imagery, optical and radarsensor, processing level, acquisition datepixel size and revisitper scene
Reanalysis and climate model outputmodel, experiment, member, versiongrid and time stepper release
In-situ sensors and gaugesstation, instrument, calibration recordpoint and sampling rateper network
Population and asset exposuremethod, vintage, input sourcescell size and unitper release
Boundaries and reference geographyproducer, edition, datescaleper edition
वंशावळ
W3C PROV record from source to figure
तत्त्वे
FAIR: findable, accessible, interoperable, reusable
Gaps
shown as missing, never filled silently
Data classes and the provenance fields recorded for each; a dataset is listed by name only once its licence admits the use.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
12Core questions

What experts ask.

A digital public service is only as dependable as its weakest dependency. Identity, payment and data exchange components are shared across many services, so an outage in one can halt several at once. Demand surges, for example during an emergency benefit programme, can overwhelm systems that perform well in normal times. Resilience requires engineering, operations and governance that plan for failure.

  • Which public services are essential, and what minimum level of service must they maintain during disruption?
  • Which shared components do they depend on, and what happens to each service if one fails?
  • How quickly can services be restored, and have recovery plans been tested?
  • What offline or assisted channels let people reach essential services while digital systems are down?
13Mechanisms

Drivers and processes.

Resilience depends on design, operations and fallback arrangements.

Design

Architecture for failure

Redundancy, graceful degradation and isolation of components so that one failure does not take down everything.

Operations

Monitoring and response

Capacity planning, change control, monitoring and incident response. Many outages follow changes or updates.

Fallback

Continuity channels

Offline procedures, assisted service and deferred processing that keep essential functions running.

Resilience is often traded away quietly. Paper processes are retired to save money, the staff who knew manual procedures move on, and redundancy is cut because it was never used. Evidence from outages suggests that maintaining and exercising fallback arrangements for the most essential functions is one of the most cost-effective resilience measures available.

14Methods and data

How the evidence is built, and its limits.

  1. 01

    Service level data

    Availability and performance records. Public reporting by government services is uneven.

  2. 02

    Incident reviews

    Post-incident reports show causes and lessons. Blame-free review encourages candour.

  3. 03

    Exercises

    Simulated outages and cyber incidents test plans. Digital service continuity is the platform's Universe theme.

  4. 04

    Dependency mapping

    Maps of shared components and their failure impact, applying cybersecurity and cryptography and high-performance, cloud and edge computing.

16Where this page's references

या पानाचे संदर्भ कुठे नेतात.

हे पान ज्या संस्था आणि दस्तऐवजांच्या आधारे वाचले जाते. स्थिती आणि आवृत्त्या बदलतात; प्रत्येक दुवा जारी करणाऱ्या संस्थेकडे जातो.

17प्रश्न

प्रश्न आणि उत्तरे.

What is graceful degradation in public services?
Designing services so that, when parts fail, essential functions continue in a reduced form, such as offline verification or manual processing.
Why do shared components matter?
Because when many services depend on one identity, payment or hosting component, its failure disrupts all of them at once.
How are digital services tested for surges?
Through load and stress testing that simulates peak demand, combined with capacity plans for crisis periods.
What is graceful degradation?
Designing a service so that, when part of it fails, essential functions continue at a reduced level instead of the whole service stopping.
Why do many outages follow updates?
Because changes introduce errors or unexpected interactions. Staged rollout, testing and quick rollback reduce the risk.
Is the platform an operator of public services?
No. It studies resilience and does not operate, monitor or support any live service.
Are demand surges a resilience issue?
Yes. Emergencies often create sudden demand for digital services, such as benefit applications, which can overwhelm systems sized for normal use.
अहवालयोगदान द्या

या पानावरून पुरावा योगदान द्या.

Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

GCRIडिजिटल सार्वजनिक पायाभूत सुविधाधोरणात्मक प्रणालीघातांकी तंत्रज्ञान

वैयक्तिक डेटा, संवेदनशील पायाभूत सुविधांचा तपशील किंवा सामायिक करण्याचा तुम्हाला अधिकार नसलेले काहीही कधीही पाठवू नका. योगदानाचे वापरापूर्वी पुनरावलोकन केले जाते; ते पाठवल्याने कोणतेही लेखकत्व किंवा संपादकीय अधिकार मिळत नाहीत, आणि प्रायोजकत्वाने कधीही निष्कर्ष विकत घेता येत नाही.

डिजिटल सार्वजनिक पायाभूत सुविधा

Bring a method, a dataset or a question.

Information and enquiries are open today. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.

कायदेशीर

या साइटवरील नकाशे, डेटा आणि आकृत्या संदर्भ आणि सर्वसाधारण माहितीसाठी दाखवल्या आहेत. त्या सल्ला, अंदाज किंवा इशारे नाहीत; माहितीच्या मर्यादा अस्वीकरणे आणि डेटा सूचनांमध्ये नमूद केल्या आहेत.