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GCRI · Health Nexus

Health system continuity

A health system keeps working through a shock when its staff, power, water, medicines, data and referral routes hold together long enough for essential care to continue. Continuity fails at the weakest of these dependencies, often far from the hazard itself. This page sets out how disruption develops and propagates through services, how continuity is measured, and what the evidence serves for the institutions that must keep care running.

01Register

Health system continuity on the record.

02The question

Health system continuity: how the risk develops.

Hospitals, staff, power and essential services. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Dependencies fail in sequence

A facility depends on grid power, piped water, medical oxygen, fuel, communications and supply deliveries. Losing one rarely stops care at once: generators, stored water and buffer stock buy time, and the binding constraint is whichever buffer runs out first.

Mechanism

The workforce is the first buffer

Staff absorb surges through overtime, redeployment and task shifting, but illness, displacement, caring duties and unpaid salaries erode that capacity. A system that loses staff loses services even when its buildings and supplies are intact.

Mechanism

Essential services are crowded out

During an epidemic or disaster, routine immunisation, maternal care, chronic disease management and mental health services are deferred or abandoned. The indirect harm from interrupted care appears later than the direct harm of the shock and is counted less often.

Mechanism

Disruption compounds across shocks

A system still recovering from one event meets the next with depleted staff, stock and finance. Heat during an outbreak, or conflict during a flood, stacks the pressures, and recovery lengthens with each overlapping shock.

03Geography

Environmental exposure in Africa.

Population density, daytime surface heat and haze over Africa, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.

Die interaktiewe kaart benodig JavaScript; die laaglys en bronne is hieronder.

Lae 3

Environmental exposure, for this page

Oor hierdie laag
Bewyse
Geskat
Bron
Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia-universiteit))
Verskaffer
NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia-universiteit)
Lisensie
CC BY 4.0
Oesjaar
null; Sensusgebaseerde skatting, staties (2020)
Resolusie
ongeveer 1 km-rooster
Onsekerheid
Sensusgebaseerde skatting van mense per vierkante kilometer in 2020, getoon as blootstellingskonteks; nie ’n telling van mense wat deur enige gevaar geraak word nie.
Bereik deur
hierdie werf se data-aanstuurder, vanaf gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Oor hierdie laag
Bewyse
Waargeneem (aanhoudende wolke laat steeds gapings)
Bron
VIIRS NOAA-20 Vlak 3, 8-dag (NASA LANCE)
Verskaffer
NASA LANCE
Lisensie
NASA-oopdata
Oesjaar
8-dag; Satelliet-8-dag-samestelling; aanhoudende wolke laat steeds gapings
Nuutste by bou
2026-09-14
Resolusie
ongeveer 1 km-rooster
Onsekerheid
Satelliet-oppervlaktemperatuur van die grond oor die 8 dae wat op die getoonde datum eindig, ’n aanwyser van hitteblootstelling; nie lugtemperatuur, hitte-indeks of ’n hittewaarskuwing nie.
Bereik deur
hierdie werf se data-aanstuurder, vanaf gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Oor hierdie laag
Bewyse
Waargeneem (wolke laat gapings)
Bron
VIIRS NOAA-20 Deep Blue AOD (NASA LANCE)
Verskaffer
NASA LANCE
Lisensie
NASA-oopdata
Oesjaar
daagliks; Satellietherwinning; wolke laat gapings
Nuutste by bou
2026-10-14
Resolusie
ongeveer 2 km-rooster
Onsekerheid
Satellietmeting van waas, rook en stof deur die hele lugkolom op die getoonde dag; ’n blootstellingsaanwyser, nie PM2.5 op grondvlak, ’n luggehalte-indeks of ’n gesondheidswaarskuwing nie.
Bereik deur
hierdie werf se data-aanstuurder, vanaf gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Oor hierdie laag
Bewyse
Waargeneem
Bron
VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance (NASA LANCE)
Verskaffer
NASA LANCE
Lisensie
NASA-oopdata
Oesjaar
daily; Satellite image
Nuutste by bou
2026-10-14
Resolusie
ongeveer 250 m-rooster
Onsekerheid
Satellite image. Satellite or model raster as the provider publishes it. Clouds, swath gaps and retrieval error leave gaps and noise; values are indicators, not measurements at a place.
Bereik deur
hierdie werf se data-aanstuurder, vanaf gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Oor hierdie laag
Bewyse
Modelled (latest year GIBS publishes)
Bron
MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1) (NASA LP DAAC)
Verskaffer
NASA LP DAAC
Lisensie
NASA-oopdata
Oesjaar
yearly; Satellite classification; latest year GIBS publishes
Nuutste by bou
2024-01-01
Resolusie
ongeveer 500 m-rooster
Onsekerheid
Satellite land cover classes for the year shown, including croplands; a classification with known errors, not a farm register.
Bereik deur
hierdie werf se data-aanstuurder, vanaf gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov
Oor hierdie laag
Bewyse
Waargeneem
Bron
VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2) (NASA LAADS DAAC)
Verskaffer
NASA LAADS DAAC
Lisensie
NASA-oopdata
Oesjaar
daagliks; Satellietstraling, gekorrigeer vir maanlig en atmosfeer
Nuutste by bou
2026-10-12
Resolusie
ongeveer 500 m-rooster
Onsekerheid
Satelliet-nagstraling vir die getoonde datum; ligte is ’n benadering van elektrisiteitsgebruik en onderbrekings, nie ’n meting van voorsiening of toegang nie.
Bereik deur
hierdie werf se data-aanstuurder, vanaf gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov

Nuutste beskikbaar

NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap-bydraers (ODbL) · Natural Earth

Laai tans die nuutste NASA-beelde.

Sleep om te skuif. Ctrl of ⌘ en rol, knyp of die knoppies om te zoem; sweef vir die waardes onder die wyser; terugstel keer terug na die streek.

Environmental exposure, framed on Africa.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.

Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERTSources and licences

  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
  • VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS and VIIRS atmosphere products, NASA LANCE and LAADS DAAC; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
  • Gemaak met Natural Earth. Gratis vektor- en rasterkaartdata @ naturalearthdata.com. Openbare domein
  • © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
  • Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Konteks op die aardbol en platkaart: kuslyne, grense, paaie en plekname uit NASA GIBS-verwysingslae (OpenStreetMap-data, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap contributors); Blue Marble-beelde as 'n opsionele basis; 3D-terrein en die hoogte-aflesing vanaf die ASTER GDEM-hoogtekleurindeks (klasse van 5 m tot 200 m, vir leesbaarheid oordryf). Grense word geteken soos gepubliseer en impliseer geen standpunt oor enige gebied nie.
  • Lewende gebeure: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); gebeure is aanduidend en behou hul oorspronklike bronskakels.
  • Lewend: NASA EONET. Gebeure is aanduidend, nie owerheidswaarskuwings nie.
  • Observed (EO): NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERT (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • NASA GIBS: Ons erken die gebruik van beelde verskaf deur dienste van NASA se Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), deel van NASA se Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • Air quality forecast, 5 days, PM2.5 (CAMS via Open-Meteo): Contains modified Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service information 2026.
  • Past year, daily temperature (ERA5 via Open-Meteo): Contains modified Copernicus Climate Change Service information 2026.
  • Weerdata deur Open-Meteo.com (https://open-meteo.com/), gelisensieer onder CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
  • Optional layers (14 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.

Lae en datums

  • Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
  • Landoppervlaktemperatuur, dag, 8-dae-saamgestelde beeld: VIIRS NOAA-20 Level 3, 8-dae, NASA LANCE · 14 Sep. 2026
  • Aërosol-optiese diepte, daagliks: VIIRS NOAA-20 Deep Blue AOD, NASA LANCE · 13 Oktober 2026
  • Ware kleur: VIIRS NOAA-20 gekorrigeerde weerkaatsing, NASA LANCE · 13 Oktober 2026
  • Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024
  • Naglig, daagliks: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Okt. 2026

04Couplings

Health services keep running only if their inputs do.

DomainHow it couples hereWhat to watch
EnergiePower for theatres, intensive care, oxygen and cold chains. See grid disruption and recovery.Backup autonomy in hours; facilities without reliable electricity
WaterSafe water for clinical care, sterilisation and dialysis. See water utilities.Water storage at facilities in days of use
VoedselNutrition for inpatients and therapeutic feeding programmes.Supply interruptions of therapeutic foods
BiodiversiteitMedicinal resources and disease ecology shift with ecosystem change.Vector range change near facilities

WHO’s Health Emergency and Disaster Risk Management Framework (2019) and its operational framework for climate resilient and low carbon health systems (2023) describe continuity as a property of the whole system: workforce, supplies, facilities, information and finance. Continuity is measured by service volumes against baseline, for example essential services tracked during the COVID-19 pandemic.

05Monitor

Surveillance and capacity board.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

Surveillance and capacity board: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Health system continuity.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
06Reports, standards and contributions

Continuity evidence and contributions.

Continuity analyses are designed for the Country Quarterly series. Decisions on health services stay with ministries of health and providers; the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) assesses no facility. Service-volume series would carry NS-3 identifiers under the proposed Nexus Standards, using aggregated data only.

  • Service disruption records from past emergencies.
  • Facility continuity plans and their exercise results.
  • Workforce absence data during shocks, aggregated.
07Twin and cascade simulator

Model health system continuity as a system. Run the cascade.

Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Health security and One Health: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.

Gevare

Controls

  • NS-0 Grondwet en beginsels
  • NS-3 Risikorekord-UNI's (grammatika, oorerflike kruisverwysing, toewysingsgesag)
  • NS-9 Kontekstuele UNI's (ontplooiings, instansies, programinstansies)
  • NS-10 Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)
  • NS-11 Verifikasie en monitering (getuienis, attestasies, zero-trust-ooreenstemmingwaarneming)
  • NRS-H83 Hazard family: Health system capacity failure (NHS-1 health.system)
  • NRS-H42 Hazard family: Rare and persistent human infections (NHS-1 health.other-human)
  • NRS-H41 Hazard family: Animal-to-human spillover (NHS-1 health.zoonotic)
  • NRS-H43 Hazard family: Livestock and aquaculture epizootics (NHS-1 health.animal-health)
  • NRS-D3 Humanitarian response and resilient recovery
  • NRS-H46 Hazard family: Environmental and product harm to people (NHS-1 health.harm)

Observation

  • WHO Disease Outbreak News (listed for reference)
  • WAHIS animal health events (listed for reference)
  • WorldPop gridded population (listed for reference)
  • International Health Regulations capacity and health emergency preparedness
  • Percentage of bloodstream infections due to selected antimicrobial-resistant organisms

Example geography

  • West Africa: 59 hexagonal cells
  • Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
  • Surface water through cloud, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
  • Rain rate, last half hour (IMERG), NASA GIBS
08Aanwysers

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Essential health service disruptionpercent of tracer services reported disruptedper survey roundKey informant national and facility surveysREPORTED
Routine service volume against expectedratio of observed to expected visitsmonthlyRoutine health information systems such as DHIS2ESTIMATED
Facilities with reliable electricity and waterpercent of facilitiesper assessmentFacility surveys such as SARA and SPAOBSERVED
Backup power and water endurancehours of autonomous operationper facilityFacility asset registersPublished statistics
Health worker densitydoctors, nurses and midwives per ten thousand populationannualNational health workforce accountsPublished statistics
Unfilled shiftspercent of rostered shifts unfilledweeklyHospital human resources recordsOBSERVED
Tracer medicine stock-outpercent of facilities reporting a stock-outmonthlyLogistics management information systemsREPORTED
Bed occupancy and surge capacitypercent occupied; additional beds deployabledailyHospital bed management systemsOBSERVED
09Sector signature

The sector signature of health system continuity.

The sectors health system continuity touches and how strongly they depend on each other: what a study has to observe and model together.

Select corners · hover lines6 / 15 relations

Signature

Health and its partners

Health gives workforce for operations to infrastructure (0.3), farm labour to food (0.3) and utility workforce to water (0.2).

W · E · I · F · H · B

Sektore
4 of 6
Verhoudings
6 of 15
Koppeling
0.42 share of total

Strongest relations in play

  • Water → Food · irrigation0.8
  • Food → Health · nutrition0.7
  • Infrastructure → Water · pipes, dams and treatment works0.6
  • Water → Health · drinking water and sanitation0.7
Teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements for any place. Coupling is the summed strength of the relations in play, as a share of all fifteen.
10Bronne

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

BronWhat it givesLicence class
WHO pulse surveys on continuity of essential health servicesNational reports of service disruption, its causes and mitigation across tracer servicesPublished records, WHO terms of use
DHIS2 national health information systemsRoutine facility reporting of service volumes, stock and workforceBy agreement with each ministry of health
WHO SARA and DHS Service Provision Assessment surveysFacility readiness: power, water, equipment, staff, diagnostics and medicinesTerms per survey programme
WHO National Health Workforce AccountsHealth workforce stock, distribution and flows by cadreOpen, attribution, WHO terms of use
WHO HeRAMSFunctionality, accessibility and service availability of facilities in emergenciesBy agreement; public summaries
WHO Global Health Expenditure DatabaseHealth spending by source of financing and functionOpen, attribution, WHO terms of use
11Methods and evidence

How health system continuity is modelled, measured and tested.

The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.

System model

The couplings between the systems in health system continuity: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.

++−GesondheidGemeenskappeEkonomieR reinforcingB balancing
Causal loop diagram from the page’s systems; signs show the direction of influence. Illustrative structure for a system dynamics or network model, not estimated couplings.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
12Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Health Nexus prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Wie besluitThe questionEvidence this page serves
Ministries of healthWhich essential services must be protected first in a shock, and with what reserve capacityTracer-service disruption patterns; dependency maps; workforce and stock buffers by district
Hospital boards and managersWhere to invest first: backup power, water storage, oxygen supply or surge staffingEndurance hours by dependency; stress tests by facility and scenario
Finance ministries and development partnersHow much contingency financing keeps services running, and how fast it must flowContinuity scenarios with service losses stated apart from the direct impacts of the shock
WHO regional offices and national public health institutesWhere to deploy surge teams and supplies when several countries are affected at onceComparable continuity evidence across countries, with reporting completeness labelled

Outputs this topic produces

  • Dependency maps of facilities on power, water, oxygen, staff and supplies
  • Continuity stress tests for outbreak, heat, flood and outage scenarios
  • Expected-against-observed service tracking with reporting completeness stated
  • Health-system resilience briefs prepared for review by ministries
13Core questions

What experts ask.

Continuity starts from services, not buildings.

  • Which services are essential, and for how long can each be interrupted before harm occurs?
  • What does each essential service depend on, including dependencies outside the health sector?
  • How long can backup power, water storage, oxygen and medicine stocks sustain operations?
  • Can enough staff reach the facility and work safely during the event?
  • How do neighbouring facilities absorb diverted patients, and what happens when they are affected too?
14Mechanisms

Mechanisms and drivers.

Hospitals are designed with redundancy, but redundancy is usually sized for single failures of limited duration. Extended or compound events, such as a regional outage during a heatwave, can exhaust backup fuel, overheat equipment and wards, and coincide with a surge in patients. Small dependencies with no substitute, such as a single medical gas supplier or a laboratory information system, can halt whole departments.

Workforce is often the binding constraint. Staff are themselves affected by the event, may be unable to travel, and fatigue quickly under surge conditions. Continuity also degrades gradually rather than failing outright: elective activity is cancelled first, then standards of care are adjusted, and harm accumulates among patients whose treatment is delayed.

15Methods and data

How it is studied, and where the methods stop.

Method or dataWhat it showsLimits
Facility dependency mappingWhich services rely on which utilities, suppliers and systemsDepends on accurate internal data that facilities may not hold or share
Business impact and maximum tolerable outage analysisHow long each service can be interruptedTolerances are judgements and vary with case mix
Exercises and after-action reviewsHow plans perform with real peopleExercises rarely test long or compound disruptions
Discrete-event and agent-based simulationQueues, bed occupancy and staff load under surgeResults are sensitive to behavioural assumptions
Routine activity and outcome dataDeferred care and excess harm after eventsAttribution to the disruption needs careful causal design
16Metodes

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Epidemiology and public health scienceSurveillance design and evaluation · Nowcasting under reporting delayApplied here
  2. Complex systems and agent-based modellingContact and mobility networks · Cascades across health and infrastructureApplied here
  3. Probability and statisticsSurvey-weighted and small-area estimation · Expected baselines for excess mortalityApplied here
  4. Data engineering, interoperability and stewardshipLinking health information systems · Privacy-preserving publicationApplied here
  5. Causal inference and impact evaluationEvaluating public health measures · Exposure-response for heat and airApplied here
19Vrae

Questions and answers.

What is an essential health service?
A service a population needs continuously whatever the shock, such as immunisation, maternal and newborn care, emergency care and management of chronic conditions. Countries define their own lists, often drawing on WHO guidance on maintaining essential services.
Why measure the indirect effects of a shock?
Because people harmed by interrupted care rarely appear in emergency statistics. Comparing observed with expected service use and outcomes makes that indirect harm visible, with the uncertainty of the baseline stated.
How long can a hospital run without grid power?
As long as its fuel, its generators and the loads they must carry allow, and that differs by facility. The endurance figure belongs in the asset register and in every continuity test.
Does Health Nexus tell hospitals what to do?
No. It prepares evidence on dependencies and continuity that ministries, hospital boards and emergency agencies can use under their own mandates and procedures.
Is continuity the same as emergency preparedness?
They overlap. Preparedness covers the response to an emergency; continuity focuses on keeping routine essential services running through it, including care unrelated to the emergency itself.
Does Health Nexus assess individual hospitals?
Not at this service level. Facility assessments would only take place under a mandate from the facility or competent authority, with data terms agreed in advance. Published work is aggregated or uses public information.
Which services are usually treated as essential?
Emergency care, intensive care, maternity, dialysis, oncology treatment, mental health crisis care and the diagnostics and pharmacy services that support them are commonly prioritised, though each health system defines its own list.
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Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

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