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Systems and sectors at baseline

6 min read0 figures2 tables13 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Cryptography is infrastructure under change
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
    1. 3.1 Where each system stood at evidence close
    2. 3.2 Domain posture
    3. 3.3 Sector screens
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Signature lag while key agreement migrates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMetodologie
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

DAT · Cryptography

Post-quantum standards finalised by NIST

3standaarde

FIPS 203, 204 and 205.

Reported2024NIST123

DAT · Resource estimate

RSA-2048 noisy-qubit estimate

<1million qubits

under a week, under stated assumptions.

Reported2025preprint22

INF · Deployment

Share of human traffic on one network using post-quantum key agreement

>50%

vendor measurement, late October 2025.

Reported2025Cloudflare23

INF · Threat

Complaints received by the FBI

859,532complaints

USD 16.6 billion of reported losses.

Reported2024FBI IC315

FIN · Finance

Global average cost of a data breach

4.99USD million

vendor study, up 12%.

Reported2026IBM18

INF · Exploitation

Vulnerabilities in the CISA KEV catalogue

NOT BOUNDentries

count at the 30 September close not bound; the 3 November read is post-close, context only.

Not bound2026CISA

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through cybersecurity and cryptography, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries cybersecurity and cryptography risk into each domain.

Table 3.1Each domain read in words, not scored
DomainPosture at baselineKoppelingStatus
WATWater utilities are among critical infrastructure sectors that report incidents; no sector figure is bound here.INF → WATExpert input EQL 1
ENERouter and edge-device compromise in telecom and transport networks shows exposure; energy-specific figures are not bound.INF → ENEExpert input EQL 1
FOONo documented coupling at baseline in the sources read.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
HLTHealth records are long-lived and exposed to later decryption; no figure is bound here.DAT → HLTExpert input EQL 1
BIONo documented coupling at baseline in the sources read.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
CLIEnergy and bandwidth cost of larger cryptographic objects is stated for one network only23; no climate figure is bound.INF → CLIExpert input EQL 1
INFThe core system: three standards finalised, hybrid key agreement widely deployed, signatures lagging, known vulnerabilities exploited.the core systemReported EQL 4
FINAverage breach cost USD 4.99 million in 2026; ransomware payments above USD 820 million in 2025; both vendor estimates.FIN ↔ INFReported EQL 2
DATLong-lived data face later decryption; migration is a planning task now.INF → DATReported EQL 4
AICNo documented coupling to other compute platforms is bound here; automated attack tooling claims are not evidenced in this edition.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
MINNo documented coupling at baseline; module and chip supply is not bound.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
TRDRegulation and reporting duties set by the EU and the US cross borders; export-control effects on cryptography are not bound.GOV ↔ TRDInferred EQL 2

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on cybersecurity and cryptography, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Table 3.2Sectors: baseline evidence and the exposure to watch
CodeSectorBaseline evidenceExposure to watchEvidence coverage
GS-00Cross-systemcryptography underlies every sectorsignature and device lagTHIN
GS-01Watersector figures not boundoperational technology exposureTHIN
GS-02Energierouter and edge exposure shown in advisories14grid control networksTHIN
GS-03Voedselno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-04Gesondheidlong-lived records; no figure boundransomware and data breachTHIN
GS-05Finansiesbreach and ransomware costs from vendors1819migration costPARTIAL
GS-06Ontwikkelingaccess to tools and skillswidening gapsTHIN
GS-07Klimaatno figure boundnone documentedTHIN
GS-08Disasterno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-09Infrastruktuurcritical infrastructure complaints reported15edge devicesPARTIAL
GS-10Stedeno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-11Biodiversiteitno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-12Aardwaarnemingno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-13Kuber en digitaalstandards, deployment and threat evidence11323migration lagGOOD
GS-14BeleidNCSC, NIST draft and EU timelines101144divergent datesPARTIAL
GS-15Wetenskapresource estimate and standards process221common benchmarksPARTIAL

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

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Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 3: Systems and sectors at baseline. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

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