Systems and sectors at baseline
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Cryptography is infrastructure under change
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Signature lag while key agreement migrates
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
3.1Where each system stood at evidence close
DAT · Cryptography
Post-quantum standards finalised by NIST
3standardsFIPS 203, 204 and 205.
DAT · Resource estimate
RSA-2048 noisy-qubit estimate
<1million qubitsunder a week, under stated assumptions.
Reported2025preprint22
INF · Deployment
Share of human traffic on one network using post-quantum key agreement
>50%vendor measurement, late October 2025.
Reported2025Cloudflare23
INF · Threat
Complaints received by the FBI
859,532complaintsUSD 16.6 billion of reported losses.
Reported2024FBI IC315
FIN · Finance
Global average cost of a data breach
4.99USD millionvendor study, up 12%.
Reported2026IBM18
INF · Exploitation
Vulnerabilities in the CISA KEV catalogue
NOT BOUNDentriescount at the 30 September close not bound; the 3 November read is post-close, context only.
Not bound2026CISA
3.2Domain posture
Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through cybersecurity and cryptography, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries cybersecurity and cryptography risk into each domain.
| Domain | Posture at baseline | Coupling | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| WAT | Water utilities are among critical infrastructure sectors that report incidents; no sector figure is bound here. | INF → WAT | Expert input EQL 1 |
| ENE | Router and edge-device compromise in telecom and transport networks shows exposure; energy-specific figures are not bound. | INF → ENE | Expert input EQL 1 |
| FOO | No documented coupling at baseline in the sources read. | none documented | Expert input EQL 1 |
| HLT | Health records are long-lived and exposed to later decryption; no figure is bound here. | DAT → HLT | Expert input EQL 1 |
| BIO | No documented coupling at baseline in the sources read. | none documented | Expert input EQL 1 |
| CLI | Energy and bandwidth cost of larger cryptographic objects is stated for one network only23; no climate figure is bound. | INF → CLI | Expert input EQL 1 |
| INF | The core system: three standards finalised, hybrid key agreement widely deployed, signatures lagging, known vulnerabilities exploited. | the core system | Reported EQL 4 |
| FIN | Average breach cost USD 4.99 million in 2026; ransomware payments above USD 820 million in 2025; both vendor estimates. | FIN ↔ INF | Reported EQL 2 |
| DAT | Long-lived data face later decryption; migration is a planning task now. | INF → DAT | Reported EQL 4 |
| AIC | No documented coupling to other compute platforms is bound here; automated attack tooling claims are not evidenced in this edition. | none documented | Expert input EQL 1 |
| MIN | No documented coupling at baseline; module and chip supply is not bound. | none documented | Expert input EQL 1 |
| TRD | Regulation and reporting duties set by the EU and the US cross borders; export-control effects on cryptography are not bound. | GOV ↔ TRD | Inferred EQL 2 |
3.3Sector screens
All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on cybersecurity and cryptography, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.
| Code | Sector | Baseline evidence | Exposure to watch | Evidence coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GS-00 | Cross-system | cryptography underlies every sector | signature and device lag | THIN |
| GS-01 | Water | sector figures not bound | operational technology exposure | THIN |
| GS-02 | Energy | router and edge exposure shown in advisories14 | grid control networks | THIN |
| GS-03 | Food | no documented coupling | none documented | THIN |
| GS-04 | Health | long-lived records; no figure bound | ransomware and data breach | THIN |
| GS-05 | Finance | breach and ransomware costs from vendors1819 | migration cost | PARTIAL |
| GS-06 | Development | access to tools and skills | widening gaps | THIN |
| GS-07 | Climate | no figure bound | none documented | THIN |
| GS-08 | Disaster | no documented coupling | none documented | THIN |
| GS-09 | Infrastructure | critical infrastructure complaints reported15 | edge devices | PARTIAL |
| GS-10 | Cities | no documented coupling | none documented | THIN |
| GS-11 | Biodiversity | no documented coupling | none documented | THIN |
| GS-12 | Earth observation | no documented coupling | none documented | THIN |
| GS-13 | Cyber and digital | standards, deployment and threat evidence11323 | migration lag | GOOD |
| GS-14 | Policy | NCSC, NIST draft and EU timelines101144 | divergent dates | PARTIAL |
| GS-15 | Science | resource estimate and standards process221 | common benchmarks | PARTIAL |
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back