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Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

8 min read0 figures5 tables16 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Lifelines fail together
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
    1. 8.1 Common causes
    2. 8.2 Domino effects
    3. 8.3 Inter-systemic feedbacks
    4. 8.4 Shared vulnerabilities
    5. 8.5 Thresholds and tipping
  11. Aপদ্ধতি
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

8.1Common causes

One cause can strike many lifelines at once: a hazard, a cyber campaign, a war or a faulty update. The shared cause matters more than the sector.

4,875incidents

analysed by ENISA, Jul 2024 to Jun 20253

≥5years

longest reported intrusion persistence2

>250USD billion

annual loss to infrastructure, three hazards10

Table 8.1Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionপ্রমাণঅবস্থা
Natural hazardsfloods, cyclones and earthquakes drive large annual losses to infrastructure10Reported
Cyber operationspre-positioning reported in four sectors23Reported
সংঘাতdirect strikes on power and water plants1213Reported
Software faultsone update reached millions of devices4Reported

Pathways in this mechanism

  • CLI → INF hazards
  • DAT → INF software and cyber
  • CON → INF strikes

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • common cause tagging of incidents
  • frequency of concurrent causes

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.2Domino effects

A failure in one lifeline removes an input from the next. Power outages reach water works, exchanges and hospitals in sequence.

28April 2025

Iberian blackout1

8.5million

Windows devices affected, 18 July 20244

≥90%

of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar (90 to 99)13

Table 8.2Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionপ্রমাণঅবস্থা
Power to telecomsexchanges run on batteries and generators after grid loss1Inferred
Software to servicesone vendor update disabled many operators’ machines4Reported
Power to waterco-located plants lose both services when struck13Reported
Water to healthhospital supply depends on water works11Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • ENE → INF → WAT, HLT
  • DAT → INF → FIN
  • CON → ENE, WAT

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • sequence timing of service loss
  • hospital-level dependence data

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.3Inter-systemic feedbacks

Lifelines also depend on what they power. Control networks need telecoms, telecoms need power, and digital loads press back on grids.

≈50%

of US electricity demand growth from data centres, 20259

≈45%

of US data-centre capacity in five clusters (nearly half)8

57%

of survey respondents reported a latest major outage above USD 100,00014

Table 8.3Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionপ্রমাণঅবস্থা
Digital load to gridclustered demand tightens local grids89Reported
Grid to digitaldata centres need continuous power14Inferred
Remote controlcontrol networks need telecoms and power5Inferred
Financial feedbacklosses feed budgets and delay maintenance11Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • AIC → ENE
  • ENE → AIC → INF
  • DAT ↔ INF

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • control-network dependence data
  • cluster-level reliability

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.4Shared vulnerabilities

Different lifelines share the same weak points: subsea cables, widely deployed software, ageing assets and a few repair resources.

199faults a year

subsea cable average, 2010 to 20237

≈2/3

of faults from fishing and transport vessels7

3.6USD trillion

US ten-year investment gap6

Table 8.4Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionপ্রমাণঅবস্থা
Subsea cablesfrequent, mostly accidental faults; few repair ships715Reported
Common softwarea shared platform spreads one fault widely4Reported
Ageing assetsenergy D+, wastewater D+, dams D+ in the US6Reported
Positioning and timingsignals underpin networks; no consolidated series here8Expert input

Pathways in this mechanism

  • INF → DAT cable loss
  • DAT → INF software
  • INF → FIN deferred maintenance

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • repair-vessel capacity by region
  • dependence on positioning and timing

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.5Thresholds and tipping

A system can absorb stress until a threshold is crossed. Black-start capability, repair capacity and recovery finance are such thresholds for lifelines.

587.7USD billion

Ukraine recovery needs over ten years12

24.8USD billion

direct damage, energy and extractives, to end 202512

≈4USD per USD 1

reported return on resilient options in LMICs11

Table 8.5Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in actionপ্রমাণঅবস্থা
Restoration capacityservice returned after 2024 and 2025 events; times not consolidated14Reported
Repair capacityageing repair fleet15Reported
Recovery financeneeds far exceed damage recorded to date12Reported
Tipping in networkscascades can become abrupt in interdependent networks29Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • INF → INF cascade thresholds
  • FIN → INF recovery finance
  • CON → INF repeated damage

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • black-start capability data
  • cascade thresholds at operating scale

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  4. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back

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Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 8: Systems in depth. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

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Sector signature

The sectors behind Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

Select corners · hover lines6 / 15 relations

প্রেক্ষাপট

Infrastructure and its partners

Infrastructure gives pipes, dams and treatment works to water (0.6), transmission and fuel logistics to energy (0.6) and access to care to health (0.5).

W · E · I · F · H · B

খাত
4 6টির মধ্যে
সম্পর্ক
6 15টির মধ্যে
সংযোগ
0.46 মোটের অংশ

Strongest relations in play

  • Energy → Infrastructure · power for transport and telecoms0.8
  • Water → Energy · cooling water and hydropower0.6
  • Infrastructure → Water · pipes, dams and treatment works0.6
  • Water → Health · drinking water and sanitation0.7
Teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements for any place. Coupling is the summed strength of the relations in play, as a share of all fifteen.
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