Systems in depth
One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.
İçindekiler
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Lifelines fail together
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMetodoloji
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
8.1Common causes
One cause can strike many lifelines at once: a hazard, a cyber campaign, a war or a faulty update. The shared cause matters more than the sector.
| Instance | Mechanism in action | Kanıt | Durum |
|---|---|---|---|
| Natural hazards | floods, cyclones and earthquakes drive large annual losses to infrastructure | 10 | Bildirilen |
| Cyber operations | pre-positioning reported in four sectors | 23 | Bildirilen |
| Çatışma | direct strikes on power and water plants | 1213 | Bildirilen |
| Software faults | one update reached millions of devices | 4 | Bildirilen |
Pathways in this mechanism
- CLI → INF hazards
- DAT → INF software and cyber
- CON → INF strikes
Evidence to bind in 2027
- common cause tagging of incidents
- frequency of concurrent causes
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
- SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
8.2Domino effects
A failure in one lifeline removes an input from the next. Power outages reach water works, exchanges and hospitals in sequence.
| Instance | Mechanism in action | Kanıt | Durum |
|---|---|---|---|
| Power to telecoms | exchanges run on batteries and generators after grid loss | 1 | Inferred |
| Software to services | one vendor update disabled many operators’ machines | 4 | Bildirilen |
| Power to water | co-located plants lose both services when struck | 13 | Bildirilen |
| Water to health | hospital supply depends on water works | 11 | Inferred |
Pathways in this mechanism
- ENE → INF → WAT, HLT
- DAT → INF → FIN
- CON → ENE, WAT
Evidence to bind in 2027
- sequence timing of service loss
- hospital-level dependence data
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
- SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
8.3Inter-systemic feedbacks
Lifelines also depend on what they power. Control networks need telecoms, telecoms need power, and digital loads press back on grids.
| Instance | Mechanism in action | Kanıt | Durum |
|---|---|---|---|
| Digital load to grid | clustered demand tightens local grids | 89 | Bildirilen |
| Grid to digital | data centres need continuous power | 14 | Inferred |
| Remote control | control networks need telecoms and power | 5 | Inferred |
| Financial feedback | losses feed budgets and delay maintenance | 11 | Inferred |
Pathways in this mechanism
- AIC → ENE
- ENE → AIC → INF
- DAT ↔ INF
Evidence to bind in 2027
- control-network dependence data
- cluster-level reliability
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
- SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
8.4Shared vulnerabilities
Different lifelines share the same weak points: subsea cables, widely deployed software, ageing assets and a few repair resources.
of faults from fishing and transport vessels7
| Instance | Mechanism in action | Kanıt | Durum |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subsea cables | frequent, mostly accidental faults; few repair ships | 715 | Bildirilen |
| Common software | a shared platform spreads one fault widely | 4 | Bildirilen |
| Ageing assets | energy D+, wastewater D+, dams D+ in the US | 6 | Bildirilen |
| Positioning and timing | signals underpin networks; no consolidated series here | 8 | Expert input |
Pathways in this mechanism
- INF → DAT cable loss
- DAT → INF software
- INF → FIN deferred maintenance
Evidence to bind in 2027
- repair-vessel capacity by region
- dependence on positioning and timing
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
- SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
8.5Thresholds and tipping
A system can absorb stress until a threshold is crossed. Black-start capability, repair capacity and recovery finance are such thresholds for lifelines.
| Instance | Mechanism in action | Kanıt | Durum |
|---|---|---|---|
| Restoration capacity | service returned after 2024 and 2025 events; times not consolidated | 14 | Bildirilen |
| Repair capacity | ageing repair fleet | 15 | Bildirilen |
| Recovery finance | needs far exceed damage recorded to date | 12 | Bildirilen |
| Tipping in networks | cascades can become abrupt in interdependent networks | 29 | Inferred |
Pathways in this mechanism
- INF → INF cascade thresholds
- FIN → INF recovery finance
- CON → INF repeated damage
Evidence to bind in 2027
- black-start capability data
- cascade thresholds at operating scale
Related editions
- GLB Global Systems
- SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
- SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
- SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
- GS-02 Energy
- GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
- 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back