- Quantum Technologies 2026
- Chapter 1
Quantum is infrastructure and a cryptographic deadline
Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.
ناوەڕۆک
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Quantum is infrastructure and a cryptographic deadline
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Long-lived data exposure while migration is slow
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- Aمیتۆدۆلۆژی
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
1.1The questions this part answers
Key questions
- Where is quantum risk concentrated?
- Which couplings carry quantum shocks into other systems?
- Which quantum capabilities hold under compound stress?
- What must 2027 evidence measure first?
In this part
- Narrative
- Headline finding
- Lead figure
- Five footprint and governance chapters
- Twelve-domain reading
- Sector screens
- Dependency matrix
- Risk objects
- Capability ladder
- سیناریۆ
- Three lenses
- پۆرتفۆلیۆ
1.2The argument
Quantum technology is usually discussed as a computing race. The 2026 evidence reads it as two things at once: a physical infrastructure that needs refrigerators, helium, materials and people, and a deadline-setting force for the cryptography that protects every other infrastructure8103.
The hardware evidence is strong at small scale. A surface code on 101 qubits cut logical error by a factor of 2.14 for each step up in code distance2. IBM states a plan for 200 logical qubits and 100 million gates in 20298. These are results and plans, not a machine of useful size.
The cryptographic evidence is practical. A 2025 preprint lowered the estimated qubits for RSA-2048 to under a million, under stated assumptions1. NIST finalised three post-quantum standards in 20243, and the EU asked Member States to define roadmaps by the end of 202615. Data that must stay secret for decades is the first exposure.
The physical base is the least measured part. Helium markets were disrupted in 202610, the energy and water footprint of useful machines is not published, and a peer-reviewed estimate finds classical methods can be more energy-efficient for some problems9.
The estimated number of noisy qubits fell by about a factor of twenty between two estimates by the same author, while the assumed run time grew from hours to days. The estimates rest on stated error and cycle-time assumptions and are not forecasts127.
| بابەت | Bar, scaled to the largest value | بەها |
|---|---|---|
| 2021 estimate: about 20 million noisy qubits in 8 hours | 20 | |
| 2025 estimate: under 1 million noisy qubits in under a week | 1 |
Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.
Figure ID FIG-XTECH-QUANTUM-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003
1.3The six-sector nexus: twenty couplings across five assessed sectors
The quantum-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their quantum content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.
Each line is one coupling from one sector to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events. Infrastructure: not assessed in this edition’s coupling matrix, so it is drawn hollow with no couplings. The hexagon is the estate doctrine: six sectors and fifteen relations.
- Strong
- مامناوەند
- Weak
- Not assessed in this edition
Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated. Hexagon: the estate doctrine (Signature).
| From, to | WAT | ENE | FOO | HLT | BIO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WAT ئاو | · | WEAK facility cooling | WEAK no documented link | WEAK no documented link | WEAK no documented link |
| ENE وزە | WEAK cooling load | · | WEAK catalysis claims, undocumented | WEAK sensing claims, undocumented | WEAK no documented link |
| FOO خۆراک | WEAK no documented link | WEAK no documented link | · | WEAK no documented link | WEAK no documented link |
| HLT تەندروستی | WEAK workforce | WEAK workforce | WEAK no documented link | · | WEAK no documented link |
| BIO فرەجۆریی زیندەوەری | WEAK no documented link | WEAK no documented link | WEAK no documented link | WEAK no documented link | · |
| Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A. | |||||
Transmission paths
- 01
TRD → MIN → INF
A helium or mineral supply disruption slows cryogenic hardware.
Reported 2026 Hormuz closure and helium10
- 02
INF → DAT
A capable machine would expose data protected by today’s public-key methods.
Inferred RSA-2048 estimates1
- 03
FIN → INF
Investment funds hardware scale-up and fabrication.
Reported USD 12.6 billion in 202511
- 04
ENE → INF
Facility power and cooling constrain siting and scale.
Inferred energy estimate9
- 05
GOV → DAT
Standards and roadmaps set migration timing.
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 8IBM (ed.), IBM Quantum technology and roadmap page (Nighthawk 120 qubits; Starling planned for 2029 with 200 logical qubits and 100 million gates; statement on advantage in 2026). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3NIST (ed.), NIST releases first 3 finalised post-quantum encryption standards (news release, 13 August 2024; FIPS 203, 204, 205). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2Google Quantum AI and collaborators, Quantum error correction below the surface code threshold, Nature 638, 920 to 926, 2025 (preprint arXiv:2408.13687, August 2024). Springer Nature, London. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 1Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025. arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15NIS Cooperation Group, EU PQC Workstream (eds.), A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, Version 1.1, 11 June 2025 (Member States to start national transition strategies by the end of 2026; high-risk use cases no later than the end of 2030; as many systems as practically feasible by 2035). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 9Jaschke, D. and Montangero, S., Is quantum computing green? An estimate for an energy-efficiency quantum advantage, Quantum Science and Technology 8, 025001, 2023 (preprint arXiv:2205.12092). IOP Publishing, Bristol. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 27Gidney, C. and Ekerå, M., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits, Quantum 5, 433, 2021. Verein zur Förderung des Open Access Publizierens in den Quantenwissenschaften, Vienna. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 11Consulting.us (ed.), Quantum computing reaches commercial turning point, McKinsey report finds (article of 10 June 2026; reports the McKinsey Quantum Technology Monitor 2026: investment in quantum technology startups USD 12.6 billion in 2025, more than six times 2024; quantum computing company revenues above USD 1 billion in 2025), and Ivezic, M., McKinsey Quantum Technology Monitor 2026: A Commercial Tipping Point, But the Numbers Deserve Scrutiny (PostQuantum, 20 April 2026; 6.3-fold increase over 2024; private investment 97% of funding, against 67% in 2024). Press reports of an analyst publication; the McKinsey pages returned a service error, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 6European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; roadmap published 23 June 2025; page updated 3 September 2026; the roadmap milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back