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Quantum is infrastructure and a cryptographic deadline

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

6 min read2 figures1 table10 notesNR-XTECH-QUANTUM-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Quantum is infrastructure and a cryptographic deadline
    1. 1.1 The questions this part answers
    2. 1.2 The argument
    3. 1.3 Twenty couplings between five systems
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Long-lived data exposure while migration is slow
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is quantum risk concentrated?
  • Which couplings carry quantum shocks into other systems?
  • Which quantum capabilities hold under compound stress?
  • What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five footprint and governance chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • Scenario
  • Three lenses
  • Portfolio

1.2The argument

Quantum technology is usually discussed as a computing race. The 2026 evidence reads it as two things at once: a physical infrastructure that needs refrigerators, helium, materials and people, and a deadline-setting force for the cryptography that protects every other infrastructure8103.

The hardware evidence is strong at small scale. A surface code on 101 qubits cut logical error by a factor of 2.14 for each step up in code distance2. IBM states a plan for 200 logical qubits and 100 million gates in 20298. These are results and plans, not a machine of useful size.

The cryptographic evidence is practical. A 2025 preprint lowered the estimated qubits for RSA-2048 to under a million, under stated assumptions1. NIST finalised three post-quantum standards in 20243, and the EU asked Member States to define roadmaps by the end of 202615. Data that must stay secret for decades is the first exposure.

The physical base is the least measured part. Helium markets were disrupted in 202610, the energy and water footprint of useful machines is not published, and a peer-reviewed estimate finds classical methods can be more energy-efficient for some problems9.

Figure 1.1How have estimates of the hardware needed to break RSA-2048 changed? Qubits, millions

The estimated number of noisy qubits fell by about a factor of twenty between two estimates by the same author, while the assumed run time grew from hours to days. The estimates rest on stated error and cycle-time assumptions and are not forecasts127.

ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
2021 estimate: about 20 million noisy qubits in 8 hours20
2025 estimate: under 1 million noisy qubits in under a week1

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.

Figure ID FIG-XTECH-QUANTUM-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

<1million qubits

RSA-2048 estimate, 20251

≈20million qubits

earlier estimate, 202127

0.1%

assumed gate error1

1µs

assumed surface-code cycle1

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The quantum-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their quantum content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings between the five systems

Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.

  • Strong
  • Moderate
  • Weak

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT Water·WEAK
facility cooling		WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link
ENE EnergyWEAK
cooling load		·WEAK
catalysis claims, undocumented		WEAK
sensing claims, undocumented		WEAK
no documented link
FOO FoodWEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		·WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link
HLT HealthWEAK
workforce		WEAK
workforce		WEAK
no documented link		·WEAK
no documented link
BIO BiodiversityWEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    TRD → MIN → INF

    A helium or mineral supply disruption slows cryogenic hardware.

    Reported 2026 Hormuz closure and helium10

  2. 02

    INF → DAT

    A capable machine would expose data protected by today’s public-key methods.

    Inferred RSA-2048 estimates1

  3. 03

    FIN → INF

    Investment funds hardware scale-up and fabrication.

    Reported USD 12.6 billion in 202511

  4. 04

    ENE → INF

    Facility power and cooling constrain siting and scale.

    Inferred energy estimate9

  5. 05

    GOV → DAT

    Standards and roadmaps set migration timing.

    Reported NIST and EU36

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 8IBM (ed.), IBM Quantum technology and roadmap page (Nighthawk 120 qubits; Starling planned for 2029 with 200 logical qubits and 100 million gates; statement on advantage in 2026). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 10IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3NIST (ed.), NIST releases first 3 finalised post-quantum encryption standards (news release, 13 August 2024; FIPS 203, 204, 205). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 2Google Quantum AI and collaborators, Quantum error correction below the surface code threshold, Nature 638, 920 to 926, 2025 (preprint arXiv:2408.13687, August 2024). Springer Nature, London. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 1Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025. arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 15UNVERIFIED, not opened: NIS Cooperation Group PQC workstream (eds.), A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (milestones: roadmaps by the end of 2026, high-risk use cases by 2030, as many systems as feasible by 2035), taken from secondary summaries. European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 9Jaschke, D. and Montangero, S., Is quantum computing green? An estimate for an energy-efficiency quantum advantage, Quantum Science and Technology 8, 025001, 2023 (preprint arXiv:2205.12092). IOP Publishing, Bristol. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: Gidney, C. and Ekerå, M., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits, Quantum 5, 433, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 11UNVERIFIED, not opened: McKinsey and Company (ed.), Quantum Technology Monitor 2026 (startup investment USD 12.6 billion in 2025, 6.3 times 2024; company revenues above USD 1 billion; about 97% private funding), taken from search-result summaries; the chart page returned a service error. McKinsey and Company, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 6European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; roadmap published 23 June 2025; page updated 3 September 2026; the roadmap milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 1: Quantum is infrastructure and a cryptographic deadline. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Quantum Technologies (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-QUANTUM-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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