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Methodology

How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.

14 min read0 figures13 tables19 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

વિષયવસ્તુ
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Cryptography is infrastructure under change
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Signature lag while key agreement migrates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
    1. A.1 Methods
    2. A.2 Model card, Cybersecurity and Cryptography System Model v0
    3. A.3 The baseline evidence cut
    4. A.4 Evidence age and coverage
    5. A.5 Evidence cards, two anchor sources
    6. A.6 Publication acceptance record
    7. A.7 Status words
    8. A.8 How the edition is made, released and corrected
    9. A.9 Glossary and abbreviations
    10. A.10 Technical annex
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

A.1પદ્ધતિઓ

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

Table A.1Methods
No.DerivationCalculationપરિણામ
(1)Fall in estimated qubits for RSA-2048, 2019 to 202520 ÷ 1about 20 times
(2)Share of FBI reported losses from cyber threats, 20241.571 ÷ 16.6about 9.5%
(3)Share of FBI complaints that reported a loss, 2024256,256 ÷ 859,532about 29.8%
(4)Change in on-chain ransomware payments, 2024 to 2025(820 − 892) ÷ 892about −8%, a floor
Table A.2Coupling strength scale (matrix and model card)
StrengthDefinition
STRONGa disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region
MODERATEan effect is documented but buffered or slower
WEAKan effect is plausible but not documented at global scale
Table A.3Status grammar
લેબલRule
નોંધાયેલvalue as issued by its source, with year
Inferredreasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement
અંદાજિતNexus analytical value with stated method
પરિદૃશ્યconditional on stated assumptions
Expert inputstructured editorial judgement awaiting evidence

A.2Model card, Cybersecurity and Cryptography System Model v0

Model ID
MDL-XT10-CRYPTO · v0.1
Purpose
represent cybersecurity and cryptography as protective infrastructure coupled to networks, devices, finance, workforce and regulation
Family
graph-based system of systems
Inputs
the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
પદ્ધતિ
expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
માન્યતા
none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
અનિશ્ચિતતા
qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
Domain of validity
global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
Reproducibility
strength table and sources published in this edition
20couplings

typed in v0

0strong

documented within one season

0moderate

documented, buffered

20weak

plausible, undocumented

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID
DC-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-B0
પ્રકાર
baseline documentary cut
Resolution policy
pinned · as of 30 September 2026
Sources pinned
44 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
Model runs
none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
Digest
computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
Supersedes
nothing, first cut of the series
Superseded by
the 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography annual cut

વંશાવળી

  1. 01

    source edition

  2. 02

    pinned citation

  3. 03

    finding

  4. 04

    page

  5. 05

    publication record

Table A.4From the baseline cut to the federation cut
ElementBaseline 20262027 global annual
સ્ત્રોતોcited global publications, pinned by editionnational, regional and sector cuts through one graph
Analysisstated methods and editorial estimatestyped analysis specifications
ModelsCybersecurity and Cryptography System Model v0 specificationmodel runs with receipts
Findingstwelve baseline findingsfindings re-bound to federation evidence
સમીક્ષાfive passes scheduledfive passes on the exact digest

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

Table A.5Evidence age and coverage
IndicatorઅવલોકિતReleasedCadenceNext release
Post-quantum standards2024Aug 2024periodicHQC draft
Transition report2024 draft · 2026 finalNov 2024 · Oct 2026periodicnext revision
NCSC timelines2025Mar 2025periodicnext revision
EU roadmap2025Jun 2025periodicnational roadmaps
Deployment analysis2025Oct 2025continuousnext annual review
KEV count2026page read 2026-11-03continuousdaily additions
FBI complaints and losses2024Apr 2025annualnext annual report
Breach cost20262026 reportannualnext annual report
Table A.6Coverage by system at baseline
પ્રણાલીઆવરણThinnest dimension
ધોરણોGOODmigration progress
DeploymentPARTIALsignatures and devices
શાસનPARTIALroadmap text and dates
Threat recordsPARTIALcommon incident basis
ખર્ચTHINprimary cost data
WorkforceTHINsize and gap
SupplyTHINmodule and chip supply
Advanced cryptographyTHINhomomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge deployment
Table A.7Designed empty states: what is not bound, what would fill it and why
ક્ષેત્રSource that would fill itBlocker
Post-quantum migration progress by sector and countrynational agencies, regulators, sector bodiesno consolidated series found; CISA collects inventories but publishes no totals on the page read12
Signature and certificate deployment on a common basiscertificate transparency data, browser and operating-system vendorsonly one vendor analysis read; it expects first post-quantum certificates in 202623
Share of embedded and long-life devices that can receive cryptographic updatesdevice makers, sector regulatorsnot retrieved; no figure used
Milestones in the EU coordinated roadmap, from the primary documentEuropean Commission roadmap document11the library page states no milestones; the roadmap PDF sets milestones for the end of 2026, 2030 and 203531
NSA CNSA 2.0 timetable from the NSA documentsNSA CNSA 2.0 publications30the NSA pages returned an access error; no date is used
NIST IR 8547 final text, including any dates for deprecating algorithmsNIST IR 8547 final PDF5published 27 October 2026, after the evidence close (post-close, context only); the page states no dates and the PDF was not opened; the baseline binds the November 2024 draft44
Verizon DBIR statistics from the report itselfVerizon Data Breach Investigations Report 202617only the landing page was read; the sample size is not stated there
IBM Cost of a Data Breach details such as detection timeIBM report18the landing page gives the average cost and a few findings only
Chainalysis payments from the full report and off-chain paymentsChainalysis report and law-enforcement data19one blog page read; on-chain only; the 2024 total was revised
Time from vulnerability disclosure to exploitation on a common basisCISA, vendors, CVE Program1334the CVE metrics count published records by quarter, not time to exploitation34; no series found
Global incident counts on a common basisENISA, Europol, national agencies1635the ENISA page gives a count of 4,875 incidents for the EU period; the Europol assessment page loads by script and no count was read35
Cybersecurity workforce size and gapISC2, national statistics20ISC2 published no gap estimate in 2025; no other series read
Deployment of homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proofs and multiparty computationstandards bodies, vendors, national agenciesnot retrieved; no figure used
Export-control and regulatory effects on cryptographic productsnational authoritiesnot reviewed

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Published by the UK National Cyber Security Centre on 20 March 2025, version 1.0. Periodic guidance. Role: binds GOV-004. Coverage: UK guidance for organisations.

EVD-XT10-001

NCSC migration timelines10

Issued by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology on 13 August 2024. One-off. Role: binds CRY-001 and the standards tiles. Coverage: US federal standards used globally.

EVD-XT10-002

NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205 pages123

Table A.8Quality dimensions at baseline
DimensionEVD-XT10-001EVD-XT10-002
Completenessthree milestone years; no sector detailthree standards; HQC backup in preparation
Timelinesspublished March 2025issued at publication
Revisionversion 1.0 at the readerrata noted for future revision
Method transparencyguidance text publicselection process published
External validationagency authoritypublic review rounds

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

  • NIST IR 8547 final5: dates for algorithms, if any, in the PDF
  • NIS Cooperation Group31: initial national roadmaps due by the end of 2026
  • NSA30: CNSA 2.0 documents
  • Verizon17 and IBM18: full reports

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

Table A.9Publication acceptance record
જૂથવિસ્તારItemsPassN/APending
D1Identity and scope8800
D2Source and data12912
D3Analysis and models12381
D4Findings and claims9801
D5Figures, tables, maps10622
D6Editorial and citations10802
D7Review and approval130013
D8Artefact and design12705
D9Registry and release9009

Publication gate

Conditions met
14 of 23 at evidence close
Blocking problems
none recorded
Open conditions
reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer

Not applicable at baseline

Model runs
first runs in Q1 2027
નકશા
plates in Q2 2027
Waivers
none

A.7Status words

Table A.10The status every value carries
સ્થિતિતેનો અર્થ શું છે
અવલોકિતMeasured directly and published by the source.
નોંધાયેલPublished statistics of an official or institutional source.
DeclaredStated by the body concerned; not independently measured.
અંદાજિતA Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A.
મોડેલ આધારિતProduced by a stated model from cited inputs.
InferredReasoned from cited evidence; not measured.
ForecastA projection by the cited source.
SimulatedA simulation result under stated assumptions.
પરિદૃશ્યA conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction.
Expert inputExpert judgement, recorded with its basis.
CandidateProposed for a later edition; not yet evidence.
Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject.

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

પગલુંWhat happensસ્ત્રોત
01 Evidence arrives from the pillarsFoundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s.
02 The cut is sealedOn the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on.
03 The edition is assembledThe edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide.
04 The keys turnAt the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward.
05 The gate opensA named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit.
06 Signed and depositedThe PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI.
07 Published on its desk’s siteOnly then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part.
08 Corrections go to StandardsMethod and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

Table A.11Series terms
TermMeaning
Baseline Editionthe inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series
WEFH+Bwater, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core
જોડાણa typed dependency through which one system transmits to another
Protection gapthe share of losses not covered by insurance
Capability ladderLISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED
EQLevidence-quality level, 1–5
Evidence cuta frozen resolution of exact sources and versions
NNC · NLC · NWGNational Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups
Table A.12Abbreviations used in this edition
AbbreviationExpansion
CBOMcryptographic bill of materials
CVECommon Vulnerabilities and Exposures
FIPSFederal Information Processing Standard
HQCHamming quasi-cyclic key-encapsulation method
IC3FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center
IRNIST Internal Report
KEVKnown Exploited Vulnerabilities
ML-DSAmodule-lattice digital signature algorithm
ML-KEMmodule-lattice key-encapsulation mechanism
NCSCUK National Cyber Security Centre
SLH-DSAstateless hash-based digital signature algorithm
TLSTransport Layer Security

A.10Technical annex

Table A.13Technical annex
ItemAnnexવિષયવસ્તુસ્થિતિ
A.1Indicator definitionsthe global indicator set, with units and sourcesIN THIS EDITION
A.2Coupling strengthsthe twenty-cell matrix and its rationaleIN THIS EDITION
A.3Scenario specificationSCN-XT10-SIG-01 assumptions and signpostsIN THIS EDITION
A.4Capability placementsrung evidence for fifteen functionsIN THIS EDITION
A.5Model diagnosticsfirst runs and validation2027
A.6Sensitivity analysesinfluence of coupling strengths2027
A.7Cluster notescards for the major deployment and threat clusters2027
A.8Review statementspass-by-pass review recordAT RELEASE

A.1 · indicator definition: post-quantum share of human traffic

Construct
share of human-initiated web requests to one network that use hybrid post-quantum key agreement
Unit
percent of requests
પદ્ધતિ
vendor measurement on its own network, excluding automated traffic
સ્ત્રોત
Cloudflare analysis, 202523
અનિશ્ચિતતા
the post states a majority and later over 50%; no exact value was read
Known limits
one network; client support drives the figure; signatures are not covered

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 31NIS Cooperation Group, EU PQC Workstream (ed.), A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1, 11 June 2025 (roadmap PDF: by 31 December 2026 all Member States have taken the First Steps and set initial national roadmaps; by 31 December 2030 the transition for high-risk use cases is complete; by 31 December 2035 the transition for medium-risk use cases is complete and for low-risk use cases as far as feasible). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 30Stern, M. B. (NSA Cybersecurity), Updates to the CNSA 2.0 FAQ, post to the NIST pqc-forum mailing list, 13 January 2025 (NSA has updated its guidance on the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0, listing the NIST standards that define the CNSA 2.0 algorithms, with updated transition timelines; the NSA documents themselves refused automated access and no date from them is used). National Security Agency, Fort Meade. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15; no dates on the page; PDF not opened). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 17Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (landing page; period 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; 48% of breaches involve ransomware; 31% begin with exploited vulnerabilities). Verizon Business, New York. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 34CVE Program (ed.), CVE Program metrics (page and the data file it publishes; quarterly counts of published CVE Records, for 2025: 12,009, 11,701, 11,738 and 12,796; no measure of time from disclosure to exploitation). MITRE, Bedford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 16European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; 4,875 incidents analysed; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026 corrected figures; PDF not opened). ENISA, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 35Europol (ed.), Steal, deal and repeat: How cybercriminals trade and exploit your data, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 2025 (report page; publication reported by the European Commission on 16 June 2025; the page loads its content by script and no figure is used). Europol, The Hague. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

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Cite this annex

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Annex A: Methodology. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

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