Methodology
How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Cryptography is infrastructure under change
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Signature lag while key agreement migrates
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- A.1 Methods
- A.2 Model card, Cybersecurity and Cryptography System Model v0
- A.3 The baseline evidence cut
- A.4 Evidence age and coverage
- A.5 Evidence cards, two anchor sources
- A.6 Publication acceptance record
- A.7 Status words
- A.8 How the edition is made, released and corrected
- A.9 Glossary and abbreviations
- A.10 Technical annex
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
A.1Methods
The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.
| No. | Derivation | Calculation | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | Fall in estimated qubits for RSA-2048, 2019 to 2025 | 20 ÷ 1 | about 20 times |
| (2) | Share of FBI reported losses from cyber threats, 2024 | 1.571 ÷ 16.6 | about 9.5% |
| (3) | Share of FBI complaints that reported a loss, 2024 | 256,256 ÷ 859,532 | about 29.8% |
| (4) | Change in on-chain ransomware payments, 2024 to 2025 | (820 − 892) ÷ 892 | about −8%, a floor |
| Strength | Definition |
|---|---|
| STRONG | a disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region |
| MODERATE | an effect is documented but buffered or slower |
| WEAK | an effect is plausible but not documented at global scale |
| Label | Rule |
|---|---|
| Reported | value as issued by its source, with year |
| Inferred | reasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement |
| Estimated | Nexus analytical value with stated method |
| Scenario | conditional on stated assumptions |
| Expert input | structured editorial judgement awaiting evidence |
A.2Model card, Cybersecurity and Cryptography System Model v0
- Model ID
- MDL-XT10-CRYPTO · v0.1
- Purpose
- represent cybersecurity and cryptography as protective infrastructure coupled to networks, devices, finance, workforce and regulation
- Family
- graph-based system of systems
- Inputs
- the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
- Method
- expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
- Validation
- none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
- Uncertainty
- qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
- Domain of validity
- global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
- Reproducibility
- strength table and sources published in this edition
20couplings
typed in v0
0strong
documented within one season
0moderate
documented, buffered
20weak
plausible, undocumented
A.3The baseline evidence cut
Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.
- Cut ID
- DC-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-B0
- Type
- baseline documentary cut
- Resolution policy
- pinned · as of 30 September 2026
- Sources pinned
- 44 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
- Model runs
- none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
- Digest
- computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
- Supersedes
- nothing, first cut of the series
- Superseded by
- the 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography annual cut
Lineage
- 01
source edition
- 02
pinned citation
- 03
finding
- 04
page
- 05
publication record
| Element | Baseline 2026 | 2027 global annual |
|---|---|---|
| Sources | cited global publications, pinned by edition | national, regional and sector cuts through one graph |
| Analysis | stated methods and editorial estimates | typed analysis specifications |
| Models | Cybersecurity and Cryptography System Model v0 specification | model runs with receipts |
| Findings | twelve baseline findings | findings re-bound to federation evidence |
| Review | five passes scheduled | five passes on the exact digest |
A.4Evidence age and coverage
A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.
| Indicator | Observed | Released | Cadence | Next release |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Post-quantum standards | 2024 | Aug 2024 | periodic | HQC draft |
| Transition report | 2024 draft · 2026 final | Nov 2024 · Oct 2026 | periodic | next revision |
| NCSC timelines | 2025 | Mar 2025 | periodic | next revision |
| EU roadmap | 2025 | Jun 2025 | periodic | national roadmaps |
| Deployment analysis | 2025 | Oct 2025 | continuous | next annual review |
| KEV count | 2026 | page read 2026-11-03 | continuous | daily additions |
| FBI complaints and losses | 2024 | Apr 2025 | annual | next annual report |
| Breach cost | 2026 | 2026 report | annual | next annual report |
| System | Coverage | Thinnest dimension |
|---|---|---|
| Standards | GOOD | migration progress |
| Deployment | PARTIAL | signatures and devices |
| Governance | PARTIAL | roadmap text and dates |
| Threat records | PARTIAL | common incident basis |
| Cost | THIN | primary cost data |
| Workforce | THIN | size and gap |
| Supply | THIN | module and chip supply |
| Advanced cryptography | THIN | homomorphic encryption and zero-knowledge deployment |
| Field | Source that would fill it | Blocker |
|---|---|---|
| Post-quantum migration progress by sector and country | national agencies, regulators, sector bodies | no consolidated series found; CISA collects inventories but publishes no totals on the page read12 |
| Signature and certificate deployment on a common basis | certificate transparency data, browser and operating-system vendors | only one vendor analysis read; it expects first post-quantum certificates in 202623 |
| Share of embedded and long-life devices that can receive cryptographic updates | device makers, sector regulators | not retrieved; no figure used |
| Milestones in the EU coordinated roadmap, from the primary document | European Commission roadmap document11 | the library page was read and states no milestones; dates come from secondary summaries31 |
| NSA CNSA 2.0 timetable from the NSA documents | NSA CNSA 2.0 publications30 | the NSA pages returned an access error; no date is used |
| NIST IR 8547 final text, including any dates for deprecating algorithms | NIST IR 8547 final PDF5 | published 27 October 2026, after the evidence close (post-close, context only); the page states no dates and the PDF was not opened; the baseline binds the November 2024 draft44 |
| Verizon DBIR statistics from the report itself | Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report 202617 | only the landing page was read; the sample size is not stated there |
| IBM Cost of a Data Breach details such as detection time | IBM report18 | the landing page gives the average cost and a few findings only |
| Chainalysis payments from the full report and off-chain payments | Chainalysis report and law-enforcement data19 | one blog page read; on-chain only; the 2024 total was revised |
| Time from vulnerability disclosure to exploitation on a common basis | CISA, vendors, CVE Program1334 | the CVE metrics page returned no figures; no series found |
| Global incident counts on a common basis | ENISA, Europol, national agencies1635 | the ENISA page gives a count of 4,875 incidents for the EU period; Europol was not retrieved |
| Cybersecurity workforce size and gap | ISC2, national statistics20 | ISC2 published no gap estimate in 2025; no other series read |
| Deployment of homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proofs and multiparty computation | standards bodies, vendors, national agencies | not retrieved; no figure used |
| Export-control and regulatory effects on cryptographic products | national authorities | not reviewed |
A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources
Published by the UK National Cyber Security Centre on 20 March 2025, version 1.0. Periodic guidance. Role: binds GOV-004. Coverage: UK guidance for organisations.
EVD-XT10-001
NCSC migration timelines10
Issued by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology on 13 August 2024. One-off. Role: binds CRY-001 and the standards tiles. Coverage: US federal standards used globally.
EVD-XT10-002
| Dimension | EVD-XT10-001 | EVD-XT10-002 |
|---|---|---|
| Completeness | three milestone years; no sector detail | three standards; HQC backup in preparation |
| Timeliness | published March 2025 | issued at publication |
| Revision | version 1.0 at the read | errata noted for future revision |
| Method transparency | guidance text public | selection process published |
| External validation | agency authority | public review rounds |
Evidence cards to follow in 2027
A.6Publication acceptance record
Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.
| Group | Area | Items | Pass | N/A | Pending |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Identity and scope | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| D2 | Source and data | 12 | 9 | 1 | 2 |
| D3 | Analysis and models | 12 | 3 | 8 | 1 |
| D4 | Findings and claims | 9 | 8 | 0 | 1 |
| D5 | Figures, tables, maps | 10 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| D6 | Editorial and citations | 10 | 8 | 0 | 2 |
| D7 | Review and approval | 13 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| D8 | Artefact and design | 12 | 7 | 0 | 5 |
| D9 | Registry and release | 9 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
Publication gate
- Conditions met
- 14 of 23 at evidence close
- Blocking problems
- none recorded
- Open conditions
- reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer
Not applicable at baseline
- Model runs
- first runs in Q1 2027
- Maps
- plates in Q2 2027
- Waivers
- none
A.7Status words
| Status | What it means |
|---|---|
| Observed | Measured directly and published by the source. |
| Reported | Published statistics of an official or institutional source. |
| Declared | Stated by the body concerned; not independently measured. |
| Estimated | A Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A. |
| Modelled | Produced by a stated model from cited inputs. |
| Inferred | Reasoned from cited evidence; not measured. |
| Forecast | A projection by the cited source. |
| Simulated | A simulation result under stated assumptions. |
| Scenario | A conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction. |
| Expert input | Expert judgement, recorded with its basis. |
| Candidate | Proposed for a later edition; not yet evidence. |
| Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject. | |
A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected
Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.
| Step | What happens | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 01 Evidence arrives from the pillars | Foundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s. | |
| 02 The cut is sealed | On the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on. | |
| 03 The edition is assembled | The edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide. | |
| 04 The keys turn | At the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward. | |
| 05 The gate opens | A named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit. | |
| 06 Signed and deposited | The PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI. | |
| 07 Published on its desk’s site | Only then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part. | |
| 08 Corrections go to Standards | Method and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut. |
A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).
Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.
A.9Glossary and abbreviations
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Baseline Edition | the inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series |
| WEFH+B | water, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core |
| Coupling | a typed dependency through which one system transmits to another |
| Protection gap | the share of losses not covered by insurance |
| Capability ladder | LISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED |
| EQL | evidence-quality level, 1–5 |
| Evidence cut | a frozen resolution of exact sources and versions |
| NNC · NLC · NWG | National Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups |
| Abbreviation | Expansion |
|---|---|
| CBOM | cryptographic bill of materials |
| CVE | Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures |
| FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standard |
| HQC | Hamming quasi-cyclic key-encapsulation method |
| IC3 | FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center |
| IR | NIST Internal Report |
| KEV | Known Exploited Vulnerabilities |
| ML-DSA | module-lattice digital signature algorithm |
| ML-KEM | module-lattice key-encapsulation mechanism |
| NCSC | UK National Cyber Security Centre |
| SLH-DSA | stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
A.10Technical annex
| Item | Annex | Contents | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| A.1 | Indicator definitions | the global indicator set, with units and sources | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.2 | Coupling strengths | the twenty-cell matrix and its rationale | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.3 | Scenario specification | SCN-XT10-SIG-01 assumptions and signposts | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.4 | Capability placements | rung evidence for fifteen functions | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.5 | Model diagnostics | first runs and validation | 2027 |
| A.6 | Sensitivity analyses | influence of coupling strengths | 2027 |
| A.7 | Cluster notes | cards for the major deployment and threat clusters | 2027 |
| A.8 | Review statements | pass-by-pass review record | AT RELEASE |
A.1 · indicator definition: post-quantum share of human traffic
- Construct
- share of human-initiated web requests to one network that use hybrid post-quantum key agreement
- Unit
- percent of requests
- Method
- vendor measurement on its own network, excluding automated traffic
- Source
- Cloudflare analysis, 202523
- Uncertainty
- the post states a majority and later over 50%; no exact value was read
- Known limits
- one network; client support drives the figure; signatures are not covered
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: NIS Cooperation Group (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (national roadmaps by the end of 2026, high-risk use cases by 2030, as many systems as feasible by 2035), taken from secondary summaries in an earlier edition of this series; the milestones were not on the page read. European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: NSA (ed.), Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 advisory and FAQ, cited from memory; the NSA pages returned an access error and no date is used. National Security Agency, Fort Meade. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15; no dates on the page; PDF not opened). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 17Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (landing page; period 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; 48% of breaches involve ransomware; 31% begin with exploited vulnerabilities). Verizon Business, New York. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: CVE Program (ed.), CVE metrics page; the page returned no figures. MITRE, Bedford. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 16European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; 4,875 incidents analysed; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026 corrected figures; PDF not opened). ENISA, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Europol (ed.), Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2025, cited from memory; the page returned an error. Europol, The Hague. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back