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Metodologi

How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.

12 min read0 figures13 tables11 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Daftar isi
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Lifelines fail together
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMetodologi
    1. A.1 Methods
    2. A.2 Model card, Lifeline Systems Model v0
    3. A.3 The baseline evidence cut
    4. A.4 Evidence age and coverage
    5. A.5 Evidence cards, two anchor sources
    6. A.6 Publication acceptance record
    7. A.7 Status words
    8. A.8 How the edition is made, released and corrected
    9. A.9 Glossary and abbreviations
    10. A.10 Technical annex
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

A.1Metode

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

Table A.1Methods
No.DerivationCalculationHasil
(1)Factors named in the Iberian blackout page summarycount of listed factors5, unweighted
(2)ENISA incidents per month in the period4,875 ÷ 12≈ 406
(3)Subsea faults per week at the average199 ÷ 52≈ 3.8
(4)Faults a year from external aggression (about)199 × 2 ÷ 3≈ 133
Table A.2Coupling strength scale (matrix and model card)
StrengthDefinisi
STRONGa disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region
MODERATEan effect is documented but buffered or slower
WEAKan effect is plausible but not documented at global scale
Table A.3Status grammar
LabelAturan
Dilaporkanvalue as issued by its source, with year
Inferredreasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement
EstimasiNexus analytical value with stated method
Skenarioconditional on stated assumptions
Expert inputstructured editorial judgement awaiting evidence

A.2Model card, Lifeline Systems Model v0

Model ID
MDL-SR02-LIFELINES · v0.1
Tujuan
represent lifeline systems as a dependent network and the mechanisms by which failures spread between power, water, communications, transport and health
Keluarga
graph-based system of systems
Masukan
the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
Metode
expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
Validasi
none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
Ketidakpastian
qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
Domain validitas
global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
Reproduksibilitas
strength table and sources published in this edition
20couplings

typed in v0

5strong

documented within one season

3moderate

documented, buffered

12weak

plausible, undocumented

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID
DC-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-B0
Jenis
baseline documentary cut
Resolution policy
pinned · as of 30 September 2026
Sources pinned
40 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
Model runs
none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
Ringkasan
computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
Supersedes
nothing, first cut of the series
Superseded by
the 2027 lifeline systems annual cut

Garis keturunan

  1. 01

    source edition

  2. 02

    pinned citation

  3. 03

    finding

  4. 04

    page

  5. 05

    publication record

Table A.4From the baseline cut to the federation cut
ElemenBaseline 20262027 global annual
Sumbercited global publications, pinned by editionnational, regional and sector cuts through one graph
Analysisstated methods and editorial estimatestyped analysis specifications
ModelLifeline Systems Model v0 specificationmodel runs with receipts
Temuantwelve baseline findingsfindings re-bound to federation evidence
Tinjauanfive passes scheduledfive passes on the exact digest

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

Table A.5Evidence age and coverage
IndikatorTeramatiDirilisKadensiNext release
Grid failure analysis2025Mar 2026one-offfollow-up reports
Cyber advisories2024Feb 2024per kejadiannext joint advisory
EU incident countsJul 2024 to Jun 2025Oct 2025 · v1.3 Sep 2026tahunannext ENISA report
Software outage2024Jul 2024one-offnone scheduled
US asset condition2025Mar 2025four-yearly2029
Cable fault average2010 to 20232024ad hocnext analysis
Hazard losses to infrastructure2025May 2025dua tahunan2027
Disruption cost in LMICs20192019one-offno update found
Reconstruction needsto Dec 2025Feb 2026tahunanRDNA6
Gulf strikes2026Mar to Jul 2026per kejadiannot verified
Table A.6Coverage by system at baseline
SistemCakupanThinnest dimension
DayaGOODrestoration times
KomunikasiPARTIALcross-operator dependency
AirTHINinterdependence with power
TransportasiTHINcross-modal dependence
KesehatanTHINfacility-level resilience
SiberPARTIALoperator-level data
Finance of resiliencePARTIALrecent estimates
Conflict damageTHINverified 2026 damage
Table A.7Designed empty states: what is not bound, what would fill it and why
BidangSource that would fill itBlocker
Cross-sector dependency data at city and national scaleoperators, regulators and national statistics officessecurity-sensitive and not published on a common basis
Restoration times for lifeline services after major outagesoperator and regulator reportsnot retrieved; no consolidated series
Full text of the ENTSO-E final report and its recommendation countENTSO-E final report1only the publication page was opened; sources disagree on the number of recommendations
ENISA sector breakdown and top threatsENISA Threat Landscape 2025 full report3the publication page was read; the PDF was not opened and the page notes corrected figures in version 1.3
Subsea cable repair capacity by regionTeleGeography and ICPC15regional ship counts not retrieved; the 2040 end-of-life share is from the June 2025 TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics summary
Verified damage to Gulf power and desalination plantsnational authorities and independent assessments13press and think-tank reports only; no official damage assessment found
Share of outages caused by power failure at digital facilitiesUptime Institute Annual Outage Analysis14report limited to members and subscribers
UNDRR GAR 2025 infrastructure loss by region and sectorUNDRR GAR 202510full report opened and the global figure confirmed (USD 257.2 billion); regional and sector splits not bound
World Bank Lifelines disruption costs by countryBank Dunia dan GFDRR11full report opened and headline figures confirmed; country-level disruption costs not bound
Condition of infrastructure outside the United States on one scalenational report cards and statisticsno comparable global series found
Status of EU critical entity identification by Member StatesEuropean Commission, national authorities16not retrieved
Capability rungs beyond restorationoperators, regulators, ministriesnot reviewed

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Issued by the association of European transmission system operators. One-off. Role: binds INF-001. Coverage: Continental Europe. The publication page was read; the full report was not opened.

EVD-SR02-001

ENTSO-E publication page on the Iberian blackout1

Issued by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity. Annual. Role: binds CYB-003. Reporting period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; the page notes corrections in version 1.3.

EVD-SR02-002

ENISA Threat Landscape 20253

Table A.8Quality dimensions at baseline
DimensionEVD-SR02-001EVD-SR02-002
Completenessevent-specific; some generation data missingincidents analysed; sector split not read
Timelinessabout 11 months after the eventabout 3 months after the period
Revisionfinal after interim reportsversion 1.3 corrected figures
Method transparencyexpert panel method publishedthreat-centric method stated
External validationindependent expert panelagency review

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

  • ENTSO-E1: recommendation tables in the final report
  • ENISA3: sector breakdown of incidents
  • CISA2: follow-up advisories
  • ASCE6: sector pages for energy and water

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

Table A.9Publication acceptance record
KelompokBidangButirLintasanN/ATertunda
D1Identity and scope8800
D2Source and data12912
D3Analysis and models12381
D4Findings and claims9801
D5Figures, tables, maps10622
D6Editorial and citations10802
D7Review and approval130013
D8Artefact and design12705
D9Registry and release9009

Gerbang publikasi

Conditions met
14 of 23 at evidence close
Blocking problems
none recorded
Open conditions
reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer

Not applicable at baseline

Model runs
first runs in Q1 2027
Peta
plates in Q2 2027
Waivers
tidak ada

A.7Status words

Table A.10The status every value carries
StatusArtinya
TeramatiMeasured directly and published by the source.
DilaporkanPublished statistics of an official or institutional source.
DinyatakanStated by the body concerned; not independently measured.
EstimasiA Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A.
DimodelkanProduced by a stated model from cited inputs.
InferredReasoned from cited evidence; not measured.
PrakiraanA projection by the cited source.
SimulatedA simulation result under stated assumptions.
SkenarioA conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction.
Expert inputExpert judgement, recorded with its basis.
KandidatProposed for a later edition; not yet evidence.
Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject.

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

LangkahApa yang terjadiSumber
01 Evidence arrives from the pillarsFoundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s.
02 The cut is sealedOn the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on.
03 The edition is assembledThe edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide.
04 The keys turnAt the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward.
05 The gate opensA named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit.
06 Signed and depositedThe PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI.
07 Published on its desk’s siteOnly then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part.
08 Corrections go to StandardsMethod and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

Table A.11Series terms
IstilahMakna
Baseline Editionthe inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series
WEFH+Bwater, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core
Keterkaitana typed dependency through which one system transmits to another
Kesenjangan perlindunganthe share of losses not covered by insurance
Capability ladderLISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED
EQLevidence-quality level, 1–5
Potongan buktia frozen resolution of exact sources and versions
NNC · NLC · NWGNational Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups
Table A.12Abbreviations used in this edition
AbbreviationExpansion
ASCEAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
CISAUS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CSFCybersecurity Framework
ENISAEuropean Union Agency for Cybersecurity
ENTSO-EEuropean Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
GARGlobal Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction
ICPCInternational Cable Protection Committee
LMIClow- and middle-income countries
NIS2second Network and Information Security Directive
OToperational technology
RDNARapid Damage and Needs Assessment
UNDRRUnited Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

A.10Technical annex

Table A.13Technical annex
ButirAnnexDaftar isiStatus
A.1Indicator definitionsthe global indicator set, with units and sourcesIN THIS EDITION
A.2Coupling strengthsthe twenty-cell matrix and its rationaleIN THIS EDITION
A.3Scenario specificationSCN-SR02-PWR-01 assumptions and signpostsIN THIS EDITION
A.4Capability placementsrung evidence for fifteen functionsIN THIS EDITION
A.5Model diagnosticsfirst runs and validation2027
A.6Sensitivity analysesinfluence of coupling strengths2027
A.7Regional notesregional lifeline cardsWITH REGIONAL EDITIONS
A.8Review statementspass-by-pass review recordAT RELEASE

A.1 · indicator definition: subsea cable fault

Construct
a reported break or damage event on a telecommunications submarine cable
Unit
faults per year
Metode
industry fault databases and operator reports
Sumber
TeleGeography analysis7
Ketidakpastian
counts depend on the database; public and private series differ
Batasan yang diketahui
does not record intent or repair time

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  4. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  7. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

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Cite this annex

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Annex A: Methodology. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

LaporanBerkontribusi

Send evidence or a correction on Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

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Ciri khas sektor

The sectors behind Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

Pilih sudut · arahkan kursor ke garis6 / 15 relasi

Konteks

Infrastructure and its partners

Infrastructure gives pipes, dams and treatment works to water (0.6), transmission and fuel logistics to energy (0.6) and access to care to health (0.5).

W · E · I · F · H · B

Sektor
4 dari 6
Hubungan
6 dari 15
Keterkaitan
0.46 porsi dari total

Hubungan terkuat yang berperan

  • Energi → Infrastruktur · daya untuk transportasi dan telekomunikasi0.8
  • Air → Energi · air pendingin dan tenaga air0.6
  • Infrastruktur → Air · pipa, bendungan, dan instalasi pengolahan0.6
  • Air → Kesehatan · air minum dan sanitasi0.7
Nilai pengajaran untuk wilayah kota yang tipikal, bukan pengukuran untuk tempat mana pun. Keterkaitan adalah jumlah kekuatan hubungan yang berperan, sebagai pangsa dari kelima belas hubungan.