Metodoloji
How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.
İçindekiler
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Lifelines fail together
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMetodoloji
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
A.1Yöntemler
The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.
| No. | Derivation | Calculation | Sonuç |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | Factors named in the Iberian blackout page summary | count of listed factors | 5, unweighted |
| (2) | ENISA incidents per month in the period | 4,875 ÷ 12 | ≈ 406 |
| (3) | Subsea faults per week at the average | 199 ÷ 52 | ≈ 3.8 |
| (4) | Faults a year from external aggression (about) | 199 × 2 ÷ 3 | ≈ 133 |
| Strength | Tanım |
|---|---|
| STRONG | a disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region |
| MODERATE | an effect is documented but buffered or slower |
| WEAK | an effect is plausible but not documented at global scale |
| Etiket | Kural |
|---|---|
| Bildirilen | value as issued by its source, with year |
| Inferred | reasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement |
| Tahmini | Nexus analytical value with stated method |
| Senaryo | conditional on stated assumptions |
| Expert input | structured editorial judgement awaiting evidence |
A.2Model card, Lifeline Systems Model v0
- Model ID
- MDL-SR02-LIFELINES · v0.1
- Amaç
- represent lifeline systems as a dependent network and the mechanisms by which failures spread between power, water, communications, transport and health
- Aile
- graph-based system of systems
- Girdiler
- the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
- Yöntem
- expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
- Doğrulama
- none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
- Belirsizlik
- qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
- Domain of validity
- global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
- Tekrarlanabilirlik
- strength table and sources published in this edition
typed in v0
documented within one season
documented, buffered
plausible, undocumented
A.3The baseline evidence cut
Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.
- Cut ID
- DC-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-B0
- Tür
- baseline documentary cut
- Resolution policy
- pinned · as of 30 September 2026
- Sources pinned
- 40 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
- Model runs
- none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
- Digest
- computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
- Supersedes
- nothing, first cut of the series
- Superseded by
- the 2027 lifeline systems annual cut
Köken
- 01
source edition
- 02
pinned citation
- 03
finding
- 04
page
- 05
publication record
| Unsur | Baseline 2026 | 2027 global annual |
|---|---|---|
| Kaynaklar | cited global publications, pinned by edition | national, regional and sector cuts through one graph |
| Analysis | stated methods and editorial estimates | typed analysis specifications |
| Modeller | Lifeline Systems Model v0 specification | model runs with receipts |
| Bulgular | twelve baseline findings | findings re-bound to federation evidence |
| İnceleme | five passes scheduled | five passes on the exact digest |
A.4Evidence age and coverage
A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.
| Gösterge | Gözlenen | Yayımlandı | Sıklık | Next release |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grid failure analysis | 2025 | Mar 2026 | one-off | follow-up reports |
| Cyber advisories | 2024 | Feb 2024 | olay başına | next joint advisory |
| EU incident counts | Jul 2024 to Jun 2025 | Oct 2025 · v1.3 Sep 2026 | yıllık | next ENISA report |
| Software outage | 2024 | Jul 2024 | one-off | none scheduled |
| US asset condition | 2025 | Mar 2025 | four-yearly | 2029 |
| Cable fault average | 2010 to 2023 | 2024 | ad hoc | next analysis |
| Hazard losses to infrastructure | 2025 | May 2025 | iki yılda bir | 2027 |
| Disruption cost in LMICs | 2019 | 2019 | one-off | no update found |
| Reconstruction needs | to Dec 2025 | Feb 2026 | yıllık | RDNA6 |
| Gulf strikes | 2026 | Mar to Jul 2026 | olay başına | not verified |
| Sistem | Kapsam | Thinnest dimension |
|---|---|---|
| Güç | GOOD | restoration times |
| İletişim | PARTIAL | cross-operator dependency |
| Su | THIN | interdependence with power |
| Ulaşım | THIN | cross-modal dependence |
| Sağlık | THIN | facility-level resilience |
| Siber | PARTIAL | operator-level data |
| Finance of resilience | PARTIAL | recent estimates |
| Conflict damage | THIN | verified 2026 damage |
| Alan | Source that would fill it | Blocker |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-sector dependency data at city and national scale | operators, regulators and national statistics offices | security-sensitive and not published on a common basis |
| Restoration times for lifeline services after major outages | operator and regulator reports | not retrieved; no consolidated series |
| Full text of the ENTSO-E final report and its recommendation count | ENTSO-E final report1 | only the publication page was opened; sources disagree on the number of recommendations |
| ENISA sector breakdown and top threats | ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 full report3 | the publication page was read; the PDF was not opened and the page notes corrected figures in version 1.3 |
| Subsea cable repair capacity by region | TeleGeography and ICPC15 | regional ship counts not retrieved; the 2040 end-of-life share is from the June 2025 TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics summary |
| Verified damage to Gulf power and desalination plants | national authorities and independent assessments13 | press and think-tank reports only; no official damage assessment found |
| Share of outages caused by power failure at digital facilities | Uptime Institute Annual Outage Analysis14 | report limited to members and subscribers |
| UNDRR GAR 2025 infrastructure loss by region and sector | UNDRR GAR 202510 | full report opened and the global figure confirmed (USD 257.2 billion); regional and sector splits not bound |
| World Bank Lifelines disruption costs by country | Dünya Bankası ve GFDRR11 | full report opened and headline figures confirmed; country-level disruption costs not bound |
| Condition of infrastructure outside the United States on one scale | national report cards and statistics | no comparable global series found |
| Status of EU critical entity identification by Member States | European Commission, national authorities16 | not retrieved |
| Capability rungs beyond restoration | operators, regulators, ministries | not reviewed |
A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources
Issued by the association of European transmission system operators. One-off. Role: binds INF-001. Coverage: Continental Europe. The publication page was read; the full report was not opened.
EVD-SR02-001
ENTSO-E publication page on the Iberian blackout1
Issued by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity. Annual. Role: binds CYB-003. Reporting period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; the page notes corrections in version 1.3.
EVD-SR02-002
ENISA Threat Landscape 20253
| Dimension | EVD-SR02-001 | EVD-SR02-002 |
|---|---|---|
| Completeness | event-specific; some generation data missing | incidents analysed; sector split not read |
| Timeliness | about 11 months after the event | about 3 months after the period |
| Revision | final after interim reports | version 1.3 corrected figures |
| Method transparency | expert panel method published | threat-centric method stated |
| External validation | independent expert panel | agency review |
Evidence cards to follow in 2027
A.6Publication acceptance record
Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.
| Grup | Alan | Öğeler | Geçiş | N/A | Beklemede |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Identity and scope | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| D2 | Source and data | 12 | 9 | 1 | 2 |
| D3 | Analysis and models | 12 | 3 | 8 | 1 |
| D4 | Findings and claims | 9 | 8 | 0 | 1 |
| D5 | Figures, tables, maps | 10 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| D6 | Editorial and citations | 10 | 8 | 0 | 2 |
| D7 | Review and approval | 13 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| D8 | Artefact and design | 12 | 7 | 0 | 5 |
| D9 | Registry and release | 9 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
Yayın geçidi
- Conditions met
- 14 of 23 at evidence close
- Blocking problems
- none recorded
- Open conditions
- reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer
Not applicable at baseline
- Model runs
- first runs in Q1 2027
- Haritalar
- plates in Q2 2027
- Waivers
- yok
A.7Status words
| Durum | Ne anlama gelir |
|---|---|
| Gözlenen | Measured directly and published by the source. |
| Bildirilen | Published statistics of an official or institutional source. |
| Beyan edildi | Stated by the body concerned; not independently measured. |
| Tahmini | A Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A. |
| Modellenmiş | Produced by a stated model from cited inputs. |
| Inferred | Reasoned from cited evidence; not measured. |
| Öngörü | A projection by the cited source. |
| Simulated | A simulation result under stated assumptions. |
| Senaryo | A conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction. |
| Expert input | Expert judgement, recorded with its basis. |
| Aday | Proposed for a later edition; not yet evidence. |
| Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject. | |
A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected
Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.
| Adım | Ne olur | Kaynak |
|---|---|---|
| 01 Evidence arrives from the pillars | Foundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s. | |
| 02 The cut is sealed | On the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on. | |
| 03 The edition is assembled | The edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide. | |
| 04 The keys turn | At the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward. | |
| 05 The gate opens | A named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit. | |
| 06 Signed and deposited | The PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI. | |
| 07 Published on its desk’s site | Only then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part. | |
| 08 Corrections go to Standards | Method and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut. |
A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).
Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.
A.9Glossary and abbreviations
| Terim | Anlam |
|---|---|
| Baseline Edition | the inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series |
| WEFH+B | water, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core |
| Bağlantı | a typed dependency through which one system transmits to another |
| Koruma açığı | the share of losses not covered by insurance |
| Capability ladder | LISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED |
| EQL | evidence-quality level, 1–5 |
| Kanıt kesiti | a frozen resolution of exact sources and versions |
| NNC · NLC · NWG | National Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups |
| Abbreviation | Expansion |
|---|---|
| ASCE | American Society of Civil Engineers |
| CISA | US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency |
| CSF | Cybersecurity Framework |
| ENISA | European Union Agency for Cybersecurity |
| ENTSO-E | European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity |
| GAR | Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction |
| ICPC | International Cable Protection Committee |
| LMIC | low- and middle-income countries |
| NIS2 | second Network and Information Security Directive |
| OT | operational technology |
| RDNA | Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment |
| UNDRR | United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction |
A.10Technical annex
| Kalem | Annex | İçindekiler | Durum |
|---|---|---|---|
| A.1 | Indicator definitions | the global indicator set, with units and sources | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.2 | Coupling strengths | the twenty-cell matrix and its rationale | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.3 | Scenario specification | SCN-SR02-PWR-01 assumptions and signposts | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.4 | Capability placements | rung evidence for fifteen functions | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.5 | Model tanılamaları | first runs and validation | 2027 |
| A.6 | Sensitivity analyses | influence of coupling strengths | 2027 |
| A.7 | Regional notes | regional lifeline cards | WITH REGIONAL EDITIONS |
| A.8 | Review statements | pass-by-pass review record | AT RELEASE |
A.1 · indicator definition: subsea cable fault
- Construct
- a reported break or damage event on a telecommunications submarine cable
- Birim
- faults per year
- Yöntem
- industry fault databases and operator reports
- Kaynak
- TeleGeography analysis7
- Belirsizlik
- counts depend on the database; public and private series differ
- Bilinen sınırlar
- does not record intent or repair time
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
- 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back