Skip to content

Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

The 2027 agenda

Eight bounded questions open the 2027 cyber and digital systems agenda. Each comes from a baseline finding, names the initiative that will carry it and the first output due in the 2027 cyber and digital systems edition.

5 min read0 figures6 tables4 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

目次
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1The digital layer is where the systems meet
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Provider failure under a ransomware wave
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
    1. 7.1 Questions for the operational series
    2. 7.2 Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment
    3. 7.3 The pathway
    4. 7.4 Universe 2027: evidence pack for the cyber and digital systems candidate mission
    5. 7.5 Handoffs and routing
    6. 7.6 Feeds and signal register
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. A方法論
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

7.1Questions for the operational series

  1. C-01

    How would a failure at a concentrated digital provider that coincides with a ransomware wave travel through health, power and public services at once?

    INI-GS13-CPF-01 · provider failure under ransomware; first output: concurrency analysis for six regions.

  2. C-02

    Which operational technology and control systems in utilities have incident data on a common basis?

    INI-GS13-OTI-02 · utility incident data; first output: reporting-channel register.

  3. C-03

    How do ransomware attacks on health services change care outcomes beyond the 2016 to 2021 study period?

    INI-GS13-HRW-03 · health ransomware and care; first output: data scoping note.

  4. C-04

    Which submarine routes and landing points are single points of failure, and where is repair capacity short?

    INI-GS13-CBL-04 · cable routes and repair; first output: route dependence map.

  5. C-05

    Where do connectivity gaps coincide with weak cyber capacity, and what would closing them take?

    INI-GS13-GAP-05 · connectivity and capacity; first output: tier-and-access table.

  6. C-06

    How are EU reporting duties for incidents and exploited vulnerabilities being used in practice?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: duty-to-data overlay.

  7. C-07

    What is the measured, not surveyed, effect of AI on intrusion speed and volume?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: scoping note.

  8. C-08

    Which cyber capabilities have been tested in real incidents, and which are only planned?

    Cyber capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.

7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment

Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 cyber and digital portfolio. They are programme objects: no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.

Table 7.1Objects proposed for the first operational quarter
IDオブジェクト種別問い状況
INI-GS13-CPF-01Provider failure under ransomwareInitiativeC-01提案中
INI-GS13-OTI-02Utility incident dataInitiativeC-02提案中
INI-GS13-HRW-03Health ransomware and careInitiativeC-03提案中
INI-GS13-CBL-04Cable routes and repairInitiativeC-04提案中
INI-GS13-GAP-05Connectivity and capacityInitiativeC-05提案中
MSN-GS13-2027-01Provider failure under ransomware Universe mission使命C-01Candidate

7.3The pathway

The cyber and digital edition reads national cyber and digital chapters, regional connectivity and incident evidence and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed; the Canada and global chapters are drafted. This page states what exists today and what comes next.

  1. 01

    National cyber and digital chapters

    digital and cyber content of each national edition

    DRAFTED · further national baselines

  2. 02

    Route and incident evidence

    shared cables, exchange points and reporting channels

    PLANNED · regional Baseline Editions

  3. 03

    Cyber and digital sector model

    the digital layer under the system of systems

    v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence

  4. 04

    Global and strategic links

    GLB · SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems · SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk

    PLANNED · strategic baselines

  5. 05

    ユニバース

    annual proving environment

    CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027

  6. 06

    Global Cyber and Digital Systems Report

    this series

    BASELINE DRAFT · 2027 annual edition

  7. 07

    エビデンスと訂正

    one graph, many projections

    OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027

7.4Universe 2027: evidence pack for the cyber and digital systems candidate mission

  1. 01

    任務

  2. 02

    Core Build · 1 month

  3. 03

    Action · 1 week

  4. 04

    Evidence seal

  5. 05

    Portfolio correction

  6. 06

    Next mandate

Table 7.2Universe 2027: evidence pack for the cyber and digital systems candidate mission
項目記録状況時期
F1Annual mandate recordPLANNEDafter the Q2 2027 alignment
F2Core Build recordPLANNEDone month before the exercise
F3演習の証拠PLANNEDduring the Action week
F4Decision packetsPLANNEDexercise state only
F5Proof receiptsPLANNEDscoped to each recorded check
F6After-action reportPLANNEDwithin one quarter
F7Upgrade docketPLANNEDrouted to the Portfolio
F8Portfolio renewalPLANNED2027 global annual edition
F9Public synthesisPLANNEDpublic-safe extracts only

使命

ID
MSN-GS13-2027-01 · Provider failure under ransomware Universe mission
Role spine
Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead: drawn from national pathways
Receiving actors
to be identified with the mandate

7.5Handoffs and routing

Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.

Table 7.3Handoffs and routing
調査結果Routed to目的クラス
INF-001 · connectivitypublic recordreference for the 2027 seriesPUBLIC
DAT-002 · crime reportsINI-GS13-GAP-05connectivity and capacityPUBLIC
INF-005 · exploited flawsINI-GS13-OTI-02utility incident dataPUBLIC
HLT-009 · health ransomwareINI-GS13-HRW-03health ransomware and carePUBLIC
GOV-006 · capacity indexpublic recordcountry tier overlayPUBLIC
INF-008 · cable faultsINI-GS13-CBL-04cable routes and repairPUBLIC
INF-011 · update failureINI-GS13-CPF-01 · key F reviewprovider failure under ransomwarePUBLIC
SYS-012 · compound pathwayMSN-GS13-2027-01Universe candidateCONSORTIUM
Table 7.4Routing rules by publication class
クラスWhere it goesWho can see it
PUBLICthe published edition and its evidence bundleanyone
CONSORTIUMgoverned rooms of the federationconsortium members under agreement
CONTROLLEDneed-to-know channelsnamed competent actors only

7.6Feeds and signal register

Table 7.5Feeds watched from 2027
FeedProducerLatencyFeeds into
Catalogue of known exploited vulnerabilitiesCISA継続的INF-005
National Vulnerability DatabaseNIST継続的INF-005
Measuring digital development dataITU年次INF-001
Internet Crime Complaint Center reportsFBI年次DAT-002
Threat LandscapeENISA年次DAT-004
Treaty status pageUNODC継続的GOV-007
Internet shutdowns dataAccess Now年次INF-001

Escalation routes

  • none · keep monitoring
  • research question
  • project
  • risk object
  • annual publication
  • signal report
Table 7.6Signals at baseline
IDSignalCorroborationシステムルート
SIG-GS13-001Entries added to the exploited vulnerabilities catalogue in 2026 exceed those added in 20257CORROBORATEDINF · DATresearch question C-02
SIG-GS13-002Claimed ransomware attacks rose while on-chain payments fell29PARTIALFIN · DATinitiative C-03
SIG-GS13-003Submarine cable faults persist at about 200 a year1213CORROBORATEDINF · TRDinitiative C-04

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 12Lamanauskas, T. and Veverka, D., The world is coming together to strengthen submarine cable resilience (ITU news article, 2 February 2026). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 13Internet Society (ed.), Enhancing the Resilience of Submarine Internet Infrastructure (public policy brief, November 2025). Internet Society, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Downloads

Draft, not yet releasedReview copies of a draft in stewardship review. The released edition carries its DOI and replaces them.

  • 印刷

    • PDF, A4

      The designed print edition, A4: cover, imprint and licence, how to cite, contents with page numbers, every chapter, figure, table and annex.

      PDF113 pages1.0 MBTagged, with bookmarks

      SHA-256 b19e7ae9bf2cc87dc3b8e214555e21a4a2be7039d4f799910c17435452c2f2c6

    • PDF, US Letter

      The designed print edition, US Letter: cover, imprint and licence, how to cite, contents with page numbers, every chapter, figure, table and annex.

      PDF120 pages1.0 MBTagged, with bookmarks

      SHA-256 e0883201299babc3d65e3acceb937741370e86f3cf82afda84009d6bf9efc7e6

  • Web edition

  • データバンドル

    • Indicators, CSV

      22 indicators with unit, year, status and source

      NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-indicators.csv1 KB

      SHA-256 ab28713686053ae48e9584c74e23699c66f6d7c8c47ce1dd37c8a04c1380651a

    • Indicators, JSON

      The same indicators with the edition’s identity and licence

      NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-indicators.json3 KB

      SHA-256 7fa0b750ad2d327a543c2d290220bb7f71dd4b7cefbae74ab2de98722f923278

    • Findings, CSV

      12 findings with status, evidence-quality level and references

      NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-findings.csv4 KB

      SHA-256 aac2170ddf4296f2bc4e71fa29806eba229e9b0d309d823de05ccfa772d07475

  • Citation files

    • Citation, BibTeX

      For LaTeX and reference managers

      NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.bib1 KB

      SHA-256 38565702962aa10f370fd968eb50c175e3311f217da3fe0792fe7f1e352af4da

    • Citation, RIS

      For Zotero, EndNote and Mendeley

      NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.ris1 KB

      SHA-256 265735200b30730b4c2676ac2283d986c300203be608039702d0697bff6ec1ed

    • Citation, CITATION.cff

      Citation File Format 1.2.0, for GitHub, Zenodo and software catalogues

      NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.cff1 KB

      SHA-256 e09e7b3868a7b44ce5d616f61962ce573c69a530b61065e9ad3a23c58cf3c9f6

Check a file with its SHA-256: shasum -a 256 <file> (macOS, Linux) or Get-FileHash <file> (Windows). Text, tables and figures by Nexus: CC BY 4.0; each source keeps its own licence.

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 7: The 2027 agenda. In Nexus Global Cyber and digital systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of the World’s Cyber and Digital Systems. (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

報告書貢献する

Send evidence or a correction on Global Cyber and Digital Systems.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

GCRI システム・エビデンスデスクグローバル部門のリスクとレジリエンス

CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.

Your role here

What you can do from this page.

  • ReaderFound an error? Every correction is public.Corrections log
  • ContributorSend evidence, data or a correction to this desk.Contribute
  • ReviewerReview for this desk; verified reviews are credited.Become a reviewer
  • Editor, steward or boardQueues, decisions and production are in the workspace.My workspace