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Metodolojî

How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.

15 min read0 figures13 tables21 notesNR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Naverok
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1The digital layer is where the systems meet
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Provider failure under a ransomware wave
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMetodolojî
    1. A.1 Methods
    2. A.2 Model card, Cyber and Digital Sector Model v0
    3. A.3 The baseline evidence cut
    4. A.4 Evidence age and coverage
    5. A.5 Evidence cards, two anchor sources
    6. A.6 Publication acceptance record
    7. A.7 Status words
    8. A.8 How the edition is made, released and corrected
    9. A.9 Glossary and abbreviations
    10. A.10 Technical annex
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

A.1Rêbaz

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

Table A.1Methods
No.DerivationCalculationEncam
(1)Share of catalogue entries flagged for ransomware use, 3 November 2026361 ÷ 1,767≈20.4%
(2)Growth in NVD records published, 2025 against 2024, excluding rejected records (sum of four quarterly counts each year)48,150 ÷ 39,953≈20.5% more
(3)FBI reported ransomware losses against on-chain ransomware payments, 2025USD 820 million ÷ USD 32.3 million≈25 times, a scope difference, not an error
(4)Countries without a national incident response team, 2024194 − 13955
Table A.2Coupling strength scale (matrix and model card)
StrengthPênase
STRONGa disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region
MODERATEan effect is documented but buffered or slower
WEAKan effect is plausible but not documented at global scale
Table A.3Status grammar
NîşanRêgez
Raportkirîvalue as issued by its source, with year
Inferredreasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement
TexmînkirîNexus analytical value with stated method
Senaryoconditional on stated assumptions
Expert inputstructured editorial judgement awaiting evidence

A.2Model card, Cyber and Digital Sector Model v0

Model ID
MDL-GS13-CYBER · v0.1
Armanc
represent the global digital layer and its couplings to water, energy, food, health and nature
Malbat
graph-based system of systems
Têketin
the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
Rêbaz
expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
Erêkirin
none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
Nediyarî
qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
Domain of validity
global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
Reproducibility
strength table and sources published in this edition
20couplings

typed in v0

2strong

documented within one season

4moderate

documented, buffered

14weak

plausible, undocumented

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID
DC-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-B0
Cure
baseline documentary cut
Resolution policy
pinned · as of 30 September 2026
Sources pinned
48 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
Model runs
none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
Digest
computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
Supersedes
nothing, first cut of the series
Superseded by
the 2027 cyber and digital systems annual cut

Xetên eslê daneyê

  1. 01

    source edition

  2. 02

    pinned citation

  3. 03

    finding

  4. 04

    page

  5. 05

    publication record

Table A.4From the baseline cut to the federation cut
ElementBaseline 20262027 global annual
Çavkanîcited global publications, pinned by editionnational, regional and sector cuts through one graph
Analysisstated methods and editorial estimatestyped analysis specifications
ModelCyber and Digital Sector Model v0 specificationmodel runs with receipts
Encamtwelve baseline findingsfindings re-bound to federation evidence
Nirxandinfive passes scheduledfive passes on the exact digest

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

Table A.5Evidence age and coverage
NîşaneÇavdêrîkirîHatiye weşandinRîtmNext release
Internet use and coverage2025November 2025annualnext Facts and Figures
Victim-reported cybercrime20252026annualnext IC3 report
Intrusion vectors in the EUJuly 2024 to June 2025October 2025annualnext Threat Landscape
Known exploited vulnerabilities2021 to 20263 November 2026continuouscontinuous
National cybersecurity capacity20242024periodicnext index
Treaty signatures and parties20263 November 2026continuouscontinuous
Submarine cable faultsabout 200 a yearFebruary 2026one-offfollow-up reports
Internet shutdowns2025March 2026annualnext KeepItOn report
Ransomware payments2025February 2026annualnext analysis
Health ransomware trends2016 to 20212022one-offfollow-up studies
Table A.6Coverage by system at baseline
PergalVegirtinThinnest dimension
ConnectivityGOODquality and affordability by country
Crime and fraudPARTIALlosses outside the United States
Threat landscapePARTIALregions beyond the EU and US
VulnerabilitiesGOODtime to patch, by vendor
RêveberîGOODtreaty status after access
Critical servicesTHINutility incident data on a common basis
TenduristîPARTIALdata after 2021
BerxwedanPARTIALtested capabilities beyond recovery from one update failure
Table A.7Designed empty states: what is not bound, what would fill it and why
WarSource that would fill itBlocker
Global cybercrime losses on one basisnational police and crime agencies; UNODCthe FBI series covers United States victims only and no common global series was found; a commercial lower-bound figure for receipts by illicit crypto addresses33 measures flows, not losses, and is not used
Ransomware: reconciliation of claimed attacks, payments and reported lossesChainalysis29; FBI IC32; national reporting channelsthe series use different bases and are not reconciled in this edition
Third-party involvement and exploitation shares in breaches, 2026Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report 202632only the executive summary was opened (third-party involvement 48%, exploitation 31% of known initial access vectors); a commercial dataset, not bound in this edition
Final count of people affected by the 2024 health claims processor breachUS Department of Health and Human Services breach portal; company notice34the federal breach portal lists 192.7 million individuals34; whether the count is final is not stated
Cyber incidents at utilities, by sector and regionoperators, regulators and national authoritiesincident data are not published on a common basis; only advisories on compromise were opened26
Time between vulnerability disclosure and exploitation, by vendorCISA catalogue7; ENISA3the catalogue holds dates added, not dates of first exploitation; only ENISA’s statement of exploitation within days is cited
Cybersecurity workforce shortfallISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study6the 2025 study states that it includes no estimate of the workforce gap
Share of Internet users with digital safety skillsITU Facts and Figures 202548only 88 countries have submitted ICT skills data since 2020, rarely for all skill areas; no global share is published
Financial stability losses from cyber incidentsIMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2024, chapter 335only the chapter abstract was read; no figure is used
Operation of the UN Global Mechanism after 2026, from the final report textworking group final report A/80/25743the report of 24 July 2025 was opened and sets out elements for the Global Mechanism, endorsed by the General Assembly10; operation after 2026 is not yet observed
Treaty ratifications after the access dateUN Treaty Collection; UNODC9status changes continuously; the page was read on 3 November 2026 only
Application dates of EU acts after any later amendmentOfficial Journal consolidated versions19202122the texts as first published were opened; later amendments were not checked
Capability rungs beyond recovery from one update failure and asset freezesoperators, regulators, ministriesnot reviewed
Cost of a data breach, by sector and regionIBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 202538report is gated; only the IBM release was read and no figure is used

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Issued by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (October 2025) from 4,875 incidents curated from open sources and member state reports. Annual. Role: binds DAT-004 and the intrusion vector figure.

EVD-GS13-001

ENISA Threat Landscape 20253

Compiled by the ITU from official national statistics and ITU estimates (November 2025). Annual. Role: binds INF-001 and the connectivity tiles.

EVD-GS13-002

ITU Facts and Figures 202548

Released 3 November 2026, after the evidence close. Annual. Role: context only. It binds no baseline claim and no figure in this edition.

EVD-GS13-003

ITU Facts and Figures 20261 (post-close, context only)

Table A.8Quality dimensions at baseline
DimensionEVD-GS13-001EVD-GS13-002
Completenessopen sources and shared reports; not a census2025 aggregates are ITU estimates computed with the published method
Timelinessabout 4 months after the period endsweeks after the end of the year
Revisionannual editionannual edition with revised back series
Method transparencymethodology publishedindicator definitions published
External validationreviewed by national liaison and response teamsmember state review

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

  • FBI IC32: complaints by state and sector tables
  • ENISA3: incident dataset by sector
  • ITU4: country tier table
  • CISA7: dates of first exploitation, if published

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

Table A.9Publication acceptance record
KomQada erdnigarîTiştDerbasN/ALi bendê
D1Identity and scope8800
D2Source and data12912
D3Analysis and models12381
D4Findings and claims9801
D5Figures, tables, maps10622
D6Editorial and citations10802
D7Review and approval130013
D8Artefact and design12705
D9Registry and release9009

Publication gate

Conditions met
14 of 23 at evidence close
Blocking problems
none recorded
Open conditions
reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer

Not applicable at baseline

Model runs
first runs in Q1 2027
Nexşe
plates in Q2 2027
Waivers
tune

A.7Status words

Table A.10The status every value carries
RewşEv tê çi wateyê
ÇavdêrîkirîMeasured directly and published by the source.
RaportkirîPublished statistics of an official or institutional source.
Hatiye daxuyandinStated by the body concerned; not independently measured.
TexmînkirîA Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A.
ModelkirîProduced by a stated model from cited inputs.
InferredReasoned from cited evidence; not measured.
PêşbînîA projection by the cited source.
SimulatedA simulation result under stated assumptions.
SenaryoA conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction.
Expert inputExpert judgement, recorded with its basis.
CandidateProposed for a later edition; not yet evidence.
Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject.

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

GavWhat happensÇavkanî
01 Evidence arrives from the pillarsFoundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s.
02 The cut is sealedOn the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on.
03 The edition is assembledThe edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide.
04 The keys turnAt the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward.
05 The gate opensA named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit.
06 Signed and depositedThe PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI.
07 Published on its desk’s siteOnly then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part.
08 Corrections go to StandardsMethod and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

Table A.11Series terms
TêgehWate
Baseline Editionthe inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series
WEFH+Bcyber and digital systems, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core
Girêdana typed dependency through which one system transmits to another
Protection gapthe share of losses not covered by insurance
Capability ladderLISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED
EQLevidence-quality level, 1–5
Evidence cuta frozen resolution of exact sources and versions
NNC · NLC · NWGNational Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups
Table A.12Abbreviations used in this edition
AbbreviationExpansion
CIRTcomputer incident response team
CISAUS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
DORADigital Operational Resilience Act
ENISAEuropean Union Agency for Cybersecurity
FBI IC3Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Complaint Center
GCIGlobal Cybersecurity Index
ITUYekîtiya Têlekomunîkasyonê ya Navneteweyî
KEVknown exploited vulnerabilities
NIS2second Network and Information Security Directive
NVDNational Vulnerability Database
OToperational technology
WEFWorld Economic Forum

A.10Technical annex

Table A.13Technical annex
BeşAnnexNaverokRewş
A.1Indicator definitionsthe global indicator set, with units and sourcesIN THIS EDITION
A.2Coupling strengthsthe twenty-cell matrix and its rationaleIN THIS EDITION
A.3Scenario specificationSCN-GS13-CPF-01 assumptions and signpostsIN THIS EDITION
A.4Capability placementsrung evidence for fifteen functionsIN THIS EDITION
A.5Model diagnosticsfirst runs and validation2027
A.6Sensitivity analysesinfluence of coupling strengths2027
A.7Route and exchange notescards for the major shared cable routes and exchange pointsWITH REGIONAL EDITIONS
A.8Review statementspass-by-pass review recordAT RELEASE

A.1 · indicator definition: national incident response team

Construct
a national team with responsibility for responding to cyber incidents, as reported by countries
Yekîne
count of countries
Rêbaz
country questionnaire compiled by the ITU for the Global Cybersecurity Index
Çavkanî
ITU Global Cybersecurity Index 20244
Nediyarî
self-reported; verified with country focal points where possible
Sînorên naskirî
presence of a team does not measure its capacity, staffing or independence

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 33Chainalysis (ed.), Crypto Crime Reaches Record High in 2025 as Nation-State Sanctions Evasion Moves On-Chain at Scale, introduction to the 2026 Crypto Crime Report, 8 January 2026 (illicit cryptocurrency addresses received at least USD 154 billion in 2025, a lower-bound estimate; not used for a figure). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  2. 29Chainalysis (ed.), Ransomware Payments Stagnate for Second Consecutive Year, While Attacks Escalate (analysis dated 26 February 2026; on-chain data). Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 2FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2025 IC3 Annual Report. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 32Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report, executive summary (incidents 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; third-party involvement in 48% of breaches and exploitation of vulnerabilities in 31% of known initial access vectors; a commercial dataset and no figure is bound). Verizon, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 34US Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (ed.), Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS, Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information, archive listing (Change Healthcare, Inc., business associate, hacking or IT incident, submitted 19 July 2024: 192,700,000 individuals affected, the largest entry on the portal). HHS OCR, Washington. Observation year 2024 (count as listed at the access date). Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 26CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, joint advisory AA24-038A (7 February 2024). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 7CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, machine-readable file, catalogue version 2026.11.03 (1,767 entries; read on 2026-11-03; entries counted by the editors from the date added and the ransomware-use flag). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (October 2025; incidents from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 6ISC2 (ed.), 2025 ISC2 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (December 2025; 16,029 respondents; states that it includes no estimate of the workforce gap). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 48ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2025 (released 17 November 2025; pages on Internet use, mobile network coverage, Internet use in urban and rural areas and ICT skills opened, with the press release; 2025 aggregates are ITU estimates). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 35IMF (ed.), Global Financial Stability Report, April 2024, chapter 3, Cyber Risk: A Growing Concern for Macrofinancial Stability (Crossref record and chapter abstract opened; no figure is used). International Monetary Fund, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 43United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Final report of the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies 2021 to 2025, A/80/257, transmitted by note of the Secretary-General of 24 July 2025 (includes additional elements for the Global Mechanism). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 10United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution 80/16 on the final report of the open-ended working group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (endorses A/80/257; Global Mechanism from 2026). United Nations, New York, December 2025. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 9UNODC (ed.), United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, convention page (status: 96 signatories and 3 States Parties at the access date; opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 19Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 20Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 November 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 21Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 22Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (AI Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 38IBM (ed.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2025, conducted by the Ponemon Institute (600 organisations, breaches from March 2024 to February 2025), as described in the IBM release of 30 July 2025 (global average cost USD 4.44 million; the gated report itself was not opened and no figure is used). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  20. 1POST-CLOSE, context only: ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2026 (released 3 November 2026, after the 30 September 2026 evidence close; supports no baseline claim). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026 (estimates, with 2025 comparison). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 4ITU (ed.), Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 (fifth edition, collection years 2023 to 2024). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

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Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Annex A: Methodology. In Nexus Global Cyber and digital systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of the World’s Cyber and Digital Systems. (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-SECTOR-CYBER-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

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