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Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems

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Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026

Imprint

편집자
Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor, the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI)
공식 발행인
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto
Report number
NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE
근거 마감
30 September 2026, cut DC-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-B0
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Draft under stewardship review; not yet released
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Issued at deposit
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Cite as
Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI). https://therisk.global/nexus-reports/editions/sr-02/

목차

  1. ·

    Executive summary

  2. 1

    Chapter 1. Lifelines fail together

  3. 2

    Chapter 2. Key findings

  4. 3

    Chapter 3. Systems and sectors at baseline

  5. 4

    Chapter 4. Risks and capability

  6. 5

    Chapter 5. Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure

  7. 6

    Chapter 6. Readings from the other desks

  8. 7

    Chapter 7. The 2027 agenda

  9. 8

    Chapter 8. Systems in depth

  10. A

    Annex A. Methodology

  11. B

    Annex B. Data appendix

  12. C

    Annex C. References and record

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Executive summary

The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.

6 min read1 figure0 tables12 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

S.1Abstract

Lifeline systems are the networks other systems run on: power, water, communications, transport and health services. The 2025 and 2026 evidence shows the same mechanisms at work in very different events. The Iberian blackout of 28 April 2025 came from interacting factors, including voltage control gaps, oscillations and generator disconnections1. A single software update on 18 July 2024 affected an estimated 8.5 million Windows devices4. Government agencies assessed in February 2024 that state-sponsored actors had pre-positioned in the networks of communications, energy, transport and water operators, with some intrusions lasting at least five years2. ENISA analysed 4,875 incidents in a single twelve-month period3. Asset condition and investment are part of the picture: the 2025 US report card grades the country’s infrastructure C with a USD 3.6 trillion ten-year gap6. Around 199 subsea cable faults occur each year, about two thirds from fishing and transport vessels7. War adds direct damage: Ukraine’s recovery needs reached USD 587.7 billion and Gulf power and desalination plants were struck from March 20261213. This baseline reads these events as mechanisms, not as a list. It ranks no country or operator, attributes no attack and recommends no policy.

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the lifeline systems baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

  1. Yes: hazards, cyber operations, conflict and software faults recur across sectors.12410

    Do lifeline failures have common causes?Reported

  2. Through shared dependence on power, telecoms and software.14

    How do failures spread?Reported

  3. Grades are mixed: C overall in the 2025 US report card.6

    Is the physical base sound?Reported

  4. About 199 faults a year; most are accidental.7

    How exposed are subsea links?Reported

  5. More than USD 250 billion a year to infrastructure from three hazards.10

    How large are the losses?Reported

  6. It adds direct damage to power and water systems.1213

    Does war change the picture?Reported

  7. Concentrated demand on local grids.89

    What does digital load add?Reported

  8. Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure. SCN-SR02-PWR-01

    What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-006

Subsea cable faults averaged 199 a year from 2010 to 2023. About two thirds came from fishing and transport vessels, and intent is hard to establish.

Figure S.1Subsea cable faults a year, 2010 to 2023
항목Bar, scaled to the largest value값
Average faults a year199
of which external aggression (about two thirds)≈133

Source: TeleGeography7. The second bar is a Nexus derivation, method (4), and is approximate.

Most faults are accidents, so route diversity and repair capacity matter more than detecting intent. Governments around the Baltic investigate each fault as potential sabotage, and the analyst notes that severing a few cables is noise rather than a signal7.

S.4At a glance

199faults a year

subsea cables7

8.5million

devices, July 20244

4,875사고

ENISA, to June 20253

3.6USD trillion

US ten-year gap6

>250USD billion

annual hazard loss10

390USD billion

annual disruption cost, LMICs11

S.5What each steward reads in it

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading lifelines as one dependent network.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people lifeline failure arrives as a dark home, a dry tap or a card that will not work.

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Disruption is costly, resilient options are reported to return several times their cost, and the investment gap is large in places.

NEXUS

종합

Lifeline risk is well described event by event and thinly measured as a system.

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

A baseline: the 2026 state of the world’s critical infrastructure and lifeline systems and the couplings through which it carries risk into other systems. It synthesises published evidence and ranks no country, company or asset.

What it is not

Not an infrastructure-security ranking, a threat attribution, a vulnerability disclosure or an assessment of any operator, regulator or government. Operation, protection and recovery of infrastructure rest with owners, operators and competent authorities.

What comes next

National, regional and sector evidence feeds the 2027 lifeline systems edition through the federation. Each edition reports what changed against this baseline: observations, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  10. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

Lifelines fail together

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

6 min read2 figures2 tables11 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is lifeline systems risk concentrated?
  • Which couplings carry lifeline systems shocks into other systems?
  • Which lifeline systems capabilities hold under compound stress?
  • What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five mechanism chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • 시나리오
  • Three lenses
  • 포트폴리오

1.2The argument

Lifeline systems are usually reported by sector: grid operators, water utilities, telecom carriers, hospitals. The 2025 and 2026 evidence reads them as one dependent network. Power runs the water works and the exchanges, the exchanges run the control systems, and software runs all of them142.

The causes repeat. A grid event in 2025 came from interacting technical factors1. A software update in 2024 reached millions of machines in hours4. State-sponsored actors were reported inside operator networks for years2. Fishing and anchoring faults hit subsea links about 199 times a year7. War now adds direct strikes on power and desalination plants13.

The physical base is uneven. The 2025 US report card gives energy D+ and drinking water C−, with a USD 3.6 trillion ten-year gap6. In low- and middle-income countries, disruptions cost at least USD 390 billion a year, and the World Bank finds that resilient options return about USD 4 per USD 111.

The edition therefore asks the same four questions of every event: what was the common cause, how did it spread, what was shared, and what threshold was crossed. It makes no attribution and ranks no operator.

Figure 1.1How large are the published lifeline loss and need estimates? USD billion

Estimates of need and loss are large and drawn from different sources. The three bars use different periods and methods, so they show scale only and are not added101112.

항목Bar, scaled to the largest value값
Ukraine recovery needs, ten years587.7
Disruption cost in LMICs, per year (at least)390
Hazard loss to infrastructure, per year (more than)250

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.

Figure ID FIG-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

>250USD billion

annual loss to infrastructure, three hazards10

≥390USD billion

annual disruption cost in LMICs11

587.7USD billion

Ukraine needs over ten years12

≈4USD per USD 1

reported return on resilient options11

1.3The six-sector nexus: twenty couplings across five assessed sectors

The lifeline systems-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their lifeline systems content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings across the six sectors

Each line is one coupling from one sector to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events. Infrastructure: not assessed in this edition’s coupling matrix, so it is drawn hollow with no couplings. The hexagon is the estate doctrine: six sectors and fifteen relations.

  • Strong
  • 중간 규모 손실
  • Weak
  • Not assessed in this edition

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated. Hexagon: the estate doctrine (Signature).

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT 물·STRONG
cooling · hydro
MODERATE
irrigation · processing
STRONG
safe supply · hospitals
WEAK
flows
ENE 에너지STRONG
pumping · treatment · desalination
·STRONG
cold chain · processing
STRONG
hospitals · cooling · telecoms
WEAK
land use
FOO 식량WEAK
withdrawals
WEAK
bioenergy
·MODERATE
nutrition · food safety
WEAK
토지 전용
HLT 보건WEAK
workforce
WEAK
workforce
WEAK
labour
·WEAK
residues
BIO 생물다양성MODERATE
natural infrastructure
WEAK
hydrology
WEAK
pollination
WEAK
zoonoses
·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    ENE → INF → HLT

    A grid failure removes power from exchanges, pumps and hospitals together.

    Reported 2025 blackout1

  2. 02

    DAT → INF

    A software fault spreads through a shared vendor to many operators.

    Reported 2024 outage4

  3. 03

    CON → ENE, WAT

    Strikes on co-located power and desalination plants remove two services at once.

    Reported 2026 Gulf strikes13

  4. 04

    CLI → INF → FIN

    Hazards damage assets and the cost lands on budgets.

    Reported GAR 202510

  5. 05

    AIC → ENE

    Clustered digital load tightens local grids.

    Reported US 202598

1.4Reinforcing loops

A shock entering either system of a loop can return amplified through the other.

Table 1.2Pairs of systems where both directions are rated strong
LoopFirst directionSecond direction
WAT and ENEWater to energy: cooling · hydroEnergy to water: pumping · treatment · desalination
A causal-loop reading of the matrix (Sterman, Business Dynamics, 2000): structural, from estimated strengths, not a measured feedback.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  9. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  10. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Key findings

Twelve findings carry the lifeline systems baseline. They are grouped by coupling and never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

5 min read1 figure0 tables12 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-006

Subsea cable faults averaged 199 a year from 2010 to 2023. About two thirds came from fishing and transport vessels, and intent is hard to establish.

Figure 2.1Subsea cable faults a year, 2010 to 2023
항목Bar, scaled to the largest value값
Average faults a year199
of which external aggression (about two thirds)≈133

Source: TeleGeography7. The second bar is a Nexus derivation, method (4), and is approximate.

Implication

Most faults are accidents, so route diversity and repair capacity matter more than detecting intent. Governments around the Baltic investigate each fault as potential sabotage, and the analyst notes that severing a few cables is noise rather than a signal7.

What would move it

Repair-vessel investment, route diversity and the outcome of Baltic investigations would each move this finding.

2.2인프라

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-001

    The Iberian blackout of 28 April 2025 came from interacting factors, including voltage control gaps, oscillations and generator disconnections, according to the ENTSO-E final report of 20 March 2026.1

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-005

    The 2025 US report card grades national infrastructure C, with a USD 3.6 trillion ten-year investment gap and energy at D+.6

  3. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-006

    Subsea cable faults averaged 199 a year from 2010 to 2023; about two thirds came from fishing and transport vessels, and intent is hard to establish.7

2.3CYB

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-002

    Agencies assessed in February 2024 that state-sponsored actors were pre-positioning on networks in communications, energy, transportation and water sectors, with some intrusions lasting at least five years.2

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-003

    ENISA analysed 4,875 incidents between 1 July 2024 and 30 June 2025 for the EU threat landscape.3

2.4Data and digital

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-004

    A single software update affected an estimated 8.5 million Windows devices on 18 July 2024.4

2.5Climate forcing

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CLI-007

    UNDRR puts the annual average loss to critical infrastructure from floods, tropical cyclones and earthquakes at more than USD 250 billion.10

2.6개발

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DEV-008

    Disruptions to power, transport, telecommunications and water cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year, and resilient options return about USD 4 per USD 1.11

2.7CON

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-009

    Ukraine’s ten-year recovery and reconstruction needs are USD 587.7 billion, with energy and extractives at USD 90.6 billion, and direct damage to energy and extractives reached USD 24.8 billion by the end of 2025.12

  2. ReportedEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-010

    Power and desalination plants in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates were reported struck from March 2026, in a region where desalination supplies most drinking water.13

2.8AIC

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-011

    Data centres made up half of US electricity demand growth in 2025, and nearly half of US data-centre capacity sits in five regional clusters.98

2.9시스템

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure and limited repair capacity. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  8. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  10. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  11. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Systems and sectors at baseline

6 min read0 figures2 tables15 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

ENE · Power

Iberian blackout, interacting causes

2025

final report published 20 March 2026.

보고값2025ENTSO-E1

DAT · Digital

Windows devices hit by one update

8.5million

estimate, 18 July 2024.

Reported2024Microsoft4

INF · Subsea

Cable faults a year, average

199a year

about two thirds from external aggression.

Reported2010 to 2023TeleGeography7

FIN · Investment

US ten-year infrastructure gap

3.6USD trillion

overall grade C.

보고값2025ASCE6

CLI · Hazard

Annual loss to critical infrastructure, three hazards

>250USD billion

floods, cyclones and earthquakes.

보고값2025UNDRR10

SYS · Cross-system

Ukraine recovery needs, ten years

587.7USD billion

energy and extractives USD 90.6 billion.

보고값2025RDNA512

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through lifeline systems, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries lifeline systems risk into each domain.

Table 3.1Each domain read in words, not scored
영역Posture at baseline연계상태
WATWater works depend on power and telecoms; desalination in the Gulf was struck in 2026.ENE → WATReported EQL 3
ENEGrid failure from interacting factors in 2025; data-centre load concentrating on local grids.ENE → allReported EQL 4
FOOCold chains and logistics depend on power and telecoms; no consolidated series here.ENE → FOOExpert input EQL 2
HLTHospitals depend on power, water and communications; not consolidated here.ENE, WAT → HLTInferred EQL 2
BIONatural infrastructure can buffer hazards; evidence not consolidated here.BIO → WATExpert input EQL 2
CLIMore than USD 250 billion a year of loss to infrastructure from three hazards.CLI → INFReported EQL 3
INFThe core system: US grade C and a USD 3.6 trillion gap; 199 cable faults a year.the core systemReported EQL 4
FINResilient options return about USD 4 per USD 1; Ukraine needs USD 587.7 billion.INF → FINReported EQL 3
DATOne software update reached 8.5 million devices; incident data are not on a common basis.DAT ↔ INFReported EQL 4
AICData-centre load clusters in a few regions; half of US electricity growth in 2025.AIC → ENEReported EQL 4
MINPower equipment and cables depend on refined minerals; the top refiner’s average share rose to 72% in 202540.MIN → INFReported EQL 3
TRDShipping lanes and ports carry cable ships and equipment; chokepoint data sit in sibling editions.INF ↔ TRDInferred EQL 2

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on lifeline systems, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Table 3.2Sectors: baseline evidence and the exposure to watch
코드부문Baseline evidenceExposure to watchEvidence coverage
GS-00Cross-systemlifelines couple every sector14power loss with telecom failurePARTIAL
GS-01물water works depend on power13outage and strikesTHIN
GS-02에너지blackout of 28 April 20251voltage and frequency eventsGOOD
GS-03Food and agrifoodcold chains depend on poweroutage during heatTHIN
GS-04보건hospitals depend on lifelinesloss of power and waterTHIN
GS-05Finance and economyUSD 390 billion a year of disruption cost11payment and market outagesPARTIAL
GS-06개발losses concentrate in lower-income countries11weak maintenancePARTIAL
GS-07기후hazard losses above USD 250 billion a year10floods, cyclones, heatGOOD
GS-08재난cascading outages after hazards10concurrent hazardsPARTIAL
GS-09인프라US grade C and USD 3.6 trillion gap6ageing assetsGOOD
GS-10도시dense dependence on power and telecomsmulti-sector outageTHIN
GS-11생물다양성natural buffers for infrastructureloss of buffersTHIN
GS-12지구 관측positioning and timing signals underpin networkssignal interferenceTHIN
GS-13사이버와 디지털pre-positioning in four sectors2; 4,875 incidents3disruptive attacksGOOD
GS-14정책critical-entity and network security rules1617implementation gapsPARTIAL
GS-15과학interdependency science is mature2829data at operating scalePARTIAL

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  6. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  7. 40IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  10. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 17European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  14. 28Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (DOI 10.1109/37.969131; Crossref record and abstract read). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131back
  15. 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back

Risks and capability

Four global risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence; loss metrics are added only where they can be modelled.

6 min read0 figures1 table19 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR02-INF-001

    Grid failure with telecom and water knock-on

    동인
    interacting technical factors in a synchronous grid1
    노출
    cities, hospitals, water works, exchanges
    취약성
    uneven stabilisation capability; shared dependence on power
    역량
    black-start plans; priority supply; operator coordination
    캐스케이드
    ENE → INF → WAT, HLT
    예측 시계
    1 to 3 years
  2. InferredEQL 3RSK-SR02-CYB-002

    Pre-positioned access in operator networks

    동인
    state-sponsored access reported in four sectors2
    노출
    communications, energy, transport and water operators
    취약성
    internet-facing devices; long dwell time
    역량
    logging; phishing-resistant authentication; segmentation5
    캐스케이드
    DAT → INF → HLT
    예측 시계
    1 to 5 years
  3. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR02-DAT-003

    Common-vendor software failure

    동인
    one faulty update on a widely deployed platform4
    노출
    airlines, hospitals, banks, broadcasters
    취약성
    concentrated vendors; automatic update paths
    역량
    staged roll-out; manual fallback; recovery playbooks
    캐스케이드
    DAT → INF → FIN, HLT
    예측 시계
    연간
  4. InferredEQL 3RSK-SR02-INF-004

    Subsea link loss with limited repair capacity

    동인
    about 199 faults a year, mostly accidental7
    노출
    island states, landing-point regions, cloud routes
    취약성
    few repair vessels; ageing fleet15
    역량
    route diversity; repair agreements; cable protection7
    캐스케이드
    INF → DAT → FIN
    예측 시계
    1 to 5 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence at the global level, from a policy listing to performance in real events.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
기능Rung단계Strongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationEXISTSsecurity and continuity standards widespread; implementation uneven52022
Monitoring and observationADEQUATEthreat reporting by agencies; operator data uneven23
조기경보EXISTSadvisories from agencies; no common cross-sector warning
Preparedness and planningEXISTScritical-entity rules in force or being applied1618
Redundancy and reservesLISTEDblack-start and spare-capacity data not consolidated
대응DEMONSTRATEDoperators restored services after the 2024 and 2025 events14
Continuity of critical servicesEXISTSpriority supply to hospitals and water works in many systems; testing uneven
복구DEMONSTRATEDIberian grid restored; causes published1
AdaptationEXISTSresilience standards and financing advice published1123
사회적 보호LISTEDsupport during long outages not consolidated
금융과 보험EXISTSresilience financing guidance; protection gaps in sibling editions1011
Institutional coordinationEXISTSEU and national frameworks; cross-border practice uneven161718
Technical infrastructureEXISTSageing assets in places6
인력LISTEDskills for operations and cable repair reported thin15
Research capacityADEQUATEinterdependency science mature282933
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  7. 20ISO (ed.), ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: Business continuity management systems: Requirements, edition 2 (30 October 2019; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 22IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, including IEC 62443-2-1:2024, Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners, edition 2.0 (7 August 2024), catalogue record read; no figure is used. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  11. 18The White House (ed.), National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), 30 April 2024 (archived page; sector risk management agencies for 16 sectors; biennial National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 23OECD (ed.), Good Governance for Critical Infrastructure Resilience, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies (17 April 2019; DOI 10.1787/02f0e5a0-en, Crossref record read). OECD Publishing, Paris. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/02f0e5a0-enback
  14. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  15. 17European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 28Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (DOI 10.1109/37.969131; Crossref record and abstract read). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131back
  18. 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back
  19. 33Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497, 51 to 59, 2013 (DOI 10.1038/nature12047; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature12047back

Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure

A conditional statement under stated assumptions, never a prediction.

2 min read0 figures0 tables2 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

5.1가정

Scenario SCN-SR02-PWR-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.

기준선
the 2026 reference state in this edition
동인
a regional power loss during a heat wave, coinciding with a software or cloud outage at a shared vendor
Analogues
Iberian blackout, 2025; global software outage, 202414
개입 조치
none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case
Run state
narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027

5.2The cascade, step by step

  1. 1

    ENE → INF

    voltage and frequency events trip generation; the grid separates

    2025

  2. 2

    INF → DAT

    exchanges and data centres run on batteries and generators

    2025

  3. 3

    DAT → INF

    a vendor outage removes remote management and payment services

    2024

  4. 4

    INF → WAT

    pumping and treatment stop or run on reserves

    2026

  5. 5

    INF → HLT

    hospitals move to emergency power; dispatch and records degrade

    2024 · 2025

  6. 6

    INF → FIN

    payments and markets pause; losses accumulate

    2024

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

How the shock in scenario SCN-SR02-PWR-01 would travel through Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems‘s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.

단계진행 내용출처
01 Energy to infrastructureVoltage and frequency events trip generation; the grid separates. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition SR-02, scenario SCN-SR02-PWR-01, step 1
02 Infrastructure to datExchanges and data centres run on batteries and generators. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition SR-02, scenario SCN-SR02-PWR-01, step 2
03 DAT to infrastructureA vendor outage removes remote management and payment services. Analogue or source: 2024.Edition SR-02, scenario SCN-SR02-PWR-01, step 3
04 Infrastructure to waterPumping and treatment stop or run on reserves. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition SR-02, scenario SCN-SR02-PWR-01, step 4
05 Infrastructure to healthHospitals move to emergency power; dispatch and records degrade. Analogue or source: 2024 · 2025.Edition SR-02, scenario SCN-SR02-PWR-01, step 5
06 Infrastructure to financePayments and markets pause; losses accumulate. Analogue or source: 2024.Edition SR-02, scenario SCN-SR02-PWR-01, step 6

A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026, scenario SCN-SR02-PWR-01 (2026); Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Readings from the other desks

The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

16 min read0 figures8 tables39 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

데스크판상태식별자
GCRI Systems EvidenceSystems Evidence: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026Drafted, in stewardship reviewNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
GRF Public DeliberationOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
GRA Capital ReadinessCapital Readiness: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026준비 중NR-GRA-SR-02-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Standards ProgressOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Academy CapabilityOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Index MeasurementOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading lifelines as one dependent network. Common causes recur across sectors, failures spread through shared dependence on power, telecoms and software, and recovery is limited by thresholds such as black-start capability and repair capacity. Evidence is strongest for single events and weakest for cross-sector dependency data.

INF-001 · CYB-002 · DAT-004 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people lifeline failure arrives as a dark home, a dry tap or a card that will not work. The baseline asks that public debate treat infrastructure as shared and interdependent, and keep recovery, not only prevention, in view.

INF-001 · DAT-004 · DEV-008

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Disruption is costly, resilient options are reported to return several times their cost, and the investment gap is large in places116. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

INF-005 · DEV-008

NEXUS

종합

Lifeline risk is well described event by event and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind dependency data, test the power and telecom compound loss, and map recovery thresholds before the next large event.

SYS-012 · L-01 · L-03

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for lifeline systems. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
Quarter판질문경계
Q1State and Agenda올해 무엇이 중요하며, 출발점은 어디입니까?observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2Evidence and BuildWhat new evidence and capability exist?a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3스트레스 테스트 및 준비 태세What do scenarios and tests show?simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4Annual Synthesis and RenewalWhat changed in the year, and what renews?release follows review, not event publicity deadlines
Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or body역할Contribution route
GCRI CanadaLead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
글로벌 리스크 포럼(Global Risks Forum, GRF)leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
글로벌 리스크 얼라이언스(Global Risks Alliance, GRA)finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standardspreparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methodsStandards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Risk Academylearning pathways tied to the agenda questionsAcademy gateway · learning by review
Reports strategic deskslifeline chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readinessstrategic editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

  • Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
  • Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
  • Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

  • Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
  • Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
  • Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

Power runs the exchanges, the exchanges run the control systems, and software runs both. Treating each sector alone understates how a fault in one becomes a fault in all. This edition reads the network.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

Lifelines are one network

Prevention fails sometimes. Restoration after the Iberian blackout and the 2024 software outage shows that recovery capability is a distinct and measurable asset.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Recovery is part of resilience

Agency reporting describes long-lived access to operator networks rather than visible outages. The risk is a capability held in reserve, which is hard to count and easy to underestimate.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Cyber evidence is mostly about access

The investment gap is large, and resilient options are reported to return several times their cost. Yet maintenance, coordination and data matter at least as much as capital.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Money is not the whole answer

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 lifeline systems readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 lifeline systems readiness pack
항목등록State at baselineFirst 2027 entry
E1Global risk state deltabaseline set by this editionchanges against the baseline
E2WEFH+B state deltafive global system readings setindicator updates and freshness
E3Agenda and Portfolio movementeight agenda items · 6 proposed objectsadmission decisions
E4Federation delivery registernational chapters in preparationnational chapters
E5Consortium capability registernational consortia formingfirst contributions
E6Leadership questions and challenges아직 없음first challenge log
E7Foundry technical statenational environments preparedfirst federation cut
E8Publication candidatestwelve findings carried forwardPUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9Universe readinessone candidate missionadmission and role spine
E10Correction register없음first federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

  • 발행
  • Hold
  • Needs evidence
  • 제한됨
  • 대체됨

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

  • IN FORCE
  • 채택됨
  • PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE
  • PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
도구기구범위상태관련성
핵심 주체 회복력 지침16유럽연합EUIN FORCEcritical entities
NIS2 지침17유럽연합EUIN FORCEnetwork security
National Security Memorandum 2218미국USISSUED 2024infrastructure security
Sendai Framework 2015 to 203019UNDRRglobalADOPTED 2015infrastructure damage target
NIST 사이버보안 프레임워크 2.05NISTglobal usePUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYcyber risk
ISO/IEC 27001 information security21ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYsecurity management
ISO 31000 risk management27ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYrisk process
Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals26CISAUSPUBLISHED · GUIDANCEbaseline practices
ISO 22301 business continuity20ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYcontinuity
IEC 62443 control-system security22IECglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYoperational technology
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, articles 112 to 11524국제연합globalIN FORCEsubmarine cables

Changed since 2024

  • The ENTSO-E final report on the Iberian blackout was published on 20 March 20261
  • The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 added a Govern function in 20245
  • The EU published an action plan on cable security in 202538

To watch in 2027

  • Member State identification of critical entities under the EU directive16
  • Implementation of national security rules for operators1718
  • Application of international humanitarian law to objects indispensable to civilians25

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers lifeline systems assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

질문
What does the published evidence establish about the world’s critical infrastructure and lifeline systems and its couplings?
Sources searched
agency advisories; operator and regulator reports; peer-reviewed interdependency literature; loss statistics
기간
releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
선정
sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
다음 단계
systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and assessments
참조 번호유형연도역할Used for
Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly28journal article2001프레임워크interdependencies
Buldyrev et al.29journal article2010supports연쇄 장애
Koks et al.30journal article2019supportstransport hazard risk
Helbing33journal article2013프레임워크networked risk
Perrow, Normal Accidents34book1984프레임워크tight coupling
Zscheischler et al.32journal article2018프레임워크compound events
Table 6.6Institutional flagships
참조 번호Issuer연도역할Used for
Iberian blackout final report1ENTSO-E2026supports전력망 장애
Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A2CISA and partners2024supportspre-positioning
ENISA Threat Landscape 20253ENISA2025supportsincident counts
GAR 202510UNDRR2025supportshazard losses
GAR 202237UNDRR2022context시스템 리스크
라이프라인11세계은행과 GFDRR2019supportsdisruption cost
Table 6.7Statistics, losses and reconstruction
참조 번호Issuer연도역할Used for
2025 Report Card6ASCE2025supportsasset condition
RDNA512World Bank, UN, EU2026supportsreconstruction needs
Building Back Better31세계은행2018contextrecovery
Energy and AI8IEA2025supportsload clusters
Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions35IEA2023contextgrid needs
Climate Resilience for Energy Security39IEA2022contextresilience
Global Critical Minerals Outlook 202640IEA2026supportsmineral concentration
Global Energy Review 20269IEA2026supportselectricity growth
Table 6.8Standards, directives and operators
참조 번호Issuer연도역할Used for
Microsoft statement on the 2024 outage4Microsoft2024supportssoftware failure
Root cause analysis36CrowdStrike2024contextsoftware failure
Cable fault analysis7TeleGeography2024supportssubsea faults
Cable maintenance data15TeleGeography2025contextrepair ships
Annual Outage Analysis 202614Uptime Institute2026contextoutage cost
EU Action Plan on Cable Security38유럽연합 집행위원회2025contextcable policy
Gulf desalination reporting13Arab Center Washington DC2026contextstrikes on plants

Where the evidence agrees

  • Failures cross sectors through shared power, telecoms and software14
  • Most subsea cable faults are accidental7
  • Infrastructure asset condition is uneven6

Where it is unsettled

  • Whether any given cable fault is deliberate7
  • How much pre-positioned access could be used to disrupt services2
  • How large cross-sector cascades are at operating scale2829

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  2. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  4. 17European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 18The White House (ed.), National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), 30 April 2024 (archived page; sector risk management agencies for 16 sectors; biennial National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 19United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 to 2030, resolution 69/283 of 3 June 2015 (global target (d): substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services by 2030). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2015. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  7. 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 21ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, edition 3 (25 October 2022), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 27ISO (ed.), ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: Guidelines, edition 2 (14 February 2018; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  10. 26CISA (ed.), Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (update of the goals first issued in 2022, announced in the CISA bulletin of 10 December 2025; adds a governance component); the goals document itself was not read and no figure is used. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  11. 20ISO (ed.), ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: Business continuity management systems: Requirements, edition 2 (30 October 2019; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 22IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, including IEC 62443-2-1:2024, Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners, edition 2.0 (7 August 2024), catalogue record read; no figure is used. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 24United Nations (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982, articles 112 to 115 on submarine cables and pipelines (United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1833, No. 31363, text opened). United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  14. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 38European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (eds.), Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: EU Action Plan on Cable Security, JOIN(2025) 9, 21 February 2025 (Publications Office record read). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 25Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted at Geneva on 8 June 1977, articles 54 and 56 on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and works and installations containing dangerous forces (United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1125, No. 17512, text opened). United Nations, New York. Observation year 1977. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  17. 28Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (DOI 10.1109/37.969131; Crossref record and abstract read). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131back
  18. 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back
  19. 30Koks, E.E. et al., A global multi-hazard risk analysis of road and railway infrastructure assets, Nature Communications 10, 2677, 25 June 2019 (DOI 10.1038/s41467-019-10442-3; Crossref record and abstract read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/s41467-019-10442-3back
  20. 33Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497, 51 to 59, 2013 (DOI 10.1038/nature12047; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature12047back
  21. 34Perrow, C., Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books, New York, 1984 (library catalogue record read; later edition Princeton University Press, 1999). Observation year 1984. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  22. 32Zscheischler, J. et al., Future climate risk from compound events, Nature Climate Change 8(6), 469 to 477, 2018 (DOI 10.1038/s41558-018-0156-3; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0156-3back
  23. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  25. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  26. 37UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2022: Our World at Risk (4 May 2022; DOI 10.18356/9789210015059, Crossref record read). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789210015059back
  27. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  28. 31Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Walsh, B., Building Back Better: Achieving Resilience through Stronger, Faster, and More Inclusive Post-Disaster Reconstruction (repository record and abstract read). World Bank, Washington, June 2018. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  29. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  30. 35IEA (ed.), Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions (27 October 2023; DOI 10.1787/455dd4fb-en, Crossref record read). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/455dd4fb-enback
  31. 39IEA (ed.), Climate Resilience for Energy Security (15 November 2022; DOI 10.1787/2a931f53-en, Crossref record read). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/2a931f53-enback
  32. 40IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  33. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  34. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  35. 36CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (6 August 2024; full text opened); no figure is used. CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  36. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  37. 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  38. 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  39. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

The 2027 agenda

Eight bounded questions open the 2027 lifeline systems agenda. Each comes from a baseline finding, names the initiative that will carry it and the first output due in the 2027 lifeline systems edition.

5 min read0 figures6 tables3 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

7.1Questions for the operational series

  1. L-01

    How would a regional power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure spread through water, health and transport at the same time?

    INI-SR02-PWR-01 · power and telecom compound loss; first output: dependency analysis for six regions.

  2. L-02

    Which shared dependencies (power, telecoms, software, positioning) sit behind the most services?

    INI-SR02-DEP-02 · shared dependencies; first output: dependency register.

  3. L-03

    How long do lifeline services take to return after major outages, and what limits recovery?

    INI-SR02-RST-03 · restoration times; first output: restoration table.

  4. L-04

    Where are subsea links and repair capacity thinnest?

    INI-SR02-CBL-04 · subsea links; first output: link and repair map.

  5. L-05

    How do ageing assets and investment gaps coincide with hazard exposure?

    INI-SR02-AST-05 · asset condition and exposure; first output: exposure overlay.

  6. L-06

    Which operators and states publish incident data on a comparable basis?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: coverage note.

  7. L-07

    How do conflict and sabotage threats change protection priorities for water and power?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: scoping note.

  8. L-08

    Which lifeline capabilities have been tested in real outages, and which are only planned?

    Lifeline capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.

7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment

Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 lifeline portfolio. They are programme objects: no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.

Table 7.1Objects proposed for the first operational quarter
ID객체유형질문상태
INI-SR02-PWR-01Power and telecom compound lossInitiativeL-01제안됨
INI-SR02-DEP-02공유된 의존성InitiativeL-02제안됨
INI-SR02-RST-03Restoration timesInitiativeL-03제안됨
INI-SR02-CBL-04Subsea links and repair capacityInitiativeL-04제안됨
INI-SR02-AST-05Asset condition and exposureInitiativeL-05제안됨
MSN-SR02-2027-01Power and telecom loss Universe mission임무L-01Candidate

7.3The pathway

The lifeline systems edition reads national infrastructure chapters, sector editions and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed and its first editions are drafted. This page states what exists today and what comes next.

  1. 01

    National infrastructure chapters

    lifeline reading in each national edition

    IN PREPARATION · national baselines

  2. 02

    Sector editions

    power, water, cyber, transport

    PLANNED · sector Baseline Editions

  3. 03

    Lifeline systems model

    the global lifeline system of systems

    v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence

  4. 04

    Strategic links

    SR-01 · SR-03 supply chains · SR-10 digital public infrastructure

    PLANNED · strategic baselines

  5. 05

    유니버스

    annual proving environment

    CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027

  6. 06

    Lifeline Systems Report

    this series

    BASELINE DRAFT · 2027 annual edition

  7. 07

    근거와 정정

    one graph, many projections

    OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027

7.4Universe 2027: evidence pack for the lifeline systems candidate mission

  1. 01

    임무

  2. 02

    Core Build · 1 month

  3. 03

    Action · 1 week

  4. 04

    Evidence seal

  5. 05

    Portfolio correction

  6. 06

    Next mandate

Table 7.2Universe 2027: evidence pack for the lifeline systems candidate mission
항목기록상태시기
F1Annual mandate recordPLANNEDafter the Q2 2027 alignment
F2Core Build recordPLANNEDone month before the exercise
F3훈련 증거PLANNEDduring the Action week
F4Decision packetsPLANNEDexercise state only
F5Proof receiptsPLANNEDscoped to each recorded check
F6After-action reportPLANNEDwithin one quarter
F7Upgrade docketPLANNEDrouted to the Portfolio
F8Portfolio renewalPLANNED2027 lifeline systems annual edition
F9Public synthesisPLANNEDpublic-safe extracts only

임무

ID
MSN-SR02-2027-01 · Power and telecom loss Universe mission
Role spine
Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead: drawn from national pathways
Receiving actors
to be identified with the mandate

7.5Handoffs and routing

Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.

Table 7.3Handoffs and routing
지적 사항Routed to목적등급
INF-001 · grid failureregional consortiagrid constraint overlayPUBLIC
CYB-002 · pre-positioningINI-SR02-DEP-02shared dependenciesPUBLIC
DAT-004 · software failureINI-SR02-DEP-02shared dependenciesPUBLIC
INF-005 · asset conditionINI-SR02-AST-05asset condition and exposurePUBLIC
INF-006 · subsea linksINI-SR02-CBL-04subsea links and repair capacityPUBLIC
DEV-008 · disruption costINI-SR02-RST-03 · key F reviewrestoration timesPUBLIC
CON-009 · war damagesector editionsrecovery needsPUBLIC
SYS-012 · compound pathwayMSN-SR02-2027-01Universe candidateCONSORTIUM
Table 7.4Routing rules by publication class
등급Where it goesWho can see it
PUBLICthe published edition and its evidence bundleanyone
CONSORTIUMgoverned rooms of the federationconsortium members under agreement
CONTROLLEDneed-to-know channelsnamed competent actors only

7.6Feeds and signal register

Table 7.5Feeds watched from 2027
FeedProducerLatencyFeeds into
Incident and advisory feedsCISA and partner agencies사건별CYB-002
EU threat landscapeENISA연간CYB-003
Transparency platform for the continental gridENTSO-E시간별INF-001
Cable fault and repair dataTeleGeography and industry사건별INF-006
Disaster loss dataUNDRR and reinsurers연간CLI-007
장애 분석Uptime Institute연간DAT-004
Damage assessmentsWorld Bank, UN and EU연간CON-009

Escalation routes

  • none · keep monitoring
  • research question
  • project
  • risk object
  • annual publication
  • signal report
Table 7.6Signals at baseline
IDSignalCorroboration시스템경로
SIG-SR02-001Single-vendor software outage in 20244CORROBORATEDDAT · INFrisk object RSK-SR02-DAT-003
SIG-SR02-002Multi-year pre-positioning reported in four sectors2CORROBORATEDINF · DATresearch question L-02
SIG-SR02-003Strikes on co-located power and water plants in 202613PARTIALENE · WATresearch question L-01

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

8 min read0 figures5 tables16 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

8.1Common causes

One cause can strike many lifelines at once: a hazard, a cyber campaign, a war or a faulty update. The shared cause matters more than the sector.

4,875사고

analysed by ENISA, Jul 2024 to Jun 20253

≥5년

longest reported intrusion persistence2

>250USD billion

annual loss to infrastructure, three hazards10

Table 8.1Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action증거상태
Natural hazardsfloods, cyclones and earthquakes drive large annual losses to infrastructure10보고값
Cyber operationspre-positioning reported in four sectors23보고값
분쟁direct strikes on power and water plants1213보고값
Software faultsone update reached millions of devices4보고값

Pathways in this mechanism

  • CLI → INF hazards
  • DAT → INF software and cyber
  • CON → INF strikes

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • common cause tagging of incidents
  • frequency of concurrent causes

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.2Domino effects

A failure in one lifeline removes an input from the next. Power outages reach water works, exchanges and hospitals in sequence.

28April 2025

Iberian blackout1

8.5million

Windows devices affected, 18 July 20244

≥90%

of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar (90 to 99)13

Table 8.2Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action증거상태
Power to telecomsexchanges run on batteries and generators after grid loss1Inferred
Software to servicesone vendor update disabled many operators’ machines4보고값
전력에서 물로co-located plants lose both services when struck13보고값
Water to healthhospital supply depends on water works11Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • ENE → INF → WAT, HLT
  • DAT → INF → FIN
  • CON → ENE, WAT

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • sequence timing of service loss
  • hospital-level dependence data

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.3Inter-systemic feedbacks

Lifelines also depend on what they power. Control networks need telecoms, telecoms need power, and digital loads press back on grids.

≈50%

of US electricity demand growth from data centres, 20259

≈45%

of US data-centre capacity in five clusters (nearly half)8

57%

of survey respondents reported a latest major outage above USD 100,00014

Table 8.3Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action증거상태
Digital load to gridclustered demand tightens local grids89보고값
Grid to digitaldata centres need continuous power14Inferred
Remote controlcontrol networks need telecoms and power5Inferred
Financial feedbacklosses feed budgets and delay maintenance11Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • AIC → ENE
  • ENE → AIC → INF
  • DAT ↔ INF

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • control-network dependence data
  • cluster-level reliability

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.4Shared vulnerabilities

Different lifelines share the same weak points: subsea cables, widely deployed software, ageing assets and a few repair resources.

199faults a year

subsea cable average, 2010 to 20237

≈2/3

of faults from fishing and transport vessels7

3.6USD trillion

US ten-year investment gap6

Table 8.4Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action증거상태
Subsea cablesfrequent, mostly accidental faults; few repair ships715보고값
Common softwarea shared platform spreads one fault widely4보고값
Ageing assetsenergy D+, wastewater D+, dams D+ in the US6보고값
Positioning and timingsignals underpin networks; no consolidated series here8Expert input

Pathways in this mechanism

  • INF → DAT cable loss
  • DAT → INF software
  • INF → FIN deferred maintenance

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • repair-vessel capacity by region
  • dependence on positioning and timing

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

8.5Thresholds and tipping

A system can absorb stress until a threshold is crossed. Black-start capability, repair capacity and recovery finance are such thresholds for lifelines.

587.7USD billion

Ukraine recovery needs over ten years12

24.8USD billion

direct damage, energy and extractives, to end 202512

≈4USD per USD 1

reported return on resilient options in LMICs11

Table 8.5Evidence at baseline
InstanceMechanism in action증거상태
Restoration capacityservice returned after 2024 and 2025 events; times not consolidated14보고값
Repair capacityageing repair fleet15보고값
Recovery financeneeds far exceed damage recorded to date12보고값
Tipping in networkscascades can become abrupt in interdependent networks29Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

  • INF → INF cascade thresholds
  • FIN → INF recovery finance
  • CON → INF repeated damage

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • black-start capability data
  • cascade thresholds at operating scale

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • SR-01 Global Polycrisis and Cascading Systems Risk
  • SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • GS-02 Energy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  4. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back

방법론

How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.

12 min read0 figures13 tables11 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

A.1방법

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

Table A.1Methods
아니요.DerivationCalculation결과
(1)Factors named in the Iberian blackout page summarycount of listed factors5, unweighted
(2)ENISA incidents per month in the period4,875 ÷ 12≈ 406
(3)Subsea faults per week at the average199 ÷ 52≈ 3.8
(4)Faults a year from external aggression (about)199 × 2 ÷ 3≈ 133
Table A.2Coupling strength scale (matrix and model card)
Strength정의
STRONGa disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region
MODERATEan effect is documented but buffered or slower
WEAKan effect is plausible but not documented at global scale
Table A.3Status grammar
라벨규칙
보고값value as issued by its source, with year
Inferredreasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement
추정Nexus analytical value with stated method
시나리오conditional on stated assumptions
Expert inputstructured editorial judgement awaiting evidence

A.2Model card, Lifeline Systems Model v0

Model ID
MDL-SR02-LIFELINES · v0.1
목적
represent lifeline systems as a dependent network and the mechanisms by which failures spread between power, water, communications, transport and health
계열
graph-based system of systems
투입 자료
the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
방법
expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
검증
none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
불확실성
qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
Domain of validity
global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
재현성
strength table and sources published in this edition
20couplings

typed in v0

5strong

documented within one season

3moderate

documented, buffered

12weak

plausible, undocumented

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID
DC-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-B0
유형
baseline documentary cut
Resolution policy
pinned · as of 30 September 2026
Sources pinned
40 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
Model runs
none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
Digest
computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
Supersedes
nothing, first cut of the series
Superseded by
the 2027 lifeline systems annual cut

계보

  1. 01

    source edition

  2. 02

    pinned citation

  3. 03

    finding

  4. 04

    page

  5. 05

    publication record

Table A.4From the baseline cut to the federation cut
요소Baseline 20262027 global annual
출처cited global publications, pinned by editionnational, regional and sector cuts through one graph
Analysisstated methods and editorial estimatestyped analysis specifications
모델Lifeline Systems Model v0 specificationmodel runs with receipts
조사 결과twelve baseline findingsfindings re-bound to federation evidence
검토five passes scheduledfive passes on the exact digest

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

Table A.5Evidence age and coverage
지표관측공개됨주기Next release
Grid failure analysis2025Mar 2026one-offfollow-up reports
Cyber advisories2024Feb 2024사건별next joint advisory
EU incident countsJul 2024 to Jun 2025Oct 2025 · v1.3 Sep 2026연간next ENISA report
Software outage2024Jul 2024one-offnone scheduled
US asset condition2025Mar 2025four-yearly2029
Cable fault average2010 to 20232024ad hocnext analysis
Hazard losses to infrastructure2025May 2025격년2027
Disruption cost in LMICs20192019one-offno update found
Reconstruction needsto Dec 2025Feb 2026연간RDNA6
Gulf strikes2026Mar to Jul 2026사건별not verified
Table A.6Coverage by system at baseline
시스템적용 범위Thinnest dimension
전력GOODrestoration times
통신PARTIALcross-operator dependency
물THINinterdependence with power
교통THINcross-modal dependence
보건THINfacility-level resilience
사이버PARTIALoperator-level data
Finance of resiliencePARTIALrecent estimates
Conflict damageTHINverified 2026 damage
Table A.7Designed empty states: what is not bound, what would fill it and why
분야Source that would fill itBlocker
Cross-sector dependency data at city and national scaleoperators, regulators and national statistics officessecurity-sensitive and not published on a common basis
Restoration times for lifeline services after major outagesoperator and regulator reportsnot retrieved; no consolidated series
Full text of the ENTSO-E final report and its recommendation countENTSO-E final report1only the publication page was opened; sources disagree on the number of recommendations
ENISA sector breakdown and top threatsENISA Threat Landscape 2025 full report3the publication page was read; the PDF was not opened and the page notes corrected figures in version 1.3
Subsea cable repair capacity by regionTeleGeography and ICPC15regional ship counts not retrieved; the 2040 end-of-life share is from the June 2025 TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics summary
Verified damage to Gulf power and desalination plantsnational authorities and independent assessments13press and think-tank reports only; no official damage assessment found
Share of outages caused by power failure at digital facilitiesUptime Institute Annual Outage Analysis14report limited to members and subscribers
UNDRR GAR 2025 infrastructure loss by region and sectorUNDRR GAR 202510full report opened and the global figure confirmed (USD 257.2 billion); regional and sector splits not bound
World Bank Lifelines disruption costs by country세계은행과 GFDRR11full report opened and headline figures confirmed; country-level disruption costs not bound
Condition of infrastructure outside the United States on one scalenational report cards and statisticsno comparable global series found
Status of EU critical entity identification by Member StatesEuropean Commission, national authorities16not retrieved
Capability rungs beyond restorationoperators, regulators, ministriesnot reviewed

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Issued by the association of European transmission system operators. One-off. Role: binds INF-001. Coverage: Continental Europe. The publication page was read; the full report was not opened.

EVD-SR02-001

ENTSO-E publication page on the Iberian blackout1

Issued by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity. Annual. Role: binds CYB-003. Reporting period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; the page notes corrections in version 1.3.

EVD-SR02-002

ENISA Threat Landscape 20253

Table A.8Quality dimensions at baseline
DimensionEVD-SR02-001EVD-SR02-002
Completenessevent-specific; some generation data missingincidents analysed; sector split not read
Timelinessabout 11 months after the eventabout 3 months after the period
Revisionfinal after interim reportsversion 1.3 corrected figures
Method transparencyexpert panel method publishedthreat-centric method stated
External validationindependent expert panelagency review

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

  • ENTSO-E1: recommendation tables in the final report
  • ENISA3: sector breakdown of incidents
  • CISA2: follow-up advisories
  • ASCE6: sector pages for energy and water

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

Table A.9Publication acceptance record
그룹영역항목통과N/A대기 중
D1Identity and scope8800
D2Source and data12912
D3Analysis and models12381
D4Findings and claims9801
D5Figures, tables, maps10622
D6Editorial and citations10802
D7Review and approval130013
D8Artefact and design12705
D9Registry and release9009

Publication gate

Conditions met
14 of 23 at evidence close
Blocking problems
none recorded
Open conditions
reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer

Not applicable at baseline

Model runs
first runs in Q1 2027
지도
plates in Q2 2027
Waivers
없음

A.7Status words

Table A.10The status every value carries
상태의미
관측Measured directly and published by the source.
보고값Published statistics of an official or institutional source.
신고됨Stated by the body concerned; not independently measured.
추정A Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A.
모형 산출Produced by a stated model from cited inputs.
InferredReasoned from cited evidence; not measured.
예보A projection by the cited source.
SimulatedA simulation result under stated assumptions.
시나리오A conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction.
Expert inputExpert judgement, recorded with its basis.
CandidateProposed for a later edition; not yet evidence.
Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject.

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

단계진행 내용출처
01 Evidence arrives from the pillarsFoundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s.
02 The cut is sealedOn the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on.
03 The edition is assembledThe edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide.
04 The keys turnAt the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward.
05 The gate opensA named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit.
06 Signed and depositedThe PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI.
07 Published on its desk’s siteOnly then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part.
08 Corrections go to StandardsMethod and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

Table A.11Series terms
용어의미
Baseline Editionthe inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series
WEFH+Bwater, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core
연계a typed dependency through which one system transmits to another
보장 격차the share of losses not covered by insurance
Capability ladderLISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED
EQLevidence-quality level, 1–5
증거 기준 시점a frozen resolution of exact sources and versions
NNC · NLC · NWGNational Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups
Table A.12Abbreviations used in this edition
AbbreviationExpansion
ASCEAmerican Society of Civil Engineers
CISAUS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CSFCybersecurity Framework
ENISAEuropean Union Agency for Cybersecurity
ENTSO-EEuropean Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
GARGlobal Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction
ICPCInternational Cable Protection Committee
LMIClow- and middle-income countries
NIS2second Network and Information Security Directive
OToperational technology
RDNARapid Damage and Needs Assessment
UNDRRUnited Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

A.10Technical annex

Table A.13Technical annex
항목Annex목차상태
A.1Indicator definitionsthe global indicator set, with units and sourcesIN THIS EDITION
A.2Coupling strengthsthe twenty-cell matrix and its rationaleIN THIS EDITION
A.3Scenario specificationSCN-SR02-PWR-01 assumptions and signpostsIN THIS EDITION
A.4Capability placementsrung evidence for fifteen functionsIN THIS EDITION
A.5Model diagnosticsfirst runs and validation2027
A.6민감도 분석influence of coupling strengths2027
A.7Regional notesregional lifeline cardsWITH REGIONAL EDITIONS
A.8Review statementspass-by-pass review recordAT RELEASE

A.1 · indicator definition: subsea cable fault

Construct
a reported break or damage event on a telecommunications submarine cable
단위
faults per year
방법
industry fault databases and operator reports
출처
TeleGeography analysis7
불확실성
counts depend on the database; public and private series differ
알려진 한계
does not record intent or repair time

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  4. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  7. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Data appendix

The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.

9 min read0 figures8 tables13 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

B.1The indicator set

Table B.1Global baseline indicator set
지표값단위연도상태출처
Subsea cable faults, average199a year2010 to 2023보고값7
Faults from external aggression≈ two thirdsshare2010 to 2023보고값7
ENISA incidents analysed4,875사고Jul 2024 to Jun 2025보고값3
Windows devices affected8.5million2024보고값4
Longest reported intrusion persistence≥ 5년2024보고값2
US overall infrastructure gradeCletter grade2025보고값6
US ten-year investment gap3.6USD trillion2025보고값6
Annual loss to infrastructure, three hazards>250USD billion2025보고값10
Annual disruption cost, LMICs≥ 390USD billion2019보고값11
Return on resilient options≈ 4USD per USD 12019추정11
Ukraine recovery needs, ten years587.7USD billionto Dec 2025보고값12
Ukraine energy and extractives needs, ten years90.6USD billionto Dec 2025보고값12
Direct damage, energy and extractives24.8USD billionto Dec 2025보고값12
Share of US electricity growth from data centres≈ 50%2025보고값9
Survey respondents reporting latest major outage above USD 100,00057%2025보고값14

B.2Global source register

The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.

Domains bound by the register

  • INF
  • ENE
  • DAT
  • CLI
  • FIN
  • WAT
  • HLT
  • AIC
  • MIN
  • TRD
Table B.3Global source register
출처범주적용 범위Period주기역할
ENTSO-E final report1operators’ associationContinental Europe2025one-off전력망 장애
CISA advisory AA24-038A2national agenciesUS and partners2024사건별cyber access
ENISA Threat Landscape3EU agencyEU2024 to 2025연간사고
Microsoft statement4vendorglobal2024one-offsoftware failure
NIST CSF 2.05national standards bodyglobal use2024주기적cyber framework
ASCE Report Card6professional bodyUS2025four-yearlyasset condition
TeleGeography7market analystglobal2010 to 2023ad hoccable faults
UNDRR GAR 202510UN agencyglobal2025격년hazard losses
World Bank Lifelines11multilateral bankLMICs2019one-offdisruption cost
RDNA512multilateral우크라이나2025연간damage and needs

B.3Regional reading, ten regional clusters

Map plates follow with the regional Baseline Editions, when boundary sources and public-safe resolutions are bound. This page gives the regional reading in table form and ranks no region.

Table B.4Regional reading, ten regional clusters
지역Principal hazardsSystems most exposedBaseline evidence
북미ageing assets; hurricanes; data-centre loadpower, water, telecomsASCE report card6; IEA9
남아메리카hydropower dependence; floodspower, transportregional statistics (not bound)
유럽grid stability; cable incidents; cyberpower, telecomsENTSO-E1; ENISA3
Eurasiaconflict damage; grid attackspower, heatRDNA512
중동 및 북아프리카strikes on co-located plants; desalination reliancewater, powerpress reports13
아프리카maintenance and financing gapspower, transport라이프라인11
남아시아cyclones and floodspower, portsGAR 202510
동아시아earthquake and typhoon exposure; cablespower, telecomsGAR 202510; cable analysis7
ASEANcyclones; subsea linkstelecoms, portscable analysis7
Oceania-Pacificisland links; cyclonestelecoms, powercable analysis7

B.4Regional card: Continental Europe grid

  • 지역
  • grid
  • synchronous area
  • cross-border
Systems in view
power, telecoms, water, hospitals
Defining events
blackout in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 20251
연계
ENE → INF → HLT; ENE → WAT
Capability evidence
restoration and a published expert report1
격차
cross-border flows; data on pre-event generation tripping
Agenda items
L-01 · L-03

The final report names oscillations, voltage and reactive power control gaps and generator disconnections as interacting factors [1].

POWER

Interacting factors

Service returned after the event; the time to restore each lifeline is not consolidated here.

RECOVERY

복원

The expert panel report is an analysis of causes and recommendations, not an attribution of liability [1].

LEARNING

A public report

B.5How countries appear in the global edition

Countries enter the lifeline systems edition through the infrastructure chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never placed in a league table.

Table B.5How countries appear in the global edition
Card field표시 내용출처
WEFH+B stateeach core system against peer distribution bandsnational edition
연계the national dependency matrixnational edition
Risk objectsthe national risk portfolionational edition
Capability rungsthe national capability laddernational edition
Evidence ageoldest and newest source datesnational source register

Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme

26국가

countries and unions

10regional

clusters

16global

flagship and sector

14strategic

systems reports

20frontier

technology reports

How to read a country card

  • Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
  • Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
  • Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
  • Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such
Table B.6National Baseline Editions in the 2026 programme
웨이브Countries and unions상태
W0캐나다ISSUED
W1United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, SwitzerlandPLANNED
W2Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, AustraliaPLANNED

B.6라이선스

Table B.7Licences of each kind of material
Material라이선스
TextCC BY 4.0
데이터on the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0
수치Nexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited
지도boundary source and licence printed on each plate
메타데이터CC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it
Third-party data, figures and textThe source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed
Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence.

B.7Formats and provenance

Table B.8This edition in every format
형식유형상태개요식별자
Web editionHTML이 사이트에서Draft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source.NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Print editionPDFAt releaseA4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release.NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Indicator dataCSV · JSON이 사이트에서15 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release.NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1
수치SVG · PNG이 사이트에서4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder.FIG-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-*
SlidesPDF기록되지 않음No slide deck is recorded for this edition.
근거 브리프HTML · PDF기록되지 않음No evidence brief is recorded for this edition.
Dataset with DOIDataCiteAt releaseConcept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet.

출처 이력

Edition pack
The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
증거 기준 시점
DC-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
재현성
sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
Self-check
14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
검토
five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
공식 발행인
GCRI for the Nexus Consortium
정정
Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  7. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  11. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

References and record

Every source the edition rests on, the publication record, the corrections log and the open record.

14 min read0 figures1 table0 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

C.140 sources

NR-CIT-1, editor first. A DOI is linked where the source has one; Nexus records carry a UNI once the catalogue allocates it (NS-1).

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 8
  2. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  3. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  4. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  5. 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  6. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  7. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  8. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 6, chapter 8
  9. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 6, chapter 8
  10. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740 Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  11. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  12. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  13. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  14. 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
  15. 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  16. 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  17. 17European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  18. 18The White House (ed.), National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), 30 April 2024 (archived page; sector risk management agencies for 16 sectors; biennial National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  19. 19United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 to 2030, resolution 69/283 of 3 June 2015 (global target (d): substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services by 2030). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2015. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  20. 20ISO (ed.), ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: Business continuity management systems: Requirements, edition 2 (30 October 2019; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  21. 21ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, edition 3 (25 October 2022), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  22. 22IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, including IEC 62443-2-1:2024, Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners, edition 2.0 (7 August 2024), catalogue record read; no figure is used. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  23. 23OECD (ed.), Good Governance for Critical Infrastructure Resilience, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies (17 April 2019; DOI 10.1787/02f0e5a0-en, Crossref record read). OECD Publishing, Paris. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/02f0e5a0-en Cited in chapter 4
  24. 24United Nations (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982, articles 112 to 115 on submarine cables and pipelines (United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1833, No. 31363, text opened). United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  25. 25Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted at Geneva on 8 June 1977, articles 54 and 56 on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and works and installations containing dangerous forces (United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1125, No. 17512, text opened). United Nations, New York. Observation year 1977. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  26. 26CISA (ed.), Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (update of the goals first issued in 2022, announced in the CISA bulletin of 10 December 2025; adds a governance component); the goals document itself was not read and no figure is used. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  27. 27ISO (ed.), ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: Guidelines, edition 2 (14 February 2018; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  28. 28Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (DOI 10.1109/37.969131; Crossref record and abstract read). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131 Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  29. 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932 Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  30. 30Koks, E.E. et al., A global multi-hazard risk analysis of road and railway infrastructure assets, Nature Communications 10, 2677, 25 June 2019 (DOI 10.1038/s41467-019-10442-3; Crossref record and abstract read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/s41467-019-10442-3 Cited in chapter 6
  31. 31Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Walsh, B., Building Back Better: Achieving Resilience through Stronger, Faster, and More Inclusive Post-Disaster Reconstruction (repository record and abstract read). World Bank, Washington, June 2018. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  32. 32Zscheischler, J. et al., Future climate risk from compound events, Nature Climate Change 8(6), 469 to 477, 2018 (DOI 10.1038/s41558-018-0156-3; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0156-3 Cited in chapter 6
  33. 33Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497, 51 to 59, 2013 (DOI 10.1038/nature12047; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature12047 Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  34. 34Perrow, C., Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books, New York, 1984 (library catalogue record read; later edition Princeton University Press, 1999). Observation year 1984. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  35. 35IEA (ed.), Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions (27 October 2023; DOI 10.1787/455dd4fb-en, Crossref record read). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/455dd4fb-en Cited in chapter 6
  36. 36CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (6 August 2024; full text opened); no figure is used. CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  37. 37UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2022: Our World at Risk (4 May 2022; DOI 10.18356/9789210015059, Crossref record read). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789210015059 Cited in chapter 6
  38. 38European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (eds.), Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: EU Action Plan on Cable Security, JOIN(2025) 9, 21 February 2025 (Publications Office record read). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. Cited in chapter 6
  39. 39IEA (ed.), Climate Resilience for Energy Security (15 November 2022; DOI 10.1787/2a931f53-en, Crossref record read). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/2a931f53-en Cited in chapter 6
  40. 40IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 6

C.2Publication record

발행

제목
Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems, Baseline Edition
시리즈
Reports · Strategic Systems Series SR-02
판
Baseline Edition 2026 · inaugural annual
버전
v1.0.0 · draft for stewardship review
Publication ID
NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
근거 마감
30 September 2026
Publication date
2026년 10월
DOI
concept and version DOI at deposit

발행자

공식 발행인
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for the Nexus Consortium
장소
Toronto
편집자
Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor
관리 주체
GCRI · technical truth · GRF · public meaning · GRA · capital meaning
라이선스
text CC BY 4.0; data on the terms of each source
Copyright
© 2026 GCRI · Nexus Consortium
언어
English (en-GB) source edition
Correspondence
Registry correction pathway · editorial office

Colophon

형식
A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF
Typefaces
Space Grotesk (display) · Geist (text) · IBM Plex Sans Italic (standfirsts) · IBM Plex Mono (data)
Design standard
Reports Foundational Edition, Volume I, Part VII
접근성
tagged PDF and HTML targets; text alternatives for every figure
생산
Reports editorial team, GCRI

Release path for this version

Table C.1Release path for this version
단계진행 내용언제
초안editorial self-check complete at evidence close2026년 10월
Steward reviewfive passes on the exact draft (keys T · M · F · N)Q4 2026
승인publication authority approves the exact digestbefore release
Depositconcept and version DOI minted; registry pointer setat release
승계the 2027 lifeline systems edition reports changes against this baseline2027
Current version
v1.0.0 draft, stewardship review
Previous edition
none, first edition of the series
Next edition
NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2027-v1.0.0
Latest version
resolve the concept DOI or the registry record
Correction route
Registry correction pathway
Notice types
erratum · addendum · supersession · withdrawal

C.3정정 기록

0correction notices. No edition has been released yet, so none can be corrected; the log below lists each edition’s current version.

판버전날짜상태변화공지
SR-02NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.02026년 10월초안Baseline Edition 2026, inaugural annual edition,없음

Notice types: erratum, addendum, supersession, withdrawal. A correction is a new version with a published notice; the earlier version stays resolvable, and no edition is ever edited in silence.

C.4Open record

This edition’s open record

Publication ID
NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Desk identifier and series alias
NR-GCRI-SR-02-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 · NR-STR-SR-02-2026-BL
Collection
NR-COL-2026-BASELINE (IsPartOf at deposit)
DOI
Concept and version DOI at deposit, on Zenodo with DataCite metadata
버전
Each correction is a new version (isNewVersionOf); the concept DOI resolves to the latest
Bundle
RO-Crate 1.2 with CITATION.cff, CodeMeta and PROV-O provenance; a signed manifest
라이선스
CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0) for original material; metadata CC0 1.0

Credit and identity

ORCID
Your iD in the deposit and the contribution record; DataCite can then add the work to your ORCID record
ROR
Your organisation by its ROR identifier, never by a typed name alone
CRediT
Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Validation, Visualisation, Writing, review and editing
계정
None needed to contribute; never a password

Find and follow

Search the open indexes for Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems; software is cited by its SWHID from Software Heritage, and a quantified scenario run is preregistered on OSF before it is run. Annotation is your choice: Hypothesis opens this page in its own viewer.

Mirrors and harvest

The DOI is canonical. At release each signed bundle is also given an IPFS content identifier and a bloxberg anchor as mirrors; both are listed in the record once they exist. Zenodo exposes every record over OAI-PMH, and reviews and endorsements can arrive through COAR Notify where the repository supports it.

InvenioRDM metadata for a contribution on Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems, prefilled from this page
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C.5Where this edition sits among the six pillars

Foundry seals the evidence and Universe tests it; Reports publishes it; Standards takes its corrections and Academy teaches from it.

  1. F03 Sealed observations and indicator series Foundry Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
  2. F04 After-action and scenario findings for Universe After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
  3. F05 National Portfolio movement for chapter Foundry National Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
  4. Applied in editions Standards Nexus Standards: applied in editions.
  5. SR-02 edition Reports Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026, published in every format with its sources, citation and corrections.
  6. F06 Method and correction findings as change Standards Method and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
  7. F12 Q4 synthesis informs the next-year Universe Q4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
  8. Taught in the open Academy Risk Academy: taught in the open.

What Foundry and Universe hand to this edition, and what it hands to Standards, Universe and Academy. From the programme spine; SR-02 is a drafted Baseline Edition, so these handoffs run from its first operational quarter.

인계BetweenWhat crosses, and when
F03Foundry to ReportsSealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
F04Universe to ReportsAfter-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
F05Foundry to ReportsNational Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
RingNexus Standards to ReportsNexus Standards: applied in editions.
F06Reports to Nexus StandardsMethod and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
F12Reports to UniverseQ4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
RingReports to Risk AcademyRisk Academy: taught in the open.
보고서기여하기

Send evidence or a correction on Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the GCRI Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

GCRI 시스템 증거 담당 부서전략 시스템

CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.

부문 특성

The sectors behind Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

모서리 선택 · 선 위에 올려 보기6 / 15 관계

맥락

Infrastructure and its partners

Infrastructure gives pipes, dams and treatment works to water (0.6), transmission and fuel logistics to energy (0.6) and access to care to health (0.5).

W · E · I · F · H · B

부문
4 / 6
관계
6 / 15
연계
0.46 전체 대비 비율

작동 중인 가장 강한 관계

  • 에너지 → 인프라 · 교통과 통신을 위한 전력0.8
  • 물 → 에너지 · 냉각수와 수력 발전0.6
  • 인프라 → 물 · 관로, 댐, 정수 시설0.6
  • 물 → 보건 · 식수와 위생0.7
전형적인 도시권을 위한 교육용 값이며 어느 장소의 측정치도 아닙니다. 결합도는 작용 중인 관계의 강도 합을 전체 15개 관계에 대한 비율로 나타낸 것입니다.