Systems and sectors at baseline
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Lifelines fail together
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMbinu
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
3.1Where each system stood at evidence close
ENE · Power
Iberian blackout, interacting causes
2025final report published 20 March 2026.
Reported2025ENTSO-E1
DAT · Digital
Windows devices hit by one update
8.5millionestimate, 18 July 2024.
Reported2024Microsoft4
INF · Subsea
Cable faults a year, average
199a yearabout two thirds from external aggression.
Reported2010 to 2023TeleGeography7
FIN · Investment
US ten-year infrastructure gap
3.6USD trillionoverall grade C.
Reported2025ASCE6
CLI · Hazard
Annual loss to critical infrastructure, three hazards
>250USD billionfloods, cyclones and earthquakes.
Reported2025UNDRR10
SYS · Cross-system
Ukraine recovery needs, ten years
587.7USD billionenergy and extractives USD 90.6 billion.
Reported2025RDNA512
3.2Domain posture
Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through lifeline systems, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries lifeline systems risk into each domain.
| Domain | Posture at baseline | Muunganiko | Hali |
|---|---|---|---|
| WAT | Water works depend on power and telecoms; desalination in the Gulf was struck in 2026. | ENE → WAT | Reported EQL 3 |
| ENE | Grid failure from interacting factors in 2025; data-centre load concentrating on local grids. | ENE → all | Reported EQL 4 |
| FOO | Cold chains and logistics depend on power and telecoms; no consolidated series here. | ENE → FOO | Expert input EQL 2 |
| HLT | Hospitals depend on power, water and communications; not consolidated here. | ENE, WAT → HLT | Inferred EQL 2 |
| BIO | Natural infrastructure can buffer hazards; evidence not consolidated here. | BIO → WAT | Expert input EQL 2 |
| CLI | More than USD 250 billion a year of loss to infrastructure from three hazards. | CLI → INF | Reported EQL 3 |
| INF | The core system: US grade C and a USD 3.6 trillion gap; 199 cable faults a year. | the core system | Reported EQL 4 |
| FIN | Resilient options return about USD 4 per USD 1; Ukraine needs USD 587.7 billion. | INF → FIN | Reported EQL 3 |
| DAT | One software update reached 8.5 million devices; incident data are not on a common basis. | DAT ↔ INF | Reported EQL 4 |
| AIC | Data-centre load clusters in a few regions; half of US electricity growth in 2025. | AIC → ENE | Reported EQL 4 |
| MIN | Power equipment and cables depend on refined minerals; the top refiner’s average share rose to 72% in 202540. | MIN → INF | Reported EQL 3 |
| TRD | Shipping lanes and ports carry cable ships and equipment; chokepoint data sit in sibling editions. | INF ↔ TRD | Inferred EQL 2 |
3.3Sector screens
All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on lifeline systems, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.
| Code | Sector | Baseline evidence | Exposure to watch | Evidence coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GS-00 | Cross-system | lifelines couple every sector14 | power loss with telecom failure | PARTIAL |
| GS-01 | Maji | water works depend on power13 | outage and strikes | THIN |
| GS-02 | Nishati | blackout of 28 April 20251 | voltage and frequency events | GOOD |
| GS-03 | Food and agrifood | cold chains depend on power | outage during heat | THIN |
| GS-04 | Afya | hospitals depend on lifelines | loss of power and water | THIN |
| GS-05 | Finance and economy | USD 390 billion a year of disruption cost11 | payment and market outages | PARTIAL |
| GS-06 | Maendeleo | losses concentrate in lower-income countries11 | weak maintenance | PARTIAL |
| GS-07 | Tabianchi | hazard losses above USD 250 billion a year10 | floods, cyclones, heat | GOOD |
| GS-08 | Disaster | cascading outages after hazards10 | concurrent hazards | PARTIAL |
| GS-09 | Miundombinu | US grade C and USD 3.6 trillion gap6 | ageing assets | GOOD |
| GS-10 | Miji | dense dependence on power and telecoms | multi-sector outage | THIN |
| GS-11 | Bioanuwai | natural buffers for infrastructure | loss of buffers | THIN |
| GS-12 | Uchunguzi wa Dunia | positioning and timing signals underpin networks | signal interference | THIN |
| GS-13 | Kidijitali na mtandao | pre-positioning in four sectors2; 4,875 incidents3 | disruptive attacks | GOOD |
| GS-14 | Sera | critical-entity and network security rules1617 | implementation gaps | PARTIAL |
| GS-15 | Sayansi | interdependency science is mature2829 | data at operating scale | PARTIAL |
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
- 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 40IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 17European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 28Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (DOI 10.1109/37.969131; Crossref record and abstract read). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131back
- 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back