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Systems and sectors at baseline

6 min read0 figures2 tables15 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Lifelines fail together
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
    1. 3.1 Where each system stood at evidence close
    2. 3.2 Domain posture
    3. 3.3 Sector screens
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

ENE · Power

Iberian blackout, interacting causes

2025

final report published 20 March 2026.

Reported2025ENTSO-E1

DAT · Digital

Windows devices hit by one update

8.5million

estimate, 18 July 2024.

Reported2024Microsoft4

INF · Subsea

Cable faults a year, average

199a year

about two thirds from external aggression.

Reported2010 to 2023TeleGeography7

FIN · Investment

US ten-year infrastructure gap

3.6USD trillion

overall grade C.

Reported2025ASCE6

CLI · Hazard

Annual loss to critical infrastructure, three hazards

>250USD billion

floods, cyclones and earthquakes.

Reported2025UNDRR10

SYS · Cross-system

Ukraine recovery needs, ten years

587.7USD billion

energy about USD 91 billion.

Reported2025RDNA512

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through lifeline systems, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries lifeline systems risk into each domain.

Table 3.1Each domain read in words, not scored
DomainPosture at baselineCouplingStatus
WATWater works depend on power and telecoms; desalination in the Gulf was struck in 2026.ENE → WATReported EQL 3
ENEGrid failure from interacting factors in 2025; data-centre load concentrating on local grids.ENE → allReported EQL 4
FOOCold chains and logistics depend on power and telecoms; no consolidated series here.ENE → FOOExpert input EQL 2
HLTHospitals depend on power, water and communications; not consolidated here.ENE, WAT → HLTInferred EQL 2
BIONatural infrastructure can buffer hazards; evidence not consolidated here.BIO → WATExpert input EQL 2
CLIMore than USD 250 billion a year of loss to infrastructure from three hazards.CLI → INFReported EQL 3
INFThe core system: US grade C and a USD 3.6 trillion gap; 199 cable faults a year.the core systemReported EQL 4
FINResilient options return about USD 4 per USD 1; Ukraine needs USD 587.7 billion.INF → FINReported EQL 3
DATOne software update reached 8.5 million devices; incident data are not on a common basis.DAT ↔ INFReported EQL 4
AICData-centre load clusters in a few regions; half of US electricity growth in 2025.AIC → ENEReported EQL 4
MINPower equipment and cables depend on refined minerals; the top refiner’s average share rose to 72% in 202540.MIN → INFReported EQL 3
TRDShipping lanes and ports carry cable ships and equipment; chokepoint data sit in sibling editions.INF ↔ TRDInferred EQL 2

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on lifeline systems, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Table 3.2Sectors: baseline evidence and the exposure to watch
CodeSectorBaseline evidenceExposure to watchEvidence coverage
GS-00Cross-systemlifelines couple every sector14power loss with telecom failurePARTIAL
GS-01Waterwater works depend on power13outage and strikesTHIN
GS-02Energyblackout of 28 April 20251voltage and frequency eventsGOOD
GS-03Food and agrifoodcold chains depend on poweroutage during heatTHIN
GS-04Healthhospitals depend on lifelinesloss of power and waterTHIN
GS-05Finance and economyUSD 390 billion a year of disruption cost11payment and market outagesPARTIAL
GS-06Developmentlosses concentrate in lower-income countries11weak maintenancePARTIAL
GS-07Climatehazard losses above USD 250 billion a year10floods, cyclones, heatGOOD
GS-08Disastercascading outages after hazards10concurrent hazardsPARTIAL
GS-09InfrastructureUS grade C and USD 3.6 trillion gap6ageing assetsGOOD
GS-10Citiesdense dependence on power and telecomsmulti-sector outageTHIN
GS-11Biodiversitynatural buffers for infrastructureloss of buffersTHIN
GS-12Earth observationpositioning and timing signals underpin networkssignal interferenceTHIN
GS-13Cyber and digitalpre-positioning in four sectors2; 4,875 incidents3disruptive attacksGOOD
GS-14Policycritical-entity and network security rules1617implementation gapsPARTIAL
GS-15Scienceinterdependency science is mature2829data at operating scalePARTIAL

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 10UNVERIFIED, not opened: UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays (annual average loss to critical infrastructure above USD 250 billion for floods, tropical cyclones and earthquakes; about USD 2.3 trillion total annual disaster cost), taken from search-result summaries; the report page returned an access error. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 12UNVERIFIED, not opened: World Bank, United Nations and European Commission (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5), released 23 February 2026 (needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy about USD 91 billion; direct damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion to end 2025), taken from search-result summaries. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 40IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 13UNVERIFIED, not opened: press and think-tank reports on strikes on power and desalination plants in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, March to July 2026 (including The National, Arab News and the Arab Center Washington DC), taken from search-result summaries; no official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 11UNVERIFIED, not opened: Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (disruptions cost at least USD 390 billion a year in low- and middle-income countries; USD 4.2 trillion net benefit; about USD 4 per USD 1), taken from search-result summaries; the repository returned an access error. World Bank and GFDRR, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 16UNVERIFIED, not opened: Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities, Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 17UNVERIFIED, not opened: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS2), Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, 2001, cited from memory. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: Buldyrev, S.V. et al., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, 2010, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 3: Systems and sectors at baseline. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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Sector signature

The sectors behind Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

Select corners · hover lines6 / 15 relations

Context

Infrastructure and its partners

Infrastructure gives pipes, dams and treatment works to water (0.6), transmission and fuel logistics to energy (0.6) and access to care to health (0.5).

W · E · I · F · H · B

Sectors
4 of 6
Relations
6 of 15
Coupling
0.46 share of total

Strongest relations in play

  • Energy → Infrastructure · power for transport and telecoms0.8
  • Water → Energy · cooling water and hydropower0.6
  • Infrastructure → Water · pipes, dams and treatment works0.6
  • Water → Health · drinking water and sanitation0.7
Teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements for any place. Coupling is the summed strength of the relations in play, as a share of all fifteen.
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