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Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Readings from the other desks

The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

16 min read0 figures8 tables40 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Technology rests on a few physical inputs
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
    1. 6.1 The other desks’ editions of this subject
    2. 6.2 Three lenses
    3. 6.3 Standards, Academy and steward contributions
    4. 6.4 GCRI reading: the model card
    5. 6.5 Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
    6. 6.6 Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 strategic technology infrastructure readiness pack
    7. 6.7 Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
    8. 6.8 Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMbinu
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

DeskToleoHaliIdentifier
GCRI Systems EvidenceSystems Evidence: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness 2026Drafted, in stewardship reviewNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
GRF Public DeliberationOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
GRA Capital ReadinessCapital Readiness: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness 2026In preparationNR-GRA-SR-13-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Standards ProgressOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Academy CapabilityOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Index MeasurementOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading technology infrastructure as one dependent stack. Load growth, concentrated refining and concentrated chip production recur across regions, and policy targets and delivery are still apart. Evidence is strongest for load and sales and weakest for capacity by region and provider concentration.

AIC-001 · ENE-003 · MIN-005 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people the stack appears as a service that works or does not. The baseline asks that public debate treat power, chips and minerals as shared inputs, and keep recovery as well as growth in view.

INF-004 · DAT-009 · DEV-011

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Public funding is large in places and private investment is concentrated4311. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

FIN-008 · FIN-010

NEXUS

Synthesis

Technology infrastructure risk is well described by layer and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind connection times, chip capacity and provider concentration, and test the grid and supply overlap before the next shortage.

SYS-012 · R-01 · R-03

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for strategic technology infrastructure. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
QuarterToleoSwaliMpaka
Q1State and AgendaWhat matters this year, and what is the starting position?observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2Evidence and BuildWhat new evidence and capability exist?a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3Stress Test and ReadinessWhat do scenarios and tests show?simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4Annual Synthesis and RenewalWhat changed in the year, and what renews?release follows review, not event publicity deadlines
Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or bodyJukumuContribution route
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
Global Risks Forum (GRF)leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
Global Risks Alliance (GRA)finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standardspreparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methodsStandards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Risk Academylearning pathways tied to the agenda questionsAcademy gateway · learning by review
Reports strategic deskstechnology infrastructure chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readinessstrategic editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

  • Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
  • Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
  • Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

  • Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
  • Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
  • Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

Chips need minerals, data centres need power and services need both. Treating each layer alone understates how a limit in one becomes a limit in all. This edition reads the stack.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

Technology is a stack of physical inputs

The global share of electricity used by data centres is small. The effect is local, in clusters such as those in the United States and in Ireland, where grid limits arrive first.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Load is local

Public targets and funding set direction. The Commission’s forecast and the Court of Auditors show that a target and delivered capacity can be far apart, and the same test applies to every programme.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Targets are not capacity

Readiness is not self-sufficiency. It is the ability to keep critical services running and to recover them when an input is short. The literature on weaponised interdependence explains why shared inputs matter.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Sovereignty is a matter of degree

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 strategic technology infrastructure readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 strategic technology infrastructure readiness pack
ItemRegisterState at baselineFirst 2027 entry
E1Global risk state deltabaseline set by this editionchanges against the baseline
E2WEFH+B state deltafive global system readings setindicator updates and freshness
E3Agenda and Portfolio movementeight agenda items · 6 proposed objectsadmission decisions
E4Federation delivery registernational chapters in preparationnational chapters
E5Consortium capability registernational consortia formingfirst contributions
E6Leadership questions and challengesnone yetfirst challenge log
E7Foundry technical statenational environments preparedfirst federation cut
E8Publication candidatestwelve findings carried forwardPUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9Universe readinessone candidate missionadmission and role spine
E10Correction registernonefirst federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

  • Chapisha
  • Hold
  • Needs evidence
  • Restricted
  • Imebadilishwa

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

  • IN FORCE
  • IMEPITISHWA
  • PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
ChomboBodyWigoHaliRelevance
EU Chips Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/17818European UnionEUIN FORCEchip supply and resilience
EU Artificial Intelligence Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/168916European UnionEUIN FORCEartificial intelligence
EU Data Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/285417European UnionEUIN FORCEdata access and cloud switching
EU Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/284718European UnionEUIN FORCEproduct security
NIS2 Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/255519European UnionEUIN FORCEnetwork security
Critical Entities Resilience Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/255729European UnionEUIN FORCEcritical entities
CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-16727United StatesUSIMEPITISHWAchip funding
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.035NISTglobal usePUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYcyber risk
ISO/IEC 27001 information security31ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYsecurity management
ISO 22301 business continuity32ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYcontinuity
IEC 62443 control-system security33IECglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYoperational technology

Changed since 2024

  • The EU AI Act applies generally from 2 August 2026, with some high-risk dates extended by an omnibus act that entered into force on 27 July 202616
  • Reporting obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act apply from 11 September 202618
  • The Data Act has applied since 12 September 202517
  • The EU published an action plan on cable security in February 202530
  • The 20% chip target comes from the Digital Decade programme36

To watch in 2027

  • Full application of the Cyber Resilience Act on 11 December 202718
  • Mid-term review of the EU Chips Act and any successor78
  • Member State transposition of the NIS2 Directive, due 17 October 202419

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers strategic technology infrastructure assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

Swali
What does the published evidence establish about the world’s strategic technology infrastructure and sovereign readiness and its couplings?
Sources searched
agency and statistical releases; policy pages; peer-reviewed interdependency literature; market statistics
Window
releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
Selection
sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
Next step
systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and assessments
MarejeoTypeYearJukumuUsed for
Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly39journal article2001frameworkinterdependencies
Buldyrev et al.40journal article2010supportscascading failure
Farrell and Newman37journal article2019frameworkweaponised interdependence
Miller, Chip War38book2022contextchip supply history
Bradford, Digital Empires42book2023contextregulatory models
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory report23national laboratory report2024contextUS data-centre energy
Table 6.6Institutional flagships
MarejeoIssuerYearJukumuUsed for
Energy and AI1IEA2025supportsdata centre load
Global Energy Review 20262IEA2026supportselectricity growth
Global Critical Minerals Outlook 20263IEA2026supportsrefining concentration
Technology and Innovation Report 202522UNCTAD2025contextfrontier technology
Draghi report20European Commission2024contextcompetitiveness
Space Environment Report25ESA2025contextorbital infrastructure
Table 6.7Statistics, markets and indices
MarejeoIssuerYearJukumuUsed for
Semiconductor sales release4WSTS2026supportschip market
Annual sales release5SIA2026supportschip market
AI Index 202611Stanford HAI2026supportsprivate investment
Data centre tracker14Epoch AI2026supportslarge sites
Cloud use by enterprises9Eurostat2025supportscloud use
AI use by enterprises10Eurostat2025supportsMatumizi ya akili bandia
Data centre electricity release12CSO Ireland2025supportslocal load
Facts and Figures13ITU2026supportsconnectivity
Cloud market share series26Synergy Research2026contextprovider concentration
Table 6.8Standards, directives and policy
MarejeoIssuerYearJukumuUsed for
Chips Act page8European Commission2026supportsEU chip policy
Special report on the EU chip strategy7European Court of Auditors2025supportstarget and forecast
CHIPS and Science Act text43US Congress2022supportsUS funding
CHIPS for America page6NIST2026post-close, context onlyaward notices
National Semiconductor Strategy21UK government2023contextUK policy
AI Factories15EuroHPC Joint Undertaking2026contextcompute capacity
AI Act page16European Commission2026contextdates of application
AI export measure of 202528US Department of Commerce2025contextexport controls

Where the evidence agrees

  • Data-centre load is growing fast and is concentrated in a few regions12
  • Refining of energy minerals is concentrated3
  • The chip market is large and growing45

Where it is unsettled

  • How fast efficiency gains will slow data-centre load growth1
  • Whether public targets for chip capacity will be met78
  • How large cross-system cascades are at operating scale3940

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 11Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report (report page; private AI investment in 2025 of USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 16European Commission (ed.), AI Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; in force 1 August 2024; general application 2 August 2026; omnibus in force 27 July 2026). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 17European Commission (ed.), Data Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/2854; in force 11 January 2024; applies from 12 September 2025). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 18European Commission (ed.), Cyber Resilience Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/2847; in force 10 December 2024; reporting from 11 September 2026; main obligations from 11 December 2027). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 19European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive (policy page; Directive (EU) 2022/2555; transposition deadline 17 October 2024). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 29European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022, 164 (text read via the Publications Office; in force on the twentieth day after publication). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 27CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, United States (statute text opened; see reference [43]). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 35NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, doi 10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29 (Crossref record read; published 26 February 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29back
  11. 31ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements (edition 3, published 25 October 2022; amendment 1 of 23 February 2024; record checked in the ISO open data deliverables file). International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 32ISO (ed.), ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: Business continuity management systems: Requirements (edition 2, published 30 October 2019; amendment 1 of 23 February 2024; record checked in the ISO open data deliverables file). International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 33IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems (IEC webstore record for IEC 62443-4-2:2019, Technical security requirements for IACS components, edition 1.0, published 27 February 2019). International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  14. 30European Commission and High Representative (eds.), EU Action Plan on Cable Security, Joint Communication JOIN(2025) 9 final, 21 February 2025 (text read via Council cover note 6444/25 of 21 February 2025). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 36European Parliament and Council (eds.), Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030, Official Journal of the European Union L 323, 19 December 2022, 4 (text read via the Publications Office; Article 4 target that production of cutting-edge semiconductors in the Union is at least 20% of world production in value). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 39Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001, doi 10.1109/37.969131 (Crossref and OpenAlex records read). IEEE. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131back
  18. 40Buldyrev, S.V. et al., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464(7291), 1025 to 1028, April 2010, doi 10.1038/nature08932 (Crossref record read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back
  19. 37Farrell, H. and Newman, A.L., Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, International Security 44(1), 42 to 79, 2019, doi 10.1162/isec_a_00351 (Crossref record read). MIT Press. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00351back
  20. 38Miller, C., Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology, ISBN 9781982172008 (Open Library edition record read; 464 pages; no figure used). Scribner, New York, 2022. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  21. 42Bradford, A., Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology, doi 10.1093/oso/9780197649268.001.0001 (Crossref record read; published 21 September 2023; no figure used). Oxford University Press, New York, 2023. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197649268.001.0001back
  22. 23Shehabi, A. et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, LBNL-2001637, doi 10.71468/P1WC7Q (publication page read: published 19 December 2024; electricity use estimated from 2014 with scenarios to 2028; the report PDF returned an access error; no figure used). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.71468/P1WC7Qback
  23. 1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  25. 3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  26. 22UNCTAD (ed.), Technology and Innovation Report 2025 (publication page read for date, 7 April 2025; no figures used). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  27. 20European Commission (ed.), The Draghi report: A competitiveness strategy for Europe (page read for title and date, 9 September 2024; no figures used). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  28. 25ESA (ed.), ESA Space Environment Report 2025 (report page of 1 April 2025; data to end 2024; about 40,000 tracked objects of which about 11,000 active payloads; no figure used in this pack). European Space Agency, Darmstadt. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  29. 4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  30. 5SIA (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release of 6 February 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  31. 14POST-CLOSE, context only: Epoch AI (ed.), Frontier data centres (tracker page updated 1 November 2026; 96 sites, 15.1 GW of IT power; estimated coverage of about 45% of deployed AI compute). Epoch AI. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  32. 9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  33. 10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  34. 12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  35. 13ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures (page titled 2025 whose text describes the 2026 edition; 6.3 billion people online, 76%; 2 billion offline; 93% in high-income and 32% in low-income countries). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  36. 26Synergy Research Group (ed.), Q2 Cloud Market Passes $143 Billion; Highest Growth Rate in Eight Years (release of 30 July 2026; worldwide cloud infrastructure service revenues of USD 143.4 billion in the quarter; worldwide shares Amazon 28%, Microsoft 20%, Google 15%; no regional split; no figure used in this pack). Synergy Research Group, Reno. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  37. 6POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), CHIPS for America (programme page; award notices to October 2026; supports no baseline claim). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  38. 21UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (ed.), National Semiconductor Strategy (page read for date, 19 May 2023, and three objectives; no figures used). UK Government, London. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  39. 15EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (ed.), AI Factories (programme page; states 19 AI Factories and 13 antennas while the listing shows 18 entries; no amounts). EuroHPC Joint Undertaking, Luxembourg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  40. 28US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), Department of Commerce Announces Rescission of Biden-Era Artificial Intelligence Diffusion Rule, Strengthens Chip-Related Export Controls (press release of 13 May 2025; rule issued 15 January 2025 with compliance due 15 May 2025; enforcement halted and a replacement rule announced). Bureau of Industry and Security, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

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Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 6: Readings from the other desks. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

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