Readings from the other desks
The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Technology rests on a few physical inputs
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 6.1 The other desks’ editions of this subject
- 6.2 Three lenses
- 6.3 Standards, Academy and steward contributions
- 6.4 GCRI reading: the model card
- 6.5 Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
- 6.6 Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 strategic technology infrastructure readiness pack
- 6.7 Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
- 6.8 Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject
Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.
| Desk | Edition | State | Identifier |
|---|---|---|---|
| GCRI Systems Evidence | No edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycle | Not in this cycle | |
| GRF Public Deliberation | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| GRA Capital Readiness | No edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycle | Not in this cycle | |
| Standards Progress | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| Academy Capability | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| Index Measurement | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit |
6.2Three lenses
One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.
GCRI · KEY T
Technical Truth
The evidence supports reading technology infrastructure as one dependent stack. Load growth, concentrated refining and concentrated chip production recur across regions, and policy targets and delivery are still apart. Evidence is strongest for load and sales and weakest for capacity by region and provider concentration.
AIC-001 · ENE-003 · MIN-005 · SYS-012
GRF · KEY M
Public Meaning
For most people the stack appears as a service that works or does not. The baseline asks that public debate treat power, chips and minerals as shared inputs, and keep recovery as well as growth in view.
INF-004 · DAT-009 · DEV-011
GRA · KEY F
Capital Meaning
Readiness implications only. Public funding is large in places and private investment is concentrated4311. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.
FIN-008 · FIN-010
NEXUS
Synthesis
Technology infrastructure risk is well described by layer and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind connection times, chip capacity and provider concentration, and test the grid and supply overlap before the next shortage.
SYS-012 · R-01 · R-03
6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions
How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for strategic technology infrastructure. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.
| Quarter | Edition | Question | Boundary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | State and Agenda | What matters this year, and what is the starting position? | observed baseline stays distinct from planned work |
| Q2 | Evidence and Build | What new evidence and capability exist? | a configured capability is not a validated result |
| Q3 | Stress Test and Readiness | What do scenarios and tests show? | simulated loss or performance is not observed impact |
| Q4 | Annual Synthesis and Renewal | What changed in the year, and what renews? | release follows review, not event publicity deadlines |
| Steward or body | Role | Contribution route |
|---|---|---|
| The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada) | Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T) | science and practice communities · GCRI gateway |
| The Global Risks Forum (GRF) | leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M) | policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway |
| The Global Risks Alliance (GRA) | finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F) | finance and insurance · GRA gateway |
| Nexus Standards | preparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methods | Standards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI |
| Risk Academy | learning pathways tied to the agenda questions | Academy gateway · learning by review |
| Reports strategic desks | technology infrastructure chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readiness | strategic editorial board |
Standards drafts used in this edition
- Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
- Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
- Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech
Standards calendar to watch
- Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
- Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
- Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition
6.4GCRI reading: the model card
GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology
6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.
Chips need minerals, data centres need power and services need both. Treating each layer alone understates how a limit in one becomes a limit in all. This edition reads the stack.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01
Technology is a stack of physical inputs
The global share of electricity used by data centres is small. The effect is local, in clusters such as those in the United States and in Ireland, where grid limits arrive first.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02
Load is local
Public targets and funding set direction. The Commission’s forecast and the Court of Auditors show that a target and delivered capacity can be far apart, and the same test applies to every programme.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03
Targets are not capacity
Readiness is not self-sufficiency. It is the ability to keep critical services running and to recover them when an input is short. The literature on weaponised interdependence explains why shared inputs matter.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04
Sovereignty is a matter of degree
6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 strategic technology infrastructure readiness pack
The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.
| Item | Register | State at baseline | First 2027 entry |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | Global risk state delta | baseline set by this edition | changes against the baseline |
| E2 | WEFH+B state delta | five global system readings set | indicator updates and freshness |
| E3 | Agenda and Portfolio movement | eight agenda items · 6 proposed objects | admission decisions |
| E4 | Federation delivery register | national chapters in preparation | national chapters |
| E5 | Consortium capability register | national consortia forming | first contributions |
| E6 | Leadership questions and challenges | none yet | first challenge log |
| E7 | Foundry technical state | national environments prepared | first federation cut |
| E8 | Publication candidates | twelve findings carried forward | PUBLISH · HOLD dispositions |
| E9 | Universe readiness | one candidate mission | admission and role spine |
| E10 | Correction register | none | first federation-wide cycle |
Publication dispositions
- Publish
- Hold
- Needs evidence
- Restricted
- Superseded
6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.
- IN FORCE
- ADOPTED
- PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
| Instrument | Body | Scope | Status | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EU Chips Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/17818 | European Union | EU | IN FORCE | chip supply and resilience |
| EU Artificial Intelligence Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/168916 | European Union | EU | IN FORCE | artificial intelligence |
| EU Data Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/285417 | European Union | EU | IN FORCE | data access and cloud switching |
| EU Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/284718 | European Union | EU | IN FORCE | product security |
| NIS2 Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/255519 | European Union | EU | IN FORCE | network security |
| Critical Entities Resilience Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/255729 | European Union | EU | IN FORCE | critical entities |
| CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-16727 | United States | US | ADOPTED | chip funding |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.035 | NIST | global use | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | cyber risk |
| ISO/IEC 27001 information security31 | ISO | global | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | security management |
| ISO 22301 business continuity32 | ISO | global | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | continuity |
| IEC 62443 control-system security33 | IEC | global | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | operational technology |
Changed since 2024
- The EU AI Act applies generally from 2 August 2026, with some high-risk dates extended by an omnibus act that entered into force on 27 July 202616
- Reporting obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act apply from 11 September 202618
- The Data Act has applied since 12 September 202517
- The EU published an action plan on cable security in February 202530
- The 20% chip target comes from the Digital Decade programme36
6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
The review behind this edition covers strategic technology infrastructure assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.
Review protocol
- Question
- What does the published evidence establish about the world’s strategic technology infrastructure and sovereign readiness and its couplings?
- Sources searched
- agency and statistical releases; policy pages; peer-reviewed interdependency literature; market statistics
- Window
- releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
- Selection
- sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
- Next step
- systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
| Reference | Type | Year | Role | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly39 | journal article | 2001 | framework | interdependencies |
| Buldyrev et al.40 | journal article | 2010 | supports | cascading failure |
| Farrell and Newman37 | journal article | 2019 | framework | weaponised interdependence |
| Miller, Chip War38 | book | 2022 | context | chip supply history |
| Bradford, Digital Empires42 | book | 2023 | context | regulatory models |
| Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory report23 | national laboratory report | 2024 | context | US data-centre energy |
| Reference | Issuer | Year | Role | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy and AI1 | IEA | 2025 | supports | data centre load |
| Global Energy Review 20262 | IEA | 2026 | supports | electricity growth |
| Global Critical Minerals Outlook 20263 | IEA | 2026 | supports | refining concentration |
| Technology and Innovation Report 202522 | UNCTAD | 2025 | context | frontier technology |
| Draghi report20 | European Commission | 2024 | context | competitiveness |
| Space Environment Report25 | ESA | 2025 | context | orbital infrastructure |
| Reference | Issuer | Year | Role | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Semiconductor sales release4 | WSTS | 2026 | supports | chip market |
| Annual sales release5 | SIA | 2026 | supports | chip market |
| AI Index 202611 | Stanford HAI | 2026 | supports | private investment |
| Data centre tracker14 | Epoch AI | 2026 | supports | large sites |
| Cloud use by enterprises9 | Eurostat | 2025 | supports | cloud use |
| AI use by enterprises10 | Eurostat | 2025 | supports | AI use |
| Data centre electricity release12 | CSO Ireland | 2025 | supports | local load |
| Facts and Figures13 | ITU | 2026 | supports | connectivity |
| Cloud market share series26 | Synergy Research | 2026 | context | provider concentration |
| Reference | Issuer | Year | Role | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chips Act page8 | European Commission | 2026 | supports | EU chip policy |
| Special report on the EU chip strategy7 | European Court of Auditors | 2025 | supports | target and forecast |
| CHIPS and Science Act text43 | US Congress | 2022 | supports | US funding |
| CHIPS for America page6 | NIST | 2026 | post-close, context only | award notices |
| National Semiconductor Strategy21 | UK government | 2023 | context | UK policy |
| AI Factories15 | EuroHPC Joint Undertaking | 2026 | context | compute capacity |
| AI Act page16 | European Commission | 2026 | context | dates of application |
| AI export measure of 202528 | US Department of Commerce | 2025 | context | export controls |
Where the evidence agrees
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 11Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report (report page; private AI investment in 2025 of USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 16European Commission (ed.), AI Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; in force 1 August 2024; general application 2 August 2026; omnibus in force 27 July 2026). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 17European Commission (ed.), Data Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/2854; in force 11 January 2024; applies from 12 September 2025). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 18European Commission (ed.), Cyber Resilience Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/2847; in force 10 December 2024; reporting from 11 September 2026; main obligations from 11 December 2027). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 19European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive (policy page; Directive (EU) 2022/2555; transposition deadline 17 October 2024). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities, Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 27CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, United States (statute text opened; see reference [43]). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: NIST, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, February 2024, cited from memory; the programme page read gave no figures. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security management systems. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: business continuity management systems. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: European Commission and High Representative, Joint Communication on an EU Action Plan on Cable Security, February 2025, cited from memory; the policy page returned not found. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030, Decision (EU) 2022/2481, Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory as the origin of the 20% chip target. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, 2001, cited from memory. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Buldyrev, S.V. et al., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, 2010, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 37UNVERIFIED, not opened: Farrell, H. and Newman, A.L., Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, International Security 44(1), 42 to 79, 2019, cited from memory. MIT Press. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Miller, C., Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology. Scribner, New York, 2022, cited from memory; no figure used. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Bradford, A., Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology. Oxford University Press, New York, 2023, cited from memory; no figure used. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 23UNVERIFIED, not opened: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (ed.), 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, December 2024, cited from memory; no figure used; the page returned an access error. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 22UNCTAD (ed.), Technology and Innovation Report 2025 (publication page read for date, 7 April 2025; no figures used). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 20European Commission (ed.), The Draghi report: A competitiveness strategy for Europe (page read for title and date, 9 September 2024; no figures used). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 25UNVERIFIED, not opened: ESA (ed.), ESA Space Environment Report 2025, cited for orbital infrastructure context; the page returned an access error and no figure is used. European Space Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5SIA (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release of 6 February 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 14POST-CLOSE, context only: Epoch AI (ed.), Frontier data centres (tracker page updated 1 November 2026; 96 sites, 15.1 GW of IT power; estimated coverage of about 45% of deployed AI compute). Epoch AI. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures (page titled 2025 whose text describes the 2026 edition; 6.3 billion people online, 76%; 2 billion offline; 93% in high-income and 32% in low-income countries). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: Synergy Research Group (ed.), cloud infrastructure market share series, cited as the intended source of provider shares; the article address returned not found and no figure is used. Synergy Research Group, Reno. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6POST-CLOSE, context only: Post-close, context only: NIST (ed.), CHIPS for America (programme page; award notices to October 2026; supports no baseline claim). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 21UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (ed.), National Semiconductor Strategy (page read for date, 19 May 2023, and three objectives; no figures used). UK Government, London. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (ed.), AI Factories (programme page; states 19 AI Factories and 13 antennas while the listing shows 18 entries; no amounts). EuroHPC Joint Undertaking, Luxembourg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, rescission of the 2025 AI diffusion export measure, May 2025, cited from memory; the Federal Register page redirected to an access gate. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back