Skip to content

Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Readings from the other desks

The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

16 min read0 figures8 tables39 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

உள்ளடக்கம்
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Lifelines fail together
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
    1. 6.1 The other desks’ editions of this subject
    2. 6.2 Three lenses
    3. 6.3 Standards, Academy and steward contributions
    4. 6.4 GCRI reading: the model card
    5. 6.5 Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
    6. 6.6 Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 lifeline systems readiness pack
    7. 6.7 Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
    8. 6.8 Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

Deskபதிப்புநிலைIdentifier
GCRI Systems EvidenceSystems Evidence: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026Drafted, in stewardship reviewNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
GRF Public DeliberationOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
GRA Capital ReadinessCapital Readiness: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026In preparationNR-GRA-SR-02-2026-BASELINE (reserved)
Standards ProgressOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Academy CapabilityOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Index MeasurementOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading lifelines as one dependent network. Common causes recur across sectors, failures spread through shared dependence on power, telecoms and software, and recovery is limited by thresholds such as black-start capability and repair capacity. Evidence is strongest for single events and weakest for cross-sector dependency data.

INF-001 · CYB-002 · DAT-004 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people lifeline failure arrives as a dark home, a dry tap or a card that will not work. The baseline asks that public debate treat infrastructure as shared and interdependent, and keep recovery, not only prevention, in view.

INF-001 · DAT-004 · DEV-008

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Disruption is costly, resilient options are reported to return several times their cost, and the investment gap is large in places116. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

INF-005 · DEV-008

NEXUS

Synthesis

Lifeline risk is well described event by event and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind dependency data, test the power and telecom compound loss, and map recovery thresholds before the next large event.

SYS-012 · L-01 · L-03

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for lifeline systems. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
Quarterபதிப்புகேள்விBoundary
Q1State and AgendaWhat matters this year, and what is the starting position?observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2Evidence and BuildWhat new evidence and capability exist?a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3Stress Test and ReadinessWhat do scenarios and tests show?simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4Annual Synthesis and RenewalWhat changed in the year, and what renews?release follows review, not event publicity deadlines
Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or bodyபங்குContribution route
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
Global Risks Forum (GRF)leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
Global Risks Alliance (GRA)finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standardspreparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methodsStandards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Risk Academylearning pathways tied to the agenda questionsAcademy gateway · learning by review
Reports strategic deskslifeline chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readinessstrategic editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

  • Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
  • Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
  • Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

  • Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
  • Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
  • Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

Power runs the exchanges, the exchanges run the control systems, and software runs both. Treating each sector alone understates how a fault in one becomes a fault in all. This edition reads the network.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

Lifelines are one network

Prevention fails sometimes. Restoration after the Iberian blackout and the 2024 software outage shows that recovery capability is a distinct and measurable asset.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Recovery is part of resilience

Agency reporting describes long-lived access to operator networks rather than visible outages. The risk is a capability held in reserve, which is hard to count and easy to underestimate.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Cyber evidence is mostly about access

The investment gap is large, and resilient options are reported to return several times their cost. Yet maintenance, coordination and data matter at least as much as capital.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Money is not the whole answer

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 lifeline systems readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 lifeline systems readiness pack
Itemபதிவு செய்State at baselineFirst 2027 entry
E1Global risk state deltabaseline set by this editionchanges against the baseline
E2WEFH+B state deltafive global system readings setindicator updates and freshness
E3Agenda and Portfolio movementeight agenda items · 6 proposed objectsadmission decisions
E4Federation delivery registernational chapters in preparationnational chapters
E5Consortium capability registernational consortia formingfirst contributions
E6Leadership questions and challengesnone yetfirst challenge log
E7Foundry technical statenational environments preparedfirst federation cut
E8Publication candidatestwelve findings carried forwardPUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9Universe readinessone candidate missionadmission and role spine
E10Correction registernonefirst federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

  • வெளியிடு
  • Hold
  • Needs evidence
  • Restricted
  • Superseded

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

  • IN FORCE
  • ADOPTED
  • PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE
  • PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
கருவிஅமைப்புவரம்புநிலைRelevance
Critical Entities Resilience Directive16ஐரோப்பிய ஒன்றியம்EUIN FORCEcritical entities
NIS2 Directive17ஐரோப்பிய ஒன்றியம்EUIN FORCEnetwork security
National Security Memorandum 2218அமெரிக்க ஐக்கிய நாடுகள்USISSUED 2024infrastructure security
Sendai Framework 2015 to 203019UNDRRglobalADOPTED 2015infrastructure damage target
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.05NISTglobal usePUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYcyber risk
ISO/IEC 27001 information security21ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYsecurity management
ISO 31000 risk management27ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYrisk process
Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals26CISAUSPUBLISHED · GUIDANCEbaseline practices
ISO 22301 business continuity20ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYcontinuity
IEC 62443 control-system security22IECglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYoperational technology
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, articles 112 to 11524ஐக்கிய நாடுகள்globalIN FORCEsubmarine cables

Changed since 2024

  • The ENTSO-E final report on the Iberian blackout was published on 20 March 20261
  • The NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 added a Govern function in 20245
  • The EU published an action plan on cable security in 202538

To watch in 2027

  • Member State identification of critical entities under the EU directive16
  • Implementation of national security rules for operators1718
  • Application of international humanitarian law to objects indispensable to civilians25

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers lifeline systems assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

கேள்வி
What does the published evidence establish about the world’s critical infrastructure and lifeline systems and its couplings?
Sources searched
agency advisories; operator and regulator reports; peer-reviewed interdependency literature; loss statistics
Window
releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
Selection
sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
Next step
systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and assessments
Referenceவகைஆண்டுபங்குUsed for
Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly28journal article2001frameworkinterdependencies
Buldyrev et al.29journal article2010supportscascading failure
Koks et al.30journal article2019supportstransport hazard risk
Helbing33journal article2013frameworknetworked risk
Perrow, Normal Accidents34book1984frameworktight coupling
Zscheischler et al.32journal article2018frameworkcompound events
Table 6.6Institutional flagships
ReferenceIssuerஆண்டுபங்குUsed for
Iberian blackout final report1ENTSO-E2026supportsgrid failure
Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A2CISA and partners2024supportspre-positioning
ENISA Threat Landscape 20253ENISA2025supportsincident counts
GAR 202510UNDRR2025supportshazard losses
GAR 202237UNDRR2022contextsystemic risk
Lifelines11World Bank and GFDRR2019supportsdisruption cost
Table 6.7Statistics, losses and reconstruction
ReferenceIssuerஆண்டுபங்குUsed for
2025 Report Card6ASCE2025supportsasset condition
RDNA512World Bank, UN, EU2026supportsreconstruction needs
Building Back Better31உலக வங்கி2018contextrecovery
Energy and AI8IEA2025supportsload clusters
Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions35IEA2023contextgrid needs
Climate Resilience for Energy Security39IEA2022contextresilience
Global Critical Minerals Outlook 202640IEA2026supportsmineral concentration
Global Energy Review 20269IEA2026supportselectricity growth
Table 6.8Standards, directives and operators
ReferenceIssuerஆண்டுபங்குUsed for
Microsoft statement on the 2024 outage4Microsoft2024supportssoftware failure
Root cause analysis36CrowdStrike2024contextsoftware failure
Cable fault analysis7TeleGeography2024supportssubsea faults
Cable maintenance data15TeleGeography2025contextrepair ships
Annual Outage Analysis 202614Uptime Institute2026contextoutage cost
EU Action Plan on Cable Security38European Commission2025contextcable policy
Gulf desalination reporting13Arab Center Washington DC2026contextstrikes on plants

Where the evidence agrees

  • Failures cross sectors through shared power, telecoms and software14
  • Most subsea cable faults are accidental7
  • Infrastructure asset condition is uneven6

Where it is unsettled

  • Whether any given cable fault is deliberate7
  • How much pre-positioned access could be used to disrupt services2
  • How large cross-sector cascades are at operating scale2829

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  2. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  4. 17European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  5. 18The White House (ed.), National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), 30 April 2024 (archived page; sector risk management agencies for 16 sectors; biennial National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  6. 19United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 to 2030, resolution 69/283 of 3 June 2015 (global target (d): substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services by 2030). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2015. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  7. 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 21ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, edition 3 (25 October 2022), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 27ISO (ed.), ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: Guidelines, edition 2 (14 February 2018; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  10. 26CISA (ed.), Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (update of the goals first issued in 2022, announced in the CISA bulletin of 10 December 2025; adds a governance component); the goals document itself was not read and no figure is used. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  11. 20ISO (ed.), ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: Business continuity management systems: Requirements, edition 2 (30 October 2019; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 22IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, including IEC 62443-2-1:2024, Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners, edition 2.0 (7 August 2024), catalogue record read; no figure is used. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 24United Nations (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982, articles 112 to 115 on submarine cables and pipelines (United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1833, No. 31363, text opened). United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  14. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 38European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (eds.), Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: EU Action Plan on Cable Security, JOIN(2025) 9, 21 February 2025 (Publications Office record read). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 25Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted at Geneva on 8 June 1977, articles 54 and 56 on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and works and installations containing dangerous forces (United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1125, No. 17512, text opened). United Nations, New York. Observation year 1977. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  17. 28Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (DOI 10.1109/37.969131; Crossref record and abstract read). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131back
  18. 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back
  19. 30Koks, E.E. et al., A global multi-hazard risk analysis of road and railway infrastructure assets, Nature Communications 10, 2677, 25 June 2019 (DOI 10.1038/s41467-019-10442-3; Crossref record and abstract read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/s41467-019-10442-3back
  20. 33Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497, 51 to 59, 2013 (DOI 10.1038/nature12047; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature12047back
  21. 34Perrow, C., Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books, New York, 1984 (library catalogue record read; later edition Princeton University Press, 1999). Observation year 1984. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  22. 32Zscheischler, J. et al., Future climate risk from compound events, Nature Climate Change 8(6), 469 to 477, 2018 (DOI 10.1038/s41558-018-0156-3; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0156-3back
  23. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  25. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  26. 37UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2022: Our World at Risk (4 May 2022; DOI 10.18356/9789210015059, Crossref record read). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789210015059back
  27. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  28. 31Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Walsh, B., Building Back Better: Achieving Resilience through Stronger, Faster, and More Inclusive Post-Disaster Reconstruction (repository record and abstract read). World Bank, Washington, June 2018. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  29. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  30. 35IEA (ed.), Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions (27 October 2023; DOI 10.1787/455dd4fb-en, Crossref record read). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/455dd4fb-enback
  31. 39IEA (ed.), Climate Resilience for Energy Security (15 November 2022; DOI 10.1787/2a931f53-en, Crossref record read). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/2a931f53-enback
  32. 40IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  33. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  34. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  35. 36CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (6 August 2024; full text opened); no figure is used. CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  36. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  37. 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  38. 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  39. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

Downloads

Draft, not yet releasedReview copies of a draft in stewardship review. The released edition carries its DOI and replaces them.

  • Print

    • PDF, A4

      The designed print edition, A4: cover, imprint and licence, how to cite, contents with page numbers, every chapter, figure, table and annex.

      PDF108 pages974 KBTagged, with bookmarks

      SHA-256 a001b18049034b26b3b46681e6a6f94a52bcfa1f036a7c5ea8f5c47a0c384d7e

    • PDF, US Letter

      The designed print edition, US Letter: cover, imprint and licence, how to cite, contents with page numbers, every chapter, figure, table and annex.

      PDF115 pages979 KBTagged, with bookmarks

      SHA-256 132c29e03fd217138c54985f06a73f8934b58dafa34147c61cd392cf57bbd9bf

  • Web edition

  • Data bundle

    • Indicators, CSV

      15 indicators with unit, year, status and source

      NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-indicators.csv1 KB

      SHA-256 5fca87fb40442be1fa3dd40b9f606fbd327392ab968bc3d7b091f9adcf905973

    • Indicators, JSON

      The same indicators with the edition’s identity and licence

      NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-indicators.json2 KB

      SHA-256 84a98b8e1bfd4b1c830bc9dcedc29a2f26badce65dd579232b1a19357914995b

    • Findings, CSV

      12 findings with status, evidence-quality level and references

      NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-findings.csv3 KB

      SHA-256 dd84af93ff1227f865673e4a6e8cefebf186c950c83af875a7abd7fa0e73ed53

  • Citation files

    • Citation, BibTeX

      For LaTeX and reference managers

      NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.bib1 KB

      SHA-256 6bddfc7da88e6e3e56512894e64c6c638a2219ffb11c5da174ddb1dc119f4d45

    • Citation, RIS

      For Zotero, EndNote and Mendeley

      NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.ris1 KB

      SHA-256 8eff86b5383c0cecdf24c4f9cc2fdabdfa6dc8f7402227eb950e47633d4d68e3

    • Citation, CITATION.cff

      Citation File Format 1.2.0, for GitHub, Zenodo and software catalogues

      NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE.cff1 KB

      SHA-256 f968482ca7d3c050c6e092cde70c7287cad11378e0e7c7a1e76f69e8680f6f1f

Check a file with its SHA-256: shasum -a 256 <file> (macOS, Linux) or Get-FileHash <file> (Windows). Text, tables and figures by Nexus: CC BY 4.0; each source keeps its own licence.

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 6: Readings from the other desks. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

அறிக்கைகள்பங்களி

Send evidence or a correction on Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the GCRI Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

GCRI Systems Evidence deskStrategic Systems
Contribution form · reports.contribution.gcri

தனிப்பட்ட தரவு, உணர்திறன் வாய்ந்த உள்கட்டமைப்பு விவரங்கள் அல்லது பகிர உங்களுக்கு உரிமை இல்லாத எதையும் ஒருபோதும் அனுப்ப வேண்டாம். ஒரு பங்களிப்பு பயன்படுத்தப்படும் முன் மதிப்பாய்வு செய்யப்படுகிறது; அதை அனுப்புவது எந்த ஆசிரியர் உரிமையையோ பதிப்பு உரிமையையோ வழங்காது, நிதியுதவி ஒருபோதும் ஒரு கண்டுபிடிப்பை விலைக்கு வாங்காது.

CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.

துறை அடையாளக் குறி

The sectors behind Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

மூலைகளைத் தேர்ந்தெடு · கோடுகளின் மேல் நகர்த்து6 / 15 தொடர்புகள்

சூழல்

Infrastructure and its partners

Infrastructure gives pipes, dams and treatment works to water (0.6), transmission and fuel logistics to energy (0.6) and access to care to health (0.5).

W · E · I · F · H · B

துறைகள்
4 6 இல்
தொடர்புகள்
6 15 இல்
இணைப்பு
0.46 மொத்தத்தில் பங்கு

செயல்பாட்டிலுள்ள வலுவான தொடர்புகள்

  • Energy → Infrastructure · power for transport and telecoms0.8
  • Water → Energy · cooling water and hydropower0.6
  • உள்கட்டமைப்பு → நீர் · குழாய்கள், அணைகள் மற்றும் சுத்திகரிப்பு நிலையங்கள்0.6
  • நீர் → சுகாதாரம் · குடிநீரும் சுகாதாரத் துப்புரவும்0.7
ஒரு வழக்கமான நகர-பிராந்தியத்திற்கான கற்பித்தல் மதிப்புகள், எந்த இடத்தின் அளவீடுகளும் அல்ல. இணைப்பு என்பது செயல்பாட்டிலுள்ள தொடர்புகளின் கூட்டு வலிமை, பதினைந்திலும் உள்ள பங்காக.
Your role here

What you can do from this page.

  • ReaderFound an error? Every correction is public.Corrections log
  • ContributorSend evidence, data or a correction to this desk.Contribute
  • ReviewerReview for this desk; verified reviews are credited.Become a reviewer
  • Editor, steward or boardQueues, decisions and production are in the workspace.My workspace