Readings from the other desks
The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.
目录
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Lifelines fail together
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 6.1 The other desks’ editions of this subject
- 6.2 Three lenses
- 6.3 Standards, Academy and steward contributions
- 6.4 GCRI reading: the model card
- 6.5 Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
- 6.6 Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 lifeline systems readiness pack
- 6.7 Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
- 6.8 Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- A方法论
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject
Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.
| 办事处 | 版本 | 状态 | 标识符 |
|---|---|---|---|
| GCRI Systems Evidence | Systems Evidence: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026 | Drafted, in stewardship review | NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 |
| GRF Public Deliberation | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| GRA Capital Readiness | Capital Readiness: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems 2026 | 筹备中 | NR-GRA-SR-02-2026-BASELINE (reserved) |
| Standards Progress | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| Academy Capability | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| Index Measurement | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit |
6.2Three lenses
One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.
GCRI · KEY T
Technical Truth
The evidence supports reading lifelines as one dependent network. Common causes recur across sectors, failures spread through shared dependence on power, telecoms and software, and recovery is limited by thresholds such as black-start capability and repair capacity. Evidence is strongest for single events and weakest for cross-sector dependency data.
INF-001 · CYB-002 · DAT-004 · SYS-012
GRF · KEY M
Public Meaning
For most people lifeline failure arrives as a dark home, a dry tap or a card that will not work. The baseline asks that public debate treat infrastructure as shared and interdependent, and keep recovery, not only prevention, in view.
INF-001 · DAT-004 · DEV-008
GRA · KEY F
Capital Meaning
Readiness implications only. Disruption is costly, resilient options are reported to return several times their cost, and the investment gap is large in places116. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.
INF-005 · DEV-008
NEXUS
综合
Lifeline risk is well described event by event and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind dependency data, test the power and telecom compound loss, and map recovery thresholds before the next large event.
SYS-012 · L-01 · L-03
6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions
How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for lifeline systems. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.
| Quarter | 版本 | 问题 | 边界 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | State and Agenda | 今年什么最重要,起点在哪里? | observed baseline stays distinct from planned work |
| Q2 | Evidence and Build | What new evidence and capability exist? | a configured capability is not a validated result |
| Q3 | 压力测试 与准备度 | What do scenarios and tests show? | simulated loss or performance is not observed impact |
| Q4 | Annual Synthesis and Renewal | What changed in the year, and what renews? | release follows review, not event publicity deadlines |
| Steward or body | 角色 | Contribution route |
|---|---|---|
| 全球风险与创新中心(Global Centre for Risk and Innovation,GCRI Canada) | Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T) | science and practice communities · GCRI gateway |
| 全球风险论坛(Global Risks Forum,GRF) | leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M) | policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway |
| 全球风险联盟(Global Risks Alliance,GRA) | finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F) | finance and insurance · GRA gateway |
| Nexus Standards | preparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methods | Standards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI |
| Risk Academy | learning pathways tied to the agenda questions | Academy gateway · learning by review |
| Reports strategic desks | lifeline chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readiness | strategic editorial board |
Standards drafts used in this edition
- Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
- Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
- Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech
Standards calendar to watch
- Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
- Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
- Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition
6.4GCRI reading: the model card
GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology
6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.
Power runs the exchanges, the exchanges run the control systems, and software runs both. Treating each sector alone understates how a fault in one becomes a fault in all. This edition reads the network.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01
Lifelines are one network
Prevention fails sometimes. Restoration after the Iberian blackout and the 2024 software outage shows that recovery capability is a distinct and measurable asset.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02
Recovery is part of resilience
Agency reporting describes long-lived access to operator networks rather than visible outages. The risk is a capability held in reserve, which is hard to count and easy to underestimate.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03
Cyber evidence is mostly about access
The investment gap is large, and resilient options are reported to return several times their cost. Yet maintenance, coordination and data matter at least as much as capital.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04
Money is not the whole answer
6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 lifeline systems readiness pack
The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.
| 条目 | 登记 | State at baseline | First 2027 entry |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | Global risk state delta | baseline set by this edition | changes against the baseline |
| E2 | WEFH+B state delta | five global system readings set | indicator updates and freshness |
| E3 | Agenda and Portfolio movement | eight agenda items · 6 proposed objects | admission decisions |
| E4 | Federation delivery register | national chapters in preparation | national chapters |
| E5 | Consortium capability register | national consortia forming | first contributions |
| E6 | Leadership questions and challenges | 暂无 | first challenge log |
| E7 | Foundry technical state | national environments prepared | first federation cut |
| E8 | Publication candidates | twelve findings carried forward | PUBLISH · HOLD dispositions |
| E9 | Universe readiness | one candidate mission | admission and role spine |
| E10 | Correction register | 无 | first federation-wide cycle |
Publication dispositions
- 发布
- Hold
- Needs evidence
- 受限
- 已被取代
6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.
- IN FORCE
- 已采用
- PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE
- PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
| 工具 | 机构 | 范围 | 状态 | 相关性 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 《关键实体韧性指令》16 | 欧洲联盟 | EU | IN FORCE | critical entities |
| NIS2 指令17 | 欧洲联盟 | EU | IN FORCE | network security |
| National Security Memorandum 2218 | 美国 | US | ISSUED 2024 | infrastructure security |
| Sendai Framework 2015 to 203019 | UNDRR | global | ADOPTED 2015 | infrastructure damage target |
| NIST 网络安全框架 2.05 | NIST | global use | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | cyber risk |
| ISO/IEC 27001 information security21 | ISO | global | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | security management |
| ISO 31000 risk management27 | ISO | global | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | risk process |
| Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals26 | CISA | US | PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE | baseline practices |
| ISO 22301 business continuity20 | ISO | global | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | continuity |
| IEC 62443 control-system security22 | IEC | global | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | operational technology |
| UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, articles 112 to 11524 | 联合国 | global | IN FORCE | submarine cables |
Changed since 2024
6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
The review behind this edition covers lifeline systems assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.
Review protocol
- 问题
- What does the published evidence establish about the world’s critical infrastructure and lifeline systems and its couplings?
- Sources searched
- agency advisories; operator and regulator reports; peer-reviewed interdependency literature; loss statistics
- 窗口期
- releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
- 遴选
- sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
- 下一步
- systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
| 编号 | 类型 | 年份 | 角色 | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly28 | journal article | 2001 | 框架 | interdependencies |
| Buldyrev et al.29 | journal article | 2010 | supports | 级联失效 |
| Koks et al.30 | journal article | 2019 | supports | transport hazard risk |
| Helbing33 | journal article | 2013 | 框架 | networked risk |
| Perrow, Normal Accidents34 | book | 1984 | 框架 | 紧密耦合 |
| Zscheischler et al.32 | journal article | 2018 | 框架 | compound events |
| 编号 | Issuer | 年份 | 角色 | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Iberian blackout final report1 | ENTSO-E | 2026 | supports | 电网故障 |
| Joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A2 | CISA and partners | 2024 | supports | pre-positioning |
| ENISA Threat Landscape 20253 | ENISA | 2025 | supports | incident counts |
| GAR 202510 | UNDRR | 2025 | supports | hazard losses |
| GAR 202237 | UNDRR | 2022 | context | 系统性风险 |
| 生命线系统11 | 世界银行与 GFDRR | 2019 | supports | disruption cost |
| 编号 | Issuer | 年份 | 角色 | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 Report Card6 | ASCE | 2025 | supports | asset condition |
| RDNA512 | World Bank, UN, EU | 2026 | supports | reconstruction needs |
| Building Back Better31 | 世界银行 | 2018 | context | recovery |
| Energy and AI8 | IEA | 2025 | supports | load clusters |
| Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions35 | IEA | 2023 | context | grid needs |
| Climate Resilience for Energy Security39 | IEA | 2022 | context | resilience |
| Global Critical Minerals Outlook 202640 | IEA | 2026 | supports | mineral concentration |
| Global Energy Review 20269 | IEA | 2026 | supports | electricity growth |
| 编号 | Issuer | 年份 | 角色 | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft statement on the 2024 outage4 | Microsoft | 2024 | supports | software failure |
| Root cause analysis36 | CrowdStrike | 2024 | context | software failure |
| Cable fault analysis7 | TeleGeography | 2024 | supports | subsea faults |
| Cable maintenance data15 | TeleGeography | 2025 | context | repair ships |
| Annual Outage Analysis 202614 | Uptime Institute | 2026 | context | outage cost |
| EU Action Plan on Cable Security38 | 欧盟委员会 | 2025 | context | cable policy |
| Gulf desalination reporting13 | Arab Center Washington DC | 2026 | context | strikes on plants |
Where the evidence agrees
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 17European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 18The White House (ed.), National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), 30 April 2024 (archived page; sector risk management agencies for 16 sectors; biennial National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 19United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 to 2030, resolution 69/283 of 3 June 2015 (global target (d): substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services by 2030). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2015. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 21ISO and IEC (eds.), ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection: Information security management systems: Requirements, edition 3 (25 October 2022), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 27ISO (ed.), ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: Guidelines, edition 2 (14 February 2018; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 26CISA (ed.), Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals 2.0 (update of the goals first issued in 2022, announced in the CISA bulletin of 10 December 2025; adds a governance component); the goals document itself was not read and no figure is used. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 20ISO (ed.), ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: Business continuity management systems: Requirements, edition 2 (30 October 2019; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 22IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, including IEC 62443-2-1:2024, Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners, edition 2.0 (7 August 2024), catalogue record read; no figure is used. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 24United Nations (ed.), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, concluded at Montego Bay on 10 December 1982, articles 112 to 115 on submarine cables and pipelines (United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1833, No. 31363, text opened). United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 38European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (eds.), Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: EU Action Plan on Cable Security, JOIN(2025) 9, 21 February 2025 (Publications Office record read). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 25Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted at Geneva on 8 June 1977, articles 54 and 56 on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and works and installations containing dangerous forces (United Nations Treaty Series vol. 1125, No. 17512, text opened). United Nations, New York. Observation year 1977. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 28Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (DOI 10.1109/37.969131; Crossref record and abstract read). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131back
- 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back
- 30Koks, E.E. et al., A global multi-hazard risk analysis of road and railway infrastructure assets, Nature Communications 10, 2677, 25 June 2019 (DOI 10.1038/s41467-019-10442-3; Crossref record and abstract read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/s41467-019-10442-3back
- 33Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497, 51 to 59, 2013 (DOI 10.1038/nature12047; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature12047back
- 34Perrow, C., Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. Basic Books, New York, 1984 (library catalogue record read; later edition Princeton University Press, 1999). Observation year 1984. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 32Zscheischler, J. et al., Future climate risk from compound events, Nature Climate Change 8(6), 469 to 477, 2018 (DOI 10.1038/s41558-018-0156-3; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0156-3back
- 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
- 37UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2022: Our World at Risk (4 May 2022; DOI 10.18356/9789210015059, Crossref record read). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789210015059back
- 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 31Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Walsh, B., Building Back Better: Achieving Resilience through Stronger, Faster, and More Inclusive Post-Disaster Reconstruction (repository record and abstract read). World Bank, Washington, June 2018. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 35IEA (ed.), Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions (27 October 2023; DOI 10.1787/455dd4fb-en, Crossref record read). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/455dd4fb-enback
- 39IEA (ed.), Climate Resilience for Energy Security (15 November 2022; DOI 10.1787/2a931f53-en, Crossref record read). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/2a931f53-enback
- 40IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 36CrowdStrike (ed.), External Technical Root Cause Analysis: Channel File 291 (6 August 2024; full text opened); no figure is used. CrowdStrike, Austin. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 14Uptime Institute (ed.), Uptime Announces Annual Outage Analysis Report 2026 (press release, New York, 13 May 2026; in the 2025 annual survey 57% of respondents said their most recent major outage cost more than USD 100,000); the full report is limited to members and subscribers. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back