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Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

10 min read0 figures5 tables25 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

İçindekiler
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Cryptography is infrastructure under change
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Signature lag while key agreement migrates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
    1. 8.1 Cryptographic platforms and protocols
    2. 8.2 Performance, bandwidth and energy of cryptography
    3. 8.3 Modules, devices and supply chain
    4. 8.4 Economy, cost and workforce
    5. 8.5 Security, cryptography and governance watch
  11. AMetodoloji
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

8.1Cryptographic platforms and protocols

Cryptography reaches users through protocols and libraries. Evidence is strongest for standards texts and open-source defaults, and weakest for signatures and embedded devices.

3standartlar

finalised by NIST in 2024123

3parameter sets

ML-KEM 512, 768 and 10241

10.0version

OpenSSH release that made mlkem768x25519 the default24

Table 8.1State at baseline
BileşenStatüKanıtDurum
Key establishmentML-KEM standardised; HQC selected as backup16Bildirilen
Secure shellpost-quantum default since version 9.0; warning from 10.124Bildirilen
Messaginghybrid post-quantum steps described by two providers2526Bildirilen
Signatures and certificatesstandards exist; deployment lags2323Bildirilen

Bağlantılar

  • CRY → INF deployment
  • INF → DAT exposure
  • GOV → INF timelines

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • signature deployment
  • device update capability

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

8.2Performance, bandwidth and energy of cryptography

Post-quantum objects are larger than the ones they replace. The cost shows first in handshakes and certificate chains.

≈15kB

ML-DSA-44 signature size added to a TLS handshake23

≈7kB

FN-DSA-512 signature size added, as stated23

≈15%

handshake slowdown from adding 9 kB, as stated23

Table 8.2State at baseline
BileşenStatüKanıtDurum
Handshake sizelarger signatures add kilobytes to each connection23Bildirilen
Lightweight methodsNIST published Ascon-based standards for constrained devices8Bildirilen
Key-encapsulation useNIST guidance on secure use published in 20257Bildirilen
Energy costnot published on a common basis for migration23Expert input

Bağlantılar

  • INF → CLI energy and bandwidth
  • CRY → INF performance
  • ENE ↔ INF facility power

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • energy cost of migration
  • device performance limits

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

8.3Modules, devices and supply chain

Long-life devices and validated modules limit how fast cryptography can change. The sources read give no supply figures.

NOT BOUNDentries

CISA KEV count at the close

23kurumları

co-sealed the 2025 router advisory14

0zero-days

observed in that campaign, as stated14

Table 8.3State at baseline
BileşenStatüKanıtDurum
Edge devicesrouters and gateways compromised through known vulnerabilities14Bildirilen
Validated modulestransition of older module validations runs through 2026 per the CISA page1233Bildirilen
Product dutiesEU product law adds reporting duties in stages2740Bildirilen
Chip and module supplynot bound12Expert input

Bağlantılar

  • INF → ENE edge exposure
  • GOV → INF product duties
  • MIN → INF module supply

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • device update capability
  • module and chip supply

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

8.4Economy, cost and workforce

Cost and workforce evidence is thin and partly from vendors. The figures below are weak evidence and are read as such.

4.99USD million

average breach cost, vendor study 202618

820USD million

on-chain ransomware payments floor, 202519

59%

respondents with critical or significant skills needs, 202520

Table 8.4State at baseline
BileşenStatüKanıtDurum
Breach costUSD 4.99 million average, up 12%, from a vendor study18Bildirilen
Ransomware paymentsmore than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025; vendor estimate19Bildirilen
Workforceskills needs up from 44% to 59%; no gap figure20Bildirilen
Losses to the FBIUSD 16.6 billion in 2024, mostly fraud15Bildirilen

Bağlantılar

  • INF → FIN cost
  • FIN → DAT migration spending
  • HLT → INF workforce

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • primary cost data
  • workforce size

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

8.5Security, cryptography and governance watch

Governance is moving on three fronts: migration timelines, product and incident duties, and cybercrime law. Dates differ by authority.

2035milestone

NCSC date to finish migration10

11 Sep 2026date

EU product law reporting duties start27

4business days

SEC filing window after a materiality determination21

Table 8.5State at baseline
BileşenStatüKanıtDurum
Migration timelinesNCSC 2028, 2031 and 2035; NIST transition draft; EU roadmap101144Bildirilen
Product and entity dutiesEU product law and network security directive2728Bildirilen
AçıklamaUS listed companies disclose material incidents within four business days of the determination21Bildirilen
Cybercrime lawa UN convention opened for signature in October 2025; 95 signatures and 3 of the 40 ratifications needed for entry into force by the close29Bildirilen

Bağlantılar

  • GOV → INF timelines
  • GOV → TRD cross-border duties
  • INF → DAT exposure

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • text of national roadmaps
  • migration progress by sector

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
  • XT-11 Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 25Signal (ed.), Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets, SPQR triple ratchet (blog post, 2 October 2025; ML-KEM 768; gradual rollout; formal verification). Signal Messenger, Mountain View. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 26Apple (ed.), iMessage with PQ3: The new state of the art in quantum-secure messaging at scale (security blog post, 21 February 2024; Kyber-1024 and Kyber-768 hybrid with P-256; level 3 on its own scale). Apple, Cupertino. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 8NIST (ed.), Ascon-Based Lightweight Cryptography Standards for Constrained Devices, SP 800-232 (publication page; final 13 August 2025; Ascon-AEAD128, Ascon-Hash256, Ascon-XOF128, Ascon-CXOF128). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 7NIST (ed.), Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, SP 800-227 (publication page; final 18 September 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 33NIST (ed.), Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS 140-3 (publication page; published 22 March 2019; supersedes FIPS 140-2; the FIPS 140-3 transition project page states that FIPS 140-2 validations move to the historical list on 21 September 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  14. 27European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act), Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 20 November 2024 (Article 71: in force on the twentieth day after publication; applies from 11 December 2027; Article 14, reporting obligations of manufacturers, from 11 September 2026; Chapter IV from 11 June 2026). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  15. 40European Commission, Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024 on the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity scheme (EUCC) under Regulation (EU) 2019/881, Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 7 February 2024 (applies from 27 February 2025). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 21US Securities and Exchange Commission (ed.), SEC adopts rules on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident disclosure by public companies (press release 2023-139; adopted 26 July 2023; Form 8-K Item 1.05 within four business days of a materiality determination). SEC, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  23. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 28European Parliament and Council, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022, p. 80. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  25. 29United Nations, United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, adopted by General Assembly resolution 79/243 of 24 December 2024 (UN Treaty Collection, chapter XVIII, entry 16: opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 and 26 October 2025, with 72 signatures there; 95 signatures and 3 ratifications dated on or before 30 September 2026; entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession). United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back

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Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 8: Systems in depth. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

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