Data appendix
The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.
目录
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- A方法论
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
B.1The indicator set
| 指标 | 数值 | 单位 | 年份 | 状态 | 来源 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seaborne trade volume | 12,720 | million tons | 2024 | 报告值 | 1 |
| Seaborne trade, ton-miles | 66,781 | billion ton-miles | 2024 | 报告值 | 1 |
| Cape detour, voyage length added | ≈ 30 | % | 2024 | 报告值 | 1 |
| Suez share of maritime trade volume | ≈ 10 | % | 2023 to 2024 | 报告值 | 4 |
| Hormuz total oil flow | 20.7 | million b/d | 2024 | 报告值 | 7 |
| Middle East crude oil shut-ins, March to June average | 9.4 | million b/d | 2026 | 报告值 | 46 |
| Middle East crude oil production, February | 25.2 | million b/d | 2026 | 报告值 | 46 |
| Hormuz daily transits, March | 6 | vessels a day | 2026 | 报告值 | 5 |
| Panama Canal transits | 13,404 | transits | FY2025 | 报告值 | 10 |
| Panama Canal cargo | 489.1 | million CP/SUAB tons | FY2025 | 报告值 | 10 |
| WTO merchandise volume growth, March baseline | 1.9 | % | 2026 | 报告值 | 13 |
| Share of merchandise trade on MFN terms | ≈ 72 | % | 2025 | 报告值 | 15 |
| Seaborne fertiliser trade through Hormuz | ≈ 16 | million tonnes | 2026 | 报告值 | 6 |
| Drewry World Container Index composite | 4,429 | USD per 40ft | 29 Oct 2026 | 报告值 | 16 |
| Rare earth refining share, top country | ≈ 85 | % | 2025 | 报告值 | 2326 |
B.2Global source register
The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.
Domains bound by the register
- TRD
- INF
- ENE
- CON
- FIN
- FOO
- MIN
- AIC
- DAT
- CLI
| 来源 | 类别 | 覆盖范围 | Period | 节奏 | 角色 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 20251 | UN agency | global | 2024 | 年度 | seaborne trade |
| UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 20244 | UN agency | global | 2023 to 2024 | 年度 | canal shares |
| UNCTAD Hormuz assessment5 | UN agency | Gulf | 2026 | 每个事件 | transit drop |
| EIA chokepoints7 | national statistics agency | global | 2024 | 年度 | oil flows |
| EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook46 | national statistics agency | Gulf | 2025 to 2026 | 每月 | Hormuz-related oil shut-ins |
| Panama Canal Authority10 | canal operator | 巴拿马 | FY2025 | 年度 | canal traffic |
| WTO Global Trade Outlook13 | international organisation | global | 2026 | twice a year | trade forecast |
| WTO World Trade Report15 | international organisation | global | 2025 | 年度 | MFN share |
| Drewry World Container Index16 | shipping consultancy | global | 2026 | 每周 | container freight |
| FAO remarks17 | UN agency | global | 2026 | 每个事件 | fertiliser and food |
B.3Regional reading, ten regional clusters
Map plates follow with the regional Baseline Editions, when boundary sources and public-safe resolutions are bound. This page gives the regional reading in table form and ranks no region.
| 区域 | Principal hazards | Systems most exposed | Baseline evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 北美 | canal dependence; container imports; tariff changes | ports, rail, canals | Panama Canal Authority10; WTO13 |
| 南美洲 | bulk exports to Asia; canal and fertiliser dependence | ports, fertiliser | UNCTAD1; FAO17 |
| 欧洲 | Red Sea diversion; energy imports | container routes, LNG | UNCTAD1; EIA8 |
| Eurasia | Black Sea and Turkish Straits routes | grain, oil | EIA7 |
| 中东和北非 | Hormuz closure; Suez revenue | oil, LNG, canal | EIA46; IMF as reported18 |
| 非洲 | cobalt exports; fertiliser and fuel imports | minerals, fertiliser | UNCTAD1; FAO17 |
| 南亚 | energy and fertiliser imports through Hormuz | oil, LNG, fertiliser | UNCTAD5; FAO17 |
| 东亚 | container hubs; Malacca and Hormuz energy imports | containers, oil | EIA7; WTO13 |
| ASEAN | Malacca flows; electronics exports | oil, electronics | EIA7; WTO13 |
| Oceania-Pacific | long routes; small island freight costs | containers | UNCTAD2 |
B.4Regional card: Gulf and Strait of Hormuz
- 区域
- strait
- energy
- fertiliser
- Systems in view
- oil, LNG, fertiliser, shipping
- Defining events
- closure of the strait to most traffic from March 2026546
- 耦合
- ENE → FOO; ENE → INF
- Capability evidence
- rerouting and alternative suppliers; recovery not verified
- 缺口
- transits after Q2 2026; stocks held by importers
- Agenda items
- C-01 · C-03 · C-04
Estimated crude oil production shut-ins from the closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026, and 6.7 in August [46].
ENERGY
Oil and LNG
About one third of seaborne fertiliser trade normally passes through the strait, and urea prices rose sharply [6] [17].
FOOD
化肥
Daily transits fell from about 130 to 6 in March 2026; only two vessels were reported in one week in late October [5] [16].
SHIPPING
Traffic
B.5How countries appear in the global edition
Countries enter the supply chains edition through the trade and logistics chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never placed in a league table.
| Card field | 显示内容 | 来源 |
|---|---|---|
| WEFH+B state | each core system against peer distribution bands | national edition |
| 耦合 | the national dependency matrix | national edition |
| Risk objects | the national risk portfolio | national edition |
| Capability rungs | the national capability ladder | national edition |
| Evidence age | oldest and newest source dates | national source register |
Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme
countries and unions
clusters
flagship and sector
technology reports
How to read a country card
- Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
- Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
- Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
- Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such
| 波次 | Countries and unions | 状态 |
|---|---|---|
| W0 | 加拿大 | ISSUED |
| W1 | United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, Switzerland | PLANNED |
| W2 | Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia | PLANNED |
B.6许可
| 材料 | 许可协议 |
|---|---|
| Text | CC BY 4.0 |
| 数据 | on the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0 |
| 数据 | Nexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited |
| 地图 | boundary source and licence printed on each plate |
| 元数据 | CC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it |
| Third-party data, figures and text | The source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed |
| Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence. | |
B.7Formats and provenance
| 格式 | 类型 | 状态 | 概述 | 标识符 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Web edition | HTML | 本站内容 | Draft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source. | NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 |
| Print edition | At release | A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release. | NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 | |
| Indicator data | CSV · JSON | 本站内容 | 15 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release. | NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1 |
| 数据 | SVG · PNG | 本站内容 | 4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder. | FIG-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-* |
| Slides | 未记录 | No slide deck is recorded for this edition. | ||
| 证据简报 | HTML · PDF | 未记录 | No evidence brief is recorded for this edition. | |
| Dataset with DOI | DataCite | At release | Concept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet. |
来源追溯
- Edition pack
- The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
- 证据切片
- DC-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
- 可复现性
- sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
- Self-check
- 14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
- 审核
- five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
- 正式出版方
- The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium
- 更正
- Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 26IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026; full report opened; China’s share of rare earth refining fell from 90% to 85% between 2024 and 2025; critical mineral investment declined by 9% in 2025). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back