Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Data appendix

The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.

10 min read0 figures8 tables15 notesNR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
    1. B.1 The indicator set
    2. B.2 Global source register
    3. B.3 Regional reading, ten regional clusters
    4. B.4 Regional card: Gulf and Strait of Hormuz
    5. B.5 How countries appear in the global edition
    6. B.6 Licences
    7. B.7 Formats and provenance
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

B.1The indicator set

Table B.1Global baseline indicator set
IndicatorValueUnitYearStateSource
Seaborne trade volume12,720million tons2024Reported1
Seaborne trade, ton-miles66,781billion ton-miles2024Reported1
Cape detour, voyage length added≈ 30%2024Reported1
Suez share of maritime trade volume≈ 10%2023 to 2024Reported4
Hormuz total oil flow20.7million b/d2024Reported7
Middle East crude oil shut-ins, March to June average9.4million b/d2026Reported46
Middle East crude oil production, February25.2million b/d2026Reported46
Hormuz daily transits, March6vessels a day2026Reported5
Panama Canal transits13,404transitsFY2025Reported10
Panama Canal cargo489.1million CP/SUAB tonsFY2025Reported10
WTO merchandise volume growth, March baseline1.9%2026Reported13
Share of merchandise trade on MFN terms≈ 72%2025Reported15
Seaborne fertiliser trade through Hormuz≈ 16million tonnes2026Reported6
Drewry World Container Index composite4,429USD per 40ft29 Oct 2026Reported16
Rare earth refining share, top country≈ 85%2025Reported23
Indicators, CSVIndicators, JSON

B.2Global source register

The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.

Domains bound by the register

  • TRD
  • INF
  • ENE
  • CON
  • FIN
  • FOO
  • MIN
  • AIC
  • DAT
  • CLI
Table B.3Global source register
SourceCategoryCoveragePeriodCadenceRole
UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 20251UN agencyglobal2024annualseaborne trade
UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 20244UN agencyglobal2023 to 2024annualcanal shares
UNCTAD Hormuz assessment5UN agencyGulf2026per eventtransit drop
EIA chokepoints7national statistics agencyglobal2024annualoil flows
EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook46national statistics agencyGulf2025 to 2026monthlyHormuz-related oil shut-ins
Panama Canal Authority10canal operatorPanamaFY2025annualcanal traffic
WTO Global Trade Outlook13international organisationglobal2026twice a yeartrade forecast
WTO World Trade Report15international organisationglobal2025annualMFN share
Drewry World Container Index16shipping consultancyglobal2026weeklycontainer freight
FAO remarks17UN agencyglobal2026per eventfertiliser and food

B.3Regional reading, ten regional clusters

Map plates follow with the regional Baseline Editions, when boundary sources and public-safe resolutions are bound. This page gives the regional reading in table form and ranks no region.

Table B.4Regional reading, ten regional clusters
RegionPrincipal hazardsSystems most exposedBaseline evidence
North Americacanal dependence; container imports; tariff changesports, rail, canalsPanama Canal Authority10; WTO13
South Americabulk exports to Asia; canal and fertiliser dependenceports, fertiliserUNCTAD1; FAO17
EuropeRed Sea diversion; energy importscontainer routes, LNGUNCTAD1; EIA8
EurasiaBlack Sea and Turkish Straits routesgrain, oilEIA7
Middle East and North AfricaHormuz closure; Suez revenueoil, LNG, canalEIA46; IMF as reported18
Africacobalt exports; fertiliser and fuel importsminerals, fertiliserUNCTAD1; FAO17
South Asiaenergy and fertiliser imports through Hormuzoil, LNG, fertiliserUNCTAD5; FAO17
East Asiacontainer hubs; Malacca and Hormuz energy importscontainers, oilEIA7; WTO13
ASEANMalacca flows; electronics exportsoil, electronicsEIA7; WTO13
Oceania-Pacificlong routes; small island freight costscontainersUNCTAD2

B.4Regional card: Gulf and Strait of Hormuz

  • region
  • strait
  • energy
  • fertiliser
Systems in view
oil, LNG, fertiliser, shipping
Defining events
closure of the strait to most traffic from March 2026546
Couplings
ENE → FOO; ENE → INF
Capability evidence
rerouting and alternative suppliers; recovery not verified
Gaps
transits after Q2 2026; stocks held by importers
Agenda items
C-01 · C-03 · C-04

Estimated crude oil production shut-ins from the closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026, and 6.7 in August [46].

ENERGY

Oil and LNG

About one third of seaborne fertiliser trade normally passes through the strait, and urea prices rose sharply [6] [17].

FOOD

Fertiliser

Daily transits fell from about 130 to 6 in March 2026; only two vessels were reported in one week in late October [5] [16].

SHIPPING

Traffic

B.5How countries appear in the global edition

Countries enter the supply chains edition through the trade and logistics chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never placed in a league table.

Table B.5How countries appear in the global edition
Card fieldWhat it showsSource
WEFH+B stateeach core system against peer distribution bandsnational edition
Couplingsthe national dependency matrixnational edition
Risk objectsthe national risk portfolionational edition
Capability rungsthe national capability laddernational edition
Evidence ageoldest and newest source datesnational source register

Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme

26national

countries and unions

10regional

clusters

16global

flagship and sector

14strategic

systems reports

20frontier

technology reports

How to read a country card

  • Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
  • Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
  • Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
  • Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such
Table B.6National Baseline Editions in the 2026 programme
WaveCountries and unionsState
W0CanadaISSUED
W1United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, SwitzerlandPLANNED
W2Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, AustraliaPLANNED

B.6Licences

Table B.7Licences of each kind of material
MaterialLicence
TextCC BY 4.0
Dataon the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0
FiguresNexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited
Mapsboundary source and licence printed on each plate
MetadataCC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it
Third-party data, figures and textThe source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed
Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence.

B.7Formats and provenance

Table B.8This edition in every format
FormatKindStateWhat it isIdentifier
Web editionHTMLOn this siteDraft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source.NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Print editionPDFAt releaseA4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release.NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Indicator dataCSV · JSONOn this site15 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release.NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1
FiguresSVG · PNGOn this site4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder.FIG-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-*
SlidesPDFNot recordedNo slide deck is recorded for this edition.
Evidence briefHTML · PDFNot recordedNo evidence brief is recorded for this edition.
Dataset with DOIDataCiteAt releaseConcept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet.

Provenance

Edition pack
The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
Evidence cut
DC-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
Reproducibility
sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
Self-check
14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
Review
five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
Publisher of record
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium
Corrections
Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this annex

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Annex B: Data appendix. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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