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Risks and capability

Four global risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence; loss metrics are added only where they can be modelled.

6 min read0 figures1 table19 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Lifelines fail together
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
    1. 4.1 Risk objects
    2. 4.2 Capability ladder
  7. 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AIndlela yokusebenza
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR02-INF-001

    Grid failure with telecom and water knock-on

    Driver
    interacting technical factors in a synchronous grid1
    Exposure
    cities, hospitals, water works, exchanges
    Vulnerability
    uneven stabilisation capability; shared dependence on power
    Capacity
    black-start plans; priority supply; operator coordination
    Ukulandelana
    ENE → INF → WAT, HLT
    Horizon
    1 to 3 years
  2. InferredEQL 3RSK-SR02-CYB-002

    Pre-positioned access in operator networks

    Driver
    state-sponsored access reported in four sectors2
    Exposure
    communications, energy, transport and water operators
    Vulnerability
    internet-facing devices; long dwell time
    Capacity
    logging; phishing-resistant authentication; segmentation5
    Ukulandelana
    DAT → INF → HLT
    Horizon
    1 to 5 years
  3. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR02-DAT-003

    Common-vendor software failure

    Driver
    one faulty update on a widely deployed platform4
    Exposure
    airlines, hospitals, banks, broadcasters
    Vulnerability
    concentrated vendors; automatic update paths
    Capacity
    staged roll-out; manual fallback; recovery playbooks
    Ukulandelana
    DAT → INF → FIN, HLT
    Horizon
    annual
  4. InferredEQL 3RSK-SR02-INF-004

    Subsea link loss with limited repair capacity

    Driver
    about 199 faults a year, mostly accidental7
    Exposure
    island states, landing-point regions, cloud routes
    Vulnerability
    few repair vessels; ageing fleet15
    Capacity
    route diversity; repair agreements; cable protection7
    Ukulandelana
    INF → DAT → FIN
    Horizon
    1 to 5 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence at the global level, from a policy listing to performance in real events.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
FunctionRungLevelStrongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationEXISTSsecurity and continuity standards widespread; implementation uneven52022
Monitoring and observationADEQUATEthreat reporting by agencies; operator data uneven23
Isixwayiso sokuqalaEXISTSadvisories from agencies; no common cross-sector warning
Preparedness and planningEXISTScritical-entity rules in force or being applied1618
Redundancy and reservesLISTEDblack-start and spare-capacity data not consolidated
ImpenduloDEMONSTRATEDoperators restored services after the 2024 and 2025 events14
Continuity of critical servicesEXISTSpriority supply to hospitals and water works in many systems; testing uneven
RecoveryDEMONSTRATEDIberian grid restored; causes published1
AdaptationEXISTSresilience standards and financing advice published1123
Social protectionLISTEDsupport during long outages not consolidated
Ezezimali nomshuwalenseEXISTSresilience financing guidance; protection gaps in sibling editions1011
Institutional coordinationEXISTSEU and national frameworks; cross-border practice uneven161718
Technical infrastructureEXISTSageing assets in places6
WorkforceLISTEDskills for operations and cable repair reported thin15
Research capacityADEQUATEinterdependency science mature282933
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  7. 20ISO (ed.), ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: Business continuity management systems: Requirements, edition 2 (30 October 2019; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  8. 22IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, including IEC 62443-2-1:2024, Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners, edition 2.0 (7 August 2024), catalogue record read; no figure is used. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  11. 18The White House (ed.), National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), 30 April 2024 (archived page; sector risk management agencies for 16 sectors; biennial National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  12. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  13. 23OECD (ed.), Good Governance for Critical Infrastructure Resilience, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies (17 April 2019; DOI 10.1787/02f0e5a0-en, Crossref record read). OECD Publishing, Paris. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/02f0e5a0-enback
  14. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  15. 17European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  16. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 28Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (DOI 10.1109/37.969131; Crossref record and abstract read). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131back
  18. 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back
  19. 33Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497, 51 to 59, 2013 (DOI 10.1038/nature12047; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature12047back

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Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 4: Risks and capability. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

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Sector signature

The sectors behind Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

Select corners · hover lines6 / 15 relations

Umongo

Infrastructure and its partners

Infrastructure gives pipes, dams and treatment works to water (0.6), transmission and fuel logistics to energy (0.6) and access to care to health (0.5).

W · E · I · F · H · B

Imikhakha
4 kwangu-6
Ubudlelwano
6 kwangu-15
Ukuhlanganiswa
0.46 ingxenye yesamba

Strongest relations in play

  • Energy → Infrastructure · power for transport and telecoms0.8
  • Water → Energy · cooling water and hydropower0.6
  • Infrastructure → Water · pipes, dams and treatment works0.6
  • Water → Health · drinking water and sanitation0.7
Teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements for any place. Coupling is the summed strength of the relations in play, as a share of all fifteen.
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