Risks and capability
Four global risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence; loss metrics are added only where they can be modelled.
İçindekiler
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Lifelines fail together
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMetodoloji
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
4.1Risk objects
Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.
ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR02-INF-001
Grid failure with telecom and water knock-on
- İtici güç
- interacting technical factors in a synchronous grid1
- Maruziyet
- cities, hospitals, water works, exchanges
- Kırılganlık
- uneven stabilisation capability; shared dependence on power
- Kapasite
- black-start plans; priority supply; operator coordination
- Zincirleme etki
- ENE → INF → WAT, HLT
- Ufuk
- 1 to 3 years
InferredEQL 3RSK-SR02-CYB-002
Pre-positioned access in operator networks
ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR02-DAT-003
Common-vendor software failure
- İtici güç
- one faulty update on a widely deployed platform4
- Maruziyet
- airlines, hospitals, banks, broadcasters
- Kırılganlık
- concentrated vendors; automatic update paths
- Kapasite
- staged roll-out; manual fallback; recovery playbooks
- Zincirleme etki
- DAT → INF → FIN, HLT
- Ufuk
- yıllık
InferredEQL 3RSK-SR02-INF-004
Subsea link loss with limited repair capacity
4.2Capability ladder
Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence at the global level, from a policy listing to performance in real events.
| İşlev | Rung | Seviye | Strongest public evidence at baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prevention and mitigation | EXISTS | security and continuity standards widespread; implementation uneven52022 | |
| Monitoring and observation | ADEQUATE | threat reporting by agencies; operator data uneven23 | |
| erken uyarı | EXISTS | advisories from agencies; no common cross-sector warning | |
| Preparedness and planning | EXISTS | critical-entity rules in force or being applied1618 | |
| Redundancy and reserves | LISTED | black-start and spare-capacity data not consolidated | |
| Müdahale | DEMONSTRATED | operators restored services after the 2024 and 2025 events14 | |
| Continuity of critical services | EXISTS | priority supply to hospitals and water works in many systems; testing uneven | |
| İyileşme | DEMONSTRATED | Iberian grid restored; causes published1 | |
| Adaptation | EXISTS | resilience standards and financing advice published1123 | |
| Sosyal koruma | LISTED | support during long outages not consolidated | |
| Finans ve sigorta | EXISTS | resilience financing guidance; protection gaps in sibling editions1011 | |
| Institutional coordination | EXISTS | EU and national frameworks; cross-border practice uneven161718 | |
| Technical infrastructure | EXISTS | ageing assets in places6 | |
| Workforce | LISTED | skills for operations and cable repair reported thin15 | |
| Research capacity | ADEQUATE | interdependency science mature282933 | |
| A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline. | |||
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15TeleGeography (ed.), It’s Going to Take $3 Billion to Ensure Submarine Cable Repair Ships Can Keep the World Connected (summary of the TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics report, 30 June 2025; about two thirds of cable maintenance ships reach end of service life by 2040; 15 replacement and five additional ships, about USD 3 billion). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 20ISO (ed.), ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: Business continuity management systems: Requirements, edition 2 (30 October 2019; a revision is under development), catalogue record read through the ISO open data deliverables file; the standard text was not read and no figure is used. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 22IEC (ed.), IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems, including IEC 62443-2-1:2024, Part 2-1: Security program requirements for IACS asset owners, edition 2.0 (7 August 2024), catalogue record read; no figure is used. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 16European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 18The White House (ed.), National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (NSM-22), 30 April 2024 (archived page; sector risk management agencies for 16 sectors; biennial National Infrastructure Risk Management Plan). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 23OECD (ed.), Good Governance for Critical Infrastructure Resilience, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies (17 April 2019; DOI 10.1787/02f0e5a0-en, Crossref record read). OECD Publishing, Paris. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1787/02f0e5a0-enback
- 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
- 17European Parliament and Council (eds.), Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2 Directive), repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148, Official Journal of the European Union L 333, 27 December 2022 (Publications Office record read). Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
- 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 28Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, December 2001 (DOI 10.1109/37.969131; Crossref record and abstract read). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1109/37.969131back
- 29Buldyrev, S.V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H.E. and Havlin, S., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, April 2010 (DOI 10.1038/nature08932; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature08932back
- 33Helbing, D., Globally networked risks and how to respond, Nature 497, 51 to 59, 2013 (DOI 10.1038/nature12047; Crossref record and publisher summary read). Springer Nature. Observation year 2013. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.1038/nature12047back