Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Risks and capability

Four science and engineering risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence.

5 min read0 figures1 table18 notesNR-SECTOR-SCIENCE-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Science is where the frontier is made
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
    1. 4.1 Risk objects
    2. 4.2 Capability ladder
  7. 5Loss of trust in the research record during a fast-moving emergency
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. InferredEQL 3RSK-GS15-GOV-001

    Loss of trust in the research record

    Driver
    paper mills, brokers and AI-assisted text growing faster than screening149
    Exposure
    clinical guidance, policy advice and public debate that cite the literature
    Vulnerability
    thin screening at some journals; replication rarely funded16
    Capacity
    retraction notices; open data; replication projects; integrity units
    Cascade
    DAT → HLT, GOV
    Horizon
    1 to 5 years

  2. InferredEQL 3RSK-GS15-DAT-002

    Concentration of research capacity and compute

    Driver
    concentrated funding, people and compute124
    Exposure
    regions with few researchers; groups without access to large machines
    Vulnerability
    dependence on foreign results and foreign tools
    Capacity
    open data; shared facilities; regional networks24
    Cascade
    DAT → HLT, FOO, FIN
    Horizon
    1 to 10 years

  3. InferredEQL 3RSK-GS15-BIO-003

    Dual-use risk in life science research

    Driver
    cheaper tools and models for biology1118
    Exposure
    laboratories, funders, publishers and model developers
    Vulnerability
    guidance that is voluntary in many places
    Capacity
    WHO framework; national oversight; institutional review18
    Cascade
    BIO → HLT, GOV
    Horizon
    1 to 5 years

  4. InferredEQL 3RSK-GS15-INF-004

    Long-lead facilities and single-funder dependence

    Driver
    multi-billion projects with decade-long schedules19
    Exposure
    accelerators, observatories, supercomputers and archives
    Vulnerability
    single sites, single funders and shifting budgets
    Capacity
    international councils; staged decisions; shared archives22
    Cascade
    INF → DAT, FIN
    Horizon
    5 to 10 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence for science and engineering at the global level.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
FunctionRungLevelStrongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationEXISTSresearch ethics and integrity guidance widespread; practice uneven2537
Monitoring and observationADEQUATEopen archives and retraction notices give partial visibility62223
Early warningLISTEDno consolidated early warning for fraud or dual-use misuse
Preparedness and planningEXISTSWHO framework and national plans for dual-use research18
Redundancy and reservesEXISTSmirrored open archives and preprint servers522
ResponseEXISTSretractions and expressions of concern are used by publishers6
Continuity of critical servicesLISTEDcontinuity of shared instruments and databases not reviewed
RecoveryLISTEDrecovery of trust after large retraction waves not reviewed
AdaptationEXISTSopen science and AI ethics recommendations adopted2526
Social protectionLISTEDprotection of early-career researchers documented but not consolidated
Finance and insuranceEXISTSUSD 3.48 trillion of R&D; EUR 93.5 billion in one programme124
Institutional coordinationDEMONSTRATEDCERN feasibility study with national partners; UN panel on AI1928
Technical infrastructureDEMONSTRATEDfive exascale systems and open structure archives422
WorkforceLISTEDresearcher density known, skills gaps not consolidated2
Research capacityADEQUATEstrong in a few regions; thin in others2
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 14Richardson, R.A.K. et al., The entities enabling scientific fraud at scale are large, resilient, and growing rapidly, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 122(32), 2025 (abstract and open full text record read through Europe PMC). National Academy of Sciences, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 9Stanford HAI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report, Chapter 5 Science, chapter page with its highlights. Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI, Stanford. Page read; the chapter PDF was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 16Open Science Collaboration, Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science, Science 349(6251), aac4716, 2015 (abstract read through Europe PMC; full text not opened). American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington. Observation year 2015. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 1NSB (ed.), Science and Engineering Indicators 2026: The State of U.S. Science and Engineering (NSB-SEP-2026-1), May 2026, National Science Board and National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, US National Science Foundation, Alexandria. Full PDF opened; global R&D, publications, collaboration, venture investment, semiconductor and doctoral-degree figures read from the text. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 2UNESCO Institute for Statistics (ed.), UIS data API, data version 20260507 (February 2026 data release): indicators EXPGDP.TOT, RESDEN.INHAB.TFTE and FRESP.THC, world and regional aggregates. UNESCO, Montreal. Data pulled and read. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 4TOP500 project (ed.), TOP500 list, 67th edition, June 2026 (release text read in full for the leading systems). TOP500, Prometeus GmbH. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 24European Commission (ed.), Horizon Europe, programme page (indicative funding of EUR 93.5 billion for 2021 to 2027 after the mid-term review). European Commission, Brussels. Page read. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 11Abramson, J. et al., Accurate structure prediction of biomolecular interactions with AlphaFold 3, Nature 630, 493 to 500, 2024 (abstract and open full text read through Europe PMC). Springer Nature, London. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 18WHO (ed.), Global guidance framework for the responsible use of the life sciences: mitigating biorisks and governing dual-use research, 174 pages, 2022. World Health Organization, Geneva. Publication page and overview read; the full text was not opened. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 19CERN (ed.), Future Circular Collider, feasibility study page (results published in spring 2025: 91 km ring, estimated cost CHF 15 billion). CERN, Geneva. Page read. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 22RCSB Protein Data Bank (ed.), Current holdings, list of entry identifiers (262,922 entries counted by the editors on the access date). Research Collaboratory for Structural Bioinformatics. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 25UNESCO (ed.), UNESCO Recommendation on Open Science, 2021, programme page (193 Member States). UNESCO, Paris. Page read; the Recommendation text itself returned an access error. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 37UNVERIFIED, not opened: UNESCO (ed.), Recommendation on Science and Scientific Researchers, 2017, cited from memory. UNESCO, Paris. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 6Crossref (ed.), Crossref REST API, work counts by type and publication year and counts of retraction notices (update-type filter), queried live on the access date. Crossref, Oxford. Counts are subject to later registration. Observation year 2025 (series 2015 to 2025). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 23GBIF (ed.), GBIF API, occurrence count and counts by year (3,890,294,224 records on the access date; 305,893,347 dated 2025). Global Biodiversity Information Facility, Copenhagen. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 5POST-CLOSE, context only: arXiv (ed.), Monthly submissions statistics (monthly CSV, 1991 to November 2026; annual totals summed by the editors). Cornell University, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 26UNESCO (ed.), Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, November 2021, programme page (193 Member States). UNESCO, Paris. Page read; the text itself was not opened. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: UN General Assembly, resolution 79/325, Terms of reference and modalities for the establishment and functioning of the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence and the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance, 2025; adoption in 2025 taken from search-result summaries, because the document page returned no text. United Nations, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 4: Risks and capability. In Nexus Global Science and Engineering Frontier Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of the World’s Science and Engineering Frontier. (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-SECTOR-SCIENCE-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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