Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints

S.1Abstract

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the supply chains and chokepoints baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

1. Yes: conflict, attacks on vessels, water levels and trade controls recur across routes.¹⁴⁵²²

   Do supply chain disruptions have common causes?Reported

2. Through shared dependence on a few straits, canals and processors.⁴⁷⁴⁶

   How do disruptions spread?Reported

3. Ton-miles rose 5.9 percent in 2024 against 2.2 percent for volume.¹

   How large is the rerouting effect?Reported

4. About one fifth of oil and LNG and about one third of seaborne fertiliser pass through Hormuz.⁷⁸⁶

   How exposed are energy and fertiliser flows?Reported

5. Merchandise volume grew 4.6 percent in 2025 and the WTO March 2026 baseline for 2026 is 1.9 percent.¹³

   Has trade held up?Reported

6. About 72 percent of merchandise trade is on MFN terms.¹⁵

   Do trade rules still apply?Reported

7. A composite of USD 4,429 per 40ft container in the last week of October 2026.¹⁶

   What do freight rates show?Reported

8. A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates. SCN-SR03-CHK-01

   What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-007

Daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz fell from about 130 in February 2026 to 6 in March, a drop of about 95 percent, and sources differ on the February base.

A closure of one strait removes a large share of oil, LNG and fertiliser flows at once, so buffers, bypass routes and the speed of reopening matter more than the cause. Daily counts differ by source and by what is counted⁵¹³²⁰.

S.4At a glance

S.5What each steward reads in it

S.6What this edition is, and is not

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 3UNCTAD (ed.), Maritime trade under pressure, growth set to stall in 2025 (news item; Suez Canal tonnage 70 percent below 2023 in May 2025; Shanghai Containerized Freight Index averaged 2,496 in 2024). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 20News report, Facts about the Strait of Hormuz since its negotiated reopening (last updated 8 April 2026; Kpler: average of eight commodity carriers a day from 1 March to 7 April; Lloyd’s List estimate of about 800 ships stuck in the Gulf; two-week ceasefire). Arab News Pakistan, Islamabad. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

• Where is supply chains and chokepoints risk concentrated?
• Which couplings carry supply chains and chokepoints shocks into other systems?
• Which supply chains and chokepoints capabilities hold under compound stress?
• What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

• Narrative
• Headline finding
• Lead figure
• Five mechanism chapters
• Twelve-domain reading
• Sector screens
• Dependency matrix
• Risk objects
• Capability ladder
• Scenario
• Three lenses
• Portfolio

1.2The argument

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The supply chains and chokepoints-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their supply chains and chokepoints content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Transmission paths

1. 01

   ENE → FOO

   A strait closure removes fuel and fertiliser inputs together.

   Reported 2026 Hormuz⁶⁴⁶¹⁷

2. 02

   CON → TRD → INF

   Attacks on vessels reroute ships and lift distance.

   Reported 2024 Red Sea¹

3. 03

   CLI → INF → TRD

   Low water levels cut canal transits.

   Reported Panama to mid-2024¹⁴

4. 04

   TRD → FIN

   Lost transit revenue reaches national budgets.

   Reported Suez¹⁸

5. 05

   MIN → TRD

   Export licences on processed minerals reach downstream makers.

   Reported 2025 controls²²

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 14WTO and UNCTAD (eds.), Global goods trade resilient in Q1 2026 despite Middle East war (WTO news item of 31 July 2026; Middle East export volumes down 9.7 percent and import volumes down 11.9 percent year on year in the first quarter). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-007

Daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz fell from about 130 in February 2026 to 6 in March, a drop of about 95 percent, and sources differ on the February base.

Implication

A closure of one strait removes a large share of oil, LNG and fertiliser flows at once, so buffers, bypass routes and the speed of reopening matter more than the cause. Daily counts differ by source and by what is counted⁵¹³²⁰.

What would move it

Verified transit counts, the duration of the closure and the pace of any return of traffic would each move this finding.

2.2Trade

1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-TRD-001

   Seaborne trade reached 12,720 million tons in 2024, up 2.2 percent, and 66,781 billion ton-miles, up 5.9 percent, the fastest rise since 2011, mainly because of Red Sea rerouting.¹

2.3Infrastructure

1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-002

   The detour around the Cape of Good Hope added about 30 percent to voyage lengths and an estimated 11 percent to container TEU-mile demand.¹

2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-003

   The Suez Canal handles about 10 percent of world maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade, and the Panama Canal about 3 percent; by June 2024 transits through both were down by over half from their peaks.⁴

3. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-004

   Suez Canal tonnage was still 70 percent below 2023 levels in May 2025, while the Panama Canal recorded 13,404 transits and 489.1 million tons in fiscal year 2025, up 19.3 and 15.6 percent.³¹⁰

2.4Energy

1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-005

   The Strait of Hormuz carried 20.7 million barrels of oil a day in 2024 in the EIA table, about one fifth of global liquids consumption, and about one fifth of global LNG trade.⁷⁸

2.5CON

1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-006

   Estimated Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026, against 25.2 million barrels a day of production in February, and were 6.7 in August. NOT BOUND at the close: Hormuz oil and LNG flow series after the second quarter of 2026.⁴⁶

2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-007

   Daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz fell from about 130 in February 2026 to 6 in March, a drop of about 95 percent, and sources differ on the February base.⁵¹³

2.6Finance

1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-008

   The WTO March 2026 baseline put 2026 merchandise volume growth at 1.9 percent after 4.6 percent in 2025, and at 1.4 percent if high energy prices persist, while UNCTAD projected 1.5 to 2.5 percent. NOT BOUND at the close: any later revision of the 2026 forecast.¹³⁵

2. ReportedEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-011

   The IMF projected Suez Canal revenue at USD 3.6 billion in fiscal year 2024/25 against USD 6.6 billion a year earlier, with transit trade at about a third of pre-conflict levels.¹⁸

2.7Food

1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FOO-009

   About one third of seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes, normally passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and urea prices rose 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April 2026.⁶¹⁷

2.8Minerals

1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-MIN-010

   China’s April 2025 export controls on seven rare earth elements remain in force, and the October 2025 expansion to five more elements is suspended only until 10 November 2026.²²

2.9Systemic

1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

   The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 20News report, Facts about the Strait of Hormuz since its negotiated reopening (last updated 8 April 2026; Kpler: average of eight commodity carriers a day from 1 March to 7 April; Lloyd’s List estimate of about 800 ships stuck in the Gulf; two-week ceasefire). Arab News Pakistan, Islamabad. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 3UNCTAD (ed.), Maritime trade under pressure, growth set to stall in 2025 (news item; Suez Canal tonnage 70 percent below 2023 in May 2025; Shanghai Containerized Freight Index averaged 2,496 in 2024). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through supply chains and chokepoints, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries supply chains and chokepoints risk into each domain.

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on supply chains and chokepoints, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V.M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 80(5), 1977 to 2016, 2012, cited from memory. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Carvalho, V.M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y.U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1255 to 1321, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16. 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(3), 1543 to 1592, 2016, cited from memory. Observation year 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

1. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR03-CON-001

   Strait closure with energy and fertiliser knock-on

   Driver

   war closing a strait to most traffic⁵⁴⁶

   Exposure

   oil, LNG and fertiliser importers in South Asia and Europe

   Vulnerability

   few bypass routes; thin stocks of fertiliser inputs

   Capacity

   strategic stocks; bypass pipelines; alternative suppliers

   Cascade

   ENE → FOO → HLT

   Horizon

   1 to 3 years

2. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR03-INF-002

   Red Sea diversion and loss of Suez capacity

   Driver

   attacks on vessels leading lines to route around Africa¹

   Exposure

   East Asia to Europe container trade, Egypt’s canal revenue

   Vulnerability

   longer voyages absorb ship capacity

   Capacity

   route diversity; return of transits¹⁹¹⁶

   Cascade

   TRD → FIN → DEV

   Horizon

   1 to 3 years

3. InferredEQL 3RSK-SR03-MIN-003

   Export licensing of processed minerals

   Driver

   licence requirements on rare earth elements²²

   Exposure

   magnet, electronics and vehicle makers

   Vulnerability

   concentrated refining; no short-run substitute

   Capacity

   stocks; recycling; processing capacity outside the top refiner²³

   Cascade

   MIN → TRD → AIC

   Horizon

   1 to 5 years

4. ReportedEQL 3RSK-SR03-INF-004

   Canal capacity limits from water levels

   Driver

   low water levels limiting transits¹⁴

   Exposure

   US East Coast and Asia container, LPG and bulk trade

   Vulnerability

   single water source for a major canal

   Capacity

   draft and slot management; recovery to 13,404 transits in FY2025¹⁰

   Cascade

   CLI → INF → TRD

   Horizon

   annual

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence at the global level, from a policy listing to performance in real events.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 19FreightWaves (ed.), Suez container ships near low for all of 2025 (2 December 2025; container transits about 4.7 to 5.0 a day in July to November 2025; sources include Xeneta and a shipping agency). FreightWaves, Chattanooga. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 24IMO (ed.), SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (web page; mandatory Part A and guidance Part B; in force 1 July 2004). International Maritime Organization, London. Observation year 2004. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 25WTO (ed.), Trade Facilitation Agreement (web page; Bali Ministerial Conference 2013; in force 22 February 2017). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 28000:2022, Security and resilience: security management systems for the supply chain. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 44UNVERIFIED, not opened: IMF (ed.), PortWatch, chokepoint transit and trade monitoring platform; the dashboard page returned no readable content and no figure is used. International Monetary Fund, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2023, cited from memory. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, cited from memory. United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17. 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Montreux Convention), 1936, cited from memory. Observation year 1936. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
18. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V.M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 80(5), 1977 to 2016, 2012, cited from memory. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Carvalho, V.M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y.U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1255 to 1321, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
20. 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(3), 1543 to 1592, 2016, cited from memory. Observation year 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
21. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Baldwin, R. and Freeman, R., Risks and global supply chains: what we know and what we need to know, Annual Review of Economics 14, 153 to 180, 2022, cited from memory. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
22. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Benigno, G., di Giovanni, J., Groen, J.J.J. and Noble, A.I., The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: a new tool to measure supply chain disruptions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2022, cited from memory; the index page returned no definition. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

5.1Assumptions

Scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.

Baseline

the 2026 reference state in this edition

Drivers

a strait closure that removes energy and fertiliser flows while container ships still route around Africa

Analogues

Hormuz, March 2026; Red Sea rerouting, 2024⁵⁴⁶¹

Interventions

none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case

Run state

narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027

5.2The cascade, step by step

1. 1

   CON → ENE

   transits through the strait fall by about 95 percent

   2026

2. 2

   ENE → TRD

   tanker rates, war-risk cover and bunker costs rise

   2026

3. 3

   ENE → FOO

   fertiliser deliveries are delayed and prices rise

   2026

4. 4

   TRD → INF

   ships stay on long routes, so capacity stays tight

   2024

5. 5

   TRD → FIN

   importers face higher bills; canal revenue stays low

   2025

6. 6

   FIN → DEV

   import-dependent economies cut spending

   2026

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

How the shock in scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01 would travel through Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints’s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.

A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints 2026, scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01 (2026); Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for supply chains and chokepoints. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 supply chains and chokepoints readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Publication dispositions

• Publish
• Hold
• Needs evidence
• Restricted
• Superseded

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

• IN FORCE
• ADOPTED
• PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE
• PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers supply chains and chokepoints assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

Question

What does the published evidence establish about the world’s supply chains, trade routes and chokepoints and its couplings?

Sources searched

agency and organisation reports; chokepoint flow statistics; freight indices; peer-reviewed supply network literature

Window

releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026

Selection

sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition

Next step

systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, cited from memory. United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Montreux Convention), 1936, cited from memory. Observation year 1936. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal (Constantinople Convention), 1888, cited from memory. Observation year 1888. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: Treaty concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, 1977, cited from memory. Observation year 1977. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 24IMO (ed.), SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (web page; mandatory Part A and guidance Part B; in force 1 July 2004). International Maritime Organization, London. Observation year 2004. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 25WTO (ed.), Trade Facilitation Agreement (web page; Bali Ministerial Conference 2013; in force 22 February 2017). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 28000:2022, Security and resilience: security management systems for the supply chain. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: guidelines. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2023, cited from memory. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 37UNVERIFIED, not opened: World Customs Organization (ed.), SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, cited from memory. World Customs Organization, Brussels. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16. 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17. 45UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Trade Representative, Section 301 action on China’s targeted maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors, 2025 (port fees on certain vessels); the page returned an error and the measure is known here only from the UNCTAD press release cited as reference 2. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
18. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V.M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 80(5), 1977 to 2016, 2012, cited from memory. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Carvalho, V.M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y.U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1255 to 1321, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
20. 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(3), 1543 to 1592, 2016, cited from memory. Observation year 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
21. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Baldwin, R. and Freeman, R., Risks and global supply chains: what we know and what we need to know, Annual Review of Economics 14, 153 to 180, 2022, cited from memory. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
22. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Benigno, G., di Giovanni, J., Groen, J.J.J. and Noble, A.I., The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: a new tool to measure supply chain disruptions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2022, cited from memory; the index page returned no definition. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
23. 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rodrigue, J.-P., The Geography of Transport Systems, 5th edition. Routledge, New York, 2020, cited from memory. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
24. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
25. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
26. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
27. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
28. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
29. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
30. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
31. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
32. 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (July 2026), taken only from the press article cited as reference 23; the IEA page returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
33. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths chapter; the publication returned an access error and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
34. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era, 2021, taken from search-result summaries that disagree on the Taiwan share; no figure is used in findings. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
35. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
36. 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

7.1Questions for the operational series

1. C-01

   How would a chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates spread through energy, fertiliser, food and manufacturing at the same time?

   INI-SR03-CHK-01 · compound chokepoint loss; first output: dependency analysis for six regions.

2. C-02

   Which goods pass through two or more chokepoints on their way to market?

   INI-SR03-EXP-02 · multi-chokepoint exposure; first output: exposure register.

3. C-03

   How long do flows take to return after a closure, and what limits recovery?

   INI-SR03-RCV-03 · recovery times; first output: recovery table.

4. C-04

   Where are energy and fertiliser buffers thinnest?

   INI-SR03-BUF-04 · buffers and stocks; first output: buffer map.

5. C-05

   How do export controls on processed minerals reach downstream manufacturing?

   INI-SR03-CTL-05 · controls and processing; first output: control and processing overlay.

6. C-06

   Which ports and corridors publish throughput on a comparable basis?

   To be admitted in 2027; first output: coverage note.

7. C-07

   How do war-risk costs and insurance change route choice?

   To be admitted in 2027; first output: scoping note.

8. C-08

   Which supply chain capabilities have been tested in real disruptions, and which are only planned?

   Supply chain capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.

7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment

Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 supply chains portfolio. They are programme objects: no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.

7.3The pathway

The supply chains edition reads national trade chapters, sector editions and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed and its first editions are drafted. This page states what exists today and what comes next.

1. 01

   National trade chapters

   trade and logistics reading in each national edition

   IN PREPARATION · national baselines

2. 02

   Sector editions

   energy, food, infrastructure and transport, finance

   PLANNED · sector Baseline Editions

3. 03

   Supply chains model

   the global supply system of systems

   v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence

4. 04

   Strategic links

   SR-02 lifeline systems · SR-04 critical minerals · SR-10 digital public infrastructure

   PLANNED · strategic baselines

5. 05

   Universe

   annual proving environment

   CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027

6. 06

   Supply Chains Report

   this series

   BASELINE DRAFT · 2027 annual edition

7. 07

   Evidence and correction

   one graph, many projections

   OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027

7.4Universe 2027: evidence pack for the supply chains and chokepoints candidate mission

1. 01

   Mandate

2. 02

   Core Build · 1 month

3. 03

   Action · 1 week

4. 04

   Evidence seal

5. 05

   Portfolio correction

6. 06

   Next mandate

Mission

ID

MSN-SR03-2027-01 · Chokepoint closure Universe mission

Role spine

Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead: drawn from national pathways

Receiving actors

to be identified with the mandate

7.5Handoffs and routing

Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.

7.6Feeds and signal register

Escalation routes

• none · keep monitoring
• research question
• project
• risk object
• annual publication
• signal report

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

8.1Common causes

One cause can strike many routes at once: a war, attacks on vessels, low water levels or a licence rule. The shared cause matters more than the route.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
• GS-02 Energy
• GS-09 Infrastructure, Transport and Logistics

8.2Domino effects

A failure on one route removes an input from the next. A closed strait raises fuel and freight costs, then fertiliser costs, then food costs.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
• GS-02 Energy
• GS-09 Infrastructure, Transport and Logistics

8.3Inter-systemic feedbacks

Trade also depends on what it carries. Rerouting absorbs ship capacity and lifts rates, and energy prices feed back into trade growth.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
• GS-02 Energy
• GS-09 Infrastructure, Transport and Logistics

8.4Shared vulnerabilities

Different goods share the same weak points: a few straits and canals, concentrated processing and a small set of export origins.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
• GS-02 Energy
• GS-09 Infrastructure, Transport and Logistics

8.5Thresholds and tipping

A system can absorb stress until a threshold is crossed. Transit capacity, stocks and licence expiry dates are such thresholds for trade.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• SR-10 Digital Public Infrastructure and Systemic Cyber Risk
• GS-02 Energy
• GS-09 Infrastructure, Transport and Logistics

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era, 2021, taken from search-result summaries that disagree on the Taiwan share; no figure is used in findings. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 20News report, Facts about the Strait of Hormuz since its negotiated reopening (last updated 8 April 2026; Kpler: average of eight commodity carriers a day from 1 March to 7 April; Lloyd’s List estimate of about 800 ships stuck in the Gulf; two-week ceasefire). Arab News Pakistan, Islamabad. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

A.1Methods

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

A.2Model card, Supply Chains and Chokepoints Model v0

Model ID

MDL-SR03-SUPPLYCHAINS · v0.1

Purpose

represent trade as a network with narrow places and the mechanisms by which disruptions spread between shipping lanes, energy, fertiliser, minerals and freight

Family

graph-based system of systems

Inputs

the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data

Method

expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events

Validation

none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027

Uncertainty

qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements

Domain of validity

global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use

Reproducibility

strength table and sources published in this edition

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID

DC-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-B0

Type

baseline documentary cut

Resolution policy

pinned · as of 30 September 2026

Sources pinned

46 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references

Model runs

none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method

Digest

computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record

Supersedes

nothing, first cut of the series

Superseded by

the 2027 supply chains and chokepoints annual cut

Lineage

1. 01

   source edition

2. 02

   pinned citation

3. 03

   finding

4. 04

   page

5. 05

   publication record

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

• UNCTAD¹: chapters II to V on fleet, freight, ports and regulation
• WTO¹³: full report tables on regional trade
• EIA⁴⁶: later monthly releases on Hormuz
• Drewry¹⁶: weekly index history

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

A.7Status words

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

A.10Technical annex

A.1 · indicator definition: chokepoint transit

Construct

a recorded passage of a vessel through a named strait or canal

Unit

vessels per day or per week

Method

vessel-tracking and canal-authority counts

Source

UNCTAD rapid assessment⁵; Drewry¹⁶

Uncertainty

counts differ by provider and by what is counted

Known limits

does not record cargo, flag or destination

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era, 2021, taken from search-result summaries that disagree on the Taiwan share; no figure is used in findings. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (July 2026), taken only from the press article cited as reference 23; the IEA page returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths chapter; the publication returned an access error and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 44UNVERIFIED, not opened: IMF (ed.), PortWatch, chokepoint transit and trade monitoring platform; the dashboard page returned no readable content and no figure is used. International Monetary Fund, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

B.1The indicator set

B.2Global source register

The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.

Domains bound by the register

• TRD
• INF
• ENE
• CON
• FIN
• FOO
• MIN
• AIC
• DAT
• CLI

B.3Regional reading, ten regional clusters

Map plates follow with the regional Baseline Editions, when boundary sources and public-safe resolutions are bound. This page gives the regional reading in table form and ranks no region.

B.4Regional card: Gulf and Strait of Hormuz

• region
• strait
• energy
• fertiliser

Systems in view

oil, LNG, fertiliser, shipping

Defining events

closure of the strait to most traffic from March 2026⁵⁴⁶

Couplings

ENE → FOO; ENE → INF

Capability evidence

rerouting and alternative suppliers; recovery not verified

Gaps

transits after Q2 2026; stocks held by importers

Agenda items

C-01 · C-03 · C-04

B.5How countries appear in the global edition

Countries enter the supply chains edition through the trade and logistics chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never placed in a league table.

Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme

How to read a country card

• Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
• Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
• Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
• Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such

B.6Licences

B.7Formats and provenance

Provenance

Edition pack

The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built

Evidence cut

DC-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026

Reproducibility

sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters

Self-check

14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release

Review

five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)

Publisher of record

GCRI for the Nexus Consortium

Corrections

Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

C.146 sources

NR-CIT-1, editor first. A DOI is linked where the source has one; Nexus records carry a UNI once the catalogue allocates it (NS-1).

1. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
2. 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 6
3. 3UNCTAD (ed.), Maritime trade under pressure, growth set to stall in 2025 (news item; Suez Canal tonnage 70 percent below 2023 in May 2025; Shanghai Containerized Freight Index averaged 2,496 in 2024). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2
4. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
5. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
6. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
7. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
8. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3
9. 9POST-CLOSE, context only: EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, global energy security data (Hormuz oil flow 21.6, 14.9 and 4.9 million barrels a day; LNG 10.5, 7.4 and 0.8 billion cubic feet a day; released 6 October 2026). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.
10. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
11. 11POST-CLOSE, context only: WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, update of October 2026 (news release of 8 October 2026; 2026 merchandise volume growth 3.9 percent, 2027 4.1 percent; Middle East merchandise exports minus 17.2 percent in 2026). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.
12. 12POST-CLOSE, context only: WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, executive summary of the October 2026 update (AI-enabling goods 47 percent of merchandise trade growth and 14.8 percent of trade in the first half of 2026). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.
13. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
14. 14WTO and UNCTAD (eds.), Global goods trade resilient in Q1 2026 despite Middle East war (WTO news item of 31 July 2026; Middle East export volumes down 9.7 percent and import volumes down 11.9 percent year on year in the first quarter). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1
15. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
16. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 4, chapter 6
17. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
18. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 6, chapter 8
19. 19FreightWaves (ed.), Suez container ships near low for all of 2025 (2 December 2025; container transits about 4.7 to 5.0 a day in July to November 2025; sources include Xeneta and a shipping agency). FreightWaves, Chattanooga. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4
20. 20News report, Facts about the Strait of Hormuz since its negotiated reopening (last updated 8 April 2026; Kpler: average of eight commodity carriers a day from 1 March to 7 April; Lloyd’s List estimate of about 800 ships stuck in the Gulf; two-week ceasefire). Arab News Pakistan, Islamabad. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2, chapter 8
21. 21Lloyd’s List Intelligence (ed.), Bab el-Mandeb transits continue to decline but slight uptick for Suez Canal (blog; data for the week ending 10 March 2024: Bab el-Mandeb 218 passings, 60 percent below normal; the page carries a 2026 date, which is not reconciled). Lloyd’s List Intelligence, London. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.
22. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
23. 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
24. 24IMO (ed.), SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (web page; mandatory Part A and guidance Part B; in force 1 July 2004). International Maritime Organization, London. Observation year 2004. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
25. 25WTO (ed.), Trade Facilitation Agreement (web page; Bali Ministerial Conference 2013; in force 22 February 2017). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
26. 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (July 2026), taken only from the press article cited as reference 23; the IEA page returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
27. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths chapter; the publication returned an access error and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
28. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era, 2021, taken from search-result summaries that disagree on the Taiwan share; no figure is used in findings. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
29. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, cited from memory. United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
30. 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Montreux Convention), 1936, cited from memory. Observation year 1936. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
31. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal (Constantinople Convention), 1888, cited from memory. Observation year 1888. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
32. 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: Treaty concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, 1977, cited from memory. Observation year 1977. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
33. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 28000:2022, Security and resilience: security management systems for the supply chain. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
34. 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: guidelines. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
35. 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
36. 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2023, cited from memory. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
37. 37UNVERIFIED, not opened: World Customs Organization (ed.), SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, cited from memory. World Customs Organization, Brussels. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
38. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V.M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 80(5), 1977 to 2016, 2012, cited from memory. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
39. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Carvalho, V.M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y.U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1255 to 1321, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
40. 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(3), 1543 to 1592, 2016, cited from memory. Observation year 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
41. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Baldwin, R. and Freeman, R., Risks and global supply chains: what we know and what we need to know, Annual Review of Economics 14, 153 to 180, 2022, cited from memory. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
42. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Benigno, G., di Giovanni, J., Groen, J.J.J. and Noble, A.I., The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: a new tool to measure supply chain disruptions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2022, cited from memory; the index page returned no definition. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
43. 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rodrigue, J.-P., The Geography of Transport Systems, 5th edition. Routledge, New York, 2020, cited from memory. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
44. 44UNVERIFIED, not opened: IMF (ed.), PortWatch, chokepoint transit and trade monitoring platform; the dashboard page returned no readable content and no figure is used. International Monetary Fund, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4
45. 45UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Trade Representative, Section 301 action on China’s targeted maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors, 2025 (port fees on certain vessels); the page returned an error and the measure is known here only from the UNCTAD press release cited as reference 2. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
46. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 8

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