Exponential Technology Report 2026: Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute

S.1Abstract

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the semiconductor and compute baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

1. USD 791.7 billion in 2025, up 25.6%.⁸

   How big is the chip market?Reported

2. Performance of leading systems doubled about every nine months since 2019; training compute grows about four times a year.¹³

   How fast is AI compute growing?Reported

3. US data centres used 176 TWh in 2023; 325 to 580 TWh is projected for 2028.¹⁵

   What does it need in electricity?Reported

4. China, Taiwan and Korea took about 79% of 2025 billings.⁹

   Where is equipment bought?Reported

5. The United States set aside USD 50 billion; the EU recorded over EUR 33 billion in State aid decisions.⁴⁴¹²

   What do governments spend?Reported

6. US licences for advanced computing items to D:5 entities, per May 2026 guidance.¹³

   What controls apply?Reported

7. Not published on a common basis; one company reports about 5,300 acre-feet a year for one Arizona fab.²³

   What is the water footprint?Reported

8. Whether power, water and packaging limits slow the compute build-out. SCN-XT06-PWR-01

   What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-007

United States data centres used 176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4% of national electricity, and a Berkeley Lab report projects 325 to 580 TWh by 2028, or about 6.7% to 12%.

The compute build-out is also an electricity build-out. The 2028 range is 1.8 to 3.3 times the 2023 level (method 4), and the spread shows how much depends on chip supply, efficiency and siting. The report covers US data centres, not the world, and not fabrication plants¹⁵¹⁶.

S.4At a glance

S.5What each steward reads in it

S.6What this edition is, and is not

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 16Shehabi, A. and others, 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, December 2024 (publication page abstract only; no figures on the page; the report PDF was not read). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

• Where is semiconductor and compute risk concentrated?
• Which couplings carry semiconductor and compute shocks into other systems?
• Which semiconductor and compute capabilities hold under compound stress?
• What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

• Narrative
• Headline finding
• Lead figure
• Five footprint and governance chapters
• Twelve-domain reading
• Sector screens
• Dependency matrix
• Risk objects
• Capability ladder
• Scenario
• Three lenses
• Portfolio

1.2The argument

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The semiconductor and compute-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their semiconductor and compute content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Transmission paths

1. 01

   AIC → ENE → INF

   Compute demand raises electricity demand and constrains where sites can be built.

   Reported US data centre estimates¹⁵

2. 02

   TRD → INF

   Export controls change who can buy advanced chips and equipment.

   Reported US guidance of May 2026¹³

3. 03

   FIN → INF

   Sales and subsidies fund plants and equipment.

   Reported sales and CHIPS Act figures⁸⁴⁴

4. 04

   WAT → INF

   Water supply constrains plant siting.

   Inferred one company water report²³

5. 05

   GOV → INF

   Subsidy programmes set where capacity is built.

   Reported EU and US programmes⁴⁴¹²

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 2Sevilla, J., Heim, L., Ho, A., Besiroglu, T., Hobbhahn, M. and Villalobos, P., Compute Trends Across Three Eras of Machine Learning, arXiv:2202.05924, 2022 (abstract page: doubling about every 20 months before 2010 and about every 6 months in the deep learning era). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 6Luccioni, A.S., Jernite, Y. and Strubell, E., Power Hungry Processing: Watts Driving the Cost of AI Deployment?, ACM FAccT 2024, arXiv:2311.16863 (abstract page: multi-purpose generative models orders of magnitude more costly per 1,000 inferences than task-specific models). ACM, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 7Patterson, D. and others, Carbon Emissions and Large Neural Network Training, arXiv:2104.10350, April 2021 (abstract page: sparse models under one tenth of the energy; location effect 5 to 10 times; choice of model, datacentre and processor 100 to 1000 times). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-007

United States data centres used 176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4% of national electricity, and a Berkeley Lab report projects 325 to 580 TWh by 2028, or about 6.7% to 12%.

Implication

The compute build-out is also an electricity build-out. The 2028 range is 1.8 to 3.3 times the 2023 level (method 4), and the spread shows how much depends on chip supply, efficiency and siting. The report covers US data centres, not the world, and not fabrication plants¹⁵¹⁶.

What would move it

Next national statistics, the IEA global series, published site-level power data and utility interconnection records would each move this finding.

2.2AIC

1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-001

   A dataset of 500 AI supercomputers from 2019 to 2025 shows performance doubling about every nine months, with hardware cost and power need each doubling about every year; one system in March 2025 used about 200,000 chips and 300 MW.¹

2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-002

   Epoch AI estimates that training compute grows about four times a year, that runs of about 2e29 FLOP are likely feasible by 2030, and that power is the constraint most likely to bind first.³

3. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-003

   The 2025 AI Index reports that hardware costs fell about 30% a year and energy efficiency rose about 40% a year, while training compute doubles about every five months.⁵

2.3Finance

1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-004

   Global semiconductor sales reached USD 791.7 billion in 2025, up 25.6% from USD 630.5 billion; logic sales were USD 301.9 billion and memory sales USD 223.1 billion.⁸

2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-005

   Semiconductor equipment billings reached USD 135.1 billion in 2025, up 15%, according to a trade report of SEMI data; Taiwan rose 90% to USD 31.5 billion and China held near USD 49.3 billion.⁹

2.4Infrastructure

1. ReportedEQL 2NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-006

   Press reports put the largest foundry at nearly 70% of the global foundry market in 2025, and about 74% of its wafer revenue came from 7 nanometre and smaller nodes; both are secondary reports.²²²⁷²⁸

2.5Energy

1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-007

   US data centres used 176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4% of national electricity, and a Berkeley Lab report projects 325 to 580 TWh by 2028, or about 6.7% to 12%.¹⁵¹⁶

2. ReportedEQL 2NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-008

   The IEA reports global data centre electricity use of about 415 TWh in 2024 and projects about 945 TWh by 2030 in its base case; the figures come from search summaries of the report.²⁴

2.6Governance

1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-009

   The CHIPS and Science Act, enacted on 9 August 2022, provides USD 50 billion, of which USD 39 billion is for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, and award outlays are not bound at the close.⁴⁴

2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-010

   The EU Chips Act entered into force on 21 September 2023, more than EUR 33 billion was recorded across 19 State aid decisions, and the Commission proposed a second Chips Act in June 2026.¹²

2.7Trade

1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-TRD-011

   US guidance of May 2026 states that a licence is required to export advanced computing items to entities headquartered in Country Group D:5, and the AI diffusion rule was rescinded in May 2025.¹³³¹

2.8Systemic

1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

   The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a build-out of AI compute that meets local limits on power, water and packaging capacity while fabrication stays concentrated. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 16Shehabi, A. and others, 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, December 2024 (publication page abstract only; no figures on the page; the report PDF was not read). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 5Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2025 AI Index Report, key takeaways page (training compute doubling about every five months; hardware cost down about 30% a year; energy efficiency up about 40% a year; chips detail not given on the page). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 22Focus Taiwan, Central News Agency (ed.), report of 13 March 2026 on the largest foundry reaching almost 70% of the global foundry market in 2025 (headline and lead only; the rest is behind a paywall); press report, weak evidence. Central News Agency, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: TrendForce (ed.), 2025 foundry ranking (largest foundry sales about USD 122.5 billion and a share of about 69.9%), taken from press coverage in search results. TrendForce, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: TSMC (ed.), fourth-quarter 2025 results (about 74% of 2025 wafer revenue from 7 nanometre and smaller nodes against 69% in 2024), taken from press coverage in search results; sources differ on the quarterly share. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Hsinchu. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Energy and AI, April 2025 (about 415 TWh of global data centre electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the total; about 945 TWh in 2030 in the base case; range of 700 to 1,700 TWh in 2035), taken from search-result summaries; the IEA pages returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: law-firm client alerts on the rescission of the AI diffusion rule and related guidance, 12 and 13 May 2025, taken from search-result summaries; a formal notice date was not confirmed. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through semiconductor and compute, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries semiconductor and compute risk into each domain.

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on semiconductor and compute, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 22Focus Taiwan, Central News Agency (ed.), report of 13 March 2026 on the largest foundry reaching almost 70% of the global foundry market in 2025 (headline and lead only; the rest is behind a paywall); press report, weak evidence. Central News Agency, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Energy and AI, April 2025 (about 415 TWh of global data centre electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the total; about 945 TWh in 2030 in the base case; range of 700 to 1,700 TWh in 2035), taken from search-result summaries; the IEA pages returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 2Sevilla, J., Heim, L., Ho, A., Besiroglu, T., Hobbhahn, M. and Villalobos, P., Compute Trends Across Three Eras of Machine Learning, arXiv:2202.05924, 2022 (abstract page: doubling about every 20 months before 2010 and about every 6 months in the deep learning era). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 6Luccioni, A.S., Jernite, Y. and Strubell, E., Power Hungry Processing: Watts Driving the Cost of AI Deployment?, ACM FAccT 2024, arXiv:2311.16863 (abstract page: multi-purpose generative models orders of magnitude more costly per 1,000 inferences than task-specific models). ACM, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 7Patterson, D. and others, Carbon Emissions and Large Neural Network Training, arXiv:2104.10350, April 2021 (abstract page: sparse models under one tenth of the energy; location effect 5 to 10 times; choice of model, datacentre and processor 100 to 1000 times). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

1. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT06-ENE-001

   Power limits on the compute build-out

   Driver

   rapid growth in AI compute and data centre load¹³¹⁵

   Exposure

   regions with fast load growth; local grids

   Vulnerability

   interconnection queues; single-site clusters

   Capacity

   efficiency gains and siting choices⁵⁷

   Cascade

   ENE → INF → FIN

   Horizon

   1 to 5 years

2. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT06-INF-002

   Fabrication and packaging concentration

   Driver

   one foundry near 70% of the market; Taiwan equipment spending up 90%⁹²²

   Exposure

   chip supply for compute, memory and devices

   Vulnerability

   few sites; seismic and geopolitical exposure

   Capacity

   new plants under the US, EU and national programmes⁴⁴¹²²¹

   Cascade

   INF → AIC → FIN

   Horizon

   1 to 10 years

3. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT06-TRD-003

   Fragmented export controls and licensing

   Driver

   US guidance and rescission of the diffusion rule¹³³¹

   Exposure

   equipment and chip flows; research collaboration

   Vulnerability

   rule changes at short notice

   Capacity

   licensing channels; allied coordination⁴¹

   Cascade

   TRD → INF, FIN

   Horizon

   1 to 5 years

4. Expert inputEQL 2RSK-XT06-WAT-004

   Water siting limits for plants and cooling

   Driver

   plant expansion in water-scarce regions²³

   Exposure

   plants and data centres in dry regions

   Vulnerability

   drought; competing municipal demand

   Capacity

   reclamation; company goal of 90% in one plan²³

   Cascade

   WAT → INF → ENE

   Horizon

   1 to 5 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence for semiconductor and compute at the global level.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 5Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2025 AI Index Report, key takeaways page (training compute doubling about every five months; hardware cost down about 30% a year; energy efficiency up about 40% a year; chips detail not given on the page). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 7Patterson, D. and others, Carbon Emissions and Large Neural Network Training, arXiv:2104.10350, April 2021 (abstract page: sparse models under one tenth of the energy; location effect 5 to 10 times; choice of model, datacentre and processor 100 to 1000 times). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 22Focus Taiwan, Central News Agency (ed.), report of 13 March 2026 on the largest foundry reaching almost 70% of the global foundry market in 2025 (headline and lead only; the rest is behind a paywall); press report, weak evidence. Central News Agency, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 21The Register (ed.), Japan’s Rapidus lands $1.7B to chase 2nm chip production by 2027, 27 February 2026 (JPY 267.6 billion round; JPY 100 billion from a METI agency; JPY 167.6 billion from 32 companies); trade press, weak evidence. Situation Publishing, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: law-firm client alerts on the rescission of the AI diffusion rule and related guidance, 12 and 13 May 2025, taken from search-result summaries; a formal notice date was not confirmed. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Government of the Netherlands and Government of Japan, export-control rules on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 2023, cited from memory; no figure is used. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16. 14IEEE (ed.), International Roadmap for Devices and Systems, programme page (successor to the ITRS; IEEE sponsorship since 2016; 2023 update the latest edition listed). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17. 2Sevilla, J., Heim, L., Ho, A., Besiroglu, T., Hobbhahn, M. and Villalobos, P., Compute Trends Across Three Eras of Machine Learning, arXiv:2202.05924, 2022 (abstract page: doubling about every 20 months before 2010 and about every 6 months in the deep learning era). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

5.1Assumptions

Scenario SCN-XT06-PWR-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.

Baseline

the 2026 reference state in this edition

Drivers

AI compute demand keeps growing while grid connection, water supply and packaging capacity grow more slowly

Analogues

the 2023 to 2028 range of US data centre load; the 2019 to 2025 growth of AI supercomputers¹¹⁵

Interventions

none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case

Run state

narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027

5.2The cascade, step by step

1. 1

   AIC → ENE

   new compute sites queue for grid connection

   2025

2. 2

   ENE → WAT

   cooling and plant water demand meets local supply limits

   2026

3. 3

   INF → AIC

   packaging and memory capacity limits the chips that can be used

   2025

4. 4

   TRD → INF

   export-control changes shift where equipment and chips can go

   2026

5. 5

   GOV → FIN

   subsidy programmes move capacity to new regions over several years

   2026

6. 6

   FIN → INF

   investment shifts toward efficiency, power supply and packaging

   2025

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

How the shock in scenario SCN-XT06-PWR-01 would travel through Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute’s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.

A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute 2026, scenario SCN-XT06-PWR-01 (2026); Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for semiconductor and compute. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 semiconductor and compute readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Publication dispositions

• Publish
• Hold
• Needs evidence
• Restricted
• Superseded

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

• IN FORCE
• PUBLISHED
• DRAFT
• PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers semiconductor and compute assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

Question

What does the published evidence establish about advanced semiconductors and AI compute as infrastructure and its couplings?

Sources searched

peer-reviewed journals and preprints; agencies and ministries; roadmaps and standards; market and energy analyses

Window

releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026

Selection

sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition

Next step

systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, 2022, cited from memory. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: European Union, Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act); the EUR-Lex fetch returned no text, cited from memory. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Department of Commerce, Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, interim final rule, 90 Federal Register 4544, January 2025, cited from search summaries; the Federal Register page redirected. Federal Register, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: law-firm client alerts on the rescission of the AI diffusion rule and related guidance, 12 and 13 May 2025, taken from search-result summaries; a formal notice date was not confirmed. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: JEDEC (ed.), JESD270-4 HBM4 standard, April 2025 (about 2 TB/s per stack; 32 channels; up to 64 GB per stack), taken from search-result summaries; the JEDEC page returned an access error. JEDEC Solid State Technology Association, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 14IEEE (ed.), International Roadmap for Devices and Systems, programme page (successor to the ITRS; IEEE sponsorship since 2016; 2023 update the latest edition listed). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Government of the Netherlands and Government of Japan, export-control rules on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 2023, cited from memory; no figure is used. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Government of India, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, India Semiconductor Mission, the programme site returned an access error; cited from memory without figures. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 21The Register (ed.), Japan’s Rapidus lands $1.7B to chase 2nm chip production by 2027, 27 February 2026 (JPY 267.6 billion round; JPY 100 billion from a METI agency; JPY 167.6 billion from 32 companies); trade press, weak evidence. Situation Publishing, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: METI and press coverage of the April 2026 addition of JPY 631.5 billion to Rapidus support, bringing research and development support to about JPY 2.354 trillion, taken from search-result summaries; totals differ by source. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16. 10POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), CHIPS for America program page (USD 50 billion; USD 39 billion manufacturing incentives; USD 11 billion research; award notices of 8 September, 16 September, 14 October and 22 October 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
18. 2Sevilla, J., Heim, L., Ho, A., Besiroglu, T., Hobbhahn, M. and Villalobos, P., Compute Trends Across Three Eras of Machine Learning, arXiv:2202.05924, 2022 (abstract page: doubling about every 20 months before 2010 and about every 6 months in the deep learning era). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19. 6Luccioni, A.S., Jernite, Y. and Strubell, E., Power Hungry Processing: Watts Driving the Cost of AI Deployment?, ACM FAccT 2024, arXiv:2311.16863 (abstract page: multi-purpose generative models orders of magnitude more costly per 1,000 inferences than task-specific models). ACM, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
20. 7Patterson, D. and others, Carbon Emissions and Large Neural Network Training, arXiv:2104.10350, April 2021 (abstract page: sparse models under one tenth of the energy; location effect 5 to 10 times; choice of model, datacentre and processor 100 to 1000 times). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
21. 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Leiserson, C.E. and others, There’s plenty of room at the Top: What will drive computer performance after Moore’s law?, Science 368, eaam9744, 2020, taken from a reposted abstract in search results. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
22. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Koomey, J.G. and others, Implications of historical trends in the electrical efficiency of computing, IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 33(3), 46 to 54, 2011, cited from memory. Observation year 2011. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
23. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Masanet, E. and others, Recalibrating global data centre energy-use estimates, Science 367, 984 to 986, 2020, cited from memory. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
24. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: Khan, S.M. and Mann, A., AI Chips: What They Are and Why They Matter, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, April 2020; the file fetched returned only a notice that the report was updated, so no content was read. Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Washington. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
25. 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Moore, G.E., Cramming more components onto integrated circuits, Electronics 38(8), 1965, cited from memory. Observation year 1965. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
26. 37UNVERIFIED, not opened: Dennard, R.H. and others, Design of ion-implanted MOSFET’s with very small physical dimensions, IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits 9(5), 256 to 268, 1974, cited from memory. Observation year 1974. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
27. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
28. 4POST-CLOSE, context only: Epoch AI (ed.), AI models data hub (page updated 3 November 2026; over 3,700 models; no growth rate stated on the page). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
29. 5Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2025 AI Index Report, key takeaways page (training compute doubling about every five months; hardware cost down about 30% a year; energy efficiency up about 40% a year; chips detail not given on the page). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
30. 11NIST (ed.), CHIPS research and development programmes page (National Semiconductor Technology Center, National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program, Manufacturing USA institute; undated; no programme amounts). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
31. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
32. 16Shehabi, A. and others, 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, December 2024 (publication page abstract only; no figures on the page; the report PDF was not read). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
33. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Energy and AI, April 2025 (about 415 TWh of global data centre electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the total; about 945 TWh in 2030 in the base case; range of 700 to 1,700 TWh in 2035), taken from search-result summaries; the IEA pages returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
34. 19Nvidia (ed.), Blackwell architecture product page (208 billion transistors per GPU; custom TSMC 4NP process; performance multiples are vendor claims and weak evidence). Nvidia, Santa Clara. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
35. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
36. 22Focus Taiwan, Central News Agency (ed.), report of 13 March 2026 on the largest foundry reaching almost 70% of the global foundry market in 2025 (headline and lead only; the rest is behind a paywall); press report, weak evidence. Central News Agency, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
37. 25UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, gallium chapter (reported in summaries as about 99% of primary low-purity gallium produced in China in 2025), taken from search-result summaries; the page returned an access error and no figure is used in the findings. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
38. 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, germanium chapter, the page returned an access error; summaries differ on China shares and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

7.1Questions for the operational series

1. Q-01

   How much power and cooling water do advanced fabrication plants and AI data centres need, on a common basis, and where do the limits fall?

   INI-XT06-PWR-01 · power and water footprint; first output: footprint estimates by site type.

2. Q-02

   What advanced packaging and high-bandwidth memory capacity exists, and in which places?

   INI-XT06-PKG-02 · packaging and memory; first output: capacity map.

3. Q-03

   Which equipment and materials are single points of failure for advanced chips?

   INI-XT06-EQP-03 · equipment and materials; first output: dependence map.

4. Q-04

   How far have announced subsidies become delivered plants and output?

   INI-XT06-SUB-04 · subsidy delivery; first output: award and outlay table.

5. Q-05

   How can chip, system and compute counts be compared on a common basis?

   INI-XT06-BMK-05 · counts on a common basis; first output: benchmark table.

6. Q-06

   Which national export-control and licensing rules apply to advanced computing items, and how do they differ?

   To be admitted in 2027; first output: rule overlay.

7. Q-07

   What workforce exists for fabrication, packaging and data centre operation?

   To be admitted in 2027; first output: scoping note.

8. Q-08

   Which readiness capabilities have been tested in real shortages or disruptions, and which are only planned?

   Readiness capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.

7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment

Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 semiconductor and compute portfolio. They are programme objects: no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.

7.3The pathway

The semiconductor edition reads national readiness chapters, the coupled sector reports on energy, minerals and cybersecurity, and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed; the global energy and lifeline editions are drafted. This page states what exists today and what comes next.

1. 01

   National readiness chapters

   fabrication, power and trade readiness in each national edition

   IN PREPARATION · national baselines

2. 02

   Sector couplings

   GS-02 energy · SR-04 minerals · SR-03 supply chains

   GS-02 DRAFTED · sector baselines

3. 03

   Technology system model

   fabrication, equipment, memory, power, water, governance

   v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence

4. 04

   Strategic links

   SR-13 strategic technology · XT-07 HPC

   PLANNED · strategic baselines

5. 05

   Universe

   annual proving environment

   CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027

6. 06

   XT-06 report

   this series

   BASELINE DRAFT · 2027 annual edition

7. 07

   Evidence and correction

   one graph, many projections

   OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027

7.4Universe 2027: evidence pack for the semiconductor and compute candidate mission

1. 01

   Mandate

2. 02

   Core Build · 1 month

3. 03

   Action · 1 week

4. 04

   Evidence seal

5. 05

   Portfolio correction

6. 06

   Next mandate

Mission

ID

MSN-XT06-2027-01 · Local limits Universe mission

Role spine

Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead: drawn from national pathways

Receiving actors

to be identified with the mandate

7.5Handoffs and routing

Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.

7.6Feeds and signal register

Escalation routes

• none · keep monitoring
• research question
• project
• risk object
• annual publication
• signal report

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

8.1Compute hardware and fabrication

AI compute is built from advanced logic and memory chips made in a few clusters. Market figures are strong; counts of chips and capacity by place are thin.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• GS-02 Energy
• SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
• XT-07 HPC and Advanced Computing

8.2Energy, power and water

Compute and fabrication need electricity and cooling water. US data centre use is documented; plant water use is reported by single companies.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• GS-02 Energy
• SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
• XT-07 HPC and Advanced Computing

8.3Equipment, memory and materials

Chips depend on specialised tools, memory stacks and minerals. Equipment billings are documented through a trade report; materials figures are not bound.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• GS-02 Energy
• SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
• XT-07 HPC and Advanced Computing

8.4Economy, investment and workforce

Sales and public programmes are large and well documented. Outlays and workforce numbers are the thin parts of the evidence.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• GS-02 Energy
• SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
• XT-07 HPC and Advanced Computing

8.5Security, export controls and governance watch

Export controls and subsidies now shape the supply chain. Rules change at short notice, so the watch follows the rule texts.

Related editions

• GLB Global Systems
• GS-02 Energy
• SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
• SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
• XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems
• XT-07 HPC and Advanced Computing

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 22Focus Taiwan, Central News Agency (ed.), report of 13 March 2026 on the largest foundry reaching almost 70% of the global foundry market in 2025 (headline and lead only; the rest is behind a paywall); press report, weak evidence. Central News Agency, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: TrendForce (ed.), 2025 foundry ranking (largest foundry sales about USD 122.5 billion and a share of about 69.9%), taken from press coverage in search results. TrendForce, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: TSMC (ed.), fourth-quarter 2025 results (about 74% of 2025 wafer revenue from 7 nanometre and smaller nodes against 69% in 2024), taken from press coverage in search results; sources differ on the quarterly share. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Hsinchu. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 19Nvidia (ed.), Blackwell architecture product page (208 billion transistors per GPU; custom TSMC 4NP process; performance multiples are vendor claims and weak evidence). Nvidia, Santa Clara. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 16Shehabi, A. and others, 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, December 2024 (publication page abstract only; no figures on the page; the report PDF was not read). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Energy and AI, April 2025 (about 415 TWh of global data centre electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the total; about 945 TWh in 2030 in the base case; range of 700 to 1,700 TWh in 2035), taken from search-result summaries; the IEA pages returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 5Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2025 AI Index Report, key takeaways page (training compute doubling about every five months; hardware cost down about 30% a year; energy efficiency up about 40% a year; chips detail not given on the page). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 7Patterson, D. and others, Carbon Emissions and Large Neural Network Training, arXiv:2104.10350, April 2021 (abstract page: sparse models under one tenth of the energy; location effect 5 to 10 times; choice of model, datacentre and processor 100 to 1000 times). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 20ASML (ed.), Moore’s law explainer page (Moore observation of 1965 and revision of 1975; statement that EUV gives the highest resolution; no High-NA content on the page). ASML, Veldhoven. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16. 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Moore, G.E., Cramming more components onto integrated circuits, Electronics 38(8), 1965, cited from memory. Observation year 1965. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17. 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: JEDEC (ed.), JESD270-4 HBM4 standard, April 2025 (about 2 TB/s per stack; 32 channels; up to 64 GB per stack), taken from search-result summaries; the JEDEC page returned an access error. JEDEC Solid State Technology Association, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
18. 25UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, gallium chapter (reported in summaries as about 99% of primary low-purity gallium produced in China in 2025), taken from search-result summaries; the page returned an access error and no figure is used in the findings. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19. 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, germanium chapter, the page returned an access error; summaries differ on China shares and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
20. 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026, cited from the XT-02 notes of this series, not read for this edition; no figure is used. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
21. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
22. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
23. 11NIST (ed.), CHIPS research and development programmes page (National Semiconductor Technology Center, National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program, Manufacturing USA institute; undated; no programme amounts). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
24. 21The Register (ed.), Japan’s Rapidus lands $1.7B to chase 2nm chip production by 2027, 27 February 2026 (JPY 267.6 billion round; JPY 100 billion from a METI agency; JPY 167.6 billion from 32 companies); trade press, weak evidence. Situation Publishing, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
25. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Government of India, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, India Semiconductor Mission, the programme site returned an access error; cited from memory without figures. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
26. 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: METI and press coverage of the April 2026 addition of JPY 631.5 billion to Rapidus support, bringing research and development support to about JPY 2.354 trillion, taken from search-result summaries; totals differ by source. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
27. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
28. 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Department of Commerce, Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, interim final rule, 90 Federal Register 4544, January 2025, cited from search summaries; the Federal Register page redirected. Federal Register, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
29. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: law-firm client alerts on the rescission of the AI diffusion rule and related guidance, 12 and 13 May 2025, taken from search-result summaries; a formal notice date was not confirmed. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
30. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Government of the Netherlands and Government of Japan, export-control rules on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 2023, cited from memory; no figure is used. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
31. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: European Union, Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act); the EUR-Lex fetch returned no text, cited from memory. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

A.1Methods

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

A.2Model card, Semiconductor and compute System Model v0

Model ID

MDL-XT06-SEMICONDUCTORS · v0.1

Purpose

represent advanced semiconductors and AI compute as infrastructure coupled to electricity, cooling water, materials, finance, workforce and export controls

Family

graph-based system of systems

Inputs

the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data

Method

expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events

Validation

none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027

Uncertainty

qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements

Domain of validity

global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use

Reproducibility

strength table and sources published in this edition

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID

DC-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-B0

Type

baseline documentary cut

Resolution policy

pinned · as of 30 September 2026

Sources pinned

44 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references

Model runs

none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method

Digest

computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record

Supersedes

nothing, first cut of the series

Superseded by

the 2027 semiconductor and compute annual cut

Lineage

1. 01

   source edition

2. 02

   pinned citation

3. 03

   finding

4. 04

   page

5. 05

   publication record

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

• Pilz and others¹: publication status and dataset updates
• US Department of Commerce¹³: rule texts behind the May 2026 guidance
• European Commission¹²: second Chips Act proposal text
• IEA²⁴: global data centre figures from the report

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

A.7Status words

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

A.10Technical annex

A.1 · indicator definition: doubling time

Construct

time for a measured quantity to double under a fitted exponential trend

Unit

months

Method

regression of the quantity on date across systems or models

Source

preprint arXiv 2504.16026¹; preprint arXiv 2202.05924²

Uncertainty

depends on dataset coverage and period; not stated as one value in the abstracts read

Known limits

a historical fit, not a forecast; data come from public disclosures

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 10POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), CHIPS for America program page (USD 50 billion; USD 39 billion manufacturing incentives; USD 11 billion research; award notices of 8 September, 16 September, 14 October and 22 October 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 16Shehabi, A. and others, 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, December 2024 (publication page abstract only; no figures on the page; the report PDF was not read). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Energy and AI, April 2025 (about 415 TWh of global data centre electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the total; about 945 TWh in 2030 in the base case; range of 700 to 1,700 TWh in 2035), taken from search-result summaries; the IEA pages returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: TrendForce (ed.), 2025 foundry ranking (largest foundry sales about USD 122.5 billion and a share of about 69.9%), taken from press coverage in search results. TrendForce, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 17TSMC (ed.), Annual reports page of investor relations (2025 Annual Report and Form 20-F filed 17 April 2026 listed; the reports themselves were not read). Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Hsinchu. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 25UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, gallium chapter (reported in summaries as about 99% of primary low-purity gallium produced in China in 2025), taken from search-result summaries; the page returned an access error and no figure is used in the findings. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, germanium chapter, the page returned an access error; summaries differ on China shares and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 21The Register (ed.), Japan’s Rapidus lands $1.7B to chase 2nm chip production by 2027, 27 February 2026 (JPY 267.6 billion round; JPY 100 billion from a METI agency; JPY 167.6 billion from 32 companies); trade press, weak evidence. Situation Publishing, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: METI and press coverage of the April 2026 addition of JPY 631.5 billion to Rapidus support, bringing research and development support to about JPY 2.354 trillion, taken from search-result summaries; totals differ by source. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 19Nvidia (ed.), Blackwell architecture product page (208 billion transistors per GPU; custom TSMC 4NP process; performance multiples are vendor claims and weak evidence). Nvidia, Santa Clara. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 18POST-CLOSE, context only: WSTS (ed.), World Semiconductor Trade Statistics home page (73rd forecast conference planned for 16 to 19 November 2026; billings data through August 2026; no forecast values in the text of the page). WSTS, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
18. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19. 2Sevilla, J., Heim, L., Ho, A., Besiroglu, T., Hobbhahn, M. and Villalobos, P., Compute Trends Across Three Eras of Machine Learning, arXiv:2202.05924, 2022 (abstract page: doubling about every 20 months before 2010 and about every 6 months in the deep learning era). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

B.1The indicator set

B.2Global source register

The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.

Domains bound by the register

• INF
• AIC
• FIN
• ENE
• TRD
• WAT
• MIN
• CLI
• DAT
• HLT

B.3Regional reading, semiconductor and compute across ten clusters

Regional plates follow with the regional editions. This page gives the regional reading of semiconductor and compute infrastructure in table form and ranks no region.

B.4Cluster card: advanced fabrication in East Asia

• fabrication
• equipment
• foundry
• single cluster

Systems in view

foundry fabrication, equipment purchases, packaging, memory

Defining events

equipment spending in Taiwan up 90% in 2025⁹

Couplings

FIN → INF equipment; TRD → INF controls

Capability evidence

new plants announced under national programmes⁴⁴¹²²¹

Gaps

packaging capacity; plant power and water use

Agenda items

Q-02 · Q-03

B.5How countries appear in the semiconductor and compute edition

Countries enter the semiconductor edition through the readiness chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never ranked.

Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme

How to read a country card

• Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
• Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
• Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
• Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such

B.6Licences

B.7Formats and provenance

Provenance

Edition pack

The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built

Evidence cut

DC-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026

Reproducibility

sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters

Self-check

14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release

Review

five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)

Publisher of record

GCRI for the Nexus Consortium

Corrections

Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7. 19Nvidia (ed.), Blackwell architecture product page (208 billion transistors per GPU; custom TSMC 4NP process; performance multiples are vendor claims and weak evidence). Nvidia, Santa Clara. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9. 11NIST (ed.), CHIPS research and development programmes page (National Semiconductor Technology Center, National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program, Manufacturing USA institute; undated; no programme amounts). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Energy and AI, April 2025 (about 415 TWh of global data centre electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the total; about 945 TWh in 2030 in the base case; range of 700 to 1,700 TWh in 2035), taken from search-result summaries; the IEA pages returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13. 22Focus Taiwan, Central News Agency (ed.), report of 13 March 2026 on the largest foundry reaching almost 70% of the global foundry market in 2025 (headline and lead only; the rest is behind a paywall); press report, weak evidence. Central News Agency, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: TrendForce (ed.), 2025 foundry ranking (largest foundry sales about USD 122.5 billion and a share of about 69.9%), taken from press coverage in search results. TrendForce, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: TSMC (ed.), fourth-quarter 2025 results (about 74% of 2025 wafer revenue from 7 nanometre and smaller nodes against 69% in 2024), taken from press coverage in search results; sources differ on the quarterly share. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Hsinchu. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Government of India, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, India Semiconductor Mission, the programme site returned an access error; cited from memory without figures. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17. 21The Register (ed.), Japan’s Rapidus lands $1.7B to chase 2nm chip production by 2027, 27 February 2026 (JPY 267.6 billion round; JPY 100 billion from a METI agency; JPY 167.6 billion from 32 companies); trade press, weak evidence. Situation Publishing, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

C.144 sources

NR-CIT-1, editor first. A DOI is linked where the source has one; Nexus records carry a UNI once the catalogue allocates it (NS-1).

1. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
2. 2Sevilla, J., Heim, L., Ho, A., Besiroglu, T., Hobbhahn, M. and Villalobos, P., Compute Trends Across Three Eras of Machine Learning, arXiv:2202.05924, 2022 (abstract page: doubling about every 20 months before 2010 and about every 6 months in the deep learning era). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
3. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
4. 4POST-CLOSE, context only: Epoch AI (ed.), AI models data hub (page updated 3 November 2026; over 3,700 models; no growth rate stated on the page). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
5. 5Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2025 AI Index Report, key takeaways page (training compute doubling about every five months; hardware cost down about 30% a year; energy efficiency up about 40% a year; chips detail not given on the page). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
6. 6Luccioni, A.S., Jernite, Y. and Strubell, E., Power Hungry Processing: Watts Driving the Cost of AI Deployment?, ACM FAccT 2024, arXiv:2311.16863 (abstract page: multi-purpose generative models orders of magnitude more costly per 1,000 inferences than task-specific models). ACM, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 3, chapter 6
7. 7Patterson, D. and others, Carbon Emissions and Large Neural Network Training, arXiv:2104.10350, April 2021 (abstract page: sparse models under one tenth of the energy; location effect 5 to 10 times; choice of model, datacentre and processor 100 to 1000 times). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
8. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
9. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
10. 10POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), CHIPS for America program page (USD 50 billion; USD 39 billion manufacturing incentives; USD 11 billion research; award notices of 8 September, 16 September, 14 October and 22 October 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
11. 11NIST (ed.), CHIPS research and development programmes page (National Semiconductor Technology Center, National Advanced Packaging Manufacturing Program, Manufacturing USA institute; undated; no programme amounts). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
12. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
13. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
14. 14IEEE (ed.), International Roadmap for Devices and Systems, programme page (successor to the ITRS; IEEE sponsorship since 2016; 2023 update the latest edition listed). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
15. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
16. 16Shehabi, A. and others, 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, December 2024 (publication page abstract only; no figures on the page; the report PDF was not read). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2, chapter 6, chapter 8
17. 17TSMC (ed.), Annual reports page of investor relations (2025 Annual Report and Form 20-F filed 17 April 2026 listed; the reports themselves were not read). Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Hsinchu. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.
18. 18POST-CLOSE, context only: WSTS (ed.), World Semiconductor Trade Statistics home page (73rd forecast conference planned for 16 to 19 November 2026; billings data through August 2026; no forecast values in the text of the page). WSTS, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.
19. 19Nvidia (ed.), Blackwell architecture product page (208 billion transistors per GPU; custom TSMC 4NP process; performance multiples are vendor claims and weak evidence). Nvidia, Santa Clara. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
20. 20ASML (ed.), Moore’s law explainer page (Moore observation of 1965 and revision of 1975; statement that EUV gives the highest resolution; no High-NA content on the page). ASML, Veldhoven. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 8
21. 21The Register (ed.), Japan’s Rapidus lands $1.7B to chase 2nm chip production by 2027, 27 February 2026 (JPY 267.6 billion round; JPY 100 billion from a METI agency; JPY 167.6 billion from 32 companies); trade press, weak evidence. Situation Publishing, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
22. 22Focus Taiwan, Central News Agency (ed.), report of 13 March 2026 on the largest foundry reaching almost 70% of the global foundry market in 2025 (headline and lead only; the rest is behind a paywall); press report, weak evidence. Central News Agency, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
23. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
24. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Energy and AI, April 2025 (about 415 TWh of global data centre electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the total; about 945 TWh in 2030 in the base case; range of 700 to 1,700 TWh in 2035), taken from search-result summaries; the IEA pages returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
25. 25UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, gallium chapter (reported in summaries as about 99% of primary low-purity gallium produced in China in 2025), taken from search-result summaries; the page returned an access error and no figure is used in the findings. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
26. 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, germanium chapter, the page returned an access error; summaries differ on China shares and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
27. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: TrendForce (ed.), 2025 foundry ranking (largest foundry sales about USD 122.5 billion and a share of about 69.9%), taken from press coverage in search results. TrendForce, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 8
28. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: TSMC (ed.), fourth-quarter 2025 results (about 74% of 2025 wafer revenue from 7 nanometre and smaller nodes against 69% in 2024), taken from press coverage in search results; sources differ on the quarterly share. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Hsinchu. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 8
29. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: Khan, S.M. and Mann, A., AI Chips: What They Are and Why They Matter, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, April 2020; the file fetched returned only a notice that the report was updated, so no content was read. Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Washington. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
30. 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Department of Commerce, Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, interim final rule, 90 Federal Register 4544, January 2025, cited from search summaries; the Federal Register page redirected. Federal Register, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
31. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: law-firm client alerts on the rescission of the AI diffusion rule and related guidance, 12 and 13 May 2025, taken from search-result summaries; a formal notice date was not confirmed. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
32. 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: JEDEC (ed.), JESD270-4 HBM4 standard, April 2025 (about 2 TB/s per stack; 32 channels; up to 64 GB per stack), taken from search-result summaries; the JEDEC page returned an access error. JEDEC Solid State Technology Association, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
33. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: European Union, Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act); the EUR-Lex fetch returned no text, cited from memory. Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
34. 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, 2022, cited from memory. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
35. 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Leiserson, C.E. and others, There’s plenty of room at the Top: What will drive computer performance after Moore’s law?, Science 368, eaam9744, 2020, taken from a reposted abstract in search results. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
36. 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Moore, G.E., Cramming more components onto integrated circuits, Electronics 38(8), 1965, cited from memory. Observation year 1965. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
37. 37UNVERIFIED, not opened: Dennard, R.H. and others, Design of ion-implanted MOSFET’s with very small physical dimensions, IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits 9(5), 256 to 268, 1974, cited from memory. Observation year 1974. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
38. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Koomey, J.G. and others, Implications of historical trends in the electrical efficiency of computing, IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 33(3), 46 to 54, 2011, cited from memory. Observation year 2011. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
39. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Masanet, E. and others, Recalibrating global data centre energy-use estimates, Science 367, 984 to 986, 2020, cited from memory. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
40. 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026, cited from the XT-02 notes of this series, not read for this edition; no figure is used. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 8
41. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Government of the Netherlands and Government of Japan, export-control rules on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 2023, cited from memory; no figure is used. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
42. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Government of India, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, India Semiconductor Mission, the programme site returned an access error; cited from memory without figures. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
43. 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: METI and press coverage of the April 2026 addition of JPY 631.5 billion to Rapidus support, bringing research and development support to about JPY 2.354 trillion, taken from search-result summaries; totals differ by source. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
44. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8

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