Key findings

Twelve findings carry the AI baseline. They are grouped by coupling, never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

3 min read1 figure0 tables14 notesNR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1AI is infrastructure, not only software
  4. 2Key findings
    1. 2.1 Headline finding
    2. 2.2 Energy
    3. 2.3 Compute
    4. 2.4 Minerals
    5. 2.5 Adoption
    6. 2.6 Labour
    7. 2.7 Safety
    8. 2.8 Governance
    9. 2.9 Development
    10. 2.10 Systemic
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Chip supply disruption under grid constraint
  8. 6Lenses and readings
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-001

Data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the world total, and the IEA projects about 945 TWh by 2030, driven mainly by accelerated servers for AI.

Figure 2.1Data-centre electricity use (TWh)
ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
2024 · observed estimate415
2030 · IEA base case945

Source: IEA, Energy and AI1.

Implication

Because demand is clustered, the first effects fall on particular grids, water basins and communities: connection queues, local price pressure and competition for clean power. The global share stays small while local shares become large115.

What would move it

Grid connection queues at the largest clusters, efficiency gains in chips and cooling, and the pace of inference demand from AI agents would each move this finding.

2.2Energy

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-001

    Data centres used about 415 TWh of electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the world total; the IEA projects about 945 TWh by 2030.1

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-002

    Data centres used about 4.4% of US electricity in 2023, with 6.7–12% projected for 2028.15

2.3Compute

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CMP-003

    The training compute of frontier models has grown by four to five times a year since about 2010.14

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CMP-004

    The cost of using a model at GPT-3.5 level fell more than 280-fold between November 2022 and October 2024.2

2.4Minerals

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-MIN-005

    About 92% of leading-edge logic-chip capacity was in Taiwan in 2019; key mineral refining is concentrated in a few countries.1718

2.5Adoption

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ADO-006

    78% of organisations reported using AI in 2024, up from 55% in 2023; corporate AI investment reached about US$252 billion.2

2.6Labour

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-LAB-007

    Between about a quarter and two-fifths of global employment is exposed to AI, depending on definition.1632

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-LAB-008

    Employers expect 170 million jobs to be created and 92 million displaced by 2030, with technology a leading driver.20

2.7Safety

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SAF-009

    Reported AI incidents reached a record 233 in 2024, up 56% on 2023.227

2.8Governance

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-010

    Binding AI law has begun: the EU AI Act applies in phases from 2025, alongside a Council of Europe convention and UN governance bodies.41012

2.9Development

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DEV-011

    About 2.6 billion people remained offline in 2024, limiting who can benefit from AI.34

2.10Systemic

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is an advanced-chip supply disruption coinciding with grid constraints at major data-centre clusters. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1International Energy Agency (ed.), Energy and AI. World Energy Outlook Special Report. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
  2. 15A. Shehabi, S. J. Smith, A. Hubbard et al., 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, December 2024.back
  3. 14J. Sevilla and E. Roldán, “Training compute of frontier AI models grows by 4–5x per year.” Epoch AI, 2024.back
  4. 2Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (ed.), Artificial Intelligence Index Report 2025. Stanford HAI, Stanford, 2025.back
  5. 17Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group (eds.), Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era. SIA and BCG, Washington, DC, 2021.back
  6. 18International Energy Agency (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. IEA, Paris, 2025.back
  7. 16M. Cazzaniga, F. Jaumotte, L. Li et al., “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Work,” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2024/001. IMF, Washington, DC, 2024.back
  8. 32International Labour Organization (ed.), Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure. ILO, Geneva, 2025.back
  9. 20World Economic Forum (ed.), Future of Jobs Report 2025. WEF, Cologny/Geneva, January 2025.back
  10. 27Responsible AI Collaborative (ed.), AI Incident Database. incidentdatabase.ai, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
  11. 4European Parliament and Council of the European Union (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, as amended.back
  12. 10Council of Europe (ed.), Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, CETS No. 225. Council of Europe, Vilnius, 2024.back
  13. 12United Nations General Assembly (ed.), Resolution establishing the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence and the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance. United Nations, New York, August 2025.back
  14. 34ITU (ed.), Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures 2024. International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2024.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 2: Key findings. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-AI-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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