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Key findings

Twelve findings carry the lifeline systems baseline. They are grouped by coupling and never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

5 min read1 figure0 tables12 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Sommaire
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Lifelines fail together
  4. 2Key findings
    1. 2.1 Headline finding
    2. 2.2 Infrastructure
    3. 2.3 CYB
    4. 2.4 Data and digital
    5. 2.5 Climate forcing
    6. 2.6 Development
    7. 2.7 CON
    8. 2.8 AIC
    9. 2.9 Systemic
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMéthodologie
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-006

Subsea cable faults averaged 199 a year from 2010 to 2023. About two thirds came from fishing and transport vessels, and intent is hard to establish.

Figure 2.1Subsea cable faults a year, 2010 to 2023
ÉlémentBar, scaled to the largest valueValeur
Average faults a year199
of which external aggression (about two thirds)≈133

Source: TeleGeography7. The second bar is a Nexus derivation, method (4), and is approximate.

Implication

Most faults are accidents, so route diversity and repair capacity matter more than detecting intent. Governments around the Baltic investigate each fault as potential sabotage, and the analyst notes that severing a few cables is noise rather than a signal7.

What would move it

Repair-vessel investment, route diversity and the outcome of Baltic investigations would each move this finding.

2.2infrastructures

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-001

    The Iberian blackout of 28 April 2025 came from interacting factors, including voltage control gaps, oscillations and generator disconnections, according to the ENTSO-E final report of 20 March 2026.1

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-005

    The 2025 US report card grades national infrastructure C, with a USD 3.6 trillion ten-year investment gap and energy at D+.6

  3. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-006

    Subsea cable faults averaged 199 a year from 2010 to 2023; about two thirds came from fishing and transport vessels, and intent is hard to establish.7

2.3CYB

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-002

    Agencies assessed in February 2024 that state-sponsored actors were pre-positioning on networks in communications, energy, transportation and water sectors, with some intrusions lasting at least five years.2

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CYB-003

    ENISA analysed 4,875 incidents between 1 July 2024 and 30 June 2025 for the EU threat landscape.3

2.4Data and digital

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-004

    A single software update affected an estimated 8.5 million Windows devices on 18 July 2024.4

2.5Climate forcing

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CLI-007

    UNDRR puts the annual average loss to critical infrastructure from floods, tropical cyclones and earthquakes at more than USD 250 billion.10

2.6Développement

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DEV-008

    Disruptions to power, transport, telecommunications and water cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year, and resilient options return about USD 4 per USD 1.11

2.7CON

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-009

    Ukraine’s ten-year recovery and reconstruction needs are USD 587.7 billion, with energy and extractives at USD 90.6 billion, and direct damage to energy and extractives reached USD 24.8 billion by the end of 2025.12

  2. ReportedEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-010

    Power and desalination plants in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates were reported struck from March 2026, in a region where desalination supplies most drinking water.13

2.8AIC

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-011

    Data centres made up half of US electricity demand growth in 2025, and nearly half of US data-centre capacity sits in five regional clusters.98

2.9Systémique

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure and limited repair capacity. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 10UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays: Financing and Investing for our Future (full report; annual average loss for critical infrastructure sectors from earthquakes, floods and tropical cyclones USD 257.2 billion; total disaster-related costs closer to USD 2.3 trillion a year). United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, June 2025. DOI 10.18356/9789211576740. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05. doi:10.18356/9789211576740back
  8. 11Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (full report; disruptions cost households and firms in low- and middle-income countries at least USD 390 billion a year; net benefit of resilient infrastructure USD 4.2 trillion, about USD 4 per USD 1 invested). World Bank, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  9. 12World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Union and United Nations (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5): February 2022 to December 2025, main report (recovery and reconstruction needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy and extractives needs USD 90.6 billion; damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion). World Bank, Washington, February 2026. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  10. 13Shehabi, M., War on Iran: The Dangers of Attacking Water Desalination Plants in the Gulf (analysis of 28 April 2026; reported drone attacks on a desalination plant in Bahrain, two desalination plants in Kuwait and the Fujairah F1 power and water plant in the United Arab Emirates from March 2026; 90 to 99 percent of drinking water from desalination in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar). Arab Center Washington DC, Washington. No official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-05.back
  11. 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 8IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

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Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 2: Key findings. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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Signature sectorielle

The sectors behind Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

Select corners · hover lines6 / 15 relations

Contexte

Infrastructure and its partners

Infrastructure gives pipes, dams and treatment works to water (0.6), transmission and fuel logistics to energy (0.6) and access to care to health (0.5).

W · E · I · F · H · B

Secteurs
4 sur 6
Relations
6 sur 15
Couplage
0.46 part du total

Relations les plus fortes en jeu

  • Énergie → Infrastructures · alimentation des transports et des télécommunications0.8
  • Eau → Énergie · eau de refroidissement et hydroélectricité0.6
  • Infrastructures → Eau · canalisations, barrages et stations de traitement0.6
  • Eau → Santé · eau potable et assainissement0.7
Valeurs pédagogiques pour une ville-région type, pas des mesures pour un lieu. Le couplage est la somme des intensités des relations en jeu, en part des quinze.
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