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Executive summary

The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.

7 min read1 figure0 tables13 notesNR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Sommaire
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
    1. S.1 Abstract
    2. S.2 Key messages
    3. S.3 Headline finding
    4. S.4 At a glance
    5. S.5 What each steward reads in it
    6. S.6 What this edition is, and is not
  3. 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMéthodologie
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

S.1Abstract

Supply chains are the networks that move goods, energy and inputs between producers and users. The 2024 to 2026 evidence shows the same mechanisms at work in very different events. Seaborne trade volume grew 2.2 percent in 2024, but distance-adjusted trade grew 5.9 percent to 66,781 billion ton-miles, the fastest pace since 2011, because ships were rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope1. The Suez Canal handles about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade, and its tonnage was still 70 percent below 2023 levels in May 202543. From early March 2026 the Strait of Hormuz, which carried about 20.7 million barrels of oil a day in 2024, saw daily transits fall from about 130 to 6, and Middle East crude oil production shut-ins tied to the closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026, against 25.2 million barrels a day of production in February7546. About one third of seaborne fertiliser trade normally passes through it6. Even so, the WTO March 2026 baseline put 2026 merchandise volume growth at 1.9 percent, after 4.6 percent in 2025, and at 1.4 percent if high energy prices persist13. China’s April 2025 rare earth controls remain in place, and the October 2025 expansion is suspended only until 10 November 202622. This baseline reads these events as mechanisms, not as a list. It ranks no route or country, attributes no attack and recommends no policy.

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the supply chains and chokepoints baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

  1. Yes: conflict, attacks on vessels, water levels and trade controls recur across routes.14522

    Do supply chain disruptions have common causes?Reported

  2. Through shared dependence on a few straits, canals and processors.4746

    How do disruptions spread?Reported

  3. Ton-miles rose 5.9 percent in 2024 against 2.2 percent for volume.1

    How large is the rerouting effect?Reported

  4. About one fifth of oil and LNG and about one third of seaborne fertiliser pass through Hormuz.786

    How exposed are energy and fertiliser flows?Reported

  5. Merchandise volume grew 4.6 percent in 2025 and the WTO March 2026 baseline for 2026 is 1.9 percent.13

    Has trade held up?Reported

  6. About 72 percent of merchandise trade is on MFN terms.15

    Do trade rules still apply?Reported

  7. A composite of USD 4,429 per 40ft container in the last week of October 2026.16

    What do freight rates show?Reported

  8. A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates. SCN-SR03-CHK-01

    What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-007

Daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz fell from about 130 in February 2026 to 6 in March, a drop of about 95 percent, and sources differ on the February base.

Figure S.1Strait of Hormuz daily transits, 2026
ÉlémentBar, scaled to the largest valueValeur
February (about)≈130
March6

Source: UNCTAD rapid assessment5. The WTO cites 138 vessels a day before the closure13; the drop is a Nexus derivation, method (3).

A closure of one strait removes a large share of oil, LNG and fertiliser flows at once, so buffers, bypass routes and the speed of reopening matter more than the cause. Daily counts differ by source and by what is counted51320.

S.4At a glance

66,781billion ton-miles

seaborne trade, 20241

≈95%

Hormuz transit drop, March 20265

1.9%

WTO March 2026 baseline, 202613

72%

trade on MFN terms15

4,429USD per 40ft

Drewry composite, 29 Oct 202616

≈1/3

seaborne fertiliser via Hormuz6

S.5What each steward reads in it

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading trade as a network with narrow places.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people supply chain failure arrives as a higher price at the pump, on a food label or on a device.

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Freight, insurance and fuel costs moved sharply, and projected canal revenue halved in one year.

NEXUS

Synthèse

Trade risk is well described route by route and thinly measured as a system.

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

A baseline: the 2026 state of the world’s supply chains, trade routes and chokepoints and the couplings through which it carries risk into other systems. It synthesises published evidence and ranks no country, company or asset.

What it is not

Not a trade-policy ranking, a threat attribution, a sanctions or export-control opinion or an assessment of any carrier, port, state or company. Operation of routes, ports and canals rests with their owners, operators and competent authorities.

What comes next

National, regional and sector evidence feeds the 2027 supply chains and chokepoints edition through the federation. Each edition reports what changed against this baseline: observations, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3UNCTAD (ed.), Maritime trade under pressure, growth set to stall in 2025 (news item; Suez Canal tonnage 70 percent below 2023 in May 2025; Shanghai Containerized Freight Index averaged 2,496 in 2024). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 20News report, Facts about the Strait of Hormuz since its negotiated reopening (last updated 8 April 2026; Kpler: average of eight commodity carriers a day from 1 March to 7 April; Lloyd’s List estimate of about 800 ships stuck in the Gulf; two-week ceasefire). Arab News Pakistan, Islamabad. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

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Cite this summary

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Executive summary: Executive summary. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

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