GCRI · 先进产业与机器人
工业网络韧性
Factories and process plants depend on operational technology that was designed for reliability, not security, and is now connected to business networks and suppliers. Ransomware and targeted attacks can stop production, damage equipment or create safety hazards. This page sets out how cyber threats affect industrial operations, how resilience is built and measured, and what evidence serves the operators and regulators involved.
Industrial cyber resilience: how the risk develops.
OT/ICS and connected factories. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Connectivity widens exposure
Remote access, cloud services and integration with suppliers connect control 系统 to networks attackers can reach.
IT incidents stop production
Ransomware on business systems often halts production because scheduling, logistics and quality systems are unavailable, even if controls are untouched.
Safety and security intersect
Attacks on safety instrumented systems or controls could create hazardous conditions, so security must be part of safety engineering.
Recovery needs manual fallback
Plants that can run or shut down safely without their digital systems recover faster and more safely.
Connected activity in Germany.
Night lights, population density and land cover over Germany, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.
交互式地图需要JavaScript；图层列表和来源见下文。
图层 3
本页的互联活动
关于本图层
- 证据
- 观测
- 来源
- VIIRS Black Marble（VNP46A2）（NASA LAADS DAAC）
- 提供方
- NASA LAADS DAAC
- 许可协议
- NASA 开放数据
- 年份版本
- 每日；卫星辐射亮度，已校正月光和大气影响
- 构建时的最新内容
- 2026-10-12
- 处理结果
- 约 500 米网格
- 不确定性
- 所示日期的卫星夜间辐射亮度；灯光是用电和停电的替代指标，并非对供应或获得电力情况的测量。
- 经由以下途径到达
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov，仅在您允许实时地图后访问
关于本图层
- 证据
- 估计值
- 来源
- 世界网格化人口 v4.11（NASA SEDAC（哥伦比亚大学 CIESIN））
- 提供方
- NASA SEDAC（哥伦比亚大学 CIESIN）
- 许可协议
- CC BY 4.0
- 年份版本
- null；基于人口普查的估算，静态（2020）
- 处理结果
- 约 1 公里网格
- 不确定性
- 基于人口普查的 2020 年每平方公里人口估算，作为风险暴露背景展示；不是受任何危害影响的人数。
- 经由以下途径到达
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov，仅在您允许实时地图后访问
关于本图层
- 证据
- 观测（云层造成缺口）
- 来源
- VIIRS 全球洪水产品（NASA LANCE）
- 提供方
- NASA LANCE
- 许可协议
- NASA 开放数据
- 年份版本
- 每日；卫星探测；云层造成缺口
- 构建时的最新内容
- 2026-10-14
- 处理结果
- 约 250 米网格
- 不确定性
- 卫星探测；云层造成缺口。卫星或模型栅格数据，按提供方发布的原样呈现。云层、条带缺口和反演误差会造成缺口和噪声；数值是指标，而非某地的测量值。
- 经由以下途径到达
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov，仅在您允许实时地图后访问
关于本图层
- 证据
- 观测
- 来源
- VIIRS NOAA-20 校正反射率（NASA LANCE）
- 提供方
- NASA LANCE
- 许可协议
- NASA 开放数据
- 年份版本
- 每日；卫星图像
- 构建时的最新内容
- 2026-10-14
- 处理结果
- 约 250 米网格
- 不确定性
- 卫星图像。卫星或模型栅格数据，按提供方发布的原样呈现。云层、条带缺口和反演误差会造成缺口和噪声；数值是指标，而非某地的测量值。
- 经由以下途径到达
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov，仅在您允许实时地图后访问
关于本图层
- 证据
- 模型生成（GIBS 发布的最新年份）
- 来源
- MODIS Terra 和 Aqua 土地覆盖（MCD12Q1）（NASA LP DAAC）
- 提供方
- NASA LP DAAC
- 许可协议
- NASA 开放数据
- 年份版本
- 每年；卫星分类；GIBS 发布的最新年份
- 构建时的最新内容
- 2024-01-01
- 处理结果
- 约 500 米网格
- 不确定性
- 所示年份的卫星土地覆盖类别，含农田；该分类存在已知误差，并非农场登记册。
- 经由以下途径到达
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov，仅在您允许实时地图后访问
关于本图层
- 证据
- 观测（云层造成缺口）
- 来源
- MODIS Terra EVI（NASA LANCE）
- 提供方
- NASA LANCE
- 许可协议
- NASA 开放数据
- 年份版本
- 每日；卫星指数；云层造成缺口
- 构建时的最新内容
- 2026-10-13
- 处理结果
- 约 250 米网格
- 不确定性
- 截至所示日期 8 天的卫星植被指数，是栖息地状况指标；不衡量物种或生物多样性。
- 经由以下途径到达
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov，仅在您允许实时地图后访问
键盘操作，地图获得焦点时
按住 Ctrl 或 ⌘ 并滚动以缩放
最新可用
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap贡献者 (ODbL) · Natural Earth
正在加载最新的NASA影像。
拖动以移动。按住 Ctrl 或 ⌘ 并滚动、双指缩放或使用按钮缩放；悬停可查看指针下的数值；重置可返回该区域。
Connected activity, framed on Germany.NASA 发布的卫星和模型产品，各带自己的日期。它们是指标，而非对任何地点的评估。
数据：NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap 贡献者 · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · NASA/NOAA VIIRS · NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERT来源与许可
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA 开放数据
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA 开放数据
- VIIRS Black Marble 夜间灯光，NASA 戈达德航天中心；由 NASA Level-1 与大气档案和分发系统（LAADS DAAC）分发；影像来自 NASA GIBS。颜色依据已发布的色标重绘；显示处的数值已按六边形网格平均（经修改）。 NASA 开放数据
- Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). 采用 CC BY 4.0 许可。颜色依据已发布的色标重绘；显示处的数值已按六边形网格平均（经修改）。 doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
- VIIRS 近实时产品（洪水、地表温度、积雪覆盖、校正反射率），NASA LANCE；影像来自 NASA GIBS。颜色依据已发布的色标重绘；显示处的数值已按六边形网格平均（经修改）。 NASA 开放数据
- MODIS 陆地产品（植被指数、总初级生产力、土地覆盖），NASA LP DAAC 和 LANCE；影像来自 NASA GIBS。颜色依据已发布的色标重绘；显示处的数值已按六边形网格平均（经修改）。 NASA 开放数据
- ASTER GDEM 是 METI 和 NASA 的产品（ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003，NASA LP DAAC）；影像来自 NASA GIBS。颜色依据已发布的色标重绘；显示处的数值已按六边形网格平均（经修改）。引用格式：NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA 开放数据
- 使用 Natural Earth 制作。免费矢量和栅格地图数据，见 naturalearthdata.com。 公有领域
- © OpenStreetMap 贡献者（ODbL），经由 NASA GIBS（海岸线、边界、道路和地名）。颜色依据已发布的色标重绘；显示处的数值已按六边形网格平均（经修改）。 ODbL
- Blue Marble，NASA Earth Observatory；影像来自 NASA GIBS。颜色依据已发布的色标重绘；显示处的数值已按六边形网格平均（经修改）。 NASA 开放数据
- 地球仪和平面地图上的背景信息：海岸线、边界、道路和地名来自 NASA GIBS 参考图层（OpenStreetMap 数据，ODbL，© OpenStreetMap contributors）；Blue Marble 影像可作为可选底图；3D 地形和高程读数来自 ASTER GDEM 高程色彩指数（5 m 至 200 m 分级，为便于辨识而作了夸张处理）。边界按已发布的样式绘制，不代表对任何领土的立场。
- 实时事件：NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker（EONET）；事件仅供参考，并保留其原始来源链接。
- Observed (EO): NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
- Observed (EO): NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERT (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
- NASA GIBS: We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
- 可选图层（图层列表中有 5 个来源：实时、预报、观测和背景）在打开时会在地图上和此处显示其提供方署名；预报为模型输出，派生指数为估计值。
图层与日期
- 夜间灯光，每日：VIIRS Black Marble（VNP46A2），NASA LAADS DAAC · 2026年10月12日
- 人口密度，2020 年：人口：哥伦比亚大学 CIESIN，世界网格化人口 v4.11（2018），NASA SEDAC， CC BY 4.0 · 静态
- 洪水水体，3 日合成：VIIRS 全球洪水产品，NASA LANCE · 2026年10月14日
- 真彩色：VIIRS NOAA-20 校正反射率，NASA LANCE · 2026年10月13日
- 土地覆盖类型（IGBP），年度：MODIS Terra 和 Aqua 土地覆盖（MCD12Q1），NASA LP DAAC · 2024
- 增强型植被指数，滚动 8 天：MODIS Terra EVI，NASA LANCE · 2026年10月13日
Industrial control systems connect cyber risk to physical domains.
Findings are designed for the Global Sector Risk and Resilience 系列. IEC 62443 sets the security framework; the page publishes no vulnerability detail.
- Anonymised OT incident reviews.
- Segmentation practice studies.
在相互依存的网络中的一次级联。
A 危害足迹 takes out co-located assets in every layer; fragmentation, dependency between layers and overload of the survivors then spread the failure. The 3D view separates the layers by depth. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Germany; the model itself is not tied to a place.
控制措施
- 每个图层的资产
- 18
- 危害足迹
- 占面积的 8%
- 依赖其他图层的资产
- 60%
- 备用容量（容差）
- 30%
读数
- 受危害冲击的资产
- 15%
- 仍在运行的资产
- 26%
- 初始损害的放大
- 5.0 times
- 结算步数
- 4
数字、方法与来源
| 步骤 | 运行中的数据中心（%） | 运行中的网络（%） | 电力运行（%） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 94 | 94 | 67 |
| 1 | 94 | 56 | 50 |
| 2 | 83 | 22 | 22 |
| 3 | 44 | 22 | 22 |
| 4 | 44 | 17 | 17 |
方法
- 相互依存网络 Buldyrev 等（2010），Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks，Nature 464
- 过载级联 Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66
- 介数负载 Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25
- 多层网络 Kivela and others (2014), Journal of Complex Networks 2
- 基础设施相互依赖 Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001), IEEE Control Systems 21(6)
- 不确定性扇形图（参数蒙特卡罗） Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- 单因素敏感性（龙卷风图） Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
数据
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:
- 主要道路 Natural Earth
- 铁路 Natural Earth
- 海港 Natural Earth
- 机场 Natural Earth
- 城市范围 Natural Earth
- 今晚的夜间灯光、停电（VIIRS 昼夜波段） NASA/NOAA VIIRS（Suomi NPP）· 登记 nasa.gibs.context-live-layers
- 自然事件（NASA EONET） NASA EONET · 登记 nasa.eonet.events
贯穿六大支柱，由 Nexus Consortium 牵头
衡量什么，以及衡量得如何。
每个指标都注明其单位、频率、背后的来源类型以及数值将附带的证据标签。此处不显示数值：数值由计划依据其自身权限提供。
| 指标 | 单位 | 节奏 | 来源类型 | 标签 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Industrial cyber incidents reported | count by sector | 年度 | Agency incident reporting | 已发布统计 |
| Production days lost to cyber incidents | 天 | per incident | Incident records | 观测 |
| ICS vulnerability advisories | 计数 | 每月 | National advisories | 已发布统计 |
| Sites with IT and OT segmentation | percent of sites | 每次评估 | Operator assessments | 已声明 |
| Sites with tested manual fallback | percent of sites | 每次评估 | 演练记录 | 已报告 |
| Remote access connections to OT | 计数 | 每次评估 | Network inventories | 观测 |
Model industrial cyber resilience as a system. Run the cascade.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile 与网络和数字韧性法律保持一致: the hazards it names, the 系统 and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
灾害
- 溃坝
- Sea-ice loss
- Coastal erosion （在下游引发）
- 河流洪水（在下游引发）
- Flash flood (set off downstream)
- 大规模流离失所（在下游引发）
- Biodiversity loss (set off downstream)
- 大范围停电（在下游引发）
- 供水短缺（在下游引发）
- Arctic winter sea-ice collapse (set off downstream)
- Polar vortex disruption (set off downstream)
系统与耦合
控制措施
NS-10政策和条款（机器可读的义务：定义、约束、评估和执行）NS-11验证与监测（证据、证明、零信任符合性观测）NS-9情境 UNI（部署、实例、计划实例）NRS-X6网络与数字安全风险NRS-H93危害族：身份、信任与密码学失效（NHS-1 cyber.identity）NRS-K31领域包概况：国家网络韧性（DOMAIN-031）NRS-H54危害类别：信号与平台中断（NHS-1 cyber.platform）NRS-H86危害类别：电信与数据中心故障（NHS-1 infra.digital）NRS-H94危害族：系统性网络事件（NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber）
观测
- NIST National Vulnerability Database APIs (listed for reference)
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue (listed for reference)
- EUR-Lex Cellar (EU legal acts and delegated acts) (listed for reference)
- Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
- Legal measures pillar of the Global Cybersecurity Index
示例地理范围
- North America: 243 hexagonal cells
- 今夜夜间灯光与停电（VIIRS 昼夜波段），NASA GIBS
- 穿透云层的地表水，30 m（OPERA DSWx-S1 雷达），NASA GIBS
- 过去半小时降雨率（IMERG），NASA GIBS
- Vegetation disturbance alerts, 30 m (OPERA DIST-ALERT), NASA GIBS
证据来自何处。
具名公共数据集与机构记录，各自注明许可类别。依协议获得的来源仅按其条款使用，绝不再次发布。
| 来源 | 它提供什么 | 许可类别 |
|---|---|---|
| CISA industrial control 系统 advisories | Vulnerabilities and mitigations in control products | Public domain, US government |
| ENISA reports on industrial and OT security | Threat and good practice analysis | Public, ENISA terms |
| IEC 62443 系列 | Industrial automation security requirements | Licensed standards, purchase required |
| Joint agency advisories on threats to operational technology | Actor behaviour and mitigations | Public, terms per agency |
| Published incident reviews from manufacturers | Effects and recovery after incidents | 公共记录，条款因发布方而异 |
How industrial cyber resilience is modelled, measured and tested.
模型、其假设、数据和不确定性，以科学家或工程师会核查的形式呈现。结构遵循已发表的方法。所取数值仅为示意，不是研究发现。
系统模型
The couplings between the systems in industrial cyber resilience: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
由谁决定，以及证据服务于什么。
Advanced Industry and Robotics prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| 谁来决定 | 问题 | 本页面服务的证据 |
|---|---|---|
| Plant operators | How to segment, monitor and keep manual fallback | Security reviews; dependency maps |
| Industrial and safety regulators | What OT security to require | Incident and advisory evidence |
| Suppliers and integrators | How to secure remote access and products | Remote access evidence |
该主题产生的产出
- OT security reviews against IEC 62443
- Production continuity and recovery exercise designs
- Remote access and dependency maps
- Evidence notes for industrial regulators
专家提出的问题。
- 01
How do attacks reach control systems?
Pathways through business networks, remote access, suppliers and removable media.
- 02
What are the consequences?
Production loss, equipment damage, safety system interference and environmental release.
- 03
Why is OT different from IT?
Long equipment lifetimes, real-time constraints and safety priorities that limit patching and monitoring.
- 04
How do plants recover?
Manual operation, segmentation, backups and restoration of trusted configurations.
What drives the risk.
Industrial control 系统 were designed for reliability, not security. Many run legacy software that cannot easily be updated, and some protocols lack authentication. Connectivity for efficiency and remote support has widened the attack surface.
Ransomware on business systems often forces plants to stop production even when control systems are untouched, because scheduling, logistics or safety documentation depend on IT. This coupling is a frequent cause of industrial disruption.
Targeted attacks on control and safety systems are rarer but serious, because they can cause physical damage. Defence in depth, network segmentation and independent safety systems limit consequences.
Supply chains extend risk. Compromised vendor software, integrators and shared platforms can affect many sites at once.
Resilience depends on people as much as technology. Plants that can run key processes manually, keep trusted offline backups and rehearse recovery with operators and engineers together restore operations faster than those relying on technical controls alone.
证据如何收集，以及止于何处。
| 方法或数据 | 显示内容 | 其局限 |
|---|---|---|
| Network architecture review | Segmentation and access paths | Documentation often lags reality |
| Consequence-driven analysis | Worst credible physical outcomes | Requires joint safety and security expertise |
| Incident reports | Patterns in industrial cyber events | Under-reporting and confidentiality |
| 演练 | Recovery capability | Exercises simplify real attacks |
Where this page’s references lead.
阅读本页时所对照的机构和文件。状态和版本会变化；每个链接都指向发布机构。
问题与解答。
Why do cyber attacks stop factories?
What is IEC 62443?
What is manual fallback?
Does the platform publish vulnerabilities?
Why not simply patch control systems?
Does the platform assess a company’s security?
从本页贡献证据。
报告 is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
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