GCRI · Nexus Ecosystem
Spatial intelligenceObservations, models and their uncertainty in one view
Two layers of shared computing serve Nexus Consortiums. The Nexus Network is a durable federation of retained national and regional sites. Nexus Core is the temporary backbone assembled each year from contributed, authorized computing, networks and teams, then stood down. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) coordinates both through GCRI Canada. Part of Nexus Ecosystem.
Network and Core · Country programme A · Month 4 · Example interface, not a record
dependency strength, 0 to 100
Placeholder strengths a National Model replaces with estimates.
| Reservoir storage | OBSERVED | National Desk |
| Hydropower output | MODELLED | Technical office |
| Grid stress | SCENARIO | Technical office |
| Hospital continuity | ESTIMATED | Health ministry |
GCRI · Country programme consoleCountry programme console, in outline: domain structure with placeholder names and illustrative values, not a record.
| Layer | What it holds |
|---|---|
| Persistent coordination | Authorized institutions and projects; resource catalogues and qualification; identity, rights and methods; retained evidence and publication records |
| Temporary technical environment | Qualified networking and high-performance computing; accelerators, cloud and edge capacity; secure data spaces and cyber ranges; simulation environments and technical support |
| Durable outputs | Trained teams and tested configurations; reproducible workloads and software; datasets where permitted and evaluation results; improvements to institutional practice |
The Network is not a permanent global supercomputer, and the Core is not installed, standing capacity.
Vegetation, land cover, plant growth and true-colour imagery across the world, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.
The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.
Layers 4
Habitat condition, for this page
Keyboard, with the map focused
Hold Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll to zoom
Latest available
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth
Loading the latest NASA imagery.
Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.
Habitat condition, framed on World. Layers as NASA publishes them, each with its own date.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date; indicators, not assessments of any place; claim ceiling INTEGRATED.
Layers and dates
A contributed resource moves through offered, qualified, reserved, allocated, accessible, measured and accepted. An offer is never counted as reserved, consumed or funded, and neither membership nor sponsorship secures an allocation.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Global and systemic risk: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification.
Hazards
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-0 Constitution and principlesNS-3 Risk record UNIs (grammar, legacy crosswalk, allocation authority)NS-9 Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)NS-10 Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)NS-11 Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)NS-14 Conformance and crosswalk to external standardsNRS-H120 Hazard family: Structural fragility of interconnected systems (NHS-1 sys.fragility)NRS-C6 Systemic and cascading riskNRS-H61 Hazard family: Cascading failure (NHS-1 sys.cascade)NRS-H62 Hazard family: Compound and multi-hazard events (NHS-1 sys.compound)NRS-H94 Hazard family: Systemic cyber events (NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)NRS-H60 Hazard family: Supply-chain and flow disruption (NHS-1 sys.supply-chain)Observation
Example geography
Publish measured capability with workload, data size, hardware, topology, precision, concurrency, software version and interval.
Keep peak, sustained, available and allocated capacity apart, and never sum hardware specifications into a performance claim.
Describe local low-latency computing and wide-area federation separately.
Track energy, cooling, water, transfers and logistics, keeping measurements apart from estimates.
The proposed one-day stand-down closes new submissions, checkpoints authorized jobs, freezes the evidence manifest, revokes temporary credentials, reconciles equipment and records open exceptions. It becomes a commitment only when the annual programme records it. Review, reconciliation and corrections continue afterwards. Contributors start at Technology and infrastructure providers. The Global Risk Forum (GRF) governs the annual programme: see its Annual operating cycle.
Nexus Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
Never send personal data, sensitive infrastructure detail or anything you have no right to share. A contribution is reviewed before use; sending it confers no authorship or editorial rights, and sponsorship never buys a finding.
The current service level is R0: information and enquiries. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.
Maps, data and figures on this site are shown for context and general information. They are not advice, forecasts or warnings; the limits of the information are set out in the Disclaimers and Data Notices.